Comments on: John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part II http://www.mandm.org.nz/2009/05/john-w-loftus-on-the-christian-illusion-of-moral-superiority-part-ii.html?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=john-w-loftus-on-the-christian-illusion-of-moral-superiority-part-ii Philosophy of Religion, Ethics, Theology and Jurisprudence Thu, 09 Feb 2012 09:03:23 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: Paul Baird http://www.mandm.org.nz/2009/05/john-w-loftus-on-the-christian-illusion-of-moral-superiority-part-ii.html#comment-152139 Paul Baird Wed, 13 Apr 2011 06:56:24 +0000 http://mandm.churchweb.co.nz/2009/05/john-w-loftus-on-the-christian-illusion-of-moral-superiority-part-ii/#comment-152139 Thanks Matt, I'm still trying to get my head around DCT without having to read 10 tomes on the subject. Any chance you could post the Powerpoint from your talk on the subject (the viewing angle of the video is not good) ? Thanks Matt, I’m still trying to get my head around DCT without having to read 10 tomes on the subject.

Any chance you could post the Powerpoint from your talk on the subject (the viewing angle of the video is not good) ?

]]> By: Matt http://www.mandm.org.nz/2009/05/john-w-loftus-on-the-christian-illusion-of-moral-superiority-part-ii.html#comment-152121 Matt Tue, 12 Apr 2011 11:40:40 +0000 http://mandm.churchweb.co.nz/2009/05/john-w-loftus-on-the-christian-illusion-of-moral-superiority-part-ii/#comment-152121 Paul, I wouldn't offer a definition of what the word "good means" but in the context of a DCT when people say God is perfectly good, they mean God has certain character traits, such as being loving, being just, hating certain types of actions which are paradigmatic examples of wrong actions, and so on. These are descriptive characteristics. As to a "generic God" vs the Christian God, I am not sure these are necessarily a different God. But in the case of a DCT what is needed is a person ( capable of issuing commands) who is omniscient and is good in the above sense. Arguments from the moral order for a DCT, also suggest this being must providentially govern the world so that virtue and happiness are ultimately united. Paul, I wouldn’t offer a definition of what the word “good means” but in the context of a DCT when people say God is perfectly good, they mean God has certain character traits, such as being loving, being just, hating certain types of actions which are paradigmatic examples of wrong actions, and so on. These are descriptive characteristics.

As to a “generic God” vs the Christian God, I am not sure these are necessarily a different God. But in the case of a DCT what is needed is a person ( capable of issuing commands) who is omniscient and is good in the above sense. Arguments from the moral order for a DCT, also suggest this being must providentially govern the world so that virtue and happiness are ultimately united.

]]> By: Paul Baird http://www.mandm.org.nz/2009/05/john-w-loftus-on-the-christian-illusion-of-moral-superiority-part-ii.html#comment-152114 Paul Baird Tue, 12 Apr 2011 06:27:47 +0000 http://mandm.churchweb.co.nz/2009/05/john-w-loftus-on-the-christian-illusion-of-moral-superiority-part-ii/#comment-152114 Well I learned something new. If I could ask a question though "Divine command theorists contend that an action is right, if and only if, God commands it. God here is used to refer to a personal being that is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good." How is 'perfectly good' defined ? Also this seems to refer to a Generic version of a God rather than simply the specific Christian God or am I missing something ? Well I learned something new.

If I could ask a question though

“Divine command theorists contend that an action is right, if and only if, God commands it. God here is used to refer to a personal being that is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good.”

How is ‘perfectly good’ defined ?

Also this seems to refer to a Generic version of a God rather than simply the specific Christian God or am I missing something ?

]]> By: Matt http://www.mandm.org.nz/2009/05/john-w-loftus-on-the-christian-illusion-of-moral-superiority-part-ii.html#comment-1915 Matt Sat, 09 May 2009 11:02:00 +0000 http://mandm.churchweb.co.nz/2009/05/john-w-loftus-on-the-christian-illusion-of-moral-superiority-part-ii/#comment-1915 Hi Bnonn, <br />I think its not enough for the naturalist to contend that its <i>possible</i> for moral properties to exist if naturalism is true. The real questions faced are two fold (a) whether on naturalism the claim that such properties exist is more likely or plausible than the claim that they do not. And (b) whether a given naturalistic account is explains our moral experience as well as or better than a theistic account does. <br /><br />Now re (b) as you note that a person who took the line you suggest <i>leaves the atheist open to admitting that a lot of immoral behaviour must be permissible under his theory</i> a divine command theory can explain the nature and existence of moral properties without “admitting a lot of immoral behaviour must be permissible” this would mean that the divine command theory provides a better explanation of our pre-theoretical understandings of morality than this particular naturalistic theory does. <br /><br />This exasperated by the fact that the existence of God also provides an explanation for various other phenomena such as the origin of the universe, its continued existence, apparent fine tuning etc. So theistic accounts seem to have more explain the phenomena better than the naturalistic one you suggest does, theist accounts also bring in an increase in explanatory power that the purported naturalist one does not. <br /><br />Re (a) I am inclined to think the position you mention faces some problems here. Take (i) the hypothesis that moral properties do not exist, but because belief in that certain practises are wrong increases the chances of adaptive behaviour humans have evolved with certain false moral beliefs. And compare this with (ii) the hypothesis that moral properties do exist (they facts about counterfactuals of the sort you mention), because belief in that certain practises are wrong increases the chances of adaptive behaviour humans have evolved with certain moral beliefs, and these beliefs happen to coincide with those principles a perfectly informed loving being could endorse under counter factual situations. <br /> <br />Its not at all clear to me that (ii) is more probable on the conjunction of Naturalism and evolutionary theory than (i) is. (i) is clearly more economical and it seems quite probable given naturalism and evolutionary theory.Natural selection selects for adaptive behavour not true belief. (ii) on the other hand is less economical, moreover it seems less probable that of the many basic evaluative attitudes we could have evolved that would be conducive to survival we happened to evolve those which coincided with counter factual about what a perfectly loving being could endorse if it existed.<br /><br /><br />Recent blog post: <a HREF="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/mandmblog/~3/mBgzZ8m8zaU/christian-blog-ranking-report-for-april.html" REL="nofollow">Christian Blog Ranking Report for April 09 – HalfDone</a> Hi Bnonn,
I think its not enough for the naturalist to contend that its possible for moral properties to exist if naturalism is true. The real questions faced are two fold (a) whether on naturalism the claim that such properties exist is more likely or plausible than the claim that they do not. And (b) whether a given naturalistic account is explains our moral experience as well as or better than a theistic account does.

