“2. The certain ethical standards do not hold across all cultures.”

This is only the case if moral relativism is true. In the first place, you’re appealing to a highly exaggerated diversity, but more importantly, to assert that ethical standards do not HOLD across all cultures is to assume that thos estandards are not objective. If they are objective, then they do hold across all cultures and many members of those cultures are just mistaken. That you can be so clearly circular in your approach and then turn around and call other people confused is simply – well, confusing.

Carl:
While the ‘objectivist morality’ position requires the extreme position of positing a weird entity called ‘objective morals’, the relativist position requires no such unusual defence. What appears to you as “extreme lengths” is possibly only your inability to appreciate the position.

Matt wrote:
your defence of relativism consists in *asserting* that if a society had a cultural practise that allowed men to rape women purely for entertainment then it would be permissible for men in that society to rape women for fun. If the women objected they would be mistaken in doing so. In fact you suggest that if they do object this is merely a “whim” of theirs. (silly women they should get over their whims and do the right thing by spreading their legs, presumably) I put to you and my readers that this is an absurd conclusion. If the only way a relativist can defend his position is to make unarged for assertions like this then that suggests strongly that relativism is an indefensible position.

Carl:
Again, Matt has failed to come up with a logical argument against moral relativism. You can rant all you like about ‘absurdity’, but this is not a logical argument against relativism.

Societies invent moral positions, like they invent clothes trends. They are entirely opinions, nothing more. One may base one’s opinion on some reasons, but in the end the basis is whim. What is unusual is Matt’s position, because he has to posit some ‘objective moral’ in addition to the explanation of morality as deriving from opinion.

Our proscription of rape-for-entertainment is based on the choice of our society, nothing further. That is all that ethical relativism is saying. That is, there is no ‘objective ethic’ floating around in reality that makes our choice ‘objective’. Now, it may be the case that most societies, in order to remain stable, will protect most of their women from rape-for-entertainment. It is also the case that there are, in the majority of the countries of the world, a number of young women sold into prostitution, where their virginity is taken by rape-for-entertainment, and this is condoned and approved of by the powers that be. But whether a society approves or disapproves of such practices, it is no more than a choice. It is not magically ‘objective’, and Matt has no valid argument that must make it so (which is why he’s appealing to shock and horror examples, relying on emotive tactics rather than logic).

Matt wrote:
2. You content that I offer a “consequentialist argument”… My argument is not that relativism has consequences I don’t like. My argument is that that relativism entails false and or absurd conclusions and, yes, if a theory entails false or absurd conclusions that is a reason for rejecting it.

Carl:
You can rant all you want about “false” and “absurd” conclusions, but the fact remains: you have failed to identify even one “absurd” conclusion. Your emotive examples only show that, under moral relativism, what is “wrong” is that which is considered “wrong”. This is the very position of moral relativism.

Further, at best, you only point to that which is hypothetically absurd. You say, if some society existed
in which there were absurd consequences, then relative morality would be absurd. Well this is no different for objective morality: if some society existed in which there were objective absurd consequences, then objective morality would be absurd. Clearly such an argument has no force whatsoever.

It is, however, an emotive consequentialist argument.

Matt wrote:
3. you have argued that belief in ‘objective morality’ asks” us to posit the existence of some ‘weird entity’,” Now contrary to what you claim in your last post this conclusion does require a commitment to some metaphysical position. To say something is weird is to at the least to say it’s very different from everything else that exists. To draw this conclusion then you will need to (i) have some idea of what type of things actually exist and also a belief that (ii) morality if it exists cannot be the same type of thing. In the absence of either assumption there is no basis for saying that “objective morality” is “weird”. If objective morals are no different from anything else that exists then you cannot claim that the existence of morality moral norms would be weird, unless you claim that everything is weird. In which case if weirdness is a reason to reject morality you should reject the existence of everything.

