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Can a Divine Command Theory Ground the Objectivity of Morality? Michael Huemer on Observer Independence: Part One

September 12th, 2021 by Matt
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In a previous post  I criticized David Brink’s argument that a divine command theory cannot vindicate the objectivity of morality. Brink argued:

[1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective

[2] Moral requirements are objective just in case facts about what is right or wrong obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers.

[3] If divine command metaethics is true, facts about right and wrong depend on the attitude of an appraiser.

In response, I noted two possible interpretations of appraiser independence: (a) a weaker sense, where moral facts obtain independently of the attitudes of any actual human appraisers.  Alternatively, (b) a stronger sense, where moral facts obtain independently of the attitudes of any appraiser whatsoever. I pressed a dilemma:  If we adopt the weaker understanding of appraiser independence, premise [3] is clearly false. By contrast, if we adopt the stronger interpretation, premise [3] is true, but. [1] is unmotivated. The presuppositions of moral do not commit us to this stronger conception of appraisal independence. We can account for the presuppositions of our moral practice equally well on the weaker interpretation. In a later post, I offered similar criticisms of an analogous argument by Elizabeth Tropman.

Michael Huemer anticipates this line of criticism. “[The divine command theorist] might say that morality is objective as long as it does not depend upon human observers; it can still depend upon non-human observers.” He responds:

I try not to spend too much time on semantic debates, so I will just say I think this would be an artificial way of drawing boundaries. Physical facts-the paradigm of objectivity- are not constitutively dependent on any observers whatsoever, they can exist by themselves. If one says that physical facts need some special observer, then one is conceding they are not objective facts in the robust sense that other observers are.[1]

Huemer refers to paradigmatic cases of objective and subjective facts.  Physical facts are paradigms of objective facts: “If there is a cat on the table, then that is true regardless of whether anyone believes it, or wants it to be true, and so on. The cat can be there with no one at all being aware of it.”[2]. By contrast, “funniness” is a paradigm of a subjective fact. “Whether a joke is funny depends on whether it would tend to amuse. People. Facts about, our reaction to the joke constitute its funniness”.[3] Huemer thinks his unrestricted sense of appraiser independence[4] uses the word “objective” in the same sense as it is used in paradigmatic cases. The restricted sense does not.

Prima facie, this is mistaken. If there is a cat on the table, that will be true whether or not any actual or hypothetical human being “believes it, or wants it to be true”. But that is not true if the observer in question is God.  After all, God creates and sustains all physical objects in being moment by moment according to his will. If God did not will the cat and table exist, neither would be there. Consequently, physical objects are not objective according to an unrestricted understanding of appraiser independence.

William Lane Craig raises this point in his response to Huemer.

[O]n theism physical facts are no more dependent on God’s attitudes than are moral facts-indeed being contingent, they are less so-for they depend upon God’s will to create the physical objects and preserve them in being. Observer-dependence, then, ought not to have reference to God, lest the distinction between “objective” and “subjective” collapse. Subjectivism is Huemer’s Pickwickian sense is no longer objectionable.[5]

Craig mentions a problem for any attempt to define objective facts as facts that obtain independently of all appraisers whatsoever. Because God is the creator and sustained of every contingent being in existence, This definition threatens to collapse the distinction between objective and subjective facts. Facts about anything distinct from God will be subjective facts. By this definition, moral facts will be subjective. However, so will the fundamental laws of physics, the fact that the world is round and numerous paradigmatic examples of objective facts. The word “subjective” will be used in an idiosyncratic way.

However, I think Huemer  may be able to avoid this implication. At one point, he defines objective morality in a way similar to Brink:” “there is “objective morality” provided that there are truths about what is good or bad, right or wrong, which obtain, independently of the attitude of observers toward the objects of evaluation”. When he argues that a divine command theory entails subjectivism, he is more precise:

“It [divine command meta-ethics] …is not an objectivist theory. If true it makes morality subjective, not objective. That is because [It] holds that morality constitutively depends on the attitudes of an observer. The observer in this case is a very interesting one-God- but an observer none the less”.[6]

Here Huemer, says an objective fact is a fact that fact does not constitutively” depend on the attitude of observers towards it. Huemer distinguishes between causal and constitutive independence. The funniness of a joke is a subjective fact, not because the joke causes us to be amused. Instead, our reacting with amusement constitutes its funniness. Funniness just is the tendency to amuse. Consequently, objective facts can depend on the attitude of observers, provided the dependence is causal and not constitutive.[7]

By emphasising constitutive instead of causal independence, Huemer may be able define objectivity as strong appraiser independence without collapsing the distinction between subjective and objective facts. Suppose the cat is on the table. This fact causally depends upon God’s attitudes, God’s willing that the cat exists it to exist. However, the cat is not reducible or constituted by God’s willing. The cat remains a distinct thing.  Hence it can be objective, despite its existence depending on God’s attitudes.


I said “may be”. This response may work with physical objects like cats and tables. It is less clear with another paradigmatic example of an objective fact—the fundamental laws of physics.  According to Peter Harrison, the idea of laws of nature was a theological concept developed by early modern scientists such as Descartes, Boyle, Newton, and various others.[1] Whereas Aristotle had explained regularities in nature in terms of intrinsic dispositional properties of natural objects, their nature or substantial form, these early modern thinkers understood regularities as imposed upon nature by God.  Laws of nature were laws God laid down which govern the physical world. Some contemporary philosophers, notably Alvin Plantinga[2] and John Foster[3], have defended this account of laws.

The details of their position do not concern us here. The issue is this. Imagine Descartes and others were correct, and laws of nature are just laws God laid down that govern nature. It would follow from Heumer’s definition that the laws of physics were “subjective facts” because they are constituted by the will of an observer: God. However, it is hard to see anything of substance that follows from this. This conclusion does not suggest that “we” made up the laws of physics. It does not suggest “they are not real”, or they are “social constructs”, or are useful “fictions”. It does not mean that they depend on us for their existence, so that if we ceased to exist, so would they. It does not follow they are not true really true, or that we cannot be mistaken about them, and so on. Everything that leads us to see the laws as hard objective facts would be untouched. By contrast, if we held that laws of physics were laws “we” made up and based on our decisions, that would radically undermine scientific realism.

I will return to this point later; for now, let us assume Huemer can avoid collapsing the distinction between objective and subjective in this way. His argument would be as follows:

[1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective. 

[2] Moral requirements are objective just in case there obtain facts about what is right and wrong that do not constitutionally depend upon the attitude of observers towards the objects of evaluation.

[3] If divine command metaethics is true, facts about right and wrong constitutively depend upon the attitudes of an observer towards the objects of evaluation.

I think there are two difficulties with this argument. If limit the kind of appraiser independence moral facts must display to “constitutional independence”. Then [3] and [1] are questionable. In my next post, I will spell out why I think this is the case in more detail.

[1] Michael Huemer “Groundless Morals”, A Debate on A Debate on God and Morality What is the Best Account of Objective Moral Values and Duties? Eds. Erik Wielenberg, William Land Craig and Adam Johnson (New York: Routledge, 2021) 150-151. Kindle

[2] Huemer, “Groundless Morals” 149

[3] Ibid, 150

[4] Huemer uses the word “observer independence” instead of “appraiser independence”, his reference to an observer’s attitudes towards “the object of evaluation”; however, suggests he is thinking of an appraiser. I will use both appraiser independence and observer independence interchangeably to describe Huemer’s view.

