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Is Naturalism simpler than Theism? Some reflections on Graham Oppy’s “Best argument against God”

October 30th, 2018 by Matt
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In Best Argument Against God (BAAG) Graham Oppy sketches a sophisticated argument for atheism. Oppy’s conclusion is the result of applying a particular method to the question of God’s existence. He contends that question of Gods existence should not be determined by examining the arguments for and against the existence of God. Instead philosophy of religion :“is concerned with the clash between theistic and atheistic worldviews (or theories),” The correct way to proceed is: “(1) to develop the best theistic and atheistic theories; (2) to assess the liability of these best theories to internal defeat; and (3) to make an assessment of the comparative theoretical virtues of these best theories, paying attention to simplicity, fit with data, explanatory scope, predictive accuracy, and the like.”[1] The putative data being such things as that “there is something rather than nothing; there being a universe; there being natural laws; there being cosmic fine-tuning; there being rational, conscious agents; there being moral laws; there being dictates of conscience; and so forth.”[2]

Oppy argues that when this method is followed, there is a good reason to reject the existence of God. He contrasts Theism with naturalism:     the view that “that causal reality is natural reality” and “no supernatural causes exist”.  Looking at how each worldview accounts for such things as the existence of the universe, fine-tuning, morality and various other “putative data”.

 While Oppy thinks both theism and naturalism can provide defensible, coherent theories and that fit the data; naturalism is a preferable worldview because it is simpler. One theoretical virtue we use to asses’ theories is simplicity: “If everything else is equal, we should prefer the more simple theory to the less simple theory.”[3] Oppy argues that  “prior to the introduction of data, naturalism trumps theism on the grounds of simplicity and that none of the data that we consider favours theism over naturalism.”[4]

I think Oppy claim that “prior to the data naturalism is simpler than theism” is mistaken. It is this claim that I will discuss in this post.

 Oppy’s argument for the simplicity of naturalism 

Let’s begin by asking why Oppy thinks naturalism is simpler than Theism? Oppy’s argument is succinct:

Naturalism is simpler than Theism: it postulates fewer kinds of entities, fewer kinds of primitive properties and fewer kinds of primitive principles. According to Theism, there are two kinds of entities – natural and supernatural – whereas according to Naturalism, there is only one kind. According to Theism, there are two kinds of causation – natural causation and supernatural causation – whereas according to Naturalism, there is only one kind.[5]

There are three ideas here: First,  Oppy claims that [1] According to naturalism there is only one kind of entity and one kind of causation. Natural entities and natural causes.   By contrast [2] theism postulates two kinds of entities and causes, natural and supernatural. Third, Oppy thinks [3] the fact theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism means naturalism is simpler. I think each of Oppy’s premises is questionable.

Criticism of Oppy’s argument

Does Naturalism postulate only one kind of entity?
Let us begin with [1] the claim that according to naturalism there is only one kind of entity and one kind of causation. There are two potential problems here.

First, this conclusion is incompatible with Oppy’s own definition of naturalism. Oppy defines naturalism as follows: “Naturalism says that causal reality is natural reality: the domain of causes is nothing more nor less than the natural world.”[6]  However, according to this definition, naturalism is simply the denial of supernatural causation. It says nothing whatsoever about whether non-natural entices or properties exist, such entities and properties are perfectly possible, provided they don’t enter into causal relationships.

This brings me to the second problem, let’s suppose for the sake of argument naturalism did contend that only natural properties and entities exist.  This wouldn’t mean that only one kind of entity or property existed. Oppy states:

Any suitably elaborated naturalism will hold that some features of the natural world are primitive – not susceptible of further explanation – whereas other features of the natural world are fully explained in terms of those primitive features. Thus, for example, some naturalists suppose that all of the primitive features of the natural world are physical features – i.e. features that lie in the proper domain of the discipline of physics. Other naturalists suppose that there are features of the natural world – for example, the psychological states of human beings – that cannot be fully explained in terms of the fundamental physical properties. The key point to note is that all naturalists suppose that there are no supernatural causal properties[7]

Here Oppy here suggests that when he refers to natural features, properties and he isn’t using this word to refer to one kind of thing, such as material or physical things. Rather the natural world consists of multiple different primitive properties.

