http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sfnCKFs9DWk

Each speaker has published the speeches they wrote for this event:

• Matthew Flannagan’s speech – Theology
• Glenn Peoples’ speech – Philosophy
• Madeleine Flannagan’s speech – Law

Hat tip (and credit for filming and editing this video): Stuart at Thinking Matters.

A few weeks ago, as part of Jesus Week at the University of Auckland, Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union hosted an event entitled A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? This event was a conversation between Theology, Philosophy and Law and featured Matthew Flannagan - Analytic Theologian, Glenn Peoples - Philosopher and Madeleine Flannagan - Legal Scholar. The video is still being edited and will be available soon but for now, this 3-part series comprises the written speeches of each speaker.

Madeleine Flannagan – Law

Glenn and Matt dealt with moral restraint; the idea prevalent in our society that those of us with religious convictions ought to keep them to ourselves when we participate in public life.

Often people contend or try to imply that this obligation is required by law. We’ve all heard politicians, people in the media, leaders in our communities, lecturers at university assert that we are a secular nation and that our commitment to freedom of religion requires a secular public square.[1]

And they are not wrong to a degree. It is evident that something like this ‘obligation’ advanced by the likes of Rawls, Audi, Gaus, et al is present in western jurisprudence – most obviously in that coming out of the United States; you do not need to have studied law to be aware of this, you will have picked up on it if you have watched any American TV.

Separation of Church and State or Separationism?

Most people are aware that the US Supreme Court has interpreted America’s Religious Freedom and Free Exercise laws to mean that religious instruction, prayer, references to God, displays of the 10 commandments, nativity scenes — even where participation is totally voluntary — are banned from public institutions.

This “separationist” reading of the 1st amendment is drawn from US Founding Father Thomas Jefferson’s “Wall of separation Letter” to the Danbury Baptists Association in 1802. But it is unlikely that this reading is what Jefferson meant. At the time he was writing in early nineteenth century America, the common perception of the relationship between church and state reflected a long-standing European tradition.

Legal scholar Steven Smith wrote in “Separation and the Secular: Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision” that,

… At least since the middle ages, scholars and polemicists of all stripes had argued-on both religious and political grounds-that the church should exercise control over the state or-again on both religious and political grounds-that the state should control the church. The common view for centuries had been that an established church was essential to political and social stability.[2]

He added,

… In medieval Europe, for example, kings had claimed, and had exercised, the power to appoint bishops and popes. After the Reformation, the British monarch became the official head of the Church of England, and British government assumed control over both the selection of ecclesiastical officials and the formulation of religious doctrine.[3]

In fact, the Book of Common Prayer, including the 39 Articles, was commissioned and approved by the Crown.

Smith goes on,

… medieval popes regularly crowned earthly emperors and kings, and they claimed (and frequently purported to exercise) the authority not merely to excommunicate but actually to depose those kings. Popes sometimes asserted jurisdiction to adjudicate what were essentially political or property disputes. In England, the Church enjoyed-and still enjoys-official representation in Parliament. Immigrants later imported established churches in some form into most of the American colonies.[4]

The church-state relationship that was familiar to an eighteenth century American was that “governments controlled or directly intervened in the internal affairs of churches, and churches claimed and were formally endowed with governmental powers.”

At the time Jefferson was writing, many US States had established churches; so when the United States Congress promised to “… make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…”[5] they more likely had in mind that Separation of Church and State is simply the idea that the church should not be formally endowed with governmental powers and the state should not try to intervene in or control the church.

Separation of church and state is not separation of religious beliefs from public life (perhaps this confusion arises because both concepts have the word “separation” in them). The idea that Congress meant something more than mere Separation of Church and State when it passed the first amendment – that Congress meant Separationism — was birthed in the mid to late 20th century – some 200 years later – by the US Supreme Court when it began to hear cases about prayer in schools and the funding of Catholic schools.

