“A DCT theorist will no doubt disagree. They might say (assuming they go the route you recommend) that there’s no PW in which God commands ‘Torture this infant!’. The question then becomes how to explain why there’s no possible world in which God commands someone to torture the infant.”

Yes, but I did explain why I think there is no PW in which God commands the sort of actions Tooley mentions. That is because God is essentially perfectly good, and it’s incoherent to maintain that a good person knowingly commands acts of the sort Tooley mentions.

“Once you appreciate that (Exp1) is out of bounds, you’ll see that there’s no credible explanation available to the DCT that explains why there’s no possible world in which God commands someone to torture an infant. So, the DCT cannot credibly deny that there’s a PW in which God commands this just like the utilitarian cannot credibly claim that there’s no PW in which torture doesn’t max utility.”

This does not seem to me to follow; I agree that (Expl) is out of bounds. But all this shows is that one particular explanation of why there is no PW where God commands torturing an infant is incompatible with DCT. But that does not entail there is no credible explanation for this. Another explanation might be that God has certain character traits such as being loving or abhorring cruelty, or being compassionate, or a being who seeks the flourishing of his creatures and that no person with these traits would knowingly command the torture of an infant. DCT theorists such as Weirenga and Quinn, Carson, Adams have suggested something like this. So it appears both that (Expl) is not the only possible explanation and nor is it the explanation DC theorists typically give, hence its failure is, I think, of little consequence.
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Suppose you say to the utilitarian, “If torturing this infant maximized utility, it would be right” and the utilitarian said that’s true, but that’s because the conditional has a necessarily false antecedent. The response would fail because we know that there’s a PW where torturing this infant maximizes utility.

Suppose you say to the DCT, “If torturing this infant maximized utility, it would be right” and the DCT theorist says that this is true but only because the conditional has a necessarily false antecedent. I say that this response is as silly as the response the utilitarian offers.

A DCT theorist will no doubt disagree. They might say (assuming they go the route you recommend) that there’s no PW in which God commands ‘Torture this infant!’. The question then becomes how to explain why there’s no possible world in which God commands someone to torture the infant.

Here’s an explanation:
(Exp1) There’s no PW in which God commands you to torture the infant because in every PW it is wrong to torture the infant, God would know that, and no morally perfect being would command you to do something wrong.

That explanation isn’t available to the DCT because it is using moral facts and knowledge of them to explain why God wouldn’t issue certain commands. (We’re on the “God commands it because it’s wrong” horn.)

Once you appreciate that (Exp1) is out of bounds, you’ll see that there’s no credible explanation available to the DCT that explains why there’s no possible world in which God commands someone to torture an infant. So, the DCT cannot credibly deny that there’s a PW in which God commands this just like the utilitarian cannot credibly claim that there’s no PW in which torture doesn’t max utility. There’s nothing available to these theories to constrain metaphysical possibility in that way. There’s just too many possible worlds.

Sorry but I don’t see how the divine command theorist is commited to claiming that there is a possible world where God commands rape. The Euthyphro dilemma affirms that either an action is wrong because God commands it, or God commands it because it’s wrong. I don’t see how either option entails that a perfectly good being can command rape.

“In your last comment you didn’t want to address this issue, but I think critics of DCT typically will assume that proponents of DCT are cheating if they help themselves to moral facts to explain divine commands. I worry that this would be the only way of avoiding (TC) and I worry that the issue you don’t want to address is something that critics of DCT think is part of the objection that you are addressing here.”

Ok it’s unclear what exactly the problem is here, if I read you correctly you seem to be suggesting that the only way a person can avoid accepting (TC), is if they hold that there exist deontological properties independent of Gods commands which explain his commands. I agree that would be a problem if it were true. I fail to see however why it’s true at all. I don’t see why God couldn’t posses certain character traits essentially in all possible worlds, despite not having a duty to cultivate such traits in these worlds.
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Okay, I think it’s a bit clearer what you had in mind with your original post. So, I take it that Tooley and his crew will say that you are committed to the following troubling consequence:

(TC) There’s a possible world in which rape is obligatory; namely, the one in which God commands it.

Now, you’re response will be that this _isn’t_ a possible world. The critics response: that’s right. It’s not possible, but you’re committed to its possibility. That’s the other half of the Euthyphro dilemma. You said that the objection you were dealing with this post doesn’t really address this. Fair enough, but I think that to be fair to Tooley and co. they were assuming that you probably wouldn’t want to be committed to (TC).

In your last comment you didn’t want to address this issue, but I think critics of DCT typically will assume that proponents of DCT are cheating if they help themselves to moral facts to explain divine commands. I worry that this would be the only way of avoiding (TC) and I worry that the issue you don’t want to address is something that critics of DCT think is part of the objection that you are addressing here.

