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New publication: “Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality?”

August 26th, 2025 by Matt
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My paper, “Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality?” has been published in the latest issue of Philosophia Christi.

Abstract:
Defenders of divine command metaethics (DCM) often argue that one of its key advantages is its ability to vindicate the objectivity of moral judgments. Critics, however, contend that DCM is a subjectivist theory and therefore inherits the difficulties such theories face in accounting for the apparently objectivist features of moral thought. In this paper, I examine and critique three prominent versions of this objection: David Brink’s appeal to appraiser independence, Elizabeth Tropman’s appeal to stance independence, and Michael Huemer’s concept of observer independence. I argue that none of these criticisms succeeds.

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To Judge or not to Judge?: Part One

August 25th, 2025 by Matt
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Below is part one of a sermon I presented at Crossroads Presbyterian Church in Pokeno.

“Do not judge, or youjudgement too will be judged. 2 For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged, and with the measure you use, it will be measured to you. 3 “Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother’s eye and pay no attention to the plank in your own eye? 4 How can you say to your brother, ‘Let me take the speck out of your eye,’ when all the time there is a plank in your own eye? 5 You hypocrite, first take the plank out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother’s eye.6 “Do not give dogs what is sacred; do not throw your pearls to pigs. If you do, they may trample them under their feet, and turn and tear you to pieces.”

There is an apocryphal story going around that goes as follows: A generation ago, the most well-known New Testament passage was John 3:16—“For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life.” However, now, in this current generation, the most well-known passage is Matthew 7:1—“Do not judge, or you too will be judged.”

I don’t know if this is an accurate claim. However, it is an apocryphal story because it illustrates a widely held understanding of Jesus’ teaching. Today I want to offer a corrective. I will do three things. First, I will sketch what I take to be a common understanding of this passage. Second, I will give several reasons why I think this interpretation is mistaken—indefensible, in fact. Third, I will offer a different way of reading the passage, which I think is more accurate.

1.A Common Interpretation.

Let’s look first at how this passage is commonly understood. Several years ago, I gave a talk on moral relativism for Thinking Matters Tauranga. During that talk, I noted that relativism entails that one cannot apply the moral principles you (or your culture) accept to the practices of other people (or cultures). I was critical of this position, arguing that it suffers from all sorts of problems. Predictably, someone in the audience asked me a question about Jesus’ comments in the Sermon on the Mount:

“Do not judge, or you too will be judged. For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged.” (Matt. 7:1–2)

Notice the highlighted word “or” in this passage. It suggests a disjunction: there are only two options—either you refrain from judgement, or you fall under judgement.

It is common to hear people interpret this passage as a commandment to not “judge other people.” The basic idea is this: judging other people is wrong; if you judge other people, God will judge you.

In fact, it is common for people to use this statement as a kind of rhetorical club to silence Christian theological and moral critique of various cultural practices. When a particular practice is subjected to such critique, those who engage in the practice will complain they are being “judged,” that Christians are being “judgemental,” and that this is contrary to what Christ taught.

I believe this is a misinterpretation of the passage. In fact, if one wants an example of the claim that it is wrong to make moral judgements about other cultures in Scripture, the most explicit example actually comes from the men of Sodom in the story of Lot. When the men seek to sodomise Lot’s visitors, Lot condemns what they desire to do as a “wicked thing.” Their response is recorded as follows:

“Get out of our way,” they replied. And they said, “This fellow came here as an alien, and now he wants to play the judge! We’ll treat you worse than them.” They kept bringing pressure on Lot and moved forward to break down the door.

Here, the men of Sodom objected that Lot is from a different culture, and yet he dared “play the judge.” In my view, Jesus was not defending the men of Lot’s behaviour in Matt. 7:1–2. I think we need to look closer at this passage that is so often cited.

 2. What Is Wrong with the Common Interpretation?

Why do I think this common interpretation is mistaken? Several reasons.