Separationism and Separation of Church and State, as we have seen, are different ideas and one doe not entail the other.

Comparitive Jurisdictions

This is not just about the US. Separationist understandings of freedom of religion can be seen in Western jurisprudence elsewhere. There are European cases that exhibit it – even in places like the UK that do have an established church. Many of you will have heard the cases in the media of workers being sent home from their jobs after refusing to follow an instructions from their employers to remove religious jewellery[6] – normal jewellery was fine, just not anything that symbolised God.

The “Liberty Intervening” case is another UK example; a state-Celebrant refused to perform civil partnerships between members of the same sex. Because of her views on marriage, she was found to have discriminated against those couples. She could not appeal to freedom of religion as the court held that her employer’s requirement she perform same sex civil partnerships did not interfere with her ability to worship.[7]

Then there is this case, the summary from the head note explains it clearly:

Summary: The Employment Appeal Tribunal had correctly decided that a counselling organisation had not breached the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 reg.3(1)(a) or reg.3(1)(b) when it dismissed one of its relationship counsellors who refused to counsel same sex couples on sexual matters because of his Christian beliefs. Although the law protected a person’s right to hold or express their religious beliefs, it did not protect the substance or content of those beliefs on the ground only that they were based on religious precepts.[8]

The last line seems to suggest a denial of the existence of a right to freedom of religion. In the judgment of the case this summary note comes from, Lord Justice Laws gave a lengthy spiel on its views on religion in public life, despite going on to rule as just stated, part of that spiel was:

“We do not live in a society where all the people share uniform religious beliefs. The precepts of any one religion, any belief system, cannot, by force of their religious origins, sound any louder in the general law than the precepts of any other.”[9]

Sounds all good and equal right? – keep this quote in mind as we move onto the next case.

Earlier this year, 2011, this next one hit the news here in New Zealand; it was that of Eunice and Owen Johns, Christian foster parents, who had been disallowed from continuing to be foster parents after telling a social worker that they could not state that homosexual conduct was a good thing to one of their charges. The Johns took a case on the grounds of discrimination against their religious belief – which they understood they were free to hold to and live by – and they lost.

In their case the Lord Justice Munby quoted Lord Justice Laws’s lengthy spiel in McFarlane and Relate Avon Limited, including the quote I said to keep in mind, and after doing so they said: “We respectfully and emphatically agree with every word of that.” Then the court offered as its basis for refusing to let the Johns be foster parents,

“In the circumstances we cannot avoid the need to re-state what ought to be, but seemingly are not, well understood principles regulating the relationship of religion and law in our society. We preface what follows with the obvious point that we live in this country in a democratic and pluralistic society, in a secular state not a theocracy.”[Emphasis mine.]

So basically, it is the Court’s position that all viewpoints are equal – they referred to “religion” and “any belief system” BUT! (channelling some Orwell here) secular viewpoints are more equal than other viewpoints — and to suggest otherwise is to advocate for a theocracy.

Religious Freedom in New Zealand

So that all said about other countries; how does Freedom of Religion work for us in New Zealand?

Now, obviously NZ has its own laws and it is not bound by international laws and jurisprudence, but, if and when we do get some cases on these issues (we have not had many at all so far) it will be jurisdictions like the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Canada – the latter’s Bill of Rights arguably operates the closest to ours – that our judges will look to this body of jurisprudence for guidance in interpreting our laws because many of the same questions and factors come in to play in these western nations with a common law history and more litigation on this topic than we have had.

NZ Rights and Freedom law expert, Paul Rishworth, makes the point, and I think he is right, that as a group or belief system increasingly dominates as a majority in society there tends to be a rise in litigation over rights of minority groups. This is because the smaller they get the less the mainstream cares about their rights being infringed. Rishworth expects that we will see a rise in religious freedom cases in New Zealand in the future because of this.[10]

This is why it is important for us to have this conversation now, for us to be thinking about what the Church’s, what our response to the ideas being discussed here tonight are and what sort of Jurisprudence and public policy we want to see be developed here in NZ. [Other organisations in our society are as I documented in The New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanists and the Privileging of Secularism. The “NZARH” has published a statement of aspirational ideals for the New Zealand state on their website. Entitled “The Tolerant Secular State” the document seeks the eradication of religion from public life.]