[5] William Lane Craig, “William Lane Craig’s Final Remarks”, A Debate on A Debate on God and Morality What is the Best Account of Objective Moral Values and Duties? Eds. Erik Wielenberg, William Land Craig and Adam Johnson (New York: Routledge, 2021) 196, Kindle

[6] Huemer, “Groundless Morals”, 150

[7] See chapter 1 of Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) for the elaboration of this point.

[8] Peter Harrison “The Development of the Concept of a Law of Nature” Creation: Law and Probability ed Fraser Watts (Ashgate, 2008) 13-36

[9] Alvin Plantinga, “Law, Cause, and Occasionalism” Reason and Faith: Themes from Richard Swinburne, (Eds.) Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey E. Brower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 126-143.

[10] John Foster, The Divine Lawmaker: Lectures on Induction, Laws of Nature, and the Existence of God, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 



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Can a Divine command theory account for the objectivity of moral requirements? Elizabeth Tropman, Russ Shafer-Landau, and “Stance Independence”.

September 1st, 2021 by Matt
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In my last post, I criticised David Brink’s argument that a divine command theory cannot vindicate the objectivity of morality. A different version of the objection comes from Elizabeth Tropman. Tropman begins by giving several reasons for thinking that moral realism is an attractive moral theory. She then argues that a divine command theory fails to vindicate this realist kind of objectivity. 

[I]t is not even clear that divine command theory is compatible with a realist view of ethics after all. Divine command theory was supposed to secure the objectivity of moral demands by making morality independent of us. Yet, for many moral realists, morality’s obtaining independently of us is not enough for it to be objective. Objective moral requirements are supposed to be independent of any subject’s moral attitudes, not just ours. As leading moral realist Russ Shafer‐Landau puts it (2003), objective morality is stance‐independent “in the sense that the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective” (p. 15, emphasis in original). On Shafer‐Landau’s view, objective moral standards are valid independently of anyone’s perspective on them. This perspective could be one of an actual or hypothetical agent, human or divine. The moral requirement to help those in need would be objective just in case it does not have to be ratified, preferred, or willed by any agent to be valid. Divine command theory does not count as a form of realism on this approach since moral rules are wholly determined by God’s will.[1]

We can summarise this as follows:

[1] Moral standards are objective                                                                                               

[2] moral standards are objective only if: the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective.”

[3] If a divine command theory is true, then the moral standards that fix the moral facts are made true in virtue of their ratification from within a given actual perspective. 

The conclusion is that a divine command theory has implausible implications. 

I think the argument fails for reasons similar to the reason’s Brink’s does.

First, as Tropman formulates her argument, [3] is false. Tropman relies on Russ Schafer-Landau’s idea of stance independence: the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective” this definition comes from p 15 of Shafer-Landau’s book “Moral Realism: A Defence” in this chapter, Shafer-Landau clarified the difference between moral realism and constructivism. As Shafer-Landau understands it, constructivism accepts the reality “of the moral domain” but sees it as “constructed” out of the attitudes of various agents. By contrast, realism affirms that moral reality is “stance independent” in the way specified. Tropman fails to notice a clarificatory footnote Shafer-Landau annexed to the very next paragraph:

How should we classify views that make the determination of moral truth dependent on God’s ratification of the relevant standards? Such views seem most naturally grouped with realism, even though on these accounts, there is a constructive function that explains the correctness of the proper moral standards. For my purposes it doesn’t matter how we serve this taxonomic problem. All divine command theories incorporate a constructive function, to be sure, but it is also the case that the relevant standard-setting attitudes are not those of any human being-the attitudes (no matter how refined) of us mere mortals do not do the relevant work. Place these theories as you like; I don’t think anything that follows will be importantly affected by assigning such views to one camp rather than the other.[2]

In this note, Shafer-Landau says divine command theories are “most naturally” classified as realist theories. Although, divine command theories entail those moral standards are “constructed” out of the attitudes of an agent. They are not ratified from the standpoint of actual or refined (idealised) human beings. This suggests that when Shafer-Landau referred to stance independence, he meant independence from the perspective of actual or idealised human agents. 

 This suspicion is confirmed by a later essay Shafer-Landau’s published

 Moral realism is the view that …moral judgments are made true in some way other than by virtue of the attitudes taken towards their content by any actual or idealised human agent.

If torturing a child is wrong, it is not because of anyone’s disapproval of such an action. It is not because the action falls afoul of standards that I endorse, or rules that any society accepts. Even the disapproval of an ideal observer – say, someone who knows all nonmoral facts, and is fully rational –is not what makes an action wrong. For moral realists, the ultimate standard(s) of morality are as much a part of reality as the ultimate laws of logic, or the basic principles of physics. Perhaps God (if there is a God) made them up, but human beings certainly didn’t. (emphasis added)[3]

Here Shafer-Landau defines moral realism as the view that moral judgements are not true in virtue of the attitudes that actual or idealised human agents take towards their content. Moral realism contends that moral facts are objectively true in the same sense that the laws of physics are real objective facts. It may be that God has created these laws. However, their truth does not depend on whether any actual or hypothetical idealised human agent ratifies them.

If my interpretation of Shafer-Landau is correct, Tropman’s argument has a false premise. If we accept Shafer-Landau’s definition of stance independence, The argument would be

[1] Moral standards are objective. 

[2] moral standards are objective only if: the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or idealised human perspective.

[3] If a divine command theory is true, then the moral standards that fix the moral facts are made true in virtue of their ratification from within a given actual human or ideal perspective. 

[3] is false. Divine command theories do not entail that moral standards are ratified from any actual or idealised human perspective. A divine command theory maintains that God ratifies moral standards. God is neither an actual human being or a hypothetical human being appraising under ideal methods or conditions.

However, there is a better way to read Tropman’s argument here. Instead of seeing her as adopting Shafer-Landau’s definition of stance independence. We could read her as advocating her own stronger understanding of stance independence. Whereby moral standards are objective only if they are valid independently of absolutely anyone’s perspective on them. Let’s refer to this account of stance independence as “unrestricted stance independence” in contrast to Shafer-Landau’s, which I will call “restricted stance independence”. Taken this way, Tropman is arguing the following:

[1] Moral standards are objective. 

[2] moral standards are objective only if: the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or idealised perspective, human or divine

[3] If a divine command theory is true, then the moral standards that fix the moral facts are made true in virtue of their ratification from within a given divine perspective. 