First, the claim that it is wrong to judge other people has absurd implications. Just think about it for a minute. If it is wrong to judge other people, then—since Hitler was another person—it is wrong to say that what he did was wrong. To say that his actions were wrong is to make a judgement about them and, hence, to judge him. Similarly, Martin Luther King Jr. was wrong to criticise racism, and William Wilberforce was wrong to make moral judgements about the slave trade. Taken consistently, the claim that it is wrong to judge entails that we should have no legal system, no laws, and no courts, as all these things involve judging certain conduct as wrong and condemning and punishing those who engage in it.

Second, not only would these historical and contemporary cases of judging be wrong, but if it were sinful to judge others, then much of the Hebrew Scriptures—parts that purport to describe people faithfully following God’s will—are, in fact, exercises in wrongdoing. The prophets offer, in some instances, scathing moral critiques of (and hence make moral judgements about) the actions of Israel, Judah, and also surrounding nations such as Assyria and Babylon. Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Amos, etc., in uttering such judgements, were engaging in sin. It is not just the Hebrew Scriptures that are implicated in wrongdoing. The opening chapters of the book of Romans contain a moral critique of both the Gentile and Hebrew cultures of Paul’s day. Here is an excerpt:

Furthermore, just as they did not think it worthwhile to retain the knowledge of God, so God gave them over to a depraved mind, so that they do what ought not to be done. 29 They have become filled with every kind of wickedness, evil, greed and depravity. They are full of envy, murder, strife, deceit and malice. They are gossips, 30 slanderers, God-haters, insolent, arrogant and boastful; they invent ways of doing evil; they disobey their parents; 31 they have no understanding, no fidelity, no love, no mercy. 32 Although they know God’s righteous decree that those who do such things deserve death, they not only continue to do these very things but also approve of those who practice them.

Paul made harsh moral judgements about other people.

In fact, if one seriously believes that judging is wrong and contrary to the will of God, then Jesus was a sinner. Jesus, after all, made some very harsh judgements about the Pharisees and Sadducees throughout the Synoptic Gospels. In Matthew’s Gospel, on seven occasions he says, “Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you hypocrites!” He proceeds to offer scathing criticisms of their religious and moral practices.

On at least one occasion, Jesus criticises the Pharisees for not judging people in the correct way. In John 7:21–24, Jesus states:

Yet, because Moses gave you circumcision (though actually it did not come from Moses, but from the patriarchs), you circumcise a boy on the Sabbath. 23 Now if a boy can be circumcised on the Sabbath so that the law of Moses may not be broken, why are you angry with me for healing a man’s whole body on the Sabbath? 24 Stop judging by mere appearances, but instead judge correctly.

The problems with this interpretation of Matthew 7:1–2 do not stop there. A little reflection will demonstrate that the claim that it is wrong to judge other people is itself incoherent. It is what philosophers call a performative self-contradiction. To claim it is wrong to judge others is to make a moral judgement—it is to judge that a particular action is wrong. Moreover, when a person announces this to other people, he or she is implicitly making a judgement about other people’s actions. To utter “it is wrong to judge others,” therefore, is to engage in judging others.


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Published: Theological Utilitarianism, Supervenience, and Intrinsic Value

April 14th, 2023 by Matt
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My paper, “Theological Utilitarianism, Supervenience, and Intrinsic Value” has been published in a special issue of Religions, devoted to the topic God and Ethics. The abstract is as follows:

Erik Wielenberg has argued that robust realism can account for the “common-sense moral belief” that “some things distinct from God are intrinsically good”. By contrast, theological stateism cannot account for this belief. Hence, robust realism has a theoretical advantage over all forms of theological stateism. This article criticizes Wielenberg’s argument. Wielenberg distinguishes between R and D-supervenience. The coherence of Wielenberg’s robust realism depends upon this distinction. I argue that this distinction undermines his critique of theological stateism. I will make three points. First, once you utilize the distinction between R and D-supervenience, his argument for the incompatibility of theological stateism and intrinsic value fails. Second, theological stateism is compatible with intrinsic value. The historical example of theological utilitarianism, expounded by thinkers George Berkeley and William Paley, shows someone can accept that moral properties simultaneously R supervene upon God’s will and D supervene upon the natural properties of actions. Third, robust realism and theological stateism are in the same boat regarding intrinsic value once we distinguish between R and D-supervenience.