Does theism postulate two kinds of entities and two kinds of causes?

This brings us to [2] Oppy’s claim that theism postulates two kinds of entities and causes, natural and supernatural. I think this is false. theism is the claim that God exists, hence according to theism a supernatural being with supernatural causal powers exists. But theism by itself, prior to the data, entails nothing about the existence of natural entities or natural causes.

Nor is this a picky pedantic point because there are prominent forms of theism which affirm neither the existence of natural entities or natural causes. Let’s look first at the question of “natural entities” Some theists notably George Berkeley and Jonathan Edwards have been idealists. According to idealism, the only things that exist are immaterial minds or souls.  Physical objects are purely phenomenal: a physical object is a collection of sensations a mind has such as a perception of shape, colour, a feeling of texture, a smell, and a there is no underlying material substratum to such objects which exist only as sensations in immaterial human or divine minds.    Of course, Idealism has always been a minority view. Most theists today realists: they believe that physical objects do have an underlying substratum, distinct from mental sensations, which exists in space and time and God creates and sustains material objects in being.

The point, however, is that theism is part of and compatible with both idealism and realism. Whether a Theist postulates the existence of distinct natural entities or not depends on how he accounts for some of the purported data particularly the data that: “there is something rather than nothing; there being a universe; there being rational, conscious agent’s”. Prior to the data, theism affirms only that a supernatural being exists.

The same point can be made regarding “natural causation”.  Whether there exists natural causes distinct from God’s supernatural causation has been, and is, a matter of dispute amongst Theists. Many theists have advocated concurrentism. Concurrentism is the view that God created the material world with certain natural causal powers and He sustains it in existence, moment by moment, and concurs with the causal transactions that take place in it.  According to concurrentism, while distinct natural properties have natural causal powers exist, they do so by God͛’s creating and sustaining activity, and they require God ͛ s concurring causal activity to operate.

By contrast, occasionalists have denied the existence of distinct natural causes. All causation is reducible to the supernatural causation of God.    If objects, like fire, appear to cause another object, like cotton, to burst into flame, this is because God has decreed that when a fire is placed next to cotton, cotton will burn.  Natural causation does not involve powers inherent in nature; it occurs because there is a pre-existing law of nature that dictates that when certain events happen, other events will follow.  These laws of nature just are divine decrees.  The result is that all so-called natural causation is really divine causation.  God is the only and sole cause in nature. [8]

Theism itself a part of and compatible with both concurrentism and occasionalism. Whether a theist postulates the existence of distinct natural causes or not depends on how he accounts for some of the purported data particularly the data that “there are laws of nature”.  Prior to the data, theism affirms only that a supernatural being exists.

  1. If theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism, does it follow that naturalism is simpler?

This brings us to Oppy’s third claim: that if theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism does, then naturalism is a simpler worldview. This to contradict the criteria of simplicity which Oppy himself explicitly offers.  Oppy elaborates the criterion of simplicity as follows:

(a) Simplicity: If everything else is equal, we should prefer the more simple theory to the less simple theory. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer (and less complex) primitive entities. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that invokes fewer (and less complex) primitive features. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that appeals to fewer (and less complex) primitive principles.[9]

This doesn’t say that all else being equal we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer entities.  It states that “If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer (and less complex) primitive entities.”Oppy thinks that on any view of the world there will be features which are ‘primitive’; features that are “not susceptible of further explanation” whereas other features of the world are “fully explained in terms of those primitive features” and it is the number, and complexity of primitive features not the number of features per se that is relevant to simplicity.

