Ok here you are simply asserting the position I was contesting that objective morality is based on faith.

Moreover, you state that our belief in other minds is based on “experience”. This depends on what you mean, if you mean “observation” such as seeing hearing touching then this claim is false we do not observe other peoples mental states such as thoughts and feelings.

If you are using experience in a broader sense, such as that it feels obvious or evident to us that other people have minds, then I agree that we have experience to back this belief up. The problem is we also have experience in this sense for the existence of objective moral principles. It seems obvious to most people for example that “torturing children for fun” is wrong and would be so even if the torturer and his culture agreed with it.

Matt, could you point out your arguments providing evidence against subjective morality?
Sure in http://www.mandm.org.nz/2008/12/cultural-confusion-and-ethical-relativism-iii.html I offer several arguments against subjectivism. I note for example that it entails that cultural mores are never unjust ( which seems fairly clearly false) . It suggests that moral reformers are always wrong and it suggests moral progress does not occur. The full arguments are there.

and, as you’ve said, “one can make sense of morality in terms of it being an illusion that enhances survival.”

Yes, I noted on Open Parachute that if one relies on empirical scientific reasoning alone and bracket any other sources of knowledge nihilism is the best view. But that hardly supports your position, for two reasons, first you are defending subjectivism not nihilism ( and I do not think subjectivism would be a plausible view under these parameters) second, I do not think one should rely on empirical scientific reasoning alone when addressing these questions. Conclusions like this show why.

At this point we’re still left with subjective morality fitting observation, with no observed evidence (outside religious texts) supporting objective morality.

Well no, first I think that if one relies on empirical observation alone nihilism probably better fits the evidence. But second I argued in previous comments that there are plenty of things one is rational in believing despite not having “observed evidence” for them and I noted also the contention that one needs to have “observed evidence” to believe something is self refuting. So these lines of arguments have already been dealt with above.
.-= My last blog-post ..Snowed =-.

Beg the question much? You’re just assuming that the variety of moral beliefs implies that morality is subjective. You have yet to produce an argument that the evidence supports your contention.
.-= My last blog-post ..Hume on Induction and Miracles: Having a bob each way? =-.

Great to see we’re making progress – not.

No, because while things like other people having minds have at least our personal experiences to support them, objective morality relies on faith and, as you’ve said, “one can make sense of morality in terms of it being an illusion that enhances survival.”

Matt, could you point out your arguments providing evidence against subjective morality?

At this point we’re still left with subjective morality fitting observation, with no observed evidence (outside religious texts) supporting objective morality.

“The same I think applies to our natural disposition to make moral judgments we have to assume that they reliability track moral principles that exist independently of us.”

But the moral principles that are accepted today are unique to today, they’re very different from those that have been accepted throughout history, they’re different even to those that were accepted 50 years ago! Excepting, of course, those that are logically attributable to instinct as such instincts enhance gene survival.
I’ve never claimed that belief in objective morality was “irrational”. Certainly not in colloquial terms.

Also I used the example of Pixies, not fairies, everyone knows that belief in fairies is irrational.
But since we’re on the subject of mythical friends, do you believe in Angels?

Perhaps we can return then to Glenn’s question? Can you provide an actual example where any leading defender of a divine command theory states or asserts that one should simply take on faith without question the claims made by a religious leader?

That seems simply a caricature of the divine command theory.

The Divine Command theory states that wrongness consists in what is contrary to Gods commands. It does not state that wrongness consists in whatever a human beings says is in accord with Gods commands, nor does it contend that any human who makes such claims should be uncritically believed.

The priest/minister who tells a young member of his or her congregation that god supports their sexual liaison, that it is spiritual and divine, is – to my mind- a bigger bastard than someone who uses non-religious persuasion. At least that can be considered rationally.

I agree such people are bastards, but here your objection seems to be based on the assumption that religious discussions are irrational and secular ones are not.

I don’t take that as given absent; some actual argument for this conclusion your objection is simply the assertion that religious discussions are irrational.
.-= My last blog-post ..Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith =-.

Great, so your objection that belief in objective morality is on par with belief in fairies because you cannot empirically improve the existence of objective moral principles is mistaken.

The mere fact that we cannot empirically prove something by itself does not show that belief in that thing is an irrational belief on par with fairies pixies, spaghetti monsters, ESP etc.

That’s what humans do Matt, if our senses are assumed to be unreliable, and we cannot detect that unreliability, everything becomes meaningless, everything, as the logical conclusion is that we cannot have confidence in any observations we make of the world around us.

Agreed, you have to assume that the belief dispositions we naturally have are reliable and what we perceive actually exists independently of us (i.e objectively) and you can’t prove they are empirically.

The same I think applies to our natural disposition to make moral judgments we have to assume that they reliability track moral principles that exist independently of us.