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When bigots call out “bigots”

April 13th, 2023 by Matt
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Albert Giubilini and I would not agree on a lot. Giubilini has defended not only abortion rights but what he calls “after-birth abortion”( which of course is a reference to infanticide). He also opposes religious conscientious objection in medicine. I disagree with him on both topics and disagree strongly. I find his conclusions repugnant. 

However,  it is the nature of moral philosophy that people will debate controversial moral opinions, opinions both sides feel strongly about. When the issue is a serious one, such as the ethics of war, abortion, or capital punishment, where you are literally discussing who can and cannot be killed people will find the views of their opponents repugnant and sincerely believe their views are harmful. This does not mean I attempt to harangue and shut down any lectures he does, or lobby for journals to not publish his work. It means I do the best I can to critique his views, as well as defend and sketch an alternative ethic which better accounts for our considered moral judgements. 

Studying moral philosophy has also taught me that often people you disagree with on one topic will say insightful and interesting things on another. In fact, they often say insightful things on the topic you disagree with them on. Those you disagree with are almost never always wrong and those in your camp are almost never always right. You can learn a lot reading people whose worldviews are very different to your own. 

To this end. I recently found an interesting piece Gulibani wrote on the. Practical Ethics blog at Oxford  University. 

One thing that stands out from the article is this, which reflects ideas I have myself expressed on occasion. 

The problem I am talking about is that on university campuses there is today a tendency towards bigotry. Being offended by certain topics to the point of wanting to shut down discussions can, in certain circumstances, turn political correctness into a kind of bigotry. Following the dictionary, we can define bigotry as “intolerance towards those who hold different opinions from oneself.” In this dictionary sense, bigotry does not describe the content of one’s moral beliefs, but rather the extent to which someone is prepared to expose her ideas to counter-arguments and evidence. Also, a more philosophical definition of “bigotry” – such as the one provided by John Corvino – does not tie bigotry to any particular political or moral view, whether “conservative” or “liberal.” According to Corvino, bigotry is “stubborn and unjustified contempt toward groups of people, typically in the context of a larger system of subordination.

Giubilini points out that bigotry, or “being a bigot” is not determined by the fact a person holds a particular opinion on race, gender, abortion, religion, political policy or economics to you. According to both the normal dictionary meanings of the word[1], and also more detailed philosophical analyses such as that of John Corvino. Bigotry is a function of *how* the opinion is held, and how one responds to those who disagree with that opinion.

Two aspects of what constitutes bigotry are noteworthy. Bigotry involves not just strongly held opinions, but *stubbornly* held opinions. If one holds an opinion strongly but is prepared to listen to counterarguments and revise your opinion in the face of new information and argument rather than just stubbornly affirm it no matter what, then you are not a bigot. You might be mistaken, but you aren’t a bigot. 

Similarly, bigotry involves intolerance towards those who hold rival ideas. Intolerance is not “disagreement”. If I said to you, “I tolerate my wife’s cooking” you would assume my wife was a bad cook and her cooking was something I had to endure dispute not liking it. You are not tolerant if you agree with certain views. Tolerance is determined by how one responds to views one disagrees with or finds distasteful, mistaken and so on.  

 So if you try and ban and shut down, or express hatred towards people who disagree with you, demeaning them banning them, trying to have them removed from the country, intimidating them insulting and shaming them and so forth then you are intolerant. It doesn’t matter what those views are and what views you hold. If you do those things you are not tolerating those who disagree with you. 