Now re (b) as you note that a person who took the line you suggest leaves the atheist open to admitting that a lot of immoral behaviour must be permissible under his theory a divine command theory can explain the nature and existence of moral properties without “admitting a lot of immoral behaviour must be permissible” this would mean that the divine command theory provides a better explanation of our pre-theoretical understandings of morality than this particular naturalistic theory does.

This exasperated by the fact that the existence of God also provides an explanation for various other phenomena such as the origin of the universe, its continued existence, apparent fine tuning etc. So theistic accounts seem to have more explain the phenomena better than the naturalistic one you suggest does, theist accounts also bring in an increase in explanatory power that the purported naturalist one does not.

Re (a) I am inclined to think the position you mention faces some problems here. Take (i) the hypothesis that moral properties do not exist, but because belief in that certain practises are wrong increases the chances of adaptive behaviour humans have evolved with certain false moral beliefs. And compare this with (ii) the hypothesis that moral properties do exist (they facts about counterfactuals of the sort you mention), because belief in that certain practises are wrong increases the chances of adaptive behaviour humans have evolved with certain moral beliefs, and these beliefs happen to coincide with those principles a perfectly informed loving being could endorse under counter factual situations.

Its not at all clear to me that (ii) is more probable on the conjunction of Naturalism and evolutionary theory than (i) is. (i) is clearly more economical and it seems quite probable given naturalism and evolutionary theory.Natural selection selects for adaptive behavour not true belief. (ii) on the other hand is less economical, moreover it seems less probable that of the many basic evaluative attitudes we could have evolved that would be conducive to survival we happened to evolve those which coincided with counter factual about what a perfectly loving being could endorse if it existed.

Recent blog post: Christian Blog Ranking Report for April 09 – HalfDone

]]> By: D Bnonn Tennant http://www.mandm.org.nz/2009/05/john-w-loftus-on-the-christian-illusion-of-moral-superiority-part-ii.html#comment-1906 D Bnonn Tennant Fri, 08 May 2009 02:07:00 +0000 http://mandm.churchweb.co.nz/2009/05/john-w-loftus-on-the-christian-illusion-of-moral-superiority-part-ii/#comment-1906 Hey Matt. You said that,<br /><br />"if we ask what a perfectly good and loving being _would_ endorse, no correct answer can be ascertained. As such, one cannot ground moral obligations in the notion of lovingness or goodness alone. One needs to ground these things in the commands of an actually existing, loving and omniscient being."<br /><br />Ignoring other problems with naturalistic moral theories for now, could an atheist not take the route of arguing from what a perfectly good and loving being _could_ do? Ie, rather than attempt to appeal to (allegedly) counterfactual actions or decrees, rather appeal to counterfactual possible actions or decrees? It seems to me like this is a high price to pay, since it leaves the atheist open to admitting that a lot of immoral behavior must be permissible under his theory—but then atheists are often willing to make concessions like that anyway.<br /><br />Regards,<br />Bnonn<br /><br />Recent blog post: <a HREF="http://bnonn.thinkingmatters.org.nz/on-the-atonement-part-6-universal-atonement-fails-to-actually-accomplish-redemption-for-anyone/" REL="nofollow">On the atonement, part 6: universal atonement fails to actually accomplish redemption for anyone</a> Hey Matt. You said that,

“if we ask what a perfectly good and loving being _would_ endorse, no correct answer can be ascertained. As such, one cannot ground moral obligations in the notion of lovingness or goodness alone. One needs to ground these things in the commands of an actually existing, loving and omniscient being.”

Ignoring other problems with naturalistic moral theories for now, could an atheist not take the route of arguing from what a perfectly good and loving being _could_ do? Ie, rather than attempt to appeal to (allegedly) counterfactual actions or decrees, rather appeal to counterfactual possible actions or decrees? It seems to me like this is a high price to pay, since it leaves the atheist open to admitting that a lot of immoral behavior must be permissible under his theory—but then atheists are often willing to make concessions like that anyway.

Regards,
Bnonn

Recent blog post: On the atonement, part 6: universal atonement fails to actually accomplish redemption for anyone

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