http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sfnCKFs9DWk

Each speaker has published the speeches they wrote for this event:

• Matthew Flannagan’s speech – Theology
• Glenn Peoples’ speech – Philosophy
• Madeleine Flannagan’s speech – Law

Hat tip (and credit for filming and editing this video): Stuart at Thinking Matters.

A few weeks ago, as part of Jesus Week at the University of Auckland, Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union hosted an event entitled A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? This event was a conversation between Theology, Philosophy and Law and featured Matthew Flannagan - Analytic Theologian, Glenn Peoples - Philosopher and Madeleine Flannagan - Legal Scholar. The video is still being edited and will be available soon but for now, this 3-part series comprises the written speeches of each speaker.

Glenn Peoples – Philosophy

Often the subject of religion and politics is alluded to by way of references to terrorism, vigilantism, totalitarianism and persecution, as though these are the only alternative to a public square stripped of religious conviction altogether. This is about as helpful and honest as the automatic association of secularism with the purges of Stalin. The truth is that the flourishing debate in the Western world over the legitimate role of religious convictions in our public decision making is set within the broad liberal democratic tradition. Within that tradition, taking for granted things like freedom of religion, freedom of speech, clear institutional separation of church and state, freedom of association and so on, we’ve seen that it is clearly possible to hold a variety of views on the proper place of religious belief in politics, policy, public lobbying, your own voting and so on. Of course, there are plenty of religious people in the world and in history who do not cherish liberty and mutual respect (as there are and have been non-religious people who do not cherish these things), but you and I do.

Our popular level discussion here in New Zealand over the proper role of religion in a free society – in the media, in letters to the editor, on talkback radio, in religious speeches, could have been greatly benefited by an exposure to the way that this issue has been dealt with in philosophy, specifically in political philosophy, in ethics and philosophy of religion, which are the areas that really interest me. In particular the following issues need to be seen as central: What is the specific concern that justifies people in identifying religious convictions as an area of worry over and above other convictions? Are these concerns applied consistently and fairly when not thinking in terms of religious convictions? Are they the right concerns to have about public life generally? Secondly, should these concerns really cause us to reconsider the role of religious convictions at all? If so, then how?

Why is religion singled out?

Conflict and Polarisation
Why is there an issue centred specifically around religion in the public square? We don’t hear much, if anything, about the worry of acting on our political beliefs or (usually) our ethical convictions or our scientific findings – at least not because they are political beliefs, ethical convictions scientific findings, yet there is a concern about religious beliefs in the public square, and that concern exists because the beliefs in question are religious. What makes religion special?

Perhaps the more popular reason that people might have for wanting to see religion take a back seat when it comes to public reason is that, in their view, religious beliefs unleashed in public are dangerous in certain ways. American philosopher Robert Audi is not alone in voicing the concern that “religious disagreements are likely to polarize government” leading to irresolvable disputes and political stand-offs.[1] In order to avoid strong polarisation and the associated mischiefs that come with it (lack of co-operation, social unease and mutual suspicion, perhaps even rioting and acts of violence or terrorism as in Northern Ireland), let us keep our religious beliefs well away from our political reason.

Matt has already said a thing or two about this, so I’ll just be brief. Is this fair? For starters, is it really true that as soon as we allow people to lobby, vote or even legislate in certain ways because of their religious convictions, we will witness intractable political stand-offs and social disorder? Not at all. We can easily imagine scenarios in which one person or group lobbies for a given policy because their religious convictions motivate them to do so, and another person or group lobbies for exactly the same policy with quite different motives. I think, for example, of the government’s role in marriage. I know of religious people who maintain that the state has no role in formalising marriage since this is, in brief, “God’s business” that the government should frankly stay out of as a matter of the purity of marriage as a holy institution. I also know of libertarians committed to the doctrine of self-ownership and the priority of personal liberty who also think, without any reference to God, that marriage properly belongs entirely to the private realm. So it can’t be the case that endorsing policies because of one’s religious convictions will inevitably or always lead to social or political polarisation and conflict.

That said, it’s true that different religious convictions (including convictions against religious beliefs) have led to considerable differences of opinion over public policy. But this does not show that this polarisation is relevant in deciding whether or not people should endorse policies for religious reasons. In order to assess that, we must ask: Is religious belief in any way unique because it often perpetuates the kind of polarisation lurking behind this fear? I do not see that it is. The last century of western history alone proves fairly conclusively that human societies can become polarised with no help from religion. Civil and political clashes between fascists and communists, for example, did not take place because someone was smuggling their religious beliefs into politics. On a somewhat less dramatic scale, I see no end to disputes in New Zealand over the rights bestowed upon Iwi by the Treaty of Waitangi, nor to the hostile attitudes in society that get stirred up by these stand-offs. Again, these disputes did not arise because of the clandestine combination of religious convictions and political lobbying. What is more, there is no reason to think that policies that are likely to polarise should never be advocated. It is easy for us to appreciate, for example, that the attempt to ban slave trading in the British Empire was intensely polarising, and yet we admire those who advocated abolitionist policy.

So firstly, making political decisions because of our religions convictions does not necessarily cause polarisation and conflict and secondly, even where it does cause polarisation, religion cannot legitimately be singled out as the culprit since politics in general can have the same effect – an effect which does not necessarily indicate that the policy being advocated should not be advocated. So if there is something basically wrong with bringing our religious convictions into the public square, it is unlikely to be because this practice results in social polarisation and conflict.

Two Concerns: Respect and Justification

Most political philosophers realise that if there is a principled reason for keeping religious convictions separate from politics, it will not be the pragmatic reason suggested above. A more sophisticated and arguably more plausible line of argument has been developed in various forms in the literature.

The argument starts, not with religion, but with very general principles in political philosophy. One of the crucial concepts of the modern western liberal democracy is that of equality. There is no politically privileged class. This affects the way our societies function in all kinds of way. It’s why we have the slogan one man, one vote. Everybody’s voice counts the same. It’s why women and men both vote. But the principle of equality and consequently of equal respect is more pervasive than that. It’s the reason you care – or should care – about the way your fellow citizen is treated, politically speaking. Just as you don’t want to be subjected to arbitrary legal coercion for which there is, as far as you are concerned, no good justification, you also don’t want your fellow citizen to be treated that way either. Because we’re all equal, your fellow citizen, no less than you, is owed an explanation for why he or she is subjected to the laws that she is being asked to live by.

In short, the policies that you advocate need to be justified to your fellow citizen in the right way, or else you’re just coercing them and you’re not showing them proper respect as your equal.

20^th century political scientist Jown Rawls introduced the term overlapping consensus to describe the sorts of policies that are appropriate in a liberal democracy. Basically, the idea is that there are policies that are justified to you – justified by your own desires, beliefs, values goals, and so on. But of course the fact that they are justified to you doesn’t make them justified to anybody else. Everybody has their own set of beliefs, values, desires and so on, and their set makes a set of policies justified to them. Think of everybody’s set of justified policies as a large circle. Although it’s clear that these circles won’t share exactly the same outlines – because the liberal democracy is marked by pluralism – the fact that we share basic values, says Rawls, means that there will be considerable overlap. Think of all of us as a circle of beliefs, desires and values, and the area where we overlap in the middle is the area where those beliefs, values and desires overlap enough to support the same policies. There will, said Rawls, be an overlapping consensus on a range of policies. Those policies will be justified to all of us. To use Rawls’s language, there will be a consensus among reasonable citizens on a set of overlapping policy ideals, and it is those policies that meet the standard of justification that properly expresses respect for all our fellow citizens.

Before you support any policy with your vote – your voice as a citizen, Rawls says, it must be one that is justified to everyone else. The devil, however, is in the details. Rawls stressed that we’re only interested in the policies that our fellow citizens support in light of their reasonably held convictions, goals, values etc. And which beliefs, values, goals etc are reasonable? As good supporters of the liberal democracy, we don’t think racism is a reasonable set of values – or sexism. But what about socialism? Or strong views on private property rights and individualism? Or – and here’s where things get interesting – what about atheism? The father of classical liberalism, John Locke thought that atheism was such a despicable and dangerous view that it shouldn’t even be tolerated in a modern democracy. Or what about Islam? Or Buddhism? Or Christianity?

Part of the respect that is promoted in the modern liberal democracy is that we are accepting of pluralism. We don’t try to change the fact that we have pluralism, we accept that other people inhabit different circles and they are welcome to do so. Provided we take this open minded approach to what counts as a reasonable outlook, without imposing our beliefs upon others, the actual ground on which all those circles overlap starts shrinking.

Political philosopher Gerald Gaus was stating the obvious – even if slightly exaggerating – when he said “little, if anything, is the object of consensus among reasonable people.”[2] We recognise the danger in deferring too much to our fellow citizen, in a sense, showing them too much respect. If we give up our support of a policy just because there exists, somewhere, a reasonable person who doesn’t currently support it, the democratic state is likely to be paralysed.  What about same sex marriage? Which way should the law go? Should we use trade tariffs? Should charitable organisations – like churches – be tax exempt? Should churches be treated like charities? Should manufacturers and producers be required to regulate their business activities to take account of public concern over global warming? Is there a total consensus of reasonable people on any of these issues one way of the other? In fact there is not, and yet we do have policies one way of the other on these things, and we really can’t help doing so.

Let’s not swing too far the other way. We do want to respect our fellow citizens and not just coerce them with our will. But we have no power over what they accept and don’t accept. Justifying our policies to our fellow citizens in a way that treats them with adequate respect cannot mean that we can’t propose any policy that they don’t accept already. Just imagine advocating a policy on abortion only if it was supported both by those who believe in the sanctity of human life from conception and those on the extreme end of the pro-choice side of the issue, who think that even if the unborn child is a human person in the full sense, a mother has the right to terminate pregnancy at any stage. Good luck.