To his credit, Gulibani realizes this: 

“The aforementioned reactions of some pro-life (and, to a smaller extent, of some pro-choice) people to the after-birth abortion paper are a clear example of bigotry. But it would be a mistake to think that in academia bigotry is a prerogative of the pro-life or conservative camp. Actually, as the feminists’ disruption of the OSFL’s event demonstrates, pro-lifers and conservatives in academia are often victims of bigotry on the part of (some) feminists, pro-choice supporters, and liberals more generally. This is because bigotry is a function of the (un)ease with which someone is offended by other people’s opinions or even by scientific hypotheses, and there is no reason to think that feminists, so-called liberals or pro-choice advocates are less susceptible to being easily offended than conservatives. One can hold the most progressive or liberal ethical and political views and still be a bigot in the sense of I have defined. As Teresa Bejan recently wrote in an article in The Atlantic, today, “[w]hile conservative students defend the importance of inviting controversial speakers to campus and giving offense, many self-identified liberals are engaged in increasingly disruptive, even violent, efforts to shut them down.” As a self-identified liberal, I have to say that, sadly, this claim finds confirmation in my experience.” 

The irony is that today, many people who confidently pride themselves on “calling out bigotry” are actually bigots. 

If you turn up to angry protests demanding that people who express certain views be silenced, shut down. You are doing two things, first, you are showing, that will not consider rival views, listen to them or consider them, instead, you will just angrily shut those views down, refuse to listen and make sure no one else can. You will not examine any counterarguments, in fact you are demanding such arguments not be made. If you do this have not just strong views, but stubborn views, views immune to counter-evidence. Second, you are also exercising intolerance towards those with whom you disagree. So, you are a bigot. 

Saying “ I am calling out bigotry” doesn’t make you, not a bigot just as the claim by the characters in Orwell’s 1984 claiming they worked for the Ministry of Truth, didn’t change the fact they were publishing lies. Stating a claim over and over doesn’t make it true. Nor does chanting slogans about how much you hate bigotry make you, not a bigot. Words have meanings and we know what a bigot is. If you hold your opinion stubbornly and use it to act intolerantly against others you meet the core criteria of a bigot.

So, when I am confronted with a young first-year university student, straight out of high school, who tells me some view I hold “makes me a bigot” and concludes am to be shunned or insulted, or silenced, because of this. My reaction is to roll my eyes. 

I have spent years studying questions in moral philosophy and in theology, reading and exposing myself to people on all sides of the issue. I have engaged in public debates and panel discussions with people I disagree. I read the works of the best opponents of the views I hold and I have published responses to some of them in the literature. On some occasions, I have discussed and debated issues with them. I have learnt a lot from this, on several occasions my views have shifted, or I have revised what I thought. It is, of course, possible that I am holding my views stubbornly and if you have some reasons or arguments, you want me to consider I am happy to listen. 

However, if you are just going to assert without argument, I am a bigot, refuse to listen and then demand I be shunned, hated, fired, muzzled etc. etc. I am afraid that your claim to be calling out bigotry is self-deceived bull shit. It is true I might be a bigot. However, your behaviour makes it abundantly clear that you are.  

Your claim to be calling out bigotry is on par with someone standing in a room shouting, in English, “I don’t speak a word of English”. That’s funny, it is something one might see an epic Monty Python skit on. But don’t expect me to take your conclusions remotely seriously. When you grow up and can have a rational discussion rather than throw a tantrum let me know. In the meantime, stop the bullshit you’re a bigot. If you want to call out bigotry, try the mirror.

 

[1] Some examples:

 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines a bigot as: someone who is ‘obstinately or intolerantly devoted to his own opinions and prejudices’,

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language says a bigot is:‘one who is strongly partial to one’s own group, religion, race, or politics and is intolerant of those who differ’.

Miriam Webster defines a bigot as “a person who is obstinately or intolerantly devoted to his or her own opinions and prejudices especially : one who regards or treats the members of a group (such as a racial or ethnic group) with hatred and intolerance

The Oxford Dictionary of English defines bigotry as: ‘obstinate and unenlightened attachment to a particular creed, opinion system or party’.