Consequently, even if theism does postulate more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism does, it doesn’t follow naturalism is simpler.  This will only follow if Theists hold that these additional types of causes and entities are primitive. This, however, is not the case.  As Oppy himself states, according to theism “God is the cause of the existence of the natural world, and the source or ground or origin of most – if not all – of its significant features.”[10]  Consequentially, the natural causal order isn’t a primitive unexplained entity.

[1]  Graham Oppy “What Derivations Cannot Do” Religious Studies (2015) 51, 328

[2] Oppy, “What Derivations Cannot Do”, 51

[3] Graham Oppy. The Best Argument against God (Palgrave Pivot) (p. 18). Palgrave Macmillan. Kindle Edition

[4] Oppy, Graham. The Best Argument against God (Palgrave Pivot) (p. 18). Palgrave Macmillan. Kindle Edition.

[5] Ibid 19

[6] Ibid 19

[7] Ibid, 13

[8] Both within Islamic and Christian intellectual circles there was a rigorous metaphysical debate between concurrentism and occasionalism.  Various Islamic philosophers such as al-Ash͛ari (873-935) founder of the influential Asharite school of Islamic philosophy, and Al  Ghazali  (1055-1111),  all expounded occasionalism.  It was also embraced by Christian theologians, such as Nicholas of Autrecourt (1300-1350).  Pierre d’Ailly (1351-1420), and Gabriel Beil  (1420-1495). George Berkeley, (1685 – 1753) Nicholas Malebranche (1638 – 1715). More recently, it has been defended by John Foster and Alvin Plantinga.

[9] Oppy, Best Argument against God, 14

[10] Ibid, 12

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God and Moral Grounding Power

October 6th, 2018 by Matt
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A common objection to divine command theories of ethics (DCT) is that they make morality arbitrary. There are several ways this objection can be cashed out. The most common is what is called the ‘Horrendous deeds objection’. The Horrendous deeds objection can be formalised as follows:

(1) If the DCT is true, then if God commanded us to rape people we would be required to rape people.

(2) It is absurd that we could be required to rape people.

(3) God could command us to rape.

 (4) Therefore, DCT is absurd.

The key premise is (3), the assumption that it is possible that God could command horrendous actions like rape. Divine command theorists have responded by suggesting that (3) is dubious.  They assume a conception of God Whereby God is understood to be an immaterial person who is all powerful, all knowing, loving and just. So, as terms are defined, the claim that it is possible for God to command people to rape others would only hold if it is possible for an all-knowing, loving, and just person to command rape. This is unlikely. The very reason critics use the example of rape is that they view it as a paradigm action that no virtuous person could ever knowingly entertain.Jason Thibodeau

Suppose, however, it is possible for a just and loving, omniscient person to command rape. Divine command theorists point out, this would mean rape would be commanded in situations where a just and loving person, aware of all the relevant facts, could endorse it– and under these hypothetical circumstances, it’ s hard to see how (2) could be maintained.

  1. Jason Thibodeau’s Argument

In a recent article, published in Sophia, Jason Thibodeau updates the ‘Horrendous deeds objection’ to avoid this problem.[1] Jason starts by defining a concept which he refers to as moral grounding power. “Let us say that a being b has moral grounding power just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations.” He continues “unless it is able to deny that other possible divine beings have this power, it implies that there are possible worlds in which horrendous acts are obligatory”.

His argument for this conclusion is as follows:

(P1) If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power. (Premise)

(P2) Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has. (Premise)

(P3) In some possible world, there exists a being that is like God except that he is not omnibenevolent [henceforth this being will be called Yod]. (Premise)

(P4) If DCT is true, then Yod has moral grounding power. (From P1, P2, and P3)

(P5) In some possible world, Yod commands the gratuitous torture of children. (Premise)

(P6) If DCT is true, then there is a possible world in which the gratuitous torture of children is morally obligatory. (From P4 and P5)

(P7) There is no possible world in which the gratuitous torture of children is obligatory. (Premise)

(P8) DCT is false. (From P6 and P7) [2]

Recently Jason and I discussed this argument on Capturing Christianity, here I want to lay out in writing my main objection to it. Let me stress that Jason and I are discussing this back and forth and my thoughts may alter as the discussion continues.