But if you don’t have to successfully convince people that your policy is the right one in light of what they believe and value, then what do you have to do? According to Gaus, and I think this moves us in the right direction, you have to idealise. You idealise or imagine away from what your fellow citizen is right now willing to accept, and you think of what, as far as you can tell, they – given what they now believe about reason and evidence – would accept if they were better informed and willing to fairly consider all the available reasons. As Gaus puts it when considering our hypothetical fellow citizen, Alf, to whom we owe a justification, “if Alf’s beliefs were subject to extensive criticism and additional information, does his viewpoint commit him to revise his beliefs?”[3] If so and if we offer reasons for him to think so, then we are doing our duty in terms of showing Alf that what we are proposing really does have something going for it. So according to this view, you’re not hamstrung by what your fellow citizen is currently willing to endorse. At the same time, you regard them as worthy of a justification and you offer them one in good faith – one that you are justified in believing that they should accept based on what they know and are capable of coming to understand, but recognising that they may in fact not accept it.

Where does this leave religion?

Once we’ve strengthened the notion of political justification to make it plausible and workable, we’ve got to sit back and ask, “OK, now does this actually leave us with any problems for policies that we support for religious reasons.” Take my stance on abortion or on marriage. Let’s say that I hold to my views on those issues for religious reasons – reasons that ultimately involve my beliefs about what God wants. Does that automatically mean that there is no form of justification that I could offer for those policies? Maybe – if we are pre-committed to the personal belief that there is no justification for any of these beliefs about God. If we assume that there are no reasons for our beliefs and hence our policies that we can give our fellow citizens, reasons that we reasonably believe that they should consider if they were open minded, willing to listen to reasons, consider all the arguments and evidence, and not reject considerations out of hand just because we’re talking about the supernatural.

But why assume that? To ask Christians to assume this is to basically ask them to assume that Christianity is intellectually indefensible. It may be that you think of religious faith as being irrational, unconcerned with reasons and basically being blind devotion. I regard that caricature as a symptom just the sort of ignorance and unfairness that modern secular liberals sometimes accuse religious people, ironically enough. Now, of course Christians realise that they aren’t going to successfully persuade everybody, just as defenders of a whole range of theories on ethics understand they aren’t going to actually persuade everybody, as scientists do also when it comes to one of their findings (but this should not stop them from urging people to support policies on, say, smoking, pollution or climate change). But to ask Christians to just assume that there exists no justification for their beliefs that they can offer is not neutral. It asks them to assume that at least some of their beliefs are false, namely their beliefs about just how defensible their beliefs are.

The fact is, the disagreement over whether or not any religious beliefs are properly justified is just as evident as the disagreement over religious beliefs themselves. To claim that religious convictions must not drive public reason, and to claim the justification test as our reason for this, is simply to take a controversial stance on religious matters. It is to veil an anti-religious bias in the name of neutrality.

In a liberal, pluralistic society, of course you are welcome to the private belief that all religious beliefs lack appropriate justification, and the belief that nobody should be convinced to hold them. But to require everybody else stay out of the political game altogether until they are prepared to live in accordance with that belief steps way over the line of what is acceptable in a free society. You are welcome to advocate policies that are compatible with your beliefs, as long as you are willing to engage your fellow citizen conscientiously, as an equal with you, only propose policies that are compatible with this doctrine of equality, and therefore genuinely offer your fellow citizen justifications for your policy that you think there are good reasons to accept. But to suppose that only people whose beliefs are not religious are morally permitted to do this is to manifest a kind of bigotry that has no place in a modern, pluralistic and democratic society.

A few weeks ago, as part of Jesus Week at the University of Auckland, Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union hosted an event entitled A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? This event was a conversation between Theology, Philosophy and Law and featured Matthew Flannagan - Analytic Theologian, Glenn Peoples - Philosopher and Madeleine Flannagan - Legal Scholar. The video is still being edited and will be available soon but for now, this 3-part series comprises the written speeches of each speaker.

Matthew Flannagan – Analytic Theology

Recently, many Christian ethicists have defended the central place of God’s commands in Theological ethics. In this talk I want to discuss one important objection to appeals to God’s commands; this is the claim that, while it is perfectly appropriate for believers to appeal to purported divine commands when regulating their private conduct or the conduct of voluntary religious communities who believe in such commands, it is morally wrong to appeal to theological beliefs of this sort in any discussion of social ethics. When doing Ethics as a public enterprise i.e. engaging in debates over social policy or offering criticism of cultural and social practices, Christian Ethicists are morally bound to only appeal to secular considerations. I will argue that this position, though widely accepted inside and outside of the church, is mistaken.

The Objection
So what is the problem with appealing to divine commands in social ethics? Christian theological convictions ought to impact the whole of life both in the private and public spheres; this is what is meant by the idea of an “undivided life”, where Jesus is Lord of all aspects of our lives.

Yet this consequence of Christian faith conflicts with a pervasive contemporary attitude: the view that that religion is fundamentally a private matter. It is accepted that a Christian is free to utilise theological convictions when they make decisions about their own life but in a pluralistic society it is increasingly deemed inappropriate to bring such convictions into public discussions about morality, law, politics, economics, education, scholarship and so on. The desire to influence society with Christian ideals or to convert others to the faith is viewed by many as an intolerant desire to impose one’s private views onto others.

It is widely accepted that theological convictions can govern churches and the private lives of believers yet we are told that the public square – government, public policy, the courts, the academy, education, business, arts, media, etc – should be secular only.The problem is nicely summarised by Stephen Carter Christian theological convictions ought to impact the whole of life both in the private and public spheres; this is what is meant by the idea of an “undivided life”, where Jesus is Lord of all aspects of our lives.

Yet this consequence of Christian faith conflicts with a pervasive contemporary attitude: the view that that religion is fundamentally a private matter. It is accepted that a Christian is free to utilise theological convictions when they make decisions about their own life but in a pluralistic society it is increasingly deemed inappropriate to bring such convictions into public discussions about morality, law, politics, economics, education, scholarship and so on. The desire to influence society with Christian ideals or to convert others to the faith is viewed by many as an intolerant desire to impose one’s private views onto others.

It is widely accepted that theological convictions can govern churches and the private lives of believers yet we are told that the public square – government, public policy, the courts, the academy, education, business, arts, media, etc – should be secular only.

This event looks at this issue. The conversation will span Theology, Philosophy and Law led by a panel made up of Christian representatives from each discipline along with you the audience:

“One good way to end a conversation – or start an argument – is to tell a group of well educated professionals that you hold a political position (preferably a controversial one such as being against abortion or pornography) because it is required by your understanding of God’s will. In the unlikely event that anyone hangs around to talk with you about it, chances are that you will be challenged on the ground that you are intent on imposing your religious beliefs on other people. And in contemporary political and legal culture, nothing is worse.”[1]

Carter cites the objection that appealing to God’s commands in public moral debate involves imposing one’s religious beliefs onto other people, and points out that such impositions are morally wrong. Note that the objection is not that such divine commands do not exist or that it is irrational to believe that they do. The objection is a specifically moral one. It is morally wrong to appeal to such beliefs; doing so violates a moral obligation people have to not impose their religious beliefs onto others. Something like this moral objection is widely held, both inside and outside the church. In response to this I will make four points.

I

First, unqualified, the claim it is wrong to impose your moral beliefs onto others is problematic. Consider acts such as rape, assault or infanticide. I personally believe each of these practices is wrong for me to engage in and I support the commission of these acts being considered a crime punishable by the state. However, if it were wrong to impose moral beliefs onto others then my position on rape, assault or infanticide would be unacceptable. I would have to leave others free to choose whether they wished to rape, assault or kill children – to do otherwise would be to impose my moral beliefs onto others.

II

So there cannot be an unqualified obligation to not impose one’s beliefs onto other people. This brings me to my second point. Carter’s example is not unqualified. It explicitly mentions religious beliefs about what God wills. Carter alludes to what Richard Rorty dubbed as:

“The happy, Jeffersonian compromise that the Enlightenment reached with the religious. This compromise consists in privatizing religion — keeping it out of … ‘the public square,’ making it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy.”[2]

A particularly rigorous elaboration of this stance comes from Robert Audi. Audi argues that one should not advocate any “[policy] restrictions on human conduct unless one has, and is willing to offer an adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support”.[3]  By ‘secular reason’ he meant a reason that “does not depend on the existence of God (such as through a divine command) or on theological considerations (such as a sacred text)”.[4] So qualified, the objection is that religious believers have a moral obligation to not advocate policies or positions that restrict others on the basis of beliefs about God’s commands. In discussions in public they are to appeal to secular premises that do not invoke God, scripture or specific theological authorities.

III

This brings me to my third point; why single religious out beliefs in this way? If there is no general obligation to refrain from imposing one’s beliefs onto others then why are religious beliefs different in this respect? By limiting the moral restriction to religious beliefs and allowing non-theological secular beliefs to play a role in public discourse that religious beliefs do not, Audi’s position shows that “There is an important asymmetry between religious and secular reasons in the following respect: some secular reasons can themselves justify state coercion but no religious reason can.”[5] Audi’s position appears to privilege secular ideologies and doctrines in public debate whilst relegating religious or theological perspectives to the private sphere. But why are theological beliefs singled out in this way? Three lines of argument seem to be common.

1. Wars and Conflict

The first is an appeal to religious wars and violence. It is contended that the only way to keep social peace and prevent the kind of violence that Europe witnessed in the 17^th century is to adopt a moral rule requiring that all political discussions take place on secular terms and that religious reasons be bracketed from such discussions.