On this construal [3] is true. The problem, however, is now with premise [1]. For this argument to be valid, the word “objective must have the same meaning in premises [1] and [2]. Consequently, we should read premise [1] as claiming that it is plausible that moral standards presuppose unrestricted stance independence. But there appears to be no non-question-begging reason for thinking this is true. Consider the arguments Tropman gives for [1]

Those who think that morality is objective believe that moral requirements are not up to us; moral obligations would be as they are irrespective of our thoughts or feelings on the matter. For objectivists, lying, cheating, and stealing would still be wrong even if we thought otherwise or approved of these actions.… Moral realism is often seen as the default meta‐ethical position (see Brink 1989). It is natural to suppose that some actions are morally right or wrong, and that an action’s morality is something we discover, not create. Moral realism is appealing because it makes sense of moral error, moral progress, and the authority of moral demands. Since morality is not up to us, it is possible for us to make moral mistakes and genuinely disagree about what is morally right or wrong.[4]

None of these considerations gives us any reason for thinking that moral standards display unrestricted stance independence. The thesis of restricted stance independence can account for each of them. Suppose that the property of being morally required just is the property of being commanded by God. It will still be the case that moral requirements are “not up to us”. Lying, cheating, and stealing will still be wrong even if we thought otherwise or approved of these actions. Moral obligations will be as they are “irrespective of our thoughts and feelings on the matter”. Morality will still be something we “discover”, not “create”. People can make mistakes and genuinely disagree about what God has commanded. People can make progress in their fidelity to God’s commands. Individuals and societies can undergo religious reforms, where mistaken but socially accepted understandings of Gods will are repudiated. Moral facts will still be objective facts in the same sense that the laws of physics are objective facts. It will still be true that moral facts are not constructed from our desires via some idealised method or procedure. None of this is at all surprising; the only difference between restricted and unrestricted interpretations of stance independence is that the latter contends morality is independent of God. For all non-divine agents, the implication of each interpretation is the same. 

In, Formulating Moral Objectivity, Tropman does give some reasons for formulating moral objectivity in terms of unrestricted stance independence. In this article, Tropman examines and criticises several attempts to define what it means for moral obligations to be objective. Early on, she discusses one definition which restricts stance independence to human agents. Tropman refers to this account as M2. She gives the following reason for rejecting it:

“The trouble with (M 2) is that it cannot treat other classes of anti-realist anti-objectivists as such. Divine Command Theorists maintain that an action is right just in case God says that it is. On this theory, moral facts would indeed be independent of any of our moral beliefs. To respect this intuition about objectivity, we can revise (M 2) to refer, not only to human moral beliefs, but to those of any agent, actual or hypothetical, human or otherwise.”[5] 

Here, Tropman states that any definition of moral objectivity, which restricts stance independence is to human agents, is problematic. Why? Because, if you restrict it this way, a divine command theory would satisfy the definition and hence entail that morality is objective. Tropman is taking it as a desideratum of any account of moral objectivity that a divine command theory does not satisfy it. She uses this desideratum to determine which theories of objectivity and stance independence are acceptable theories.

Whatever one thinks of this method of theory selection. Tropman cannot use it in the present context. Tropman is arguing against divine command theory on the grounds that it contradicts a plausible definition of moral objectivity. If the definition is considered plausible because of this implication, the argument is contrived and viciously circular. Critics of divine command theory cannot stipulate that a plausible account of moral objectivity must be incompatible with divine command theories and then use these accounts to argue that divine command theories are not objective. To do this is just to rig the game.

Tropman, like Brink, fails to establish that divine command theories cannot vindicate the objectivity of morality. In both cases, I think the reason is similar. It isn’t enough to say that divine commands are not objective in some stipulated sense or other.  If you define objective standards as standards valid independently of anyone, including God’s perspective, it will be trivially obvious that Gods commands are not objective standards. The question is whether divine command theories vindicate the kind of objectivity presupposed by our moral commitments. The type of objectivity it is plausible to attribute to moral standards.

[1] Elizabeth Tropman “Meta-ethics” Companion to Atheism and Philosophy ed Graham Oppy (Wiley-Blackwell, 2019) 345

[2] Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 16

[3] Russ Shafer Landau, “Ethics as Philosophy A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism” in Ethical Theory an Anthology, Second Edition. ed Russ Schafer-Landau (Malden MA: Wiley and Sons, 2013).This article is reprinted from Metaethics After Moore Eds Terry Hogan and Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) which was published three years after Moral Realism: A Defence.

[4] Margret Tropman “Meta-ethics” 344

[5] Elizabeth Tropman “Formulating Moral Objectivity” Philosophia 6:2 (2018) 1028

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Can a Divine command theory account for the objectivity of moral requirements? Brink and Appraiser Independence.

August 24th, 2021 by Matt
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David Brink has objected to a divine command theory of ethics by contending such theories cannot vindicate the objectivity of ethics. Brink begins by defending a particular conception of the objectivity of ethics and then argues that a divine command theory fails to meet that conception.  Brink writes:

Our commitment to the objectivity of ethics is a deep one. Ethics is objective just in case there are facts or truths about what is good or bad and right or wrong that obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers. A commitment to objectivity is part of a commitment to the normativity of ethics. Moral judgments express normative claims about what we should do and care about. As such, they presuppose standards of behavior and concern that purport to be correct, that could and should guide conduct and concern, and that we might fail to accept or live up to. Normativity, therefore, presupposes fallibility, and fallibility implies objectivity. Of course, this presupposition could be mistaken. There might be no objective moral standards. Our moral thinking and discourse might be systematically mistaken. But this would be a revisionary conclusion, to be accepted only as the result of extended and compelling argument that the commitments of ethical objectivity are unsustainable. In the meantime, we should treat the objectivity of ethics as a kind of default assumption or working hypothesis [1]

 He continues:

…Ethical subjectivism is one way to deny ethical objectivity. It claims that what is good or bad and right or wrong depends on the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers. But voluntarism is just subjectivism at the highest level. If God exists and is both omniscient and perfectly good, then his approval – if only we could ascertain it – would be a perfectly reliable – indeed, infallible – indicator of what was good or right. This is what naturalism claims. But voluntarism implies that God’s attitudes play a metaphysical, not just an epistemic, role in morality; his attitudes make things good or right. This is a form of subjectivism about ethics. But then the supposition that morality requires a religious foundation, as voluntarism insists, threatens, rather than vindicates, the objectivity of morality.[2]

The argument can be summarised as follows:

[1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective

[2] Moral requirements are objective just in case there are facts or truths about what is right or wrong that obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers.

[3] If divine command metaethics is true, facts about right and wrong depend on the attitude of an appraiser.

The conclusion is that a divine command theory fails to vindicate and instead contradicts a presupposition of our commitment to morality. 

This argument is invalid to see why consider the definition of objectivity Brink proposes in [2]; “Ethics is objective just in case there are facts or truths about what is good or bad and right or wrong that obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers“[3]. Central to his definition is the idea that objectivity involves appraiser independence. The truth of a moral judgement does not depend on the attitude of the appraiser.

However, there are two ways one can understand the notion of appraiser independence here, which correspond (loosely) to different accounts of objectivity in meta-ethical literature. One way is that truths about what is right and wrong obtain independently of the beliefs and attitudes of actual human appraisers. i.e. appraisers like you and I who are imperfect reasoners with limited information, subject to biases and make errors and mistakes.  

Chris Meyers expounds an understanding of appraiser independence along these lines. Meyers states that moral truth is objective when it’s “truth is independent of any particular appraisers or appraisals, but not independent of appraising generally”[4]…

The truth of a moral judgment is determined not by our actual judgments – which might be arbitrary, biased, or otherwise irrational – but on the judgments we would hypothetically make under ideal circumstances. An act is wrong, for example, if it would be prohibited by principles regulating interpersonal conduct that would be freely agreed to by rational agents in ideal conditions.