A. Premise (P1): Does a Divine Command Theory entail that God has Moral Grounding Power?

Let me begin with (P1) the claim that “ Given Jason’s definition of moral grounding power; this premise affirms that: “if God a divine command theory is true, then Gods commands constitute moral obligations”. Is this correct? The answer is it depends on the kind of divine command theory proposed. Divine command theorists contend actions are morally required if and only if and because those actions are commanded by God. However, the word “because” here can be used to describe different kinds of explanatory relationships.

In an important article on this issue Stephen Sullivan[3] distinguishes between a causal explanation and an identity explanation. In a casual explanation, one explains the existence of A by citing some distinct thing B, which causes B to exist B. By contrast an identity explanation explains the existence of A by noting the existence of B and then saying that A just is (is identical with) B.

There are important differences between saying B caused A and saying B is identical to A.  In a causal relationship, the explanandum (the thing being explained) and explanans (the explainer) are distinct things; the former is an effect the latter a cause. As a cause, the explanans exists prior to the explandum, and there is an asymmetric dependence relationship between them: If B causes A to exist then B does not cause A to exist.  The effect depends on the cause for its existence but not vice versa.

In an identity relationship, the explandum (the thing explained) and explanans (explainer) are not distinct things at all; they are the same thing described in different terms. Because the explanans and explandum are identical, the explanans does not exist prior to the explandum, that would entail something existed prior to itself. Moreover, identity relationships are symmetrical: if A is identical to B then B is also identical to A. Sullivan subsumes identity relationships under a broader category of “constitutive” explanations which includes not just explanations in terms of identity relations but also relationships of non-reductive supervenience.

Now if we turn to (P1), Jason states “If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power” where “a being b has moral grounding power just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations”. This assumes that divine command theorists are offering a constitutive explanation of moral requirements. But unless qualified,this assumption is dubious. It is true that some divine command theorists do this. Edward Wierenga (who Jason cites as an example) seems to have in mind a non-reductive supervenience relationship between moral requirements and Gods commands. Similarly, the divine command theories of Adam’s, Craig, Evans, Forrest, and Alston all contend that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God, and so they also offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements in terms of Gods commands.

However, other divine command theorists, do not offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements. One important proponent of a divine command theory was Philip Quinn. Quinn explicitly offered a causal explanation of moral requirements in terms of Gods commands. Quinn argued that the property of being willed by God and the property of being morally required are not identical properties but distinct properties. God’s act of willing that a person performed an immediately caused it to be the case that a moral obligation to do this action existed.

Strictly speaking then (P1) is false. Divine command theories per se do not entail that Gods commands constitute moral obligations. Some divine command theories do, and some do not. Of course, the most significant divine command theories defended today involve identity explanations, and so these theories do have the entailment Jason refers to. For this reasons one might think my qualifications are a tad pedantic. However, the difference between causal and constitutive divine command theories will become important when we examine further premises.

B.Premise (P4): Is the Inference Valid?

Before, examining premise (P2), let me first say something about the Jason makes in (P4).

 (P4) If DCT is true, then Yod has moral grounding power. (From P1, P2, and P3)

Notice that (P4) draws an inference from (P1) (P2) and (P3). It takes the fact that a divine command theory entails that God has “moral grounding power” and, the fact that omnipotent beings have the same powers, and infers from this that any omnipotent being will have moral grounding power. If this inference is valid, the word “power” must have the same meaning in (P1) as it does in (P2). When Jason states in (P2) that Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has, the word “powers” must include the kind of moral grounding power he refers to in (P1). If  this isnt the case the inference commits the fallacy of equivocation.