However, this assumes that appeals to theological moral beliefs cause wars and appeals to secular reasons protect us against such wars. This is dubious. Christopher Eberle and Terence Cuneo note that the religious wars of the 17^th century were caused not by the appeal to religious reasons per sé but rather by the violation of religious freedom. Moreover, even in the 17^th century, religious persecution was typically justified on secular grounds. In addition, they note that some of the most important defences of religious persecution and defences of religious tolerance, such as those proposed by John Locke and Pierre Bayle, appealed to explicitly theological grounds.[6]

Nicholas Wolterstorff makes a similar point, he notes that much of “the slaughter, torture, and generalised brutality of our century has mainly been conducted in the name of one or another secular cause–nationalism of many sorts, communism, fascism, patriotisms of various kinds, economic hegemony.”[7] He also stated that “many of the social movements in the modern world that have moved societies in the direction of liberal democracy have been deeply and explicitly religious in their orientation.”[8] He cites examples such as the abolitionist and civil rights movements and various other resistance movements as examples.

The point is that secular and theological reasons are on par in this respect. Particular types of religious reasons in particular political contexts can lead to wars and abuse, whereas appealing to other types of religious reasons in other contexts can be beneficent. Similarly, certain types of secular reasons can be dangerous in particular contexts and other types of secular reasons are not. To single religious reasons out as being ‘too dangerous to be aired in public’ and insisting on a default to secular reasons seems ad hoc and unjustified.

2. Division

Similar things can be said about the objection that appeal to theological premises will be divisive. Robert Adam’s notes  “nothing in the history of modern secular moral theory gives us reason to expect that general agreement on a single comprehensive moral theory will ever be achieved or that, if achieved, it would long endure in a climate of free inquiry. His conclusion is that “the development and advocacy of a religious ethical theory, therefore, does not destroy a realistic possibility of agreement that would otherwise exist”.[9]

3. Pluralism

The main reason offered for excluding theological premises from public debate is that not everyone accepts the truth of such premises. Any policy decisions based on a purported divine law would be binding upon these people in spite of the fact they do not accept theological doctrines or that they do not accept these theological doctrines.

Michael Tooley states, “For it is surely true that it is inappropriate, at least in a pluralistic society, to appeal to specific theological beliefs … in support of legislation that will be binding upon everyone.”[10] Audi argues, “as advocates for laws and public policies, then, and especially for those that are coercive, virtuous citizens will seek grounds of a kind that any rational adult citizen can endorse as sufficient for the purpose.”[11] [Emphasis added]

One obvious problem with this line of argument is that exactly the same thing can be said about many secular, non-theological, beliefs. Phillip Quinn articulates this point,

“…If the fact that religious reasons cannot be shared by all in a religiously pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in fairness also to be excluded on the same grounds.”[12]

Quinn notes correctly that secular moral theories such as Utilitarianism or Kantianism, Intuitionism, Socialism, Libertarianism, can all be reasonably rejected in a philosophically-pluralistic society.

“Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies would be morally justified, a conclusion that would, I suspect, be welcome only to anarchists.”[13]

If we are to exclude appeals to theological beliefs because not all reasonable people accept such beliefs then we should be consistent and exclude from public discussion appeals to all secular moral, political, philosophical, beliefs about which reasonable people do not agree. This would gut public discussion of any substantive content.

IV

My final point is that suppose a religious person does, as Carter mentions, take a “controversial political position … because it is required by their understanding of God’s will”? The objection Carter mentions is a specifically moral one, the objection is not that such divine commands do not exist, or that it is irrational to believe that they do.

On the face of it, this seems very odd. The objection entails that a person can be morally obligated to act contrary to what he rationally and correctly believes God’s will requires of him. A person who believes that a rational, all knowing, perfectly just and loving person requires a certain action of him is morally obligated to not take that action in public.

Normally when one assesses a moral question one should take into account all the relevant information – not just some of it. If it is true that God has issued certain commands, and this is relevant to the question, then it would be prima facie irrational to not take these factors into account.

The Christian believes her theological beliefs are true, and the objector does not contest this. Further the objection is not that her belief in such commands is irrational or subject to philosophical difficulties. The objector contends that, even if the Christian’s beliefs are true, and rationally believed, she is morally obligated to ignore them in such discussions.

This entails that when doing social ethics believers are morally required to act in accord with beliefs they rationally believe to be false. The objector appears to suggest that, in a pluralistic society, believers can hold certain beliefs as true in private but in public they must deny these beliefs; even though these beliefs may be both true and rationally held. This would seem to force believers to live a divided life where their intellectual and religious commitments are incoherently compromised. I contend that there is no good reason for thinking believers are under any moral obligation to do this.

If God truly is sovereign then his commands govern the whole of life, both private and public; believers should strive to live an undivided life of loyalty to him. The fact that other people do not share this commitment does not entail that it is wrong for them to follow it.

Part II of A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? features Glenn Peoples’ talk from the perspective of Philosophy.

This idea is often enforced in the courts with public displays or manifestations of religion being challenged on freedom of religion grounds. This has recently been seen in European countries; recent laws and cases have seen bans on religious emblems being worn in schools, employment situations and in public generally. The UK courts recently ruled that Christians could not foster children out of fear their private beliefs about homosexual conduct might be taught to the children.

In the US, a confusing, and often contradictory, array of cases on everything from public displays of the ten commandments, home-schooling, school vouchers and so on has rendered the position in the position more and more hostile towards religion being exercised in public and the law has become more and more difficult to comply with because of increasing lack of clarity as to how it works.

Increasingly in the West we are seeing the idea of religion being something private being accepted by Christian believers who feel that while they personally believe something it is inappropriate for them to apply or utilise these beliefs when thinking about or going about issues that may affect others.

An increasing body of theological, philosophical and legal scholarship has called this orthodox view into question. These scholars have argued that the orthodox view is unjust, contradictory and arbitrary. It is unjust in that it places moral and social restraints on religious advocacy that are not imposed on non-religious views. It is arbitrary and contradictory in that the reasons typically offered for this view, if sound, seem to apply with equal force to any controversial view whether religious or secular and, in fact, to many doctrines central to liberal thought itself. Moreover, it suggests that even if religious beliefs are true and relevant to public issues, believers are to conduct themselves in public in a manner which ignores these beliefs or treats them as if they are not true if they cannot be justified from a secular viewpoint; in private they are free to believe what they want.

Critics of orthodoxy contend this separation of faith and self in public is unrealistic at a psychological level and that it fails to understand how religions function in the lives of believers who believe their religion to be true and not merely just a personal private preference.

New Zealand jurisprudence has not seen the litigation on this subject that the United States and Europe has so it is largely untested. The practice of being influenced by international precedent from the commonwealth and US jurisdictions coupled with our secular society which contains strong factions in favour of the liberal view – secular humanist groups, some politicians, scholars, media, bloggers – suggests that it will fall the way of the rest of the western world unless a robust counter-view is developed and advanced in the New Zealand across disciplines.

Further to the issue of justice, the tendency to view religious beliefs as a merely private preference that is isolated from one’s public actions, decisions and choices is pervasive in the New Zealand evangelical church and it leads to a view of religion that ignores questions of truth and focuses instead on private benefit and piety of religious belief.

For these reasons it is important this conversation be had across disciplines; particularly the three disciplines of theology, philosophy and law need to understand and hear each other so we can work together on this problem.

With this backdrop in mind, Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union bring you, as part of Jesus Week, the following event:

A Godless Public Square:

Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life?

7pm Wednesday 3 August
Lib B28 (Library Basement, 5 Alfred St) University of Auckland

Organised by: Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union
Format: Panel Discussion followed by Q&A
Moderated by: Patt Brittenden
Speakers: listed in the order they will speak in:

Theology – Matthew Flannagan PhD
Is it unjust for Christians to appeal to their “private” theologically based moral beliefs in public discussion or is the demand that such discussions be “secular” actually itself an arbitrary and unfair restriction on Christian believers telling them they are free to believe their beliefs are true in private but they must treat them as untrue when in public? How should Christians reconcile the requirement to live an undivided life with the expectation that they keep their religion private?

Philosophy – Glenn Peoples PhD
Liberal views on religion in public life claim that the public square should be neutral, it should not privilege one viewpoint over another when discussing public matters. For this reason the public square should be secular – but can this demand be consistently made? Can liberal thinkers consistently maintain that secular beliefs are neutral and that religious beliefs are not? Or are they in fact privileging their own secular viewpoint over all others?

Critics of the liberal view argue that it is more just to have a more pluralistic public square; one where all views, including religious views, are openly advocated, discussed and debated.

Law – Madeleine Flannagan LLB
In New Zealand the law around public expressions of religion is a little contradictory; on the one hand we have a right to freedom of religion and a right to manifest that freedom in public in the Bill of Rights Act but then there are other laws which privilege secularism, such as the Education Act. There has been very little litigation here which raises issues as to what precisely the law is.

The current law and jurisprudence in New Zealand arguably could permit the solution Glenn alludes to of having a more pluralistic public square that allows religion to participate but the liberal view has strong support in many quarters whilst the alternative view is not widely known or discussed by those quarters that might support it. An alternative jurisprudence, which encompasses the spirit of the solution advanced in philosophy, is being advocated by some Jurists and it is compatible with both our laws and our limited case law to date.

RSVP on Facebook or just bring your friends and turn up – the event is free and lay friendly.

We will be videoing it so if you cannot make it keep an eye out here at MandM or at Thinking Matters for the video.

Like a number of others tonight I have just watched Jesus: The Cold Case on TV One, presented by Bryan Bruce. Here are my thoughts on what I have seen. First off, who is Bryan Bruce?

Bryan Bruce is an award winning producer, writer & director who lives in Wellington, New Zealand. He has a MA in Sociology, Psychology & philosophy from Canterbury University. A former musician and schoolteacher, he began his television career in 1984 as front person and writer for a TVNZ arts show. Since then has won awards for Best Director and Best Factual Writer and his work has made the finals of several international festivals, including the New York Television Festival and the prestigious Banff Awards.

The overarching message that Bryan Bruce is gravitating towards in this documentary is that the biblical and subsequent Christian message on who killed Jesus, namely, “the Jews” in some broad sense, is false, and what’s more it is responsible for centuries of great evil.