Carl:
Now, this is just getting desperate. You might live in an imaginary world where an ancient Semitic god still ‘exists’, but some of us have a better grip on reality. Such beliefs, including some magical ‘objective reality’ have been ecnomically cut from our modern picture of reality — because they serve no explanatory purpose for it. Such weird entities can only be maintained by special pleading.

You have failed to come up with one argument against ethical relativism. But your own belief involves asserting something for which there is no trace or evidence. Pardon me if — in the absence of any valid argument to the contrary — I don’t give up my ethical relativism for a delusion.

Your response to my argument I think sums up well the implausibility of relativism and the extreme lengths defenders of relativism need to go to justify their position.

You assert that “it is not objectively wrong to rape and torture women for entertainment.” Just so those who read our exchange are clear here, your defence of relativism consists in *asserting* that if a society had a cultural practise that allowed men to rape women purely for entertainment then it would be permissible for men in that society to rape women for fun. If the women objected they would be mistaken in doing so. In fact you suggest that if they do object this is merely a “whim” of theirs. (silly women they should get over their whims and do the right thing by spreading their legs, presumably) I put to you and my readers that this is an absurd conclusion. If the only way a relativist can defend his position is to make unarged for assertions like this then that suggests strongly that relativism is an indefensible position.

2. You content that I offer a “consequentialist argument;” and this is mistaken because “moral objectivism isn’t factually correct just because you don’t like the consequences of the fact of moral relativism, is it?” This response is flawed. My argument is not that relativism has consequences I don’t like. My argument is that that relativism entails false and or absurd conclusions and, yes, if a theory entails false or absurd conclusions that is a reason for rejecting it. The logical rule here is known as modus tollens. I strongly suggest that instead of dismissing the authors of various ethics textbooks as “fools” you read some such books and learn what consquentialism is because arguing that a position entails an absurd claim is not consquentialism.

3. you have argued that belief in ‘objective morality’ asks” us to posit the existence of some ‘weird entity’,” Now contrary to what you claim in your last post this conclusion does require a commitment to some metaphysical position. To say something is weird is to at the least to say it’s very different from everything else that exists. To draw this conclusion then you will need to (i) have some idea of what type of things actually exist and also a belief that (ii) morality if it exists cannot be the same type of thing. In the absence of either assumption there is no basis for saying that “objective morality” is “weird”. If objective morals are no different from anything else that exists then you cannot claim that the existence of morality moral norms would be weird, unless you claim that everything is weird. In which case if weirdness is a reason to reject morality you should reject the existence of everything.

Carl
I never said you misrepresent any argument. And I am not interested in reading these fools. I am interested in the arguments.

I said that you do not “represent” the better form of the argument from diversity, which is not a priori at all. There is no circularity in the better argument from diversity.

However, the argument is inconclusive on the other grounds I gave, which is why I would not pursue it.

Matt wrote:
I am inclined to agree that *if* you accept both Naturalism and the claim that moral properties are non natural moral properties are weird.

Carl:
One does not even have to accept Naturalism. On evidential proof alone, there is no evidence of any ‘thing’ called morality in existence. The rule of evidence is not some ancient book, but modern standards of evidence, whether naturalistic or not. Moral objectivism requires special pleading for things which cannot be demonstrated as having plausible existene.

Morality has no existence. It is mere preference.

Matt wrote:
The weirdness objection applies only if you accept Naturalism, and I am inclined to say that if Naturalism does have this implication, if it implies that it’s not objectively wrong to rape and torture women for entertainment for example then so much the worse for naturalism.

Carl:
Yes – it is not objectively wrong to rape and torture women for entertainment. It is wrong for me, and my society, though.

But your judgment of this action as “wrong” is itself only a whim. So, it would be only subjective to criticise moral relativism on this basis. Moreover, it is a consequentialist argument; moral objectivism isn’t factually correct just because you don’t like the consequences of the fact of moral relativism, is it?

Bethyada wrote:
Or that people don’t know them, or don’t know them very well, or know them but don’t want to do them.

Carl:
My statement was citing a typical a posteriori argument. I was not making this argument. And I made the same criticism of the validity of such argument as you did.