Oxford Languages defines a bigot as “a person who is obstinately or unreasonably attached to a belief, opinion, or faction, especially one who is prejudiced against or antagonistic towards a person or people on the basis of their membership of a particular group.

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“Is Jesus the only Way?” talk at Newhope Community Church

November 8th, 2022 by Matt
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Recently, I gave a talk at New Hope Community Church in East Auckland. This talk was on the topic “Is Jesus the only way?  I attach it here. 

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Is Theism Incompatible with the Pauline Principle? Comments on James Sterba’s Argument from Evil

November 3rd, 2022 by Matt
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My paper, “Is Theism Incompatible with the Pauline Principle?” has been published in a special issue of Religions, devoted to the topic Do We Now Have A Logical Argument From Evil? The abstract is as follows:

 

This paper criticises James Sterba’s use of the Pauline principle to formulate a logical version of the problem of evil. Sterba’s argument contains a crucial premise: If human agents are always prohibited from doing some action, God is also prohibited from doing that action. This implies that the Pauline principle applies to both Divine and human agents. I argue that any Theist who affirms a divine command theory of ethics can consistently and coherently deny this premise and its implication. If a divine command theory is coherent, a theist can affirm that the Pauline principle governs human agents’ actions but not God’s actions. I will also criticise Sterba’s criticisms of a divine command theory and argue that they fail.

 

Enjoy.

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Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part Three:

September 8th, 2022 by Matt
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This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave.

This brings me to my second contention: If God exists, a divine command theory would provide a coherent account of our fundamental assumptions about moral requirements.

I outlined four assumptions about the kind of requirements morality imposes upon us. These were

  1. Inescapability: moral requirements apply to us irrespective of whether following them contributes to any ends or aims we currently desire.
  2. Impartiality: moral requirements are justified from an impartial perspective.
  3. Authority: agents always have conclusive reasons to do what is morally required and never have sufficiently good reasons for doing what is morally wrong.
  4. Accountability: if something is morally required, we are guilty and liable to blame if we fail to do it and lack an adequate excuse.  

I will make three points.

First, If God exists, the assumption that wrongness is identical to the property of being contrary to God’s command would coherently account for all these assumptions. Consider the fact that moral requirements are “inescapable.” If God commands someone to do something, this command is addressed to them, regardless of whether it contributes to any ends or aims they currently desire. So, the imperative in question is inescapable.  Similarly, consider the impartiality of moral requirements. God is an all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially benevolent, and impartial agent. So what God commands is co-extensive with prescriptions that a benevolent, impartial person who was fully informed and reasoning correctly would endorse.  A command is also a paradigmatic example of a prescription that involves a demand for which we hold people accountable through standard practices such as blaming. That is how a command differs from other prescriptions, such as a piece of advice or a suggestion. So, if the property of being morally required is identical to the property of being commanded by God,  we would expect it to be true that we are accountable to moral requirements.

Second, if God exists, the thesis that wrongness is identical to the property of being contrary to God’s command would vindicate the assumption that it is always in our long-term self-interest to follow impartial demands. A divine command theory entails that moral requirements are what we are accountable to God for doing. Unlike human beings, God’s commands are co-extensive with what is demanded from an impartial point of view, and people can never violate these norms secretly without being detected.  

Third,  all attempts to refute a divine command theory have failed. It’s widely claimed that divine command theories were refuted by an argument called “The Euthyphro Objection.” This objection is named after a dialogue written by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato in the 4th century BC. Plato’s original argument is somewhat obscure and applied only to polytheistic religions (those religions that believe in many gods). However, the version used by philosophers today is an adaptation of Plato’s argument for use against monotheistic faiths. Critics of divine command theories appeal to three arguments loosely associated with Plato’s dialogue. These are (1) the anything goes objection, (2) the arbitrariness objection, and (3) the vacuity objection. I will address each of these briefly in turn.