This understanding of appraiser independence distinguishes the attitudes and beliefs of actual human appraisers and the attitudes and beliefs that an appraiser would hold in ideal conditions: conditions of full information, flawlessly rationality, impartiality, etc. Moral judgements are subjective when facts about what is right and wrong depend on the attitude of actual human appraisers towards those judgements. 

This understanding of objectivity is associated with constructionist accounts of morality. However, it is also implicit in the writings of moral realists who account for moral facts in terms of the attitudes of ideal observers or facts about what communities or individuals would rationally desire or endorse under conditions of full information. [5]

The second understanding of appraiser independence is that moral judgements are objective just in case truths about right and wrong obtain independently of what any appraiser thinks. This would include actual human appraisers, but also idealized agents, hypothetical ideal observers or even God.

These two different understandings of “appraiser independence” help us see Brink’s argument’s subtle flaw. Suppose we adopt the first understanding of appraiser independence. Brink’s argument becomes: 

[1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective 

[2] moral requirements are objective if and only if facts or truths about what is right or wrong obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of any actual human appraisers. 

[3] If divine command metaethics is true, facts about right and wrong, depend on the attitude of an actual human appraiser. 

Taken this way [3] is obviously false. Divine command metaethics does not make facts about right and wrong depend upon an actual human appraiser. It entails that moral facts depend on God’s attitudes. Brink is aware of this fact. He argues that divine command metaethics is “subjectivism at the highest level” because “God’s attitudes play a metaphysical, not just an epistemic, role in morality; his attitudes make things good or right” Moreover, in the very same paragraph, Brink states that: “If God exists and is both omniscient and perfectly good, then his approval – if only we could ascertain it – would be a perfectly reliable – indeed, infallible.” So, God, would be a person who appraises under ideal conditions.  He is not an appraiser like you or I: an imperfect reasoner with limited information, subject to biases, and makes errors and mistakes. 

For this reason, I think it is best to read Brink as adopting the second understanding of appraiser independence in his argument. Hence we should read the argument as:

[1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective 

[2] moral requirements are objective if and only if facts or truths about what is right or wrong that obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of any human or ideal appraisers. 

[3]If divine command metaethics is true, facts about right and wrong, depend on the attitude of an ideal appraiser. 

Given Brink’s own meta-ethical views, this seems to be a much more plausible interpretation of his intent. This reading of the argument also makes [3] true. Divine command theories do entail that facts about right and wrong depend on the attitude of an ideal appraiser. In this respect, it is similar to ideal observer theories, constructivist theories and various forms of response-dependent realism. All of which account for moral facts in terms of the responses of appraisers under ideal conditions. 

The problem, however, is that for this argument to be valid, the word “objective must have the same meaning in premises [1] and [2]. Consequently, we must read premise [1] as claiming that our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are appraiser independent in the sense Brink defines in premise [2].

However, there doesn’t appear to be any reason for thinking that our commitment to the objectivity of morality commits us to this stronger conception of appraisal independence. Note again the argument Brink gives for [1]

Ethics is objective just in case there are facts or truths about what is good or bad and right or wrong that obtain independently of the moral beliefs or attitudes of appraisers. A commitment to objectivity is part of a commitment to the normativity of ethics. Moral judgments express normative claims about what we should do and care about. As such, they presuppose standards of behaviour and concern that purport to be correct, that could and should guide conduct and concern, and that we might fail to accept or live up to. Normativity, therefore, presupposes fallibility, and fallibility implies objectivity.[6] 

Note the inference here; Brink concludes that normative judgements assume that moral facts are appraiser independent. Why? Because normative judgements presuppose that “we” can fail to accept and live up to moral judgements. “We” are “fallible” and can make mistaken moral evaluations. Because “we” are fallible in this way that facts about what is right and wrong must be independent of the moral beliefs and attitudes of appraisers. 

This inference is valid if the appraisers in question are actual human appraisers. i.e. appraisers like you and I: imperfect reasoners, who have  limited information, are subject to biases, and make errors and mistakes. If “we” can have mistaken moral attitudes and beliefs, then correct moral judgements are independent of our attitudes and the attitudes of beings like us who share these limitations. But the argument is a non sequitur if Brink the appraisers in question include agents that appraise in ideal conditions. The fact, “we” can have mistaken moral attitudes and beliefs entails that correct moral judgements are independent of our attitudes. It does not entail that correct moral judgment is independent of appraisers’ attitudes who don’t make those mistakes. Ex hypothesis: agents who appraise under Idealised conditions, are not subject to the kind of biases, errors, and mistakes we are. 

I think this problem will afflict any attempt to argue that divine command metaethics does not account for the objective nature of moral judgements. Reasons for thinking morality is objective are typically based fallibility of the appraisers in question. The fact that individuals and societies can make mistaken appraisals. That history demonstrates reformers have pointed out flaws in our moral thinking and correctly advocated change against the tide of social pressure. That we think certain actions are wrong even if everyone approved of them. That societies have made progress in their judgements over time. That moral disagreement involves contradicting judgements other appraisers make and pointing out flaws in their reasoning or facts missed. That we don’t consider the appraisals made by racists and anti-Semites as correct as those made by people who advocate benevolence and charity. These features of moral discourse point to the fact that human appraisers are fallible: fallibility implies that the moral evaluations I make and what is wrong are distinct things and not always co-extensive. However, these features of our discourse do not presuppose that the truth of moral judgements is independent the attitudes of those who appraise under ideal conditions. They do not support the strong appraiser independence needed to justify the claim that God’s commands are not objective facts.

[1] David O Brink “The Autonomy of Ethics” The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 149.

[2] Ibid 154.

[3] Ibid 149.

[4] Chris Meyers, “Expressivism, constructivism, and the supervenience of moral properties”, Philosophical Explorations 15:1 (2012) 27. 

[5] For example, Peter Railton, “Moral Realism,” The Philosophical Review 95:2 (1986) 163-207

[6] David O Brink “The Autonomy of Ethics,” 152.

 

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Does the Incommensurability of Prudential and Impartial rationality avoid the dualism of Practical Reason?

August 14th, 2021 by Matt
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I have been discussing the dualism of practical reason. As I understand it, this is an inference from three premises:

[1] We always have most reason to do what is morally required

[2] An act is morally required if and only if it is impartially demanded: demanded by rules justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence.

 [3] If there are cases where, what is impartially demanded of a person, is an action contrary to their long-term self-interest, then the strongest reasons do not always favour what is impartially demanded.

The conclusion: unless we assume that requirements of self-interest never substantially conflict with impartial demands, we can only coherently affirm [1] and [2]. Seeing [1] is a plausible thesis about the authority of requirements, and [2] is a plausible thesis about their content.  Our fundamental moral intuitions about morality cannot be reconciled.

