Here you seem to suggest that if a person expresses a conclusion and then proceeds to argue for it that person has assumed it from the outset. This is clearly false. In any event you yourself did precisely what you accuse me of, in your first line you wrote: “…there is nothing in your reply which alters my conclusion that you had simply assumed that when a relativist spoke of a “duty” that she must be meaning it in an objective sense…” You began your comment by stating your conclusion and then you went on to offer arguments for it. Can I take it then that I can simply dismiss your comments as an assumption and ignore the arguments for them?

“In your reply here, you further demonstrate your blindness to the (quite obvious) possibility that a moral relativist would use a moral term (such as “duty”) in a relative sense.”

No, as argued in the talk and in the post above, it cannot be used in this sense. To have a premise for ethical relativism, that assumed ethical relativism, would be circular.

“To make this clear, we are only dealing with a claim, that is, a premise to which the relativist holds. But your demand for the relativist to provide “a non-question begging argument for his”

No, all I said is that the premise cannot assume the conclusion or the argument is rendered circular. In other words, in an argument for relativism, the relativist cannot appeal to moral duties that are taken as relative to prove that moral duties are relative. This is really quite basic.

“But your demand for the relativist to provide “a non-question begging argument for his position” shows that you mistake the function of a claim/premise. Such a demand fundamentally misunderstands the structure of a logical argument. You almost see this. For you rightly note that the relativist’s argument must “appeal to premises that non-relativists are likely to accept”. If you realized the meaning of your own words, you would realize, too, that “duty” cannot be confined to an “objective” sense, as you too hastily presumed. Rather, the claim of the moral relativist concerning a “duty” must be acceptable within the worldviews of both moral relativism and moral objectivism. That is, the “duty” at this stage can either be relative or objective. As you say, in a valid argument, “the premises of his argument cannot be interpreted [only] in a relativist fashion” (instead, this relativism must be a possibility, together with objectivism, in the premise).”

Sorry but it is you who does not understand the structure of a logical argument. To avoid being circular an argument for relativism needs only to avoid assuming relativism. He or she does not have to avoid assuming objectivism. In fact, if a relativist were to assume objectivism for the sake of argument and then show from objectivist premises that relativism was true that would be a valid argument, and a dialectically effective one. If she or he assumes relativist premises and argues from them to a relativist position her or his argument is not valid.

“But if you are presenting a relativist’s claim concerning a “duty”, then to really be a relativist’s claim, that duty must be able to be interpreted as relative. It is no good to then come along, having set up your alleged relativist’s argument, that he himself cannot possibly have intended “duty” in a relativist sense. For you then break the logical rule that you yourself identified, that the relativist’s argument must “appeal to premises that non-relativists are likely to accept”

Again you seem to misunderstand the situation here. If I was arguing for objectivism, it would indeed be circular to assume objectivism in my premises and hence I would have to appeal to premises a relativist would accept. I was not, however, doing this. I was showing why an argument proposed by relativists to persuade non-relativists to adopt their position is flawed. In that context there is no requirement to appeal only to premises a relativist accepts, all I need to show is that the relativist has failed to provide a valid argument from premises that her or his non-relativist audience is required to accept.

“Sure, if you can provide an argument why moral “duty” must always be objective, you are free to do so. But when you are purporting to present the claim of a relativist (and whether you consider it to be a true or a false claim), that claim must of necessity be open to be interpreted as relative. When you fail to recognize this necessity, as you have done, you don’t even represent the claim of any relativists.”

But I was not presenting the claim of a relativist. I was presenting an argument relativists give for why others are should adopt relativism. One requirement of an informally valid argument is that it not be circular, the relativist can believe whatever she or he wants but if his or her argument is to be valid she or he cannot assume these beliefs in his or her premises.

“Your alleged “relativist” must then hold to objective morals – which means she is not really a relativist at all.”

Actually this does not follow at all. It is quite possible (and I think likely) that a person can profess to be a relativist and also hold other moral opinions inconsistent with this and not realise it. This phenomenon occurs all the time.

“But even if you hypothetically could raise such an argument – what you cannot do is interpret the claim of a moral relativist as a necessarily objective claim. That is simply calling black “white”.”

Well I think this is mistaken for the reason stated above. First it could well be that a person is a relativist but also holds beliefs about tolerance that contradict her or his relativism. Pointing this out is not calling white black anymore than pointing out that a certain religious believer holds or accepts certain beliefs incompatible with his or her faith.

“So again you have confirmed what I termed the “hidden objectivist assumptions” inherent in your unsound arguments against moral relativism.”

Well, as noted, I argued that the premises need to be interpreted this way so there is no assumption here. Second, as noted, I was not, in the segment above, offering an argument against moral relativism, I was criticising two arguments for relativism. This is not the same thing. Third, in the context where a relativist is offering arguments to other people as to why they should be relativists, one has to assume that the premises do not presuppose relativism otherwise they are circular. Of course I could assume the relativist meant the premise to be interpreted in a relativist fashion, as you say I should, but then the argument is circular and easily refuted.

“But if you do open your eyes and assess the true position of moral relativism on its own terms, and as it is vigorously defended rather than popularly defended”

Well as I noted in my post, I got the arguments and definitions from ethics textbooks and not from popular presentations. I provided citations for there. So again, simply ignoring the argument I offered and asserting that I am “assuming” things is not a valid response.
.-= My last blog-post ..Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic =-.