The Anything Goes Objection

One objection is that a divine command theory makes morality arbitrary because anything at all could be right or wrong. King and Garcia explain the alleged problem in this way:

[Divine command theory] implies that it is possible for any kind of action, such as rape, not to be wrong. But it seems intuitively impossible for rape not to be wrong. So [Divine command theory] is at odds with our common-sense intuitions about rape.[1]

This objection assumes it is possible for God to command rape. Divine command theorists contest this assumption. They do not contend that moral requirements depend on the commands of just anyone. They base moral obligations on the commands of God conceived in a particular way. God is an all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially loving, just, immaterial person who created the universe on their conception. Given this, the claim that God could command people to perform a horrendous act like rape holds only if it’s possible for an all-knowing, loving, and impartial person to command rape. This is unlikely. The reason critics use examples like rape is that they view them as actions that no virtuous person could ever knowingly entertain. However, suppose, for the sake of argument, it is possible for a just and loving, omniscient person to command rape. Rape would only be commanded in situations where a just and loving person, aware of all the relevant facts, could endorse it– and under these circumstances, it’s hard to see how one could take for granted it was morally wrong.

 Arbitrariness

A pervasive objection is that divine command theories make morality arbitrary because that nothing is right or wrong prior to God’s command; God can have no reasons for issuing one set of commands instead of another. Oppy explains the objection.

Could it have been, for example, that murder, rape, lying, stealing, and cheating were good because God proclaimed them so? Surely not! But what could explain God’s inability to bring it about that murder, rape, lying, stealing and cheating are good by proclaiming them so, other than its being the case that murder, rape, lying, stealing, and cheating are wrong quite apart from any proclamations that God might make?[2]

However, this is implausible. Suppose God has character traits such as being essentially loving and impartial. In that case, God can and would have reasons for prohibiting actions like rape, murder, or cheating, quite apart from whether these actions are antecedently wrong. Antecedent to any command on God’s part, these actions won’t have the property of being morally prohibited. But they could still have other properties such as being cruel or harmful or unjust or detrimental to human happiness— or being expressions of hatred, for example. And a loving and impartial God could prohibit these actions because these actions have these non-moral properties.

Divine command theories do not entail that morality is arbitrary. If anything, the opposite is the case. A divine command theory entails that actions will be wrong in virtue of certain non-moral properties those actions have. Non-moral properties would provide an informed, loving, and impartial person with reasons to prohibit those actions.

 Vacuity Objection

A third objection is that divine command theories entail that the doctrine of the goodness of God is rendered vacuous. Someone can only be morally perfect if he has duties and acts in accordance with them. But, seeing God does not issue commands to himself, a divine command theory entails that God has no obligations. Consequently, God cannot be God.

This objection assumes that God’s goodness should be explicated in terms of God faithfully discharging his duties. But there is no reason why we must understand God’s goodness in this way. In Christian creeds like the Westminster Confession, God’s goodness is understood as possessing certain character traits, such as being loving, impartial gracious, merciful, long-suffering, truthful, forgiving, etc. If God’s commanding an action makes it required, God cannot have an obligation to do these things; that does not mean God does not do them. God does not have to have a duty to do something in order to do it.

To recap: unless we assume that prudential and impartial commands never conflict, we cannot account for our fundamental intuitions about morality. Second, secular accounts of the kind of accountability we have to morality undermine this assumption. Fourth, a divine command theory would, if true, both vindicate this assumption and coherently account for our fundamental assumptions about morality.  Finally, standard objections against a divine command theory fail. The conclusion is this. If we assume God exists, a divine command theory can coherently and defensibly account for these fundamental assumptions in a way a secular theory cannot.

[1] Nathan L King, “Introduction”, in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 11.

[2]  Graham. Oppy, Best Argument against God (Hampshire: Palgrave Pivot, 2014), 44.

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