One response to this argument is to deny [3]. This involves contending that impartial requirements are overriding: If impartial and prudential requirements clash, the former always take precedence. In my last post, I mentioned an argument made by Stephen Layman against this contention.   Layman asks us to consider the case of Ms Poore;

Ms. Poore has lived many years in grinding poverty. She is not starving, but has only the bare necessities. She has tried very hard to get ahead by hard work, but nothing has come of her efforts. An opportunity to steal a large sum of money arises. If Ms. Poore steals the money and invests it wisely, she can obtain many desirable things her poverty has denied her: cure for a painful (but nonfatal) medical condition, a well-balanced diet, decent housing, adequate heat in the winter, health insurance, new career opportunities through education, etc. Moreover, if she steals the money, her chances of being caught are very low, and she knows this. She is also aware that the person who owns the money is very wealthy and will not be greatly harmed by the theft. Let us add that Ms. Poore rationally believes that if she fails to steal the money, she will likely live in poverty for the remainder of her life. In short, Ms. Poore faces the choice of stealing the money or living in grinding poverty the rest of her life. In such a case, I think it would be morally wrong for Ms. Poore to steal the money; and yet, assuming there is no God and no life after death, failing to steal the money will likely deny her a large measure of personal fulfillment, i.e., a large measure of what is in her long-term best interests[1].

Layman takes this case to illustrate that impartial requirements are not overriding.  If there are cases where impartial demands require us to make a great sacrifice that confers relatively modest benefits on others, the strongest reasons do not support complying with impartial demands.[2] 

Peter Bryne has criticised Layman’s example. He writes:

Layman’s way of approaching his moral argument suggests the following picture: rational agents are aware of a variety of reasons for action. They see prudential reasons vying with moral reasons. They measure whether moral reasons for doing something outweigh prudential reasons for not doing it, and they follow that set of reasons which is stronger overall. Now it is time to ask the question “From what standpoint does Layman’s rational agent weigh or measure reasons for action?[3] 

Bryne thinks this is question raises an important challenge:

The unclarity in the language of weighing reasons for action, and of judging which reasons are stronger than others, lies in the fact that such language implies a common, neutral means of measuring the reasons. The very contrast, however, between morality and self-interest suggests that there can be no such means. The agent is faced with a choice between points of view and perspectives. From within a point of view or perspective, there can be weighing. What remains a mystery is how any agent could measure the relative strengths of the two kinds of consideration from neither the moral or prudential point of view but from a neutral standpoint.[4]

Bryne’s criticism seems to be this. Layman example imagines an agent “weighing” impartial reasons against prudential reasons against each other and attempting to answer the question as to which reasons are stronger or take precedence. This implies there is some rational perspective, which is neutral between prudence and impartial demands, which can weigh and adjudicate them in a conflict. 

Bryne thinks this is misleading. The clash between prudential and impartial reasons involves a clash between requirements justified by incommensurable points of “points of view” or “perspectives”. These points of view are perspectives on what interests to take into account and how much weight to give them. The impartial point of view is a perspective that takes into account everyone’s interests and forms a conclusion based on giving these interests equal weight and consideration. From this point of view, you always have decisive reasons to do what is impartially required. By contrast, the prudential point of view is a view that only gives takes into account the interest of the individual agent and gives equal weight to the future and past interests of this individual agent. From this perspective, you should always act in your long-term self-interest. 

Because these are differing perspectives on what interests to take into account and how much weight to give conflicting interests, there can be no question-begging way of weighing the conclusions of each procedure against each other. You can weigh reasons for and against actions in accord with one or more of these perspectives. You can have allegiance to one or both perspectives, and weigh from that perspective. One can also give up allegiance to one perspective in favour of another. But, when they clash, you cannot accept both perspectives simultaneously and weigh them against each other. 

I am inclined to think Byrne’s response here misses the point. Consider how Ms Poore’s case appears on Bryne’s analysis. Ms. Poore “faces the choice of stealing the money or living in grinding poverty the rest of her life”. However, you analyse this; she still has to choose what to do in this situation; she must act one way or the other. In Bryne’s terms, we can ask Which perspective should she use in making the decision and weighing the relevant factors. Which point of view should she give allegiance to? Which should she give up allegiance to? Bryne’s analysis seems to imply there is no reason one can give for or against either answer. There is no “rational” or “neutral point of view” by which she can make this choice. The implication is that Ms Poore does not have stronger or weightier reasons to do what is impartially required. This isn’t because prudential reasons sometimes outweigh or trump impartial reasons, but because one cannot coherently claim one is weightier than the other without begging the very question at issue. 

Concerns about the dualism of practical reason are concerns about a specific sort of practical dilemma. Suppose it is not always in one’s long-term self-interest to act according to impartial demands. This will mean impartial demands sometimes come into conflict with prudential requirements. When they do, we face the question: What reason is there to act impartially, rather than in one’s self-interest. What reason do we have for assuming that impartial demands are always stronger or weightier than prudential requirements when the two clash? The concern is that no answer to this question is forthcoming. If impartial and prudential requirements cannot be weighed against each other, then its hard to see how the former can always be weightier or take precedence in a clash. If they are incommensurable, we cannot have reasons for preferring one to the other.

Several commentators argue that this is precisely Sidgwick’s point when he agonised over the dualism of practical reason[5]. Note the argument Sidgwick gives for [3]

[U]nless the egoist affirms, implicitly or explicitly, that his own greatest happiness is not merely •the rational ultimate end for himself but •a part of universal good; and he can avoid the ‘proof’ of utilitarianism by declining to affirm this. Common sense won’t let him deny that the distinction between himself and any other person is real and fundamental; so it puts him in a position to think: ‘I am concerned with the quality of my existence as an individual in a fundamentally important sense in which I am not concerned with the quality of the existence of anyone else’; and I don’t see how it can be proved that this distinction ought not to be taken as fundamental in fixing the ultimate goal of an individual’s rational action… If an egoist isn’t moved by what I have called proof, the only way of arguing him into aiming at everyone’s happiness is to show that this gives him his best chance of greatest happiness for himself. And even if he admits that the principle of rational benevolence is self-evident, he may still hold •that it is irrational for him to sacrifice his own happiness to any other end;[6] 

Here, Sidgwick imagines an “egoist”: someone who has “given allegiance” to the prudential point of view and weighs reasons in accord with this perspective. This egoist discovers that an impartial point of view would prohibit some action. Does the egoist have any reason to heed this prohibition? Sidgwick argues that, unless it can be shown that doing so is in his interest, the answer is no. From the egoist’s “perspective” or “point of view,” the effects of the action on his long-term interests is the only factor that carries weight in the decision. Providing does not implicitly give allegiance to an impartial point of view, or he is willing to give up any allegiance he does have to it; he will have no reason to do what is impartially required. Nor does he have any question-begging reason why he should switch allegiance to this point of view. 

On this interpretation: the dualism of practical reason is the problem that impartial and prudential requirements are requirements justified from incommensurable points of view. Because human beings recognise both prudential and impartial reasons for acting in their practical reasoning, they implicitly give allegiance to both. This is not a problem if their requirements are consistent. But if they contradict each other, we will be rationally committed both to both doing and not doing the same action. The incommensurability of these perspectives means there is no rational basis for resolving the contradiction in favour of impartiality. Sidgwick writes:

[W]here we find a conflict between self-interest and duty, practical reason, being divided against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side. The conflict would have to be decided by which of two groups of non-rational impulses had more force. So we have this: •The harmony of duty and self-interest is a hypothesis that is required if we are to avoid a basic contradiction in one chief part of our thought.[7]

We can put it this way: Either prudential and impartial reasons are commensurable, or they are incommensurable. If they are commensurable, then when these requirements clash, we will need some reason for thinking that impartial reasons are always weightier. The Ms Poore case suggests this is not the case. By contrast, suppose that prudential and impartial requirements are incommensurable perspectives, and we cannot weigh them against each other. If they clash, we will have to choose which perspective to follow, and we will have no reason to follow one or the other. It will simply be an arbitrary act of allegiance. Either way, we will lack decisive reasons always to do what is impartiality required.