Something that strikes the viewer quite early on is that Bruce quite simply doesn’t believe that the Gospels accounts are true in general terms. “Many,” he says, “now believe that the Gospels contain more fiction than fact.” Throughout the documentary we hear from a number of academics who lend their credibility to the various claims Bruce makes.

One of the immediate worries about the presentation is that although we’re led to believe that the presenter is applying rigorous criminal investigation methods to the case, to those familiar with the world of biblical scholarship, his list of authorities suggests otherwise:

• Emeritus Prof. Geza Vermes (Oxford)
• Emeritus Prof John Dominic Crossan ( St Pauls)
• Prof. Elaine Paigels (Princeton)
• Bishop John Shelby Spong (USA)
• Prof. Lloyd Geering (New Zealand)
• Dr Helen Bond ( Edinburgh)
• Prof . Israel Hershkovitz (Tel Aviv)
• Dr Shimon Gibson (London)

Does this read like the list a careful investigator consults if he wants a decent shot at getting to the unvarnished truth, rather than a somewhat partisan perspective?

According to Vermes, Jesus was resurrected in the hearts of his followers, but not literally from the dead.

Crossan claims that Jesus’ followers had a kind of spiritual visionary experience
Paigels writes that early Christians didn’t believe in physical resurrection at all, seeking instead a state of spiritual knowledge and enlightenment Spong says that Jesus’ resurrection had nothing to do with him coming back to life, but with the subjective – but real – experiences in the hearts of his followers.

Lloyd Geering, who himself does not believe in any such being as God, claims that the body of Jesus remained buried and that the story of his resurrection was a later story concocted on the basis of a re-reading of the Old Testament.

Now of course this isn’t a documentary on the resurrection, but the pattern is somewhat striking. It looks fairly clearly as though the presenter has intentionally stacked the witness stand with those hostile to the Christian story. It will hardly come as a surprise that, given such a uniform and narrow sample, the testimony will (rather gleefully!) point away from the traditional version of events surrounding the death of Christ. We might just as easily consult the faculty of Dallas Theological Seminary and claim that using rigorous scrutiny, we have reached the conclusion that the biblical portrait of Jesus’ death is, well, inerrant! Given that those consulted would be placed at one extreme of the spectrum on whether or not we can generally trust the Gospel accounts or the teaching of the early Christian movement, the interests of balance would surely call for less radical voices, the likes of Craig Evans, James Dunn, Luke Timothy Johnson or N. T Wright. One example – Lloyd Geering is quoted as assuring viewers – completely unchallenged – that the details of the crucifixion was no more than what people “imagined” had probably taken place. When it comes to the story of the resurrection, Geering is explicit – Jesus was probably buried by the Romans and that was that. No tomb, no stone rolled away, and no angels. Geering laughs, “the very fact that you’ve got angels [in the story] shows that we’re dealing with myth, not history.” There was not a single challenge raised. Not even an innuendo that Geering’s view isn’t the scholarly consensus. This was said just minutes after the narrator told us that the Gospel was more fiction than fact.

This type of concern rears its head among a more sceptical audience when the evangelical likes of Lee Strobel seeks to do just what Bryan Bruce is doing: Apply critical scrutiny to the facts concerning the life of Christ. And yet we frequently hear the complaint that Strobel consults only committed and usually conservative Christians, people who are unlikely to disagree strongly with each other – or with Strobel. I would hope, then, that this same type of sceptical, professedly critical audience will likewise regard Bruce’s offering as a biased, selective survey of a very thin slice of the scholarly community. For example, says Bruce, the author of Mark says that the land was covered in darkness when Jesus was crucified. But how does he know this, Bruce asks, since he wasn’t there? He must be relying on hearsay, and we are therefore not reading eyewitness testimony. What then does Bruce make of the work of Richard Bauckham, who, in Jesus and the Eyewitnesses makes the case that in fact we have much that is eyewitness testimony in the Gospels? Well, we don’t know. As a scholar who reaches the wrong sort of conclusion, Bauckham does not appear to have been on Bruce’s reading list.

Herein lies the flaw in so much of what is passed of as a fresh, new, surprising, maybe even scandalous new look at the evidence to get at the real facts of New testament events. There is nothing fresh, new or surprising about it. Material like this seems to gain some traction from the rather popular but simply false assumption that any enquiry concluding that mainstream Christianity has fundamentally gotten things wrong must be fresh, honest and critical. The assumption itself, of course, is about as uncritical as assumptions get, because it is already committed to the belief – or perhaps the hope – that whatever the truth is, it’s certainly not whatever “the church” thinks. That’s what makes this project interesting to many. It’s not that there’s a surge of interest in why Jesus was crucified. Rather, there’s a sense of delight in hearing that stuffy, old, doctrinaire, cherished but uninformed Christian belief is wrong.

On to the documentary…

Strolling through the life of Jesus, Bruce starts with the birth, and with John Shelby Spong. Spong – like Geering on the resurrection – quite bluntly tells the audience that the birth story is simply made up. Since Jesus is called Jesus “of Nazareth,” and apparently for no other reasons, Spong says that “if we want to be historically accurate” we should be singing “O little town of Nazareth.” After all, Spong says, as though it will be obvious, given the number of generations between Joseph and the number of wives King David had, David would have had about ten billion descendants at the time of Jesus, and it would be absurd to believe that ten billion people would have returned to their ancestral town of Bethlehem for the census.

“In other words,” Bruce immediately says, “the Gospel writers made up stories about Jesus’ birth, just they did about his death.” It’s quite clear what has just happened. Spong’s claim has been presented as the scholarly one that we should have no problem with. But how much evidence have we really seen? If Jesus grew up in Nazareth, then the epithet “Jesus of Nazareth” would be perfectly understandable with no special need to deny the Gospel claim that Jesus was born in Bethlehem. But hey, we’ve got a ell known figyure saying that the biblical writers are wrong, and that’s, well, a little bit naughty.

Next, Bruce goes on to tell us that two Greek copies of the New Testament, Codex Sinaiticus and Codex Vaticanus, and breaks the news to the public: They’re different! This is where it becomes clear that Bruce’s audience is essentially the same as that of the popular work of Bart Ehrman: It’s the masses who don’t know anything – anything at all – about biblical scholarship. Yes, it’s true that we don’t have the original copies of the Gospels. Shock horror, they were written in the first century! Yes, over time there are going to be differences between copies as more and more copies are made. This is not news. But it does enable Bruce to add in the suggestion that really, the church was “changing” what the Bible said. What’s more, noted Bruce, there are differences between the Gospel accounts of the same events. Again, this is surprising as an attempt to stir up doubt about what we read in the Gospels, but an understandable way to prime an audience that might be quite unaware, even of the basics.

John Dominic Crossan, clearly the favouraite source of the documentary maker givent he number of times he appears on screen, is asked to comment on the historicity of the crucifixion account atthis point, and he tells us: When Jesus says “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me,” “I don’t think Jesus ever said that.” Why not? Well, that doesn’t seem to matter. Crossan just doesn’t think so. In immediate response, Bruce says that “clearly we have to be careful” when taking such Gospel accounts as historical. After all, Crossan doesn’t believe it. Just… because he doesn’t. This is a surprising pattern that begins to reappear throughout this documentary. A person in an armchair appears on-screen, declares that they don’t personally think that something in the Gospels really happened, and the narrator, in effect, strokes his beard (OK he doesn’t really have one) and says “Well, fascinating, there you have it.” But what do other scholars say? What are the reasons for agreeing with the talking head we’ve just seen? And what reasons to others bring to the discussion table for another view? None of that matters. Crossan says it. Bruce agrees. That settles it.

There are times where even the scholars that Bruce hand picked to reinforce his stance on jesus don’t seem quite negative enough about the traditional portrait of Jesus. Remember that in the Gospel, Jesus is portrayed as reading to the congregation in the synagogue. As Geza Vermes explains to Bruce, early Jewish sources like Philo of Alexandria indicate that Jewish boys were taught to read and write – given a basic education. But Bruce suddenly decides that it’s best to get a second opinion, because “just when a matter seems certain,” another scholar comes along and tells you something different. He goes back to old faithful, John Dominic Crossan, who says, apparently citing no particular source, that Jesus was probably illiterate. For no obvious reason, this seems to be Bruce’s preferred option. What’s interesting is that for some reason when the opinion being expressed is the most far left, least orthodox and least compatible with historic Christianity, Bruce never seems to see a need for a second opinion, or even evidence. Some guy in an armchair saying “I just don’t believe it” seems to settle the matter forever. At least one end is served: The Gospel portrait of Jesus is denied. Evidence? Let’s not bother about that, it only gets in the way!

Next Bruce says a few words about the political backdrop of Jesus’ life. Herod the great, who ruled at the time of Jesus’ birth, was rich and powerful. He had grand buildings and vast wealth. This, says Bruce, suggests that the account of Herod ordering the death of babies in Bethlehem “is a lie.” He was nasty, yes, admits Bruce, and he even killed family members, but there’s nothing in the literature saying that he ever killed any babies. Of course, even the Gospels don’t say that just as Herod himself killed family members, Herod also killed babies. The former was done by Herod, the latter was done by soldiers, according to the Gospels. But perhaps more importantly is this: As historians like Josephus note, Herod was a brutish man, responsible for a lot of bloodshed. According to Matthew’s Gospel, Herod’s order was to kill male children, under two years of age in Bethlehem and the immediate surroundings. As even fairly liberal sources like the BBC are willing to point out:

In fact, demographic clues from first century Palestine reveal that Bethlehem was a small village, with a population between three hundred and a thousand. Experts estimate that, at any given time, the number of babies under the age of two would be only between seven and twenty. So numbers alone may be the reason why Josephus does not mention the murders.

SOURCE

This was not an enormous slaughter of dozens, even hundreds of babies, as portrayed in films like Jesus of Nazareth or in artwork. That no such massive scale killing is recorded then, is to be expected.