C. What does the word “power” mean in (P1) and (P2)?

It’s precisely on this last point however that I think Jason’s argument falls down.  Jason supports (P2)   by asking us to imagine a being like God, who is omnipotent but lacks the property of benevolence: He then asks whether such a being would “in virtue of his malevolence, lack the power to flood the earth, destroy a planet or create the universe? “. He concludes “If the being is omnipotent, this seems unlikely, it’s hard to see how the mere absence of benevolence would limit Gods power in this way. “

I find this claim intuitively plausible, but note carefully the examples Jason uses here. He gives the examples of “lacking the power to flood the earth” “destroy a planet” “create a universe” these are all acts of causal power, where God by his actions causes something distinct from himself to come into existence or go out of existence.

However, in his first premise (P1), Jason uses the word power in a different sense. He refers to “moral grounding power” which a being has  “just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations”. Moral grounding power then isn’t the power God has to cause moral obligations to come into existence its rather the God’s ability or power to constitute moral requirements with his commands. We saw above that, in the context of divine command theories, constitutive explanations can involve the postulation a non-reductive supervenience relationship between Gods commands and moral requirements. However, in most cases, divine command theorists who offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements are offering an “identity” explanation.  Divine command theorists like Craig, Evans, Adams, Forrest, all contend that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God.

This means that the phrase “moral grounding power” is often just a technical way of saying that, the property of being commanded by God is identical with the property of being morally required.  The property of being obligatory isn’t something that is caused to come into existence by Gods commands; it just is the property of being commanded by God by a different name. Just as the morning star and evening star are the same thing under different descriptions. The property of being morally required and being commanded by God are the same property under different descriptions.

The problem is that while (P2) is intuitively plausible if you are referring to causal powers. It is not so obvious when one is talking of something like a moral grounding power.  To say God has moral grounding power could just mean that God has the power to perform actions which are identical with God’s actions under a different description. However, it is impossible for any person who is not God to have this kind of power. This is because the relationship of identity can only hold between a thing and itself. It is impossible for any being, no matter how powerful, who is not God to perform actions which are identical with God’s actions. This is an incoherent idea.

Let me illustrate this: By waving my hand I can make it the case that Matthew Flannagan Has waved his hand. However, it is not possible for anyone else, even an omnipotent being to do this. An omnipotent being has the causal power to make me wave my hand. If he becomes incarnate in human form, he could himself wave his hand. However, he could not make it the case that his standing up is identical with me standing up. That is because his actions are not identical to my actions.  Nor is it possible for him a distinct person from me to perform actions which are identical with actions I perform. If you want to refer to this ability as a power, then it is a power that it is metaphysically impossible for anyone but me to have. The only person who can perform actions numerically identical to my actions is me.

Conclusions:

Above I noted that the inference he draws in P4 is valid. Only if the word “power” is used the same way in both premises P1 and P2. The kind of power, God, is said to have when Jason states “Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has” must include the kind of power he has in mind when he states “If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power”.

We have seen that this is not the case. In our discussion of P1, we noted that the claim “If the DCT is true, then if God commanded us to rape we would be required to rape” is true only of divine command theories which do not postulate a causal explanation of moral requirements. In other words (P1) is true only in cases where the word “power” excludes causal relationships. (P2) however is defensible only if the word power refers to causal powers. If it is understood more broadly to refer to constitutive explanations of Gods commands (P2) is false. It isn’t true that any omnipotent being can perform an action which is identical with the action of another being. The crucial premise (P4) then commits the fallacy of equivocation.

 

[1] Jason Thibodeau, “God’s Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem” Sophia:1-17 (forthcoming)

[2] Jason Thibodeau, “God’s Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem” 9,

[3] Stephen Sullivan, “Arbitrariness, divine commands, and morality” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 33 (1) (1993) 33-45

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Religious Studies Scholarships and the NZAPT

October 2nd, 2018 by Matt
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Those who follow me on Facebook will know that two years ago I began teaching Philosophy and Theology full time at St Peters College one of New Zealand’s largest Catholic high schools.

Only a handful of schools teach Philosophy in New Zealand and while it has official subject recognition one cannot gain any credits for Philosophy under the National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA).  NCEA does allow credits for Religious Studies which in the secondary sector involves a mix of religious history, ethics, theology/philosophy of religion, and hermeneutics. However, Religious studies have not been treated as a very rigorous subject in the secondary sector, and so far it is mostly Catholic schools which have taken it up as a subject.