Central to these church-state debates are questions around which circumstances governmental accommodation or endorsement of a religious practice or idea amounts to coercion of a dissenter from that practice, and is therefore, a violation of freedom of religion.

It is here that questions of religion in public life come to the fore. Does the guarantee of freedom of religion entail that religion be regulated to the private sphere with the state adopting and privileging a “secular” perspective on the grounds that this is allegedly neutral towards religions?

I will argue it does not; especially not in New Zealand. Let us turn to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.

Bill of Rights Act

What sets our freedom of religion clauses in our Bill of Rights apart from, say, the US Constitution, is that we do not have an establishment clause. Further, we do not define religion narrowly nor do we view narrowly its expressions.

There is one other interesting aspect to how NZ has approached this issue (and no, I am not talking about the fact our Bill of Rights Act is a simple statute).

Our freedom of religion clauses are contained in three passages, sections: 13, 14 and 15 – the placement of section 14 between sections 13 and 15 was deliberate. Let’s look at each.

13 Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief, including the right to adopt and to hold opinions without interference. [Emphasis mine]

Now in law when you see a list of things separated by commas in the same section of an Act, as you do here, you know that Parliament is meaning to place these things on par with each other and is meaning to suggest they have a sort of equality or sameness to each other. Unless the text explicitly says otherwise, they have to be treated and weighted the same.

The New Zealand Bill of Rights then protects equally not just religion but thought, conscience and belief.

The nature of what “belief” is is what I want to focus on here.

No New Zealand cases under s13 have yet defined religion or belief – although we have a definition in s21(d) of the Human Rights Act “ethical belief, which means the lack of a religious belief, whether in respect of a particular religion or religions or all religions” and in other legislation.[11] A judge is likely to look further afield than this to be sure that the definition is appropriate for the legal issues in this particular area of law.

 International and comparative Jurisprudence has some definitions specific to this area. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Travaux Prepetoire states that ‘belief’ entails “such other beliefs as agnosticism, free thought, atheism and rationalism”.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) supports this view and adds (sounding a bit like Rawls) that “coherent views on fundamental problems” will qualify as beliefs.

Similar definitions can be found in the jurisprudence of other western jurisdictions. Comprehensive secular viewpoints count as ‘belief’ and the State is required to protect and treat them equally with religion.

Whilst s 13 deals with what you are allowed to think and believe s 14 is about finding out more and sharing what think and believe:

14 Freedom of expression

Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. [Emphasis mine]

Note that your right to seek, receive and impart information about what you believe, is stated absolutely and without limit as to location; it entails that both private and public forums is what is meant. This is bourn out in s 15, the section that covers what you do with your beliefs:

15 Manifestation of religion and belief

Every person has the right to manifest that person’s religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, or teaching, either individually or in community with others, and either in public or in private. [Emphasis mine]

You can act on your comprehensive secular belief and/or your religious belief in public or in private – again the wording is broad and unlimited.

So if freedom of religion entails that public policy discussions and administration cannot include religious considerations – that religion must be excluded from public life to safeguard religious freedom – then parity of argument suggests that freedom of ethical belief – such as secular humanism, agnosticism or atheism – precludes ethical beliefs in public policy considerations. We’re supposed to treat beliefs equally afterall.

In fact, s 15 gives proponents of religious beliefs and secular beliefs the same rights to express and manifest their belief, teach them, share them, practice them, live in accord with them, in public without limitation. The Bill of Rights allows – no, requires – parallel arguments either way.