Bethyada wrote:
And there is evidence for some fundamentals in many cultures.

Carl:
No there isn’t.

There are, however, ‘near universals’ in moral codes in different cultures. This is only what one would expect given the common cultural background of societies making rules in order to survive. That there are some commonalities provides no evidence for the ‘objective’ nature of the morals.

Bethyada wrote:
There is no ought. Everything is preference.

Carl:
Which means that morality has no ‘objective’ basis.

Carl:
You sure did. You missed the reason that Matt’s argument fails.

Christian News wrote:
I thought Matt just spent 1500 words showing that moral relativism is self refuting?! To be morally relative, doesn’t a person or culture have to accept the views of the moral objectivist as being just as valid as his own view.

Carl:
You are incorrect. Acceptance of moral relativism does not entail acceptance of anybody else’s (different) view as “valid”. “Validity” is a red herring when talking about morality, which does not rest on logic but on whim. Things are “wrong” because we do not desire them. This is so, whether or not one has a “valid” reason. Reasons can be adduced to defend one’s position, or to attempt to convince others, but moral “wrong” is a product of whim. I can say that stoning homosexuals is wrong, and I can appeal to reasons of compassion. But there is no rationale at the basis of any moral claim — that is, of the claim that it is “wrong”. Moral objectivists may well claim there is a rational basis, but this is an imaginary claim, pure projection onto ‘God’.

Christian News wrote:
Simple logic seems to ensure that:

1. If moral objectivism is true, then moral relativism is false.

Carl:
The two concepts are opposite. This is true, but trivial.

In fact, moral objectivity is insanity; a delusion.

Christian News wrote:
2. If moral relativism is true, then moral relativism is false.

Your statement is self-contradictory, complete nonsense. Nothing can be both factually the case and not factually the case.

You are obviously confused.

Matt’s third and final post in the series in up now, did that suffice or did you have in mind development of a different angle?

Are you aware of a new book called “MORAL RELATIVISM” by Steven Lukes?

Thanks for your comments.

As regards to the argument I misrepresent. I got the argument from the literature, specifically the discussions of relativism by Rachels, Pojman, Beckwith and Howard-Sydner and others, perhaps you can take it up with them.

Turning to your revised argument:
First, even if what you say is correct I criticised 2 in my post. It’s not clear that when you take into consideration disagreement over factual and non moral questions that ethical standards are radically different across cultures. To demonstrate that they one would need to show that when two cultures agree on the facts and don’t make any mistake reasoning from these facts they still come to radically different conclusions about morality. Second, it’s not clear to me that mere objectivity of moral norms would entail that all cultures agree upon them. So as you suggest in the absence of a reason for this 1 holds no force.

As to your other arguments, you claim that “no good argument against moral relativism” I dispute this point, in my next post I offer some arguments against relativism moreover the literature is full of such arguments.

Second you state objectivism asks “us to posit the existence of some ‘weird entity’ actually I am well aware of this argument, the reason I did not mention it is it’s irrelevant from my purposes. Those who object to “objective morality” because such entites are “weird” (such as J L Mackie) usually do so for two reasons. First they believe that naturalism: the postion that “the only things that exist are those things postulated by our best scientific theories” (Craig 2008) is true. Second they believe that moral properties such as rightness and wrongness if they existed would be “nonnatural in the sense that they cannot be stated entirely in the language of physics, chemistry, biology, and human or animal psychology.” (Adams 1987)

I am inclined to agree that *if* you accept both Naturalism and the claim that moral properties are non natural moral properties are weird. The problem is I am not a Naturalist. I am a theist and hence even if one grants that moral properties are non-natural in the above sense (which I do) that provides me with no reason for thinking such entities are weird. The weirdness objection applies only if you accept Naturalism, and I am inclined to say that if Naturalism does have this implication, if it implies that it’s not objectively wrong to rape and torture women for entertainment for example then so much the worse for naturalism.