It has been a very challenging couple of years as I have been getting my head around how Philosophy and Theology are taught or can be taught, in the secondary sector. Trying to balance my own very high standards for Theological and Philosophical scholarship with the practicalities on the ground in the education sector. The challenges in doing this are unique and require quite a bit of wisdom and creativity to pull off well. I can’t say I have always been successful in doing so.

It’s been an encouraging week for me in this regard.  I spent two days in Wellington this week. I was holed up in the Ministry of Education buildings a stone throw away from the beehive and parliament attending the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers. (NZAPT)  annual conference.  At the NZAPT several other philosophy teachers and I spent several hours dialoguing with policymakers in Wellington about the importance of teaching philosophy in the secondary sector. We had presentations from people in the ministry and even some Members of parliament come and discuss the subject with us. Whether anything will come of this remains unclear, but with the new Government initiating a review into NCEA and the assessment system being up in the air at the moment it certainly is starting to get on the radar.

Of course, there are still lots of questions; it was unclear from the meeting over precisely what teaching philosophy involved. Is it just a pedagogy involving Socratic questioning and inquiry learning or should the subject be taught more formally, do you introduce it as a kind of foundational sub-discipline for other subjects, i.e. philosophy of science for science? Philosophy of law for legal studies, classical philosophy in classics. Alternatively, introduce a new subject on the already proliferating curriculum, and some real questions came out of the conference around the teaching of political philosophy and the danger of it becoming activism.  These were all things we discussed and debated amongst ourselves at the conference

To cap this all off on Thursday the New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA) announced that Religious Studies would be included as a scholarship subject in 2020.  Scholarship exams are the highest level of academic assessment in New Zealand secondary schools. Only 3% of all students gain a scholarship and its only available in subjects which are considered to meet a high level of rigour specifically the criteria is:

  • significant numbers of candidates have shown the ability to perform with excellence at level 3
  • there are writers and markers available of sufficient calibre and experience in this subject to produce a quality assessment for students at the appropriate level
  • there is an appropriate tertiary path for Scholarship students in this subject
  • the subject has the capacity to permit students to exhibit the high-level cognitive abilities for the credibility of the Scholarship examination

The New Zealand Association of Religious Studies Teachers, an association of which I am a member has been pressing for the Ministry of education to consider allowing Religious Studies to be made a Scholarship subject, a move that will require increasing the rigour of teaching and assessment in this subject substantially.  My name was one of several put forward as evidence that there is now in the secondary sector “writers and markers available of sufficient calibre and experience in this subject to produce a quality assessment for students at the appropriate level”. On Thursday NZQA announced on Thursday they now consider Religious Studies to have matured enough at the high school level to meet this criterion. Religious Studies is now on the radar and a serious academic subject available in New Zealand schools, hopefully, Philosophy is not too far around the corner.

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Matthew Flannagan (MandM) and Jason Thibodeau (Secular Outpost) Debate God and Morality

September 24th, 2018 by Matt
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Yesterday, I had a long and enjoyable public discussion with Jason Thibodeau on the topic of The Euthyphro dilemma.

Jason is a writer for the Secular Outpost and teaches philosophy at Cypress college in California. He also is the author of a recent article entitled “God’s Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem” published in Sophia  The team at Real Atheology recently interviewed Jason about his paper a couple of weeks prompting  Cameron Bertuzzi from Capturing Christianity to have both of us discuss the matter further on his youtube channel.

Those who follow MandM regularly will know, Jason and I have been engaging in written exchanges on this issue for several years and he has always been a thoughtful and intelligent dialogue partner. Jason has raised some challenging responses to my arguments and yesterday’s two-hour discussion/ debate was no different. It was one of the better dialogues I have had on religion and morality in a long time. Hopefully, the dialogue generates more light than heat.