John the Baptist’s message, says Bruce, was politically important. “Things wouldn’t come right for the Jews until they put things right with God and repented.” You see, says Bruce, John believed that the world was about to end and only the pure – the baptised – would be saved. But where exactly is his evidence? None is actually cited, but it is likely that Bruce is thinking of the biblical claim that John preached that “the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” Presumably Bruce thinks that this is a reference to the end of the world, but if this is so then he has simply got to expand his reading before embarking on further works like this. The idea that first century Judaism was looking forward to some sort of end of the world is simply false. But as this does not play any major role in the remainder of the documentary, there’s no need to embark on a correction of this falsehood here. But he is right about one thing, that John was indeed calling Israel to repentance, just as the Old Testament prophets had done.

According to Elaine Paigels, since John baptised Jesus, John must have been Jesus’ teacher. Jesus therefore got his message from John, and that’s why some might have thought Jesus was a political worry, since John’s message was so political. What revealing about short comments like this from Paigels is that it offers an insight into the slender basis that the more radical wing of biblical scholarship actually has for so many of their interesting sounding claims. John the Baptist was really Jesus’ mentor? How do we know? Well, he baptised him! But was he the teacher and mentor of everyone he baptised? Well no, but gosh it does sound interesting doesn’t it? John Dominic Crossan adds here that John the Baptist thought that once enough people were baptised, once the movement had reached critical mass, God would show up and effectively consummate history. And how does he know this? Sadly, Crossan chose not to share that gem.

But if Jesus is “of Nazareth,” asks Bruce, why did he go to Capernaum to begin his ministry and not stay in Nazareth? “It seems to me,” Bruce says, that “those closest to Jesus didn’t believe that he was the son of God, so he left.” I don;t know why Bruce thinks he needs to rely on his own intuitions, since the Gospels themselves tell us precisely that. In Luke 4, Jesus did visit Nazareth, where he declared that “no prophet is accepted in his own hometown.” Bruce could have quoted this, but here as elsewhere, he prefers the glasses-adjusting chin stroking method of saying “it just seems to me that…” and banking on the credulity of the audience. They don’t need evidence, they’ve got a detective like Bryan Bruce!

Next the subject moves on to the death of John the baptist, as the death of Jesus draws nearer. Vermes rejects the biblical reason for John the Baptist’s death, namely that he had rebuked Herod for taking his brother’s wife. He was not killed for that reason, “but because he was a potential troublemaker. His eloquence might have led a revolution.” What revolution did he threaten? Well, we’re not told, but John was a wild kinda guy, so hey, let’s just throw the possibility out there.

Staying with the death of John the Baptist a little longer, Bruce notes that Matthew and Mark include an account where the daughter of Herodias danced for Herod at a party, and it pleased him so much that Herod promised to give her what she asked for. Prompted by the request of her mother, the woman Herod had married (the woman John said he ought not to have taken), she asks for the head of John the baptist. However, the story of this dance isn’t mentioned in Josephus, so, Bruce says, it didn’t happen. It’s another example, he says, of Christians making stuff up. Again, here’s a good example of how what passes for “critical” scholarship is done. Without anything by way of evidence, just declare that an account in two of the Gospels is pure fabrication – after all, Josephus doesn’t tell the story, and unless it’s mentioned by Josephus then it’s not true. Don’t worry that your argument lacks any merit. As long as you’re discrediting a Gospel account you’ll get a pat on the back from some people.

So now John the Baptist was dead, and we’re greeting again with the face of John Dominic Crossan. This time, he’s on screen to tell us again that John had predicted the end of the world (I think we’re supposed to have believed this claim previously so that we won’t raise an eyebrow at it now). When John died and this cataclysmic event had not happened, Jesus had a crisis. God didn’t arrive! Jesus now had to totally re-think his approach.

Bruce observes that the Gospels talk about crowds following Jesus, “but I suspect that having seen what happened to John, Jesus took a low key approach.” As for what the Gospels say about the ministry of Jesus, Bruce opines, “We don’t know if these stories have any truth to them.” Where does this come from? What led to it? Nothing that we’re told about. No particular evidence, no considerations, Bruce is just sharing his thoughts. What does it contribute? Little, other than a general air of “we’re above believing this stuff.” On the healing of Lazarus at Bethany, Bruce says, “I find it suspicious that only John’s Gospel has the story of Lazarus, so I think he made it up.” That was it – the whole argument verbatim. And this is the way so many things are dismissed in this documentary. If anyone doubts that a biblical event took place, then that’s the end of it. It didn’t happen.

On to Passover and the events leading up to Jesus’ crucifixion. Bruce wonders if this was Jesus’ first time in Jerusalem, “as three of the Gospels say that it was.” This had me checking the Gospels to see whether even one of the Gospels said this, let alone three. I came back empty handed. Matthew does not say this, and neither do Mark, Luke or John. Where does Bruce find this? Will he share? Apparently not, he simply tells us that this is so and that is that, as with so many of his quips.

Crossan is back, telling us that in a politically tense Jerusalem, Jesus started a demonstration. He did this by riding a donkey, which amounted to a Messianic claim – since the prophets referred to the king riding on a donkey (Zechariah 9). This was dangerous – given that the Jews were celebrating deliverance from Egyptian bondage. Given that the Jews were under Roman bondage, this environment was a fragile one and any Messianic claims during passover were potentially volatile. Incidentally, Bruce offers his wisdom here again, saying that the next time that Jesus entered the city (the next day), the crowds that hailed Jesus were no longer there, so Bruce says that the crowds of Palm Sunday simply never existed. Naturally. Perhaps Bruce thinks that the next day the streets were empty!

Shimon Gibson chimes in here, saying that while Jesus’ triumphal entry was a “very important event” for the Jesus group – those who knew or followed Jesus, as far as the geography goes and the huge number of pilgrims who travelling that route anyway, the event probably didn’t have much significance. It took place in the midst of a crowd and would not have dominated the scene. This could have been an ideal moment for Bruce to retract his comment about the whole affair being invented – but why bother?

On the cleansing of the Temple while in Jerusalem for the passover, Bruce says “This may have been a much smaller event than the New Testament suggests.” After all, the Temple court was huge, and this could have been a small skirmish. However, he acknowledges that most theologians and NT scholars agree that this is actually what got Jesus into trouble with the Jews that week, trouble that led to his arrest. At the very least, as Helen Bond says at this point, the Jewish authorities saw that Jesus is doing something out of the ordinary in the Temple at Passover. They wanted the feast to run smoothly, and any suggestion that Jesus might have disrupted that could have prompted them to alert the Romans.

Crossan seems to support the Gospel accounts here, saying that Jesus was protected by the crowd and that is why he was not arrested sooner. Bruce however doesn’t buy it – not the Gospel accounts, nor even his hand-picked scholars. After all, when Jesus was killed, there was no outcry. This too then, has to be fabrication. Unsurprisingly, Bruce also doubts the whole account of Jesus’ betrayal. “Some scholars” have called the biblical account into question. And who is Bruce referring to? John Shelby Spong. Spong says that Judas just means “Judah.” What’s more, the Apostle Paul didn’t mention the betrayal by Judas specifically. Betrayal with a kiss, pieces of silver – these are all elements found in either the Old Testament or Jewish literature, and they are used as Midrash, fictional embellishments.

Bruce adds: If people re-wrote history (his way of summing up the practice of using Midrash) in this way in those times, then we need to ask if the Christians did this as well to place the blame on the Jews. The first clue that the Gospel writers “made it all up” when recounting the betrayal of Jesus is the fact that the version of events in each Gospel is not quite the same as the other. The naivete of this sort of judgement is just staggering, and it is instructive to bear in mind that the man has absolutely no background in either history or biblical studies. That events are recounted differently by different authors does not contribute in the least to the conclusion that the events in question never happened.

Elaine Paigels, author of The Gnostic Gospels, says the trial probably never happened at all. The Sanhedrin did not meet at night. And, she says, we don’t even know that they had the jurisdiction to sentence a man to death. Crossan adds that it couldn’t have been an official “trial,” just a decision. But none of this is useful in the least. The Gospels never claim that the Sanhedrin passed judicial sentence on Jesus, so the fact that they would not have had jurisdiction to do so is just not relevant.

Elaine Paigels says that there’s evidence that Pilate was a hard man, brutal in killing people and quite happy to insult the Jews, so the Gospel account of this man who did not want to get on ther wrong side of the people by having Jesus killed (or not) must be false. Crossan adds, “I can’t even imagine any Roman Governer allowing a crowd to scream at him.” Helen Bond too says that Pilate had a military background. Jesus was peasant, and Pilate wouldn’t have had a second thought about sending him to the cross. The argument is basically that while this indeed the way the Gospels portray the actions of Pilate on that day: as wanting to appease the crowd, this doesn’t sit well with what we know about Pilate’s personality. I don’t think it’s a particularly compelling argument on its own, but I’ll say that this is as close to a sensible argument as anything that the documentary contains.

But then observe how Bruce immediately pours on the rhetoric saying that “It’s clear that much of the passion story was made up by the Christian writers,” when no such thing is “clear,” even if Bruce believes that there are reasons for doubting some of what is purported to have happened. He only makes it worse by asking, “Why would the early Christians tell stories that they clearly knew to be untrue?” That they knew to be untrue now? The strength of the rhetoric is very obvious out of proportion to any evidence based arguments, but the rhetoric is there for a reason. Bruce is whipping up his audience to make them credulous for what is about to be said. He has got to get them hearing words like “lie,” “untrue,” “why would they,” “what could motivate them,” “they knew to be untrue.” In order for his accusations that follow to fall upon receptive ears, he needs to build up a picture of a Christian community that was strongly motivated to tell deliberate lies to exonerate Pilate and blame the Jews for the death of Jesus. Evidence or not, this is what he’s got to convey.