However, there is nothing in your reply which alters my conclusion that you had simply assumed that when a relativist spoke of a “duty” that she must be meaning it in an objective sense. In fact, your reply only further demonstrates your hidden assumptions of moral objectivity, and your tendency to smuggle in objectivist assumptions into a discussion of the claims of moral relativism.

This was demonstrated in your original discussion of the relativist’s premise, “All people have a duty to not be intolerant.” It is telling that you went straight from describing what a relativist allegedly believes, to commenting, “And notice too that the second premise is making a what? An objective moral statement.” It is evident that in expressing such an opinion in this way, that you considered the relativist’s claim to be objective – before any argument was raised to support such a conclusion. For you only considered it necessary to introduce an argument for its alleged objectivity later. But at this earlier stage, you felt you could simply proclaim, as an off-hand remark, that a premise of an alleged relativist was objective! This shows that you were proceeding under the assumption that the relativist’s use of moral terminology really does has an objective sense. For you thought that all you needed to do was to introduce the moral relativist’s own words and say: ‘Look – this must be objective! Case closed!!’ The lens of your moral objective worldview prevented you from properly entertaining what the premise might mean within a consistent moral relativist worldview.

In your reply here, you further demonstrate your blindness to the (quite obvious) possibility that a moral relativist would use a moral term (such as “duty”) in a relative sense. This is very strange, but I will explore your argument so as to expose your hidden objectivist assumptions. Although you purport to represent the claims of a moral relativist, you are saying that the claims themselves are in fact objective. Now, there was a logical way to make such a claim. For it is one thing to raise an argument that the moral relativist has no grounds to support those claims. But it is another thing altogether to argue that the moral relativist must be making an objective claim – not an argument, mind you, but a claim!!

To make this clear, we are only dealing with a claim, that is, a premise to which the relativist holds. But your demand for the relativist to provide “a non-question begging argument for his position” shows that you mistake the function of a claim/premise. Such a demand fundamentally misunderstands the structure of a logical argument. You almost see this. For you rightly note that the relativist’s argument must “appeal to premises that non-relativists are likely to accept”. If you realized the meaning of your own words, you would realize, too, that “duty” cannot be confined to an “objective” sense, as you too hastily presumed. Rather, the claim of the moral relativist concerning a “duty” must be acceptable within the worldviews of both moral relativism and moral objectivism. That is, the “duty” at this stage can either be relative or objective. As you say, in a valid argument, “the premises of his argument cannot be interpreted [only] in a relativist fashion” (instead, this relativism must be a possibility, together with objectivism, in the premise). But if you are presenting a relativist’s claim concerning a “duty”, then to really be a relativist’s claim, that duty must be able to be interpreted as relative. It is no good to then come along, having set up your alleged relativist’s argument, that he himself cannot possibly have intended “duty” in a relativist sense. For you then break the logical rule that you yourself identified, that the relativist’s argument must “appeal to premises that non-relativists are likely to accept”. Sure, if you can provide an argument why moral “duty” must always be objective, you are free to do so. But when you are purporting to present the claim of a relativist (and whether you consider it to be a true or a false claim), that claim must of necessity be open to be interpreted as relative. When you fail to recognize this necessity, as you have done, you don’t even represent the claim of any relativists. Your alleged “relativist” must then hold to objective morals – which means she is not really a relativist at all. And, as I noted in my orginal post, and repeated above, this evidences your failure to appreciate the moral relativist’s claims (you smuggle in objective definitions, and make them necessary, as do other objectivists). Now, I reiterate that it is quite another matter as to whether the moral relativist’s aguent is valid. (I would never use the “argument from tolerance” you purport is used by moral relativists, so I won’t discuss the argument itself.) It is also quite another matter if you can raise an argument against the relativist’s claim of moral relativism. I haven’t seen you raise any valid argument against moral relativism, and I very much doubt you can. But even if you hypothetically could raise such an argument – what you cannot do is interpret the claim of a moral relativist as a necessarily objective claim. That is simply calling black “white”.

So again you have confirmed what I termed the “hidden objectivist assumptions” inherent in your unsound arguments against moral relativism. I think I appreciate your inability to do this, as someone who as a young child believed in moral objectivism. Once entertainted, the fantasy of moral objectivity is difficult to throw off. But there comes a time to give way childish things. I am yet to see evidence, in any of your alleged representations of moral relativism, that you can entertain moral relativism on its own terms, without smuggling in the assumptions of moral objectivity. You may dispense with these blinders in the future, I don’t know. But if you do open your eyes and assess the true position of moral relativism on its own terms, and as it is vigorously defended rather than popularly defended, you might find that the positive arguments you later raised against moral relativity in your talk (which I have not yet discussed) have become groundless.

Be good.
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I’m not certain exactly why cultural relativism should lead to greater tolerance though. If everyone else’s “truth” is considered equal to yours, presumably you still have a strong interest in your own truth prevailing if it conflicts with somebody else’s. And since there is nothing special about one person’s truth vs another, there is no longer any reason not to get in boots and all and ensure that yours comes out on top. If anything cultural relativism seems to imply less respect for what other people consider “true”, not more, since truth is no longer a master but a servant.

This is always going to be a bugbear for relativists who advocate tolerance though. The thing to ask them will always be: “So, are you saying that YOU are tolerant, or that I should be tolerant?” If he really holds that principle in a relativist fashion as Deane suggests, then she has nothing to say to me about whether or not I should be tolerant, unless she wants to get inside my head so to speak and convince me that I really do already feel that way, if only I reaslised it
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