So holding that in mind, take a look at the Education Act 1989 (just read the italicised parts if you find legalese confusing):

77  State primary schools to be kept open at certain times
Except to the extent that—

(a) a school term commences on any day other than a Monday or ends with any day other than a Friday; or

(b) a school is lawfully closed pursuant to section 129C,—

every State primary school shall be kept open 5 days in each week for at least 4 hours each day, of which hours 2 in the morning and 2 in the afternoon shall be; and the teaching shall be entirely of a secular character. [Emphasis mine]

78 Religious instruction and observances in State primary schools
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in section 77, if the school’s board for the school district in which the school is situated, after consultation with the principal, so determines, any class or classes at the school, or the school as a whole, may be closed at any time or times of the school day for any period or periods exceeding in the aggregate neither 60 minutes in any week nor 20 hours in any school year, for any class, for the purposes of religious instruction given by voluntary instructors approved by the school’s board and of religious observances conducted in a manner approved by the school’s board or for either of those purposes; and the school buildings may be used for those purposes or for either of them.

Basically, section 77 states that all teaching in a state school must be secular. Section 78 provides that if you want to bring religious teaching into a state school you have to go to the board, have consultations, officially close the school and bring in volunteers… Equal treatment of viewpoints much?

[The justification for this affront to the Bill of Rights, involves a jurisprudential move utilising a Rawlsian approach and the operational clauses of the Bill of Rights Act - sections 5, 4 and 6. I do not have time to go into how this works here tonight, perhaps another time.]

The only reason the lack of parallel argument is accepted and that some of what you have heard tonight is news is because so many people, including the church, accept the false claim that secular beliefs are neutral and that permitting religious beliefs to be out there in public, in our schools, expressed our government would be somehow tipping the balance towards a bias – privileging one viewpoint over the others – and that that would be unjust. What is unjust and biased is the claim that in order for the state to discharge its duties under the Bill of Rights to treat public expressions of ethical belief as being on par with religion, it must privilege secularism and relegate religion to the private sphere.

A few weeks ago, as part of Jesus Week at the University of Auckland, Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union hosted an event entitled A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? This event was a conversation between Theology, Philosophy and Law and featured Matthew Flannagan - Analytic Theologian, Glenn Peoples - Philosopher and Madeleine Flannagan - Legal Scholar. The video is still being edited and will be available soon but for now, this 3-part series comprises the written speeches of each speaker.

Glenn Peoples – Philosophy

Often the subject of religion and politics is alluded to by way of references to terrorism, vigilantism, totalitarianism and persecution, as though these are the only alternative to a public square stripped of religious conviction altogether. This is about as helpful and honest as the automatic association of secularism with the purges of Stalin. The truth is that the flourishing debate in the Western world over the legitimate role of religious convictions in our public decision making is set within the broad liberal democratic tradition. Within that tradition, taking for granted things like freedom of religion, freedom of speech, clear institutional separation of church and state, freedom of association and so on, we’ve seen that it is clearly possible to hold a variety of views on the proper place of religious belief in politics, policy, public lobbying, your own voting and so on. Of course, there are plenty of religious people in the world and in history who do not cherish liberty and mutual respect (as there are and have been non-religious people who do not cherish these things), but you and I do.

Our popular level discussion here in New Zealand over the proper role of religion in a free society – in the media, in letters to the editor, on talkback radio, in religious speeches, could have been greatly benefited by an exposure to the way that this issue has been dealt with in philosophy, specifically in political philosophy, in ethics and philosophy of religion, which are the areas that really interest me. In particular the following issues need to be seen as central: What is the specific concern that justifies people in identifying religious convictions as an area of worry over and above other convictions? Are these concerns applied consistently and fairly when not thinking in terms of religious convictions? Are they the right concerns to have about public life generally? Secondly, should these concerns really cause us to reconsider the role of religious convictions at all? If so, then how?

Why is religion singled out?