[1] C. Stephen Layman “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy, 23 (2006): 307

[2] Layman, “God and the Moral Order” 308

[3] Peter Bryne “God and the Moral Order: A Reply to Layman” Faith and Philosophy, 23:2 (2006): 201

[4] Bryne, “God and the Moral Order: A Reply to Layman” 206-207:

[5] See for example, Derek Parfit On What Matters (Volume 1) (Oxford: Oxford University Press : 2011) 130-134. See also Francesco Orsi, “The Dualism of the Practical Reason: Some Interpretations and Responses” Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, 10:2 (2008): 25-26

[6] Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, 242 available at https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/sidgwick1874.pdf accessed 20/3/21

[7] Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, 284 available at https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/sidgwick1874.pdf accessed 20/3/21

 

 

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Does the Dualism of Practical Reason assume Egoism?

July 30th, 2021 by Matt
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Recently, I have been examining the question, “If there is no God, why be good?” As I interpret it, this expresses an argument about the “dualism of practical reason” made by Henry Sidgwick and John Gay. This argument had three steps.

  • First, unless we assume that it is always in our long-term self-interest to follow the demands of impartial altruism, we will not always have decisive reasons to do our duty.
  • Second, secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. They imply that it is not always in our long-term self-interest to follow impartial demands.
  • By contrast, if true, a divine command theory would vindicate this assumption and provide a coherent account of our fundamental intuitions about the authority and content of moral requirements.

The conclusion is that those divine command theories can coherently answer the question: “why should I always do my duty?” whereas secular ethical theories cannot.

The first step of this argument was motivated by concerns about “the dualism of practical reasoning”. A contradiction that results from three intuitively plausible premises:

[1] We always have decisive reasons to do what is morally required.

[2] An action is morally required if it is required by rules justified from a perspective of impartial altruism.[1]

[3] If there are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with our long-term self-interest, we do not always have decisive reasons to do what is required by impartially justified rules.

These three premises entail that we must either: (a) embrace the thesis that impartial demands and prudential demands never conflict or (b) embrace a contradiction. Affirming both that we do and do not always have decisive reasons to do morality requires.

Some object that [3] assumes the truth of rational Egoism: the thesis that I have a reason to perform some action if and only if, and because performing that action maximises my self-interest. Walter Sinnott Armstrong, states.

Harming others is sometimes in some people’s best interest, even considering probable costs. In those cases, some theists say that only a divine threat of Hell provides a reason to be moral. Since atheists and agnostics do not believe in God, they do not believe in divine retribution for sins, so they have to admit that sometimes some people could get away with immorality and then they have no self-interested reason to be moral. Does that mean that these people have no reason at all to be moral? No. That conclusion would follow only if every reason had to be self-interested, selfish, or egoistic. There is no basis for that assumption. Many reasons are not based on self-interest…[2]

Armstrong provides cases where the fact an act would benefit other people provides us with reasons to do it. He concludes:

“The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. These reasons are not self-interested. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me. These unselfish reasons can answer the question, “Why be moral?”[3]

I think this dismisses the problem far too quickly. In this post, I will explain why I think this.

At the outset, one must concede that some important defenders of [3] have appealed rational Egoism. Consider, John Gay; Gay argued that:

Thus those who either or don’t mention the will of God, making the immediate criterion of virtue to be the good of mankind; must either allow that virtue is not in all cases obligatory (contrary to the idea which all or most men have of it) or they must say that the good of mankind is a sufficient obligation. But how can the good of mankind by any obligation to me, when perhaps, However, its clear in particular cases, such as laying down my life, or the like, it is contrary to my happiness?[4]

Gay uses the word “obligatory” to refer to what agents have decisive reasons to do. However, he bases his conclusion on an egoist understanding of practical reasons. Earlier, he wrote, “Obligation is the necessity of doing or omitting any action in order to be happy” we are obliged to do or omit an action…” when there is such a relation between an Agent and an action that the agent cannot be happy without doing or omitting that action.”[5]

On some interpretations, Sidgwick held a similar view. According to David Brink: “Sidgwick wants to represent the dualism of practical reason as a conflict between a utilitarian account of duty and an egoistic or prudential account of rationality.”[6]

If rational Egoism is true, we have a powerful argument favouring [3]. Suppose we grant rational Egoism and affirm the antecedent of [3] we get.

[3a] We have a reason to perform some action if and only if, and because performing that action maximises my self-interest.

[3b] There are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with our long-term self-interest

The conclusion that follows is

[3c] There are cases where we have no reasons to do what is demanded by impartially justified rules.

So, it is true that many people who have argued for [3] have appealed to Egoism. It is also true that rational Egoism would, if true, provide grounds affirming [3]. However, these facts do not show that [3] assumes rational Egoism. All they show is that some arguments for [3] depend on rational Egoism.

There are other arguments for [3] which, do not appeal to rational Egoism, which have the same result. Consider, for example, David Brink, whom I mentioned above. Brink is a leading secular meta-ethicist representing a position known as “Cornell realism“: a research project that attempts to vindicate objective moral facts within a scientific-naturalist view of the world. In doing so, Brink appeals to the thesis that all reasons for action are agent-relative: “Reasons for action are dependent on the aims or interests of the agent who has them.”[7] According to this thesis, what an agent has reasons to do, is a function of or derived from his desires and interests. Facts about reasons are simply facts about what humans desire are interested in or aim at under certain conditions.  This thesis is popular in contemporary philosophy. Brink summarises some of the reasons for its popularity:

Agent-relative assumptions seem to underlie many formal and informal discussions of individual rationality in philosophy, economics, and politics. Moreover, an agent-relative theory provides a reliable link between reasons for action and motivation, we expect one who recognises reasons for action to be motivated to act on them, and an agent seems more likely to be motivated by facts about his own interest or desires than by facts about the interest or desires of others. Also, when we explain an agent’s behaviour as an attempt to satisfy certain desires, given her beliefs, we are said to “rationalise” her behaviour. This suggests that genuinely rational behavior is that which would promote the agent’s desires or at least those desires that she would have if she met certain epistemic conditions.[8]

This thesis does not entail that all reasons are self-interested. Even if benefiting another does not promote my interests, it can still fulfil my desires or aims. What the thesis rules out is the existence of “impartial reasons”. Reasons to promote the good of others that don’t derive from the interests or aims of the agent in question.[9] Moreover, if the thesis is true, there is a sound argument for something like [3].

