True belief + an account faces the problem that if the account is to be known, then either there will have to be true belief and an account of it (and hence a regress), or “to know” will have two senses, and we will be back to square one. If, as some do (i.e. people who like the jury example), the second sense of “to know” is supposed to mean “to perceive”, then we just start at the beginning of the dialogue again.

However, i will check.

You talk about Plato, but Platonists, including Plato himself, did not believe that belief was a necessary condition for knowledge. Plato himself argues that they are radically separate, and in the Theaetetus, he spends the final half of the dialogue ridiculing the idea that any sort of belief (justified or not) can ever be knowledge.

Most contemporary epistemology rests on the error of accepting Plato’s criteria for knowledge and at the same time trying to find a way to turn belief into knowledge. This is pretty dumb, since Plato made a point of demonstrating that they were incompatible.

I am sure others are interested.

I think this, rather than any individual presentation, is the important information.

From what I can gather there seems only to have been a decision to distribute the material – which seems a cop-out given the importance and urgency of the subject.

However, I may be wrong.

Could someone clarify?

Matt… sorry. I was under the false impression that this was a yet to be delivered talk and thought I’d give my feedback… was not meant to be a post-event analysis! Glad to hear it went well and if it worked and went down with the audience. The proof is in the pudding!

Keep in mind that this is Part I of our blog series and it is basically the introduction, but on the day the three posts that will make up this series were just one talk and it does pick up from here.