Sure some have raised this objection, that’s however not the objection Tooley raised or the objection I was addressing in the post. Obviously I can’t discuss every objection to DCT in a single post

Very briefly however, I am not convinced by this objection, for several reasons. Here I can only be brief. A DCT entails that God cannot prohibit an action because it is wrong. It doesn’t follow from this that he cannot prohibit the action for reasons other than its being wrong. I also think this objection often equivocates on the word “reason” and frequently relies on the questionable presupposition that the “reasons for” relationship is transitive.
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It seems to me quite possible for an atheist to hold that there are possible worlds in which God exists and issues commands, all the atheist has to maintain is that God does not exist in the actual world.

But that’s a side issue, because what I suggest Brink holds is that if DCT is true then there is a possible world where God commands rape, he states

“DCT [divine command theory] implies that it is possible for any kind of action, such as rape, to not be wrong. But it seems intuitively impossible for rape not to be wrong. So, DCT is at odds with our commonsense intuitions about rape.”

This seems on the face of it to suggest that if DCT is true then its possible, that is there is a possible world, where God commands rape. Brink goes on to state
”We might also notice a counter intuitive implication of voluntarism. Voluntarism implies that all moral truths are contingent on what God happens to approve. … Thus, for example, had God had not condemned genocide and rape, these things would not have been wrong, or, if God were to approve these things they would become morally acceptable. But these are awkward commitments, inasmuch as this sort of conduct seems necessarily wrong”

Here Brink suggests that DCT contradicts the idea that actions like rape and genocide are necessarily wrong. That seems to imply that Brink thinks DCT entails that there are possible worlds where God commands these things. If God prohibits rape in all possible worlds then it then DCT would not contradict the claim that rape is necessarily wrong
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Clayton wrote “What’s odd is that you seem to agree that the conditional statement he thinks is a consequence of DCT is false. Isn’t that precisely the objection? I can see ‘biting the bullet’ and saying that the conditional is a genuine consequence but it’s true. I can see finessing the view and saying that the DCT doesn’t imply that the conditional is true, but you seem to go for neither option”.

Perhaps there is a misunderstanding here I was rejecting the claim that the conditional is false. Instead I argued that it has a necessarily false antecedent and hence is either true or of little consequence.

“The argument is this.
(P1) If DCT were true, ‘If God commanded rape, rape would be obligatory’ would be true.
(P2) ‘If God commanded rape, rape would be obligatory’ is false.
(C) DCT is false.

It’s valid and so far as I can tell, you accept both premises but doubt the conclusion.”

Like I said I don’t accept (P2), as it has a necessarily false antecedent.

“I don’t think this version of the argument succumbs to the problem you think arises for Tooley’s argument and the passage suggests that this is a pretty fair rendering of what Tooley had in mind.”

I agree that this is what Tooley had in mind, but I think this argument does succumb to the problem in my post (P2) has a necessarily false antecedent.

This objection seems to me to be a bit like a person who objects to the claim that a triangles has three sides by pointing out that this claim entails that if a triangle were a square it would follow that a square has three sides, seeing this is false (squares do not have three sides) a triangle does not have three sides.

That’s Matt’s [1]. Here’s what he says:
“The problem with this inference is that [1] is false. The conditional uses the term “if”, if God had … but this does not by itself imply that there is a logically possible world where such an action is obligatory. To get this conclusion one needs the additional premise that there exists a possible world where God issues such a command. Brink does not offer any reason for thinking this is the case; he seems simply to take it for granted.”

Side issue. I don’t think Bring would think there is a possible world where God exists and issues any commands as I suspect that Brink might be an atheist and think there are no possible worlds in which God exists. I don’t see why the argument against DCT would have to assume that there’s any possible world in which God exists.

Zachary, you wrote:
“@Clayton – I don’t think Matt accepts P2. He says that according to standard treatments of modal logic, the conditional given is true, while Armstrong claims it is “absurd”, so presumably false. Tooley is also taken to believe it is false. However, Matt claims it is relevant that the antecedent part is, it seems, logically impossible if God is, as defined by Tooley, morally perfect”

Just to be clear, my (P2) was, “(P2) ‘If God commanded rape, rape would be obligatory’ is false.” In the passage above, Matt says [1] is false. How could [1] be false and (P2) be false?

I think we can easily reformulate the argument to avoid these worries:

Suppose (1) God exists and (2) suppose the DCT theory is true. Given these suppositions, someone could say:
(3) It is possible that: (God commands rape & rape permissible).
But:
(4) It is not possible that: (God commands rape & rape permissible).
(C) ~(God exists & DCT).

I think Matt accepts (4) along with the critics of DCT, so the disagreement between them has to concern the claim that (3) is a commitment of those who defend DCT and believe God exists. Now, there’s an interesting question as to whether someone who accepts DCT is committed to (3) and _that_ might be what Matt denies.

There’s a problem with denying that (3) is a consequence of (1) and (2), however, and that’s that there seems to be little available to the proponent of DCT to explain how (3) is false. On its face, it seems that you’d want to say that (3) is false because rape is wrong and God wouldn’t command you to perform an impermissible course of action, but it seems you would be using moral facts to explain divine commands and that seems to go against the theory.

Thank you, I found the post helpful