[3a]* An agent has a reason to perform some action if and only if, and because, that performing that achieves ّthe agents aims or promotes the agents’ interests

[3b]* there are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with the agents’ aims and is not in the agents’ interest

Therefore

[3c] There are cases where we have no reasons to do what is demanded by impartially justified rules. [10]

Because this thesis entails that we have no reason to comply with morality in cases where doing so is not in our interests and contrary to our aims, other philosophers reject it. They contend there are also impartial reasons: reasons to promote the welfare of others that don’t derive from our interests and aims. However, even if one grants the existence of impartial reasons, worries about the dualism of practical reason still arise. Brink explains:

[W]e do not need to think of rationality in exclusively prudential terms to raise this worry. The worry can arise even if there are impartial reasons-that is, nonderivative reasons to promote the welfare of others. For as long as there are prudential reasons, a conflict between impartial reason and prudential reason appears possible. Without some reason to treat impartial reasons as superior, the supremacy of other-regarding morality must remain doubtful.[11]

Suppose impartial rules demand something contrary to our self-interests. If such cases occur, impartial reasons will point in one direction, and our interests and aims will point in another. This situation generates the sceptical question, “Why be Moral?” What reason do I have, in such cases, to follow impartial rules, not my self-interest? One cannot answer this question by pointing out we have impartial reasons to follow such rules. The question, after all, is why I should give impartial reasons precedence? Nor can it be answered by appealing to my interests or aims because the case is one where morality and such things conflict. 

Stephen Layman provides a vivid example of the problem:

Ms Poore has lived many years in grinding poverty. She is not starving but has only the bare necessities. She has tried very hard to get ahead by hard work, but nothing has come of her efforts. An opportunity to steal a large sum of money arises. If Ms. Poore steals the money and invests it wisely, she can obtain many desirable things her poverty has denied her: cure for a painful (but nonfatal) medical condition, a well-balanced diet, decent housing, adequate heat in the winter, health insurance, new career opportunities through education, etc. Moreover, if she steals the money, her chances of being caught are very low, and she knows this. She is also aware that the person who owns the money is very wealthy and will not  be greatly harmed by the theft …Ms. Poore faces the choice of stealing the money or living in grinding poverty the rest of her life. In such a case, I think it would be morally wrong for Ms. Poore to steal the money; and yet, assuming there is no God and no life after death, failing to steal the money will likely deny her a large measure of personal fulfilment, i.e. a large measure of what is in her long-term best interests.[12] 

Layman accepts that Ms Poore has impartial reasons not to steal.[13] However, these reasons conflict with powerful prudential reasons to steal. Plausibly, there are stronger reasons to break in cases like this than complying with impartial rules. Compliance will be “irrational—in the sense that it involves acting on inferior or weaker reasons.”[14] 

Let’s recap the dialectic: if rational egoism is true, we lack reason to obey impartial rules if doing so is contrary to our self-interest. If all reasons are agent-relative: we will lack reason to obey if doing so is not in our interests nor promotes our aims. By contrast, if there are impartial reasons, if compliance is not in our interest, prudential and impartial reasons will conflict. There is no reason always to treat impartial rules as having precedence in such conflicts. Even if rational egoism is false, a problematic dualism of practical reason looms.

[1] To avoid wordiness, I will use the phrase “impartially justified rules” to refer to rules which are justified from a perspective of impartial altruism.

[2] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 114

[3] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 117

[4] John Gay on Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 29/7/21

[5] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 29/7/21

[6] David Brink, “Sidgwick’s dualism of Practical Reason” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 66:3, 1998. 303. Brink’s interpretation of Sidgwick is controversial.

[7] David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Ethics”, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 6, Ethics, (1992) 1

[8] David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Ethics”, 2

[9] David Brink “Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy” in In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press (1997) 257

[10] See David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Morality” and also “Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy” in In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. (Oxford University Press, 1997). 255–291 for the articulation of an agent-relative version of what is essentially the same problem.

[11] David Brink, “Self-Love and Altruism” Social Philosophy & Policy 14 (1997) 123

[12] C. Stephen Layman “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy, 23 (2006): 307

[13] Layman “God and the Moral Order” 305:

[14] Stephen Layman Letters to Doubting Thomas: A Case for the Existence of God, (Oxford University Press, 2006) 242

 

 

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Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma: Part IV

May 20th, 2021 by Matt
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This is a talk I gave to the Philosophy Club at Glendale Community College in Phoenix, Arizona, this weekend. The talk was followed by a long discussion with some faculty, students at the college, and others who zoomed in.

In this talk, I introduced and defended a divine command theory of ethics. I divided the talk into three parts. In section I, I set out what modern divine command theories of ethics typically contend. I distinguished this from some common misunderstandings in section II. In Section III, I discussed the Euthyphro dilemma. I argued this objection is not the conclusive rebuttal it is often assumed to be. In my first post, I reproduced sections I and II. My second post began my discussion of the Euthyphro objection in section III. Focusing on the Anything Goes Objection. My third post examined the claim that a divine command theory would, if true, entail that morality is arbitrary. This post concludes this discussion. 

In my last post, I argued that divine command theories do not entail that morality is arbitrary. If anything, the opposite is the case. A divine command theory entails that actions will be wrong in virtue of those actions’ non-moral properties, properties that would provide an informed, loving and just person with reasons for prohibiting those actions.

The Vacuity Objection

Finally, critics press what is known as the vacuity objection. A divine command theory entails that “the doctrine of the goodness of God is rendered meaningless”[1]  Oppy puts the objection forcefully: “It cannot be…that God’s commands or decisions determine what is morally good because God is morally good prior to the giving of those commands or the making of those decisions.”[2]  If God is essentially good, he must be good prior to the issue any commands. However, this means that goodness cannot depend upon the existence of these commands. If it did, goodness would exist prior to itself. 

Like the previous objection, I think this one is based on an equivalent. In the first section of this talk, I pointed out that the word “good” is ambiguous”. I stated that a divine command theory is an account of moral requirements, not an account of goodness in general. This observation is essential here. When divine command theorists say God’s commands determine what is good, they mean only that the existence of moral obligations or moral requirements depends upon God. By contrast, when a divine command theorist says God is good, he means by this that God has certain character traits: God is loving, just, impartial, faithful, in all possible worlds.  

But the question of whether someone has certain character traits is distinct from whether they have moral requirements to behave in a certain way. 

Consider a nihilist who denies the existence of objective moral requirements. This nihilist could, if he wanted, choose to live in accord with the norms of justice and could decide to be a faithful, loving and impartial person. What he could not do is claim that there exists any moral obligation to live this way.[3] 

This distinction removes the sting from Oppy’s objection. God’s commands determine the existence and content of moral requirements. This does not mean his commands determine whether people can have certain character traits. Consequently, God can have these character traits prior to giving any commands.

Even if, antecedent to commanding, God has no moral duties, it does not follow that he can’t have certain character traits. Traits such as being truthful, benevolent, loving, gracious, merciful. Nor does it mean he is not opposed to actions such as murder, rape, torturing people for fun, and so on. If God has no duties, he is not under any obligation to love others or tell the truth, but that does not mean he cannot love others or be truthful. God does not have to have a duty to do something to do it.

 Conclusion

The “anything goes,” “arbitrariness,” and “vacuity” objections, therefore, all fail. This is significant because these are the three reasons commonly given for rejecting Divine command theories. Almost everyone who dismisses the claim that morality is dependent upon God cites these three objections as decisive. Seeing that these objections all fail, in the absence of further argument, one cannot proclaim with any confidence that a divine command theory is a flawed theory.

[1] James Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Mcgraw-hill Education, 2003), 50.

[2]Graham Oppy, “Morality Does Not Depend Upon God,” in Problems in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Major Debates on Knowledge, Reality, Values, and Government, ed. Steve Cowan (Bloomsbury Publishing House, Forthcoming 2018).

[3] For this point, see John L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), 26-27.  