Now that he has set the scene and basically asked why the Christians were such a pack of liars, his selected scholars come in to offer answers. Paigels suggests that Mark blamed the Jews – rather than Pilate – for the death of Jesus because he was writing in wartime and wanted to stress that Jesus did not lead a revolt against the Romans, and that the Jews tricked Pilate into having Jesus crucified. This is what bruce was looking for, so he adds his own two cents: The Christians were keen to separate themselves from the Jews after AD 70. So they re-wrote history. They made Pilate into a nicer guy and made the Jews nastier. The Gospel writers “pulled off the greatest PR spin in history.”

This anti-semitic theme, says Bruce, was then wired into the Christian writings, until John’s “Gospel of hate” that blamed the Jewish people as a whole, where the ugly and plainly anti-Jewish message was laid out clearly. Christians turned the “spotlight of hate onto Judaism.”

Bruce sees further evidence of the spread of this anti-Jewish message in AD 144 when Marcion proposed a canon of the Bible and preached a clearly anti-Semitic theology. He portrayed the Jewish God as mean spirited and dark, while the Christian Saviour was good and loving. He wanted to strip the Scripture of its traces of Jewish sympathy. The trouble with this example is that Marcion was promptly and resoundingly condemned by the orthodox Christian community. Even in AD 144 this message that Bruce says had become dominant could not find a foothold. How strange!

From here, the version of history that the viewer is exposed to descends into madness of The Da Vinci Codeproportions. We are told that the controversy at the council of Nicea was settled – not by the assembled bishops, but by Emperor Constantine, who was the “head of the church,” and Arius, the man whose views were rejected, died “mysteriously” afterwards. A conspiracy is born. Again.

From here we leap into the twentieth Century, into the life of Jules Isaac, the Jewish author of Jesus and Israel. This book was Isaac’s own account of his life during World War II, while he was asking why Christian nations took such a dim view of the Jews. His wife and daughter had been murdered by the Nazis. “What was it that the Jews were supposed to have done that could possibly warrant such hatred,” asks Bruce. Hitler played on Christian contempt of the Jews to bolster his agenda. “The impact of those lies told by the early Christians” on Jews living in Europe was massive, says Bruce. Isaac’s wife and daughter were sent to Aushwitz. What they suffered, “we can only guess.” But we can’t just blame Hitler. Martin Luther railed against the Jews, calling on the Jews to be driven out like dogs. “How he came to this vile conclusion isn’t clear,” says Bruce, but the Nazis appealed to him. But wait a moment, that was important. How he came to his conclusions isn’t clear? But the clarity of the line of reasoning here is what is carrying Bruce’s thesis: Christians hate and kill Jews because the first Christians lied and said that Jews got Jesus killed!

Things get stranger still as we hear Spong at this point say that he was taught to hate other religions because “we have the only true faith” and he was given the message that “I will kill you if you don’t agree with me.” What? How could this possibly be true? What church did Spong attend where he was given the message that it’s alright to kill people who don’t agree with us?

So now we have lies – well, alleged lies, we still haven’t quite seen the evidence that the early Christians made this stuff up, but Bruce calls them lies, that encourage Christians to actually murder Jews, and which justify the Holocaust? Not to mention churches that tell people like Spong that murder’s fine if others disagree with you. The Holocaust reminds Bruce “how dangerous it is to repeat the lies” that the New Testament tells about the Jews. Apparently, even if the people who advocated that Jesus die were actually Jewish, then simply reporting that fact would be wrong!

But wait, suddenly a new bombshell is dropped. Bruce now silently retracts the entire argument, and says that even if further documents were unearthed that did show that the Jews were responsible for Jesus’ death, “How could that justify what happened here,” at Aushwitz?

Take a moment to appreciate the importance of that. Previously Bruce had been begging us to believe that the “lies” of the New Testament are dangerous because they result in things like the Holocaust. Now he’s telling us that even if they weren’t lies at all – even if the Gospels are absolutely correct, and Jewish people really did call for the death of Jesus, that would not justify anti-semitic persecution after all.

Ding, the penny should be dropping right now. That’s the point. The New Testament accounts don’t justify anti-semitism. If some Jews were responsible for the death of Jesus then that’s what they did, but none of this offers support for the persecution of Jewish people now or at any other time. Once Bruce has acknowledged this, what, exactly, is he accusing the New Testament of? Oh that;s right, being a back of lies. But the support for this contention has always been a bit murky, leaving only one thing clear throughout: This stuff in the Gospels is definitely made up!

But forgetting that again, Bruce is back in action, saying that if you need any proof of how unfair the Gospel account is to the Jews, “all you need to do is remind yourself of what happened here, at Auschwitz.”

Bruce closes by telling us: “The Jews did not kill Jesus. Pilate killed Jesus.” What Bruce might be enlightened to know is that the person responsible for Jesus’ death is named, and has been named for many centuries now (from probably as early as the fourth or fifth century) in the Apostles’ Creed, in which the Jews are never even mentioned. Instead, we read of Jesus, the son of God, who became man for our sake and for our salvation, and who was “suffered under Pontius Pilate.” And we certainly didn’t need this documentary to tell us that.

So what have we actually seen? Well, we finally got to a true statement at the end – one that Christians have taught for centuries no less – but just look at what we had to endure to get there! An almost unbelievably partisan selection of scholars, supposedly representing a consensus, along with a generous scattering of proclamations about the reliability of New Testament accounts that Bryan Bruce appears to have simply pulled out of thin air.

What’s worse is the knowledge of the way that wide eye, impressed viewers will see this. Here’s a person who’s willing to ask “hard questions.” What a breath of fresh air! Never mind that it’s the same stale air that has been circulating on sceptical websites and religious studies departments for years. Look, he’s got scholars backing him up! Never mind any of the published responses to those scholars, Bruce can rest easy in the knowledge that his audience won’t even have read them.

For a somewhat more informed read, even if only for the sake of providing balance to this documentary, see Craig Evans and N. T. Wright, Jesus: The Final Days.

Cross Posted at: Say Hello to my Little Friend: The Beretta Blog and Podcast

(See also Mark Keown’s Jesus the Cold Case: A Response)

A Godless Public Square:

Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life?

A Jesus Week Panel Discussion
7-9pm Wednesday 3 August
Lib B28 (Library Basement) University of Auckland

Christian theological convictions ought to impact the whole of life both in the private and public spheres; this is what the idea of an “undivided life” means, Jesus is Lord of all aspects of our lives.

Yet this consequence of Christian faith conflicts with a pervasive contemporary attitude: the view that that religion is fundamentally a private matter. It is accepted that a Christian is free to utilise theological convictions when they make decisions about their own life but in a pluralistic society it is increasingly deemed inappropriate to bring such convictions into public discussions about morality, law, politics, economics, education, scholarship and so on. The desire to influence society with Christian ideals or to convert others to the faith is viewed by many as an intolerant desire to impose one’s private views onto others.

It is widely accepted that theological convictions can govern churches and the private lives of believers yet we are told that the public square – government, public policy, the courts, the academy, education, business, arts, media, etc – should be secular only.

This event looks at this issue. The conversation will span Theology, Philosophy and Law led by a panel made up of Christian representatives from each discipline along with you the audience.

Up for discussion are issues like:

- Is it wrong for Christians to impose their ‘private’ religious beliefs onto others?
- Is secularism the neutral perspective it is claimed to be?
- Are public expressions of religion regulated by law?

Bring your own questions and ask them at the Q & A session.

This is a free event open to the public, which will be lay friendly – a university degree is not necessary in order for you to attend!

Panel:

• Dr Matthew Flannagan – PhD in Theology
• Dr Glenn Peoples – PhD in Philosophy
• Madeleine Flannagan – LLB and Post-Graduate Law Student

Moderator:

• Patt Brittenden – Talkback Radio Show Host

RSVP on Facebook here (or just turn up with your friends)

The 9/11 terrorist attacks reinvigorated a fear that has lain dormant in the western psyche since at least the 17^th century. This fear is encapsulated in an objection to belief in God known as the argument from historical atrocities. Many critics of religion refer to the religious wars that tore Europe apart during the 17^th century, citing events such as the Inquisition and Crusades — although lately the Taliban have been the image of choice.

Recently, whilst debating the viability of religious morality at the University of Notre Dame, best-selling author Sam Harris repeatedly cited the Taliban as a representative example of theological ethics. One need not read far into the literature of contemporary free thinkers to uncover this line of argument. Consider Jim Peron of the Institute for Liberal Values:

“To admit religion into the “public arena” is “dangerous.” And long term the results will be just as bloody and violent as they were in the past. … To put religion into that sector is to ignore centuries of history and return to the conflict-ridden, bloody world of the Dark Ages.”

Peron went on to refer to common motifs of the Inquisition: “crazy Puritans”, Servetus’ execution in Calvin’s Geneva and so on. Similar themes abound in the writings of Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens. The citation of historical cases is not in itself an argument so it is hard to discern the exact objection here. It appears to consist of two claims. Firstly, that some people who believe in God have committed atrocities against other people. Secondly, that if people who hold a belief commit atrocities then that belief is either false or should be avoided by liberal-minded people.

Historians Ronald Numbers and David Lindberg point to recent research having discredited the portrayal of the early Middle Ages as “the Dark Ages” brought about by Christianity. Similarly, research into Inquisition archives reveal that while such tribunals did exist, many popular beliefs are based on embellishment, exaggeration and propaganda rather than a sober assessment of facts. The picture of the Inquisition that emerges from these studies is significantly more benign than has popularly been thought. Similarly, historian Leland Ryken’s studies on the Puritans have questioned many of the popular stereotypes Peron referred to.