Given that that is your reasoning, I think you’ve reached the point where I’m left doubting that rational discussion can be held with you. You seem to be trying to cast doubt on the foundations of all of philosophy and science, simply so that you can use the same reasoning to cast doubt on subjective morality.

I think you misunderstand me here, I am not arguing that our senses are unreliable. I think they are. What I am pointing out is that “if” you insist on claiming everything needs to be empirically proven before you believe it you end up in a crazy position. That’s why I would not accept the claim that every true belief needs to be empirically prove before we can accept it.

If you accept that not everything needs to be empirically proven, then you can’t automatically assert that belief in objective morality is irrational because it cannot be empirically proven.

“are implicitly presupposing that your senses are reliable to prove that they are.”

That’s what humans do Matt, if our senses are assumed to be unreliable, and we cannot detect that unreliability, everything becomes meaningless, everything, as the logical conclusion is that we cannot have confidence in any observations we make of the world around us.
Given that that is your reasoning, I think you’ve reached the point where I’m left doubting that rational discussion can be held with you. You seem to be trying to cast doubt on the foundations of all of philosophy and science, simply so that you can use the same reasoning to cast doubt on subjective morality.

“This misses the point of Max’s analogy” actually the main point Max was trying to make was that to him my reasoning was equivalent to that of a fanatical skeptic – or a fanatical solipsist. But as fanaticism is a mind-set that allows no doubt, it seems to me that you and Max are more likely the fanatics.

“the history of Philosophy from Hume onwards has shown its extremely difficult near impossible to argue to the existence of other minds from behaviour alone.”

To argue to the existence is easy, (I have a mind, in a brain in a body, I exhibit certain behaviour because of it, other people have the same set up as can be measured, and similar behaviour, as can be measured, the logical conclusion is they also have minds) to prove is not. Again, I’m not claiming there’s certainty, are you?

Let me make two things,

1. this response only addresses my first objection it does not address the second point I made about your position being self refuting.

2. I think this response is circular, for three reasons. First you state we should state which theory is more likely, to do this we need to assess the evidence for and against them, what do you mean by evidence here? presumably empirical evidence, the problem is appeals to empirical evidence involve assuming your sensory perception is reliable in the first place.

Second, to weigh up evidence takes time one can’t do it all at once, but then you’ll have to presuppose the existence of a past to prove it.

Third and more importantly you appeal to Ockham’s razor: here’s my question on what basis is the principle of Ockham’s razor accepted? Obviously one does not just see here or touch or taste the truth of this principle. It seems you will either (a) believe it intuitively or (b) believe it on the basis of empirical evidence: something its track record in being reliable in the past. If you adopt (a) you have to admit there are things we can know intuitively independently of sensory perception. If you adopt (b) then the argument is again circular: you have to assume there was a past track record and you have to rely on what you and others have observed in the past regarding the use of Ockham’s razor and hence are implicitly presupposing that your senses are reliable to prove that they are.

The point is that there are numerous rational beliefs which we accept which cannot be empirically proven. The standard skeptical theories which castigate belief in God or morality as “fairies in the garden” because they can’t be empirically proven are problematic theories. Max made the same point.

This misses the point of Max’s analogy, his point was that we know that other people have minds that is that other people have thoughts and feelings, yet we cannot perceive this directly, we can’t think others thoughts or feel their pain etc all we observe is their behavior, and and the history of Philosophy from Hume onwards has shown its extremely difficult near impossible to argue to the existence of other minds from behavior alone. This is another example of us rationally believing in something which cannot be empirically proven.
.-= ‘s last blog-post ..Top 10 NZ Christian Blogs – August 09 =-.

“Objective morality” is not really a theory – more a name for a god, I guess. No one can say where this object is – or how they use this “theory’ to determine moral positions.

When it comes down to it and people start talking about intuitions, bibles, etc., then they are actually talking about objectively-based moral decisions. We can then put the bases used for this morality under the microscope.

I assert that our moral intuitions and feelings and the fact that we belong to a social, sentient and intelligent species are objective facts which form a basis for our morality. Bibles and theological traditions don’t – although they may codify our moral which are secular in origin. Secular whether we believe so or not.
.-= ‘s last blog-post ..Humanity’s most important image =-.

Suppose its true that belief in a moral code enhances survival and hence reproductive fitness. Suppose its also true that human moral awareness evolved by darwinian evolution unguided by God. Then it seems to follow that people believe in moral principles because doing so enhances survival, not primarily because they are true.

In fact if the moral beliefs were all false and fact there were no objective moral properties, one on this account would still believe in them because belief in such properties enhances survival.

An appeal to Ockhams razor then would suggest that the existence of morality is superfluous. One can account for humans morality without postulating the existence of objective moral properties, one can make sense of morality in terms of it being an illusion that enhances survival.

And I’m sure to can recognise your own words as well as the next man.