 

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Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma: Part III

May 16th, 2021 by Matt
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This is a talk I gave to the Philosophy Club at Glendale Community College in Phoenix, Arizona, this weekend. The talk was followed by a long discussion with some faculty, students at the college, and others who zoomed in.

In this talk, I introduced and defended a divine command theory of ethics. I divided the talk into three parts. In section I, I set out what modern divine command theories of ethics typically contend. I distinguished this from some common misunderstandings in section II. In Section III, I discussed the Euthyphro dilemma. I will suggest this objection is not the conclusive rebuttal it is often assumed to be. In my first post, I reproduced sections I and II. My second post began my discussion of the Euthyphro objection in section III. This post continues that discussion. 

In my last post, I argued that a divine command theory does not entail the content of morality is arbitrary, in the sense that anything at all could be right or wrong. It entails that an action can only be permissible, only in situations where it is possible for a fully informed, rational, loving and just person to command it knowingly. Far from being absurd, this implication is entirely plausible. 

Some have objected that divine command theory makes morality arbitrary in a different sense. It means there is no reason why one action is right or wrong rather than another. Russ Shafer-Landau presses the following dilemma: “Either there are, or there are not, excellent reasons that support God’s prohibitions. If there are no such reasons, then God’s choice is arbitrary, i.e. insufficiently well supported by reason and argument.” [1] Alternatively:

If God is, in fact, issuing commands based on excellent reasons, then it is those excellent reasons and not the fact of God’s having commanded various actions, that make those actions right. The excellent reasons that support the requirements of charity and kindness are what make it right to be charitable and kind.[2]

We can summarise this argument as follows, take a paradigmatically immoral action such as rape.

(P1) Either (a) God has a reason for prohibiting rape, or (b) God has no reason for prohibiting rape. 

(P2) If God has no reason for prohibiting rape, then God’s commands are arbitrary. 

(P3) If God has a reason for prohibiting rape, then that reason is what makes rape morally wrong. 

(P4) If something distinct from God’s commands is what makes rape morally wrong, then the divine command theory is false.  

(C1) Either morality is arbitrary, or the divine command theory is false 

This argument is based on a subtle equivocation. (P3) and (P4) refer to what “makes” something morally right. But the word “makes” is ambiguous. 

In this context, Stephen Sullivan has argued that the word “make” can be used in two different senses.[3] The first sense refers to what Sullivan calls a constitutive explanation: On a hot February day, I pour a glass of water to drink it and quench my thirst. There is a legitimate sense in which I can say that what makes me pour a glass of water is the fact that I am pouring a glass of H20. When I speak like this, I use the word “makes” to refer to a relationship of identity. I am explaining one thing (the pouring of the water) but citing the existence of another thing that I take to be identical with it.

The second sense involves what Sullivan calls a motivational explanation, such as when I state that what makes me pour a glass of water is the fact that I am thirsty. Motivational explanations do not explain an action by referring to something taken to be identical with it. Instead, they attempt to tell us why an agent acted the way they did by giving us the reasons and motivations the agent acted upon. 

Let’s assume that Landau is using the word “makes” in the “motivational” sense. The inference is:

(P1) Either (a) God has reasons for prohibiting rape, or (b) God doesn’t have reasons for prohibiting rape. 

(P2) If God doesn’t have reasons for prohibiting rape, then God’s commands are arbitrary. 

(P3)’ If God has reasons for prohibiting rape, then those reasons motivationally explain why rape is morally wrong.  

(P4)’ If something distinct from God’s commands motivationally explain why rape is morally wrong, then a divine command theory is false.  

(C1) Either morality is arbitrary, or the divine command theory is false. 

On this interpretation of the argument (P3)’ is plausible. Suppose God has reasons for issuing the commands he does, and the property of being wrong is identical with the property of being contrary to God’s commands. In that case, these reasons do provide a motivational explanation as to why rape is wrong. However, (P4′) is false. The fact that God’s prohibition does not motivationally explain the wrongness of rape is wrong does not entail that the prohibition is not identical to the moral wrongness of rape. Divine command theories contend that wrongness is identical with the property of being contrary to God’s commands. So it only in the constitutive sense of the word “makes” that they deny anything other than God’s commands “make” actions wrong. 

Consequently, For Shafer-Landau’s argument to have a bite, he must use the word “makes” to refer to a constitutional explanation. So interpreted, the argument is:

(P1) Either: (a) God has reasons for prohibiting rape, or (b) God doesn’t have reasons for prohibiting rape. 

(P2) If God doesn’t have reasons for prohibiting rape, then God’s commands are arbitrary. 

(P3)” If God has reasons for prohibiting rape, then those reasons are identical with the property of moral wrongness.   

(P4)” If something distinct from God’s commands is identical with the property of moral wrongness, then a divine command theory is false.  

(C1) Either morality is arbitrary, or the divine command theory is false. 

On this interpretation (P4)” is plausible, if something distinct from God’s prohibition is identical with wrongness. God’s prohibition cannot be identical with wrongness.

However, now (P3)” turns out to be implausible. Why should the fact that God has reasons for issuing a command mean that those reasons are identical with the property of being morally wrong? The Landau seems to assume the following inference: If A is identical to B, and someone has reasons r for bringing about B, then A is identical with r.  However, this inference is invalid. An analogy will show this; A Batchelor is identical to an unmarried man, John has reasons for being unmarried, he dislikes women. Does it follow that the property of being a Bachelor is identical with the property of disliking women?[4]

Landau’s argument, therefore, is unsound. Graham Oppy proposes a more direct argument for the conclusion that a divine command theory makes morality arbitrary:

Could it have been, for example, that murder, rape, lying, stealing and cheating were good because God proclaimed them so? Surely not! But what could explain God’s inability to bring it about, that murder, rape, lying, stealing and cheating are good by proclaiming them so, other than its being the case that murder, rape, lying, stealing and cheating are wrong quite apart from any proclamations that God might make?[5]

However, this is implausible. Suppose God has character traits such as being essentially loving and just. In that case, God can and would have reasons for prohibiting actions like rape, murder, or cheating, quite apart from whether these actions are antecedently wrong. Antecedent to any command on God’s part, these actions won’t have the property of being morally prohibited. But they could still have other properties such as being cruel or harmful or unjust or detrimental to human happiness— or being expressions of hatred, for example. And a loving and just God could prohibit these actions because these actions have these non-moral properties.

Consequently, divine command theories do not entail that morality is arbitrary. If anything, the opposite is the case. A divine command theory entails that actions will be wrong in virtue of certain non-moral properties those actions have. Non-moral properties that would provide an informed, loving and just person with reasons for prohibiting those actions.

[1] Russ Shafer-Landau, “Introduction to Part IV,” in Ethical Theory: An Anthology, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 237.

[2]Ibid., 238.

[3] Stephen Sullivan, “Arbitrariness, Divine Commands, and Morality,” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 33:1 (1993): 33-45.

[4] These points are made cogently by Stephen Sullivan, “Arbitrariness, Divine Commands, and Morality,” 37-39. See also Matthew Flannagan’s, “Is Ethical Naturalism More Plausible than Supernaturalism: A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,” Philo 15:1 (2012): 19-37.

[5]  Graham. Oppy, Best Argument against God (Hampshire: Palgrave Pivot, 2014), 44.

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