Take Peron’s allusion to the execution of Servetus. In his study on the life of Calvin, Oxford Theologian Alister McGrath argues that Calvin’s role in Servetus’ execution has been greatly exaggerated and contends that such heresy prosecutions were not typical in Geneva contrary to the image popularly peddled by rationalists. McGrath has also relentlessly exposed several cases of outright distortion and myth perpetuated about the so-called “dictator” of Geneva. This is not to say that atrocities did not occur, nor that such atrocities should be justified, but it is important to be accurate and fair. The evidence suggests that much of what people believe today about religious history is based on discredited 19^th century rationalist propaganda stereotypes and consequent cultural prejudice.

Perhaps more interesting is the second claim. While this claim is seldom made explicit, something like it is necessary if the existence of atrocities entails that belief in God is false or that religious belief and practice should be avoided.

Philosopher Glenn Peoples provides several counter examples to this claim. The belief that the atom could be split is one that has been used to kill thousands of people yet that belief is true and it is an important scientific discovery. The belief that theft is wrong has, in the past, led to the lynching of thieves. Does this show that theft is not really wrong and we should not oppose it?

Other examples illustrate the absurdity of this claim. The “reign of terror” during the French Revolution was justified by appeals to liberty, equality, fraternity and the rights of humankind; one victim of the guillotine famously remarked, “Oh, Liberty, what crimes are committed in your name”. Millions have been slaughtered by appeals to the greater good of society or the liberation of the oppressed classes and it is well known that people have defended wars on the basis of justice and social peace. Should we therefore avoid liberty, equality, opposing oppression, seeking justice and social peace?

A third problem with the “argument from atrocities” is that an analogous argument can be used against atheism and secular philosophies. Millions have lost their lives in wars fought in the name of secular ideologies such as Communism — wars far more brutal and total than those that occurred during the Middle Ages. Millions have been killed in socialist states in show-trials every bit as hysterical and rigged as any witch trials were. And, as some medievalists have noted, with irony, the Committee for Public Safety in Enlightenment France was, in numerous respects, much worse than the Inquisition. If the fact that Christians engaged in historical atrocities entails belief in God is false or that religious belief is to be avoided then parity of reasoning entails atheism is false and that secular belief systems should be avoided.

At this point the sceptic will start to make qualifications. One rejoinder is that whilst atheists like Pol Pot, Mao and Stalin committed atrocities, these were not done in the name of atheism or due to their atheist beliefs. Religious atrocities, however, were committed because of religious beliefs.

However, such rejoinders fail. As Peoples explained, Stalin and Pol Pot persecuted religious groups precisely because they were atheists and saw religion as socially pernicious — the very thing people who press the historical atrocities argument are trying to contend. Richard Wurmbrand, a victim of communist persecution in Romania, stated that “communist torturers often said there is no God, no hereafter, no life after death, we can do what we wish.” The fact that atheism was not the motivation for these actions seems to be news to those who actually witnessed them.

So, many atrocities were committed on the basis of atheism. The purported rejoinder also fails due to the fact that many atrocities cited by religious critics were not committed for religious reasons but for secular ones. Christopher Eberle and Terence Cuneo noted in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy that the religious wars of the 17th Century were caused not by the appeal to religious reasons, per se, but rather by the violation of religious freedom. They noted further that even in the 17th Century religious persecution was typically justified on secular grounds,

“When such rights have been violated, the justifications offered, even by religious believers, appeal to alleged requirements for social order, such as the need for uniformity of belief on basic normative issues. One theological apologist for religious repression, for example, writes this: ‘The king punishes heretics as enemies, as extremely wicked rebels, who endanger the peace of the kingdom, which cannot be maintained without the unity of the faith. That is why they are burnt in Spain.”

Medievalist Régine Pernoud argued that heretics were burnt or tortured during the 12^th Century due to the revival of Roman Law, which allowed torture to gain a confession and burning as punishment for treason. The torture and burning of heretics had as much to do with ancient Roman legal customs as it did with biblical exegesis. In fact, the Inquisition used torture more sparingly, passed death sentences more rarely and had more humane prisons than most secular courts of the same time. This suggests inquisitors actually moderated already accepted harsh Roman practices. Now, this does not justify such practices but it does question the thesis that religious reasons were the driving motivation for them or the thesis that they would not have occurred if a more secular context had prevailed. In a similar vein the Crusades were originally called to protect pilgrims from attack, to recover annexed territory and to protect the eastern Roman Empire from invasion — all secular reasons that could have been utilised to justify war quite independently of any religious rationale. Was World War II not fought to recover annexed territory, protect innocent people and protect Europe from invasion? How many millions were killed for that?

When these qualifications fail it is contended that not all atheists support these practices. This is true. It is also true that not all religious people support the practices cited by these sceptics. In fact, historically, some of the most important criticisms of religious persecution and defences of religious tolerance, such as those proposed by John Locke and Pierre Bayle, appealed to explicitly theological grounds.

Yale Philosophy Professor, Nicholas Wolterstorff, notes that “many of the social movements in the modern world that have moved societies in the direction of liberal democracy have been deeply and explicitly religious in their orientation.” Wolterstorff cites examples such as the abolitionist, civil rights and other resistance movements as examples.

So the appeal to historical atrocities, on examination, seems often based on a fairly selective analysis of the evidence. The Bin Ladens and Hitlers of this world are clearly dangerous but so too are the Stalins, Pol Pots and secular groups like the Tamil Tigers who pioneered the practice of suicide bombing before Al-Qaeda came on the scene. People fight and kill for a number of reasons; sometimes these are religious, more often they are secular – sometimes both. When people care deeply about something, sometimes they will kill to protect it. Religion is not an exception.

Bin Laden is dead; however, as commentators incessantly tell us, the legacy of religious terror he represents will continue. What also will continue are the prejudices of some secular groups who use his example to stereotype and smear all religions as dangerous and fanatical. It is far easier to kill a terrorist than it is to kill irrational prejudice but at least one can expose it for the shallow line of thought that it is.

I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled “Contra Mundum.” This blog post was published in the June 2011 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

Letters to the editor should be sent to:
editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

RELATED POSTS:
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Contra Mundum: Is God a 21st Century Western Liberal?
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I first encountered Zeitgeist when my biological father showed it to me as an attempt to dissuade me from my faith 3 years ago when I was 13. He said it was a ground breaking and shocking devastator of religion. I found some of the claims interesting and at first glance compelling but at other points it was ridiculously far-fetched like when it claimed Horus was the “lamb of God” and “the bread of life”. My sister had studied Egyptology in some depth and had shared a lot of her knowledge with me so I strongly doubted that the Horus claims were correct. I have since encountered kids at my school who referred to claims made in Zeitgeist during debates I had with them over the case for Christianity.

So seeing a podcast examining the claims made by the movie was therefore compelling – especially on seeing who the author was. It was fantastic. I have listened to it now 6-7 times, I have played it for several of my friends and I even spent one lonely afternoon transcribing most of it so I could respond to a comment made by a sceptic on an animation forum.

After listening to Glenn’s Zeitgeist podcast, I immediately wanted more. I have since downloaded and listened to most of the 40 episodes on Say Hello to my Little Friend. I have listened to other podcasts too but the Beretta-cast remains my favourite by far.

A Beretta-cast episode is often hilarious and always offers a straightforward and fair analysis of the topic in some detail (Glenn’s badass original music at the start of each episode is pretty mean too!). Each podcast episode varies from giving an overview of a particular Christian view in a field or a cutting critique of Atheistic hostility towards the Christian faith. Given the intellectually engaging nature of the content contained, I advise anyone and everyone interested in these topics to check this podcast out!

Below, I have made a list of 10 of my favourite Beretta-cast episodes below along with some comments on the highlights of each particular one.

Stop Being A Christian and Start being a Person
I love listening to this one – I have listened to it half a dozen times – because the point of this episode is mainly directed at issues within the Christian community itself. This episode outlines how some Christians approach real life situations with an almost superficial view on what makes for a quality piece of music, literature or even a person. It really hits the nail on the head.

Is Abortion Immoral, and Should it be Illegal?
I find this episode to be very amusing (strange for this subject I know!) and very compelling. It outlines some key aspects of philosophy and applies these principals to Ethics with some hilarious analogies.

Why Become an Athiest?
This episode is just plain brilliant. It shows us how even if atheism were true, a sceptic of the Christian faith would have no reason to try to convince a Christian that we are wrong in our beliefs. It is within atheism’s interests to let us believe what we want.

Breaking the (Obama) Spell
This episode gives some very good insight into American politics. Not only does it show us how silly human perceptions on political issues can become when one is caught up in media frenzy but it also gives a clear perspective on what President Barack Obama has actually contributed to America.

The Argument from Atrocity
Another great episode. Glenn pulls no punches here in his attack on one of the ‘four horsemen’ of the new-atheism, Christopher Hitchens, and his argument from atrocity. This episode is clear-cut with devastatingly sharp criticism of Hitchens’s propositions.

Imagine there’s no Heaven
I found this one to be a real eye-opener. Like the first episode I listed, this episode is more of an internal criticism of some big ideas that float around through Christian circles about the afterlife. Specifically it touches on whether we have floaty souls that fly around on the 11th dimension after death or not.

Intelligent Design
Another great podcast. Although this one is pretty straightforward, it is one of those ones that always draws my attention because of the clarity is speaks into the debate.

Plantinga and Properly Basic Beliefs
This episode gives a good overview over Alvin Plantinga’s idea of properly basic beliefs and how this applies to Christianity. This episode has excellent philosophy content.

Zeitgeist: The Movie
Yes, some people actually believe this stuff! This is a long one but Glenn does a fantastic job at ripping this movie to shreds. I recommend it to anyone who thinks that Zeitgeist should be given any weight at all as a documentary.

Sam Harris, Science and Morality
This one is rather amusing as Glenn continually points out many of the mistakes that Sam Harris makes in his reasoning by using audio clips from a talk he gave at TED. This podcast provided some good ‘preparation’ for when I listened to Sam Harris’s recent debate with William Lane Craig.

So what are you waiting for? Dive in, start listening to the Beretta-cast today. I promise you’ll be hooked!