The whole dialogue is available on YouTube here:

 

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Matt’s book “Did God Really Command Genocide” on sale for $1.99

September 1st, 2018 by Matt
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As long-time readers of MandM will know, in 2014  I co-wrote a book with Paul Copan entitled Did God Really Command Genocide: Coming to Terms with the Justice of God.Did God Really Command Genocide?

Yesterday Baker books have notified me that, for the month of September, Amazon, Barnes and Noble, and CBD, are running an ebook promotion on this book. During September the eBook version of our book will be available for $1.99.

Please feel, to take advantage of this deal, also please feel free to let anyone you know who may be interested to take advantage of it and to share this information to anyone you know who may be interested.

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Reflections on Annihilationism, Traditionalism and the Problem of Hell

July 28th, 2018 by Matt
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Last year I gave a paper entitled “Reflections on Annihilationism, Traditionalism and the Problem of Hell’ at the Rethinking Hell conference in Auckland.  This talk is now available online.

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The Challenge of Moral Relativism: Three Problems with Relativism

June 25th, 2018 by Matt
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This is the third of a series of posts on moral relativism. These talks are based on some talks I have given on the subject in the last few months. In the first post, I looked at what the basic issues are. The second post examines some of the reasons people offer for accepting relativism. This last post looks at some problems with relativism.

Today most ethicists whether Christian or non-Christian reject relativism. Critics of relativism argue it faces several problems, which give us reason to reject it. I will focus on three.

1. The Problem of Moral Progress and Moral Reform.

Relativism is incompatible with moral progress or reform.  While relativists can accept that the moral judgements of societies change they can’t consistently claim these changes amount to progress. If society at one time supports relativism-1slavery or racial segregation, and then later disapproves of these things. Relativists cannot say that society has thrown off an incorrect view and adopted a correct, one. Instead, it must say that it has gone from one correct view to another one.

A related problem is that relativism suggests that moral reformers who spoke out against slavery and segregation were in fact in the wrong. They were opposing what society approved of and hence what was right for members of society.

This problem also applies to subjectivism. If a member of the Ku Klux Klan holds racist judgements at one time and then later rejects these judgements as bigotry, The subjectivist can’t say he has moved from a mistaken to a correct. Instead, he has changed from one correct view to another.  Individuals don’t grow in moral insight or develop more discernment

2.The possibility of Error

There is another problem with relativism. It seems plausible that we can be mistaken in our moral judgements. I can make judgements about what is right and wrong which are incorrect, and whole societies can do this.  Relativism, however, suggests mistakes like this are impossible. Subjectivism means that If I believe something is right, then I am right in doing it. Relativism means that if a society endorses a practice then its right for members of that society to do the practice. The consequence is that mistakes about morality are impossible.  For a person or a community to make a mistake, it has to be possible for the standards an individual or society accepts to be different from the standards which are correct.

3. Relativism Implies that Obvious Moral Wrongs Are Acceptable

Perhaps the most important objection to relativism is that it implies that obvious moral wrongs are acceptable. If actions are right or wrong relative to an individual or societies standpoint, then anything at all can be justified. Genocide, rape, torture of children, racial intolerance, are all morally right for a person if he believes that they are or his society endorses them.   Many find this implication hard to swallow if a serial killer thinks it’s permissible to kill women, is it really plausible to suggest this fact alone means his actions are right or did the fact German society adopted Nazism in the 1930s mean that Germans did no wrong when they implemented these policies.

Conclusion

Let me now bring the threads of this talk to a close. I have explained what relativism and objectivism are. I noted some common reasons why people accept relativism and suggested these reasons fail. The appeal to diversity fails to make some important distinctions and appeals to tolerance, openness and so on are incoherent. I have also sketched several problems with relativism it entails moral reform is impossible moral error is impossible and that obvious moral wrongs are right. For reasons like this most philosophers, today reject moral relativism. While it’s a challenge to the way, Christians think about ethics. I am not convinced it’s a challenge which is very defensible.

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