Pro Life Tour 2011

• 31 Jan Wellington
• 1 Feb Palmerston North
• 2 – 3 Feb Christchurch
• 4 Feb Dunedin
• 5 Feb Auckland
• 7 Feb Hamilton

Most centres will have day workshops and evening talks – click on the centre nearest you for details.

Dr Glenn Peoples will be joining Jill and Bryan to speak on “Pro-life Apologetics” at the workshop in Dunedin, Brendan Malone will be speaking on “Why we Believe what we Believe” at the Christchurch workshop and Matt will be giving a talk entitled “Answering Arguments for Abortion” at the Auckland workshop and also the one in Hamilton.

Pro-life Workshop Auckland

Greenlane Christian Centre, 17 Marewa Road

• 11:00am Doors open and Morning tea
• 11:20 am Welcome
• 11:30am Workshop 1 – Bryan Kemper ”Why should we be pro-life and how can we reach this generation?”
• 12.15 am Workshop 2 – Jill Stanek “Prolife blogging”
• 1:00pm Lunch
• 1:45pm Workshop 3 – Bryan Kemper “Pro-life activism on Campus”
• 2:30pm Workshop 4 – Jill Stanek “Abortion and the breast cancer link”
• 3:15pm Workshop 5 – Matthew Flannagan “Pro-Life Apologetics: Answering Arguments for Abortion”
• 3:55pm Pro-life Auckland – Simeon Brown “What we do and how you can help”
• 4:00pm – Finish

Speaker Bios

Jill Stanek was a registered nurse working in the labour & delivery department at an Illinois hospital. One evening she was on duty and she was asked to assist with a complicated abortion procedure. The baby was born alive and was subsequently put in the hospital’s soiled utility room and left to die. Jill went in and held it until it died. When hospital leaders said that they would not stop this practice, Jill went public and became a national figure in the pro-life movement.

Jill has been quoted in the national media on television, on radio, in print, and by local and national legislators, including the US President. She has now testified twice before the Judiciary Constitution Subcommittee of the US House of Representatives and in several state legislatures. Her written testimony has been read several times in key US Congressional debates on the Partial Birth Abortion Ban and the Born Alive Infants Protection Act.

Jill remained at the hospital fighting the fight from the inside, until she was terminated in 2001 for reasons related to her public outspokenness to its abortion practices.

In 2002, President Bush invited Jill to the signing of the Born Alive Infants Protection Act, which protects live aborted children from infanticide. The President publicly thanked for her help with the bill during his speech.

In 2003, World magazine named Jill as one of the 30 most prominent pro-life leaders in the movement over the past 30 years and President Bush invited Jill to his signing of the Partial Birth Abortion Ban, which protects partially delivered babies from being killed.

Today Jill writes on pro-life issues as a weekly columnist for WorldNetDaily.com, rated the #1 independent Internet news site. Jill also oversees her own blog, jillstanek.com, the top ranking pro-life blog in the US.

For her pro-life writing MSNBC’s liberal commentator Keith Olbermann named Jill, in 2009, as the “Worst Person in the World!” In 2011, News Real Blog named Jill one of the “Top Ten Enemies the Pro-Abortion Left Fears.”  More on Jill here.

Bryan Kemper grew up in a bad neighbourhood and battled drug abuse before becoming a Christian. He went on to found and run Stand True Ministries, a Christian pro-life group. He also founded Rock For Life, an organisation that blends the pro-life message with Christian rock music – two of Bryan’s own passions. He blogs at BryanKemper.com

Bryan is a passionate and compelling orator; he has spoken at high schools and Universities around the world, including Harvard, Princeton, Notre Dame, Queens University in Northern Ireland, Cardiff University in Wales and many more.  He taken the pro-life message around the world to countries like Ireland, Australia, Scotland, Austria and many more . In the past, he was a regular guest on the television show Politically Incorrect with Bill Maher and co-hosted his own call-in cable show in Portland, Oregon. Bryan has been featured on MTV, radio shows, newspapers, and magazines including the cover of the New York Times and a six-page layout in Swing Generation. He has also been featured in three documentary movies.

Aside from his speaking, Bryan is also an author. Bryan’s first book, Social Justice Begins in the Womb was released in January of 2010 by Clay Bridges Publishing. His articles have appeared in many magazines and pro-life publications. More on Bryan here

As one of the organisers, Andy Moore, wrote:

I’m going to go and hear these guys when they come to Auckland on 5 February.

These are two of the top pro-lifers in the States – on a speaking tour in NZ for the first time. Whether you’re pro-life or pro-choice, it shouldn’t matter. I put the challenge to you, come along and decide for yourself. If abortion is what I’ve said it is – the murder of an unborn child, then it’s a bloody serious issue that we should speak up about. This is not an issue where you can sit on the fence and be a typical laid-back Kiwi about – if they’re killing unborn babies down the road from you at your local abortion clinic, then you should do something about it.

Dr Glenn Peoples holds a Bachelors of Divinity, a Masters of Theology and a Doctorate in Philosophy from the University of Otago.

For over ten years he has been writing and speaking, both in New Zealand and abroad, on intellectual issues that Christians face, including the place of faith in the public square, justice and human rights and the reasons for Christian belief.

He and his wife Ruth Peoples were active in the Waikato branch of Students Organised to Uphold Life (SOUL) and later worked with the national office primarily doing pro-life talks in churches, community organisations and university campuses.

Glenn blogs and publishes his podcasts at Say Hello to my Little Friend: The Beretta Blog and Podcast. More on Glenn here.

Brendan Malone is a media and education officer for pro-life organisation, Family Life International. He regularly appears in the New Zealand media in interviews and opinion columns presenting the pro-life perspective on issues related to human persons and their fundamental right to life.

Brendan is an engaging speaker and will be taking on “Why we Believe what we Believe”, an overview of the arguments against abortion. Young people will work together in groups to learn how to communicate their pro-life views to their peers in a clear and logical way.

Brendan blogs at Semper Vita on life issues.

Dr Matthew Flannagan is a blogger at MandM – New Zealand’s most read Christian blog – and is also one of New Zealand’s leading analytic theologians. He holds a PhD in Theology, a Masters with First Class Honours and Bachelors degree in Philosophy.

His PhD thesis was on the Ethics of Feticide (the killing of fetuses). In it, he surveyed the history of Christian moral opposition to feticide and defended this tradition against contemporary secular critiques and arguments for abortion. This work is currently under consideration for publication as a monograph by a US publishing house.

His paper “Abortion as Arbitrary Killing” was made required reading for the Social and Moral Philosophy course at the University of Waikato. His article “Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic“, originally published as one of his Investigate Magazine columns, has received considerable international attention from the pro-life movement (and its opposition) – Google currently shows 346 unique links to it! His academic publications on abortion have appeared in international journals of philosophy, theology and ethics he has earned praise for his work from some of the top pro-life academics in the world.

Matt is also qualified to teach philosophy, ethics, theology and religious studies in secondary schools, so he knows how to break complex academic topics down to lay level without compromising them.

He is a proficient public speaker. He has twice formally debated Dr Zoe During (formerly of the Abortion Law Reform Association of New Zealand) on abortion; the second of these debates also featured Dr Bill Cooke (then President of the New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanists).

He has appeared on major New Zealand TV documentaries and radio shows speaking on ethical issues surrounding abortion and his opinion pieces on pro-life issues have been published in mainstream New Zealand print media.

He and his wife, Madeleine Flannagan, founded and ran the Waikato branch of SOUL and later took over the national running of it. These roles saw him speak on abortion around the country at many churches, community organisations, university campuses and more than once at the annual Voice for Life conference in Wellington.

He has spoken on abortion at the Survivors Summer Camp in Los Angeles and he has just been invited to speak on issues around personhood at the Society for Biblical Literature’s annual meeting in San Francisco in November 2011.

You can find almost all of his popular and academic written material on abortion on this blog - just click here. More on Matt here.

So mark the pro-life tour date relevant to where you are in your calendar now, register and come along.

Glenn on Physicalism
Glenn Peoples, of Say Hello to my Little Friend: The Beretta Blog and Podcast, recently spoke at the University of Oxford at the annual conference of the European Society for the Philosophy of Religion on the topic “Raising the Justificatory Hurdle: How to Make Sure Religion Stays Out of Politics No Matter What” and while he was there he appeared on the UK’s Unbelievable? radio show to debate the issue of physicalism with John Haldane.

Listen to: Christian Physicalism: Do we have a soul? – Unbelievable? 04 Sep 2010

Christians have traditionally held that humans comprise two things – a body and a soul. Christian Philosophers have written in defence of the soul against a reductive atheism that claims we are material beings alone.

But a new movement in Christian philosophy claims that the atheists are correct, at least when it comes to humans.

Dr Glenn Peoples is a Christian philosopher who subscribes to physicalism – that humans are only physical and they have no immaterial soul. He explains how he arrived at that view from Scripture and how he defends it philosophically, without giving up an evangelical Christian view.

Prof John Haldane is a Christian philosopher at St Andrews University in Scotland. He believes that Christian faith and Philosophy bear witness to an immaterial soul – though his “Thomistic” view defends it differently to the prevailing trend.

Lydia on The Probability of Christianity
Dr Lydia McGrew, of What’s Wrong With the World and Extra Thoughts, has recently co-authored a Bayesian defence of the historicity of the resurrection in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, and so Luke Muehlhauser, of Common Sense Atheism, interviewed her for his podcast, Conversations from the Pale Blue Dot.

Lydia describes herself as ‘a homemaker and home schooling mum who does analytic philosophy in some of her spare time.’ She is very good at it, as you will quickly pick up in her discussion with Luke. They talk about, among other things:

The probability of the Resurrection v the probability of witchcraft at Salem and the Hindu milk miracle

The practice of Christian philosophy

The fine-tuning argument

God as an explanation

Listen carefully to work out which blogger from this blog gets cited in an example