Conflict and Polarisation
Why is there an issue centred specifically around religion in the public square? We don’t hear much, if anything, about the worry of acting on our political beliefs or (usually) our ethical convictions or our scientific findings – at least not because they are political beliefs, ethical convictions scientific findings, yet there is a concern about religious beliefs in the public square, and that concern exists because the beliefs in question are religious. What makes religion special?

Perhaps the more popular reason that people might have for wanting to see religion take a back seat when it comes to public reason is that, in their view, religious beliefs unleashed in public are dangerous in certain ways. American philosopher Robert Audi is not alone in voicing the concern that “religious disagreements are likely to polarize government” leading to irresolvable disputes and political stand-offs.[1] In order to avoid strong polarisation and the associated mischiefs that come with it (lack of co-operation, social unease and mutual suspicion, perhaps even rioting and acts of violence or terrorism as in Northern Ireland), let us keep our religious beliefs well away from our political reason.

Matt has already said a thing or two about this, so I’ll just be brief. Is this fair? For starters, is it really true that as soon as we allow people to lobby, vote or even legislate in certain ways because of their religious convictions, we will witness intractable political stand-offs and social disorder? Not at all. We can easily imagine scenarios in which one person or group lobbies for a given policy because their religious convictions motivate them to do so, and another person or group lobbies for exactly the same policy with quite different motives. I think, for example, of the government’s role in marriage. I know of religious people who maintain that the state has no role in formalising marriage since this is, in brief, “God’s business” that the government should frankly stay out of as a matter of the purity of marriage as a holy institution. I also know of libertarians committed to the doctrine of self-ownership and the priority of personal liberty who also think, without any reference to God, that marriage properly belongs entirely to the private realm. So it can’t be the case that endorsing policies because of one’s religious convictions will inevitably or always lead to social or political polarisation and conflict.

That said, it’s true that different religious convictions (including convictions against religious beliefs) have led to considerable differences of opinion over public policy. But this does not show that this polarisation is relevant in deciding whether or not people should endorse policies for religious reasons. In order to assess that, we must ask: Is religious belief in any way unique because it often perpetuates the kind of polarisation lurking behind this fear? I do not see that it is. The last century of western history alone proves fairly conclusively that human societies can become polarised with no help from religion. Civil and political clashes between fascists and communists, for example, did not take place because someone was smuggling their religious beliefs into politics. On a somewhat less dramatic scale, I see no end to disputes in New Zealand over the rights bestowed upon Iwi by the Treaty of Waitangi, nor to the hostile attitudes in society that get stirred up by these stand-offs. Again, these disputes did not arise because of the clandestine combination of religious convictions and political lobbying. What is more, there is no reason to think that policies that are likely to polarise should never be advocated. It is easy for us to appreciate, for example, that the attempt to ban slave trading in the British Empire was intensely polarising, and yet we admire those who advocated abolitionist policy.

So firstly, making political decisions because of our religions convictions does not necessarily cause polarisation and conflict and secondly, even where it does cause polarisation, religion cannot legitimately be singled out as the culprit since politics in general can have the same effect – an effect which does not necessarily indicate that the policy being advocated should not be advocated. So if there is something basically wrong with bringing our religious convictions into the public square, it is unlikely to be because this practice results in social polarisation and conflict.

Two Concerns: Respect and Justification

Most political philosophers realise that if there is a principled reason for keeping religious convictions separate from politics, it will not be the pragmatic reason suggested above. A more sophisticated and arguably more plausible line of argument has been developed in various forms in the literature.

The argument starts, not with religion, but with very general principles in political philosophy. One of the crucial concepts of the modern western liberal democracy is that of equality. There is no politically privileged class. This affects the way our societies function in all kinds of way. It’s why we have the slogan one man, one vote. Everybody’s voice counts the same. It’s why women and men both vote. But the principle of equality and consequently of equal respect is more pervasive than that. It’s the reason you care – or should care – about the way your fellow citizen is treated, politically speaking. Just as you don’t want to be subjected to arbitrary legal coercion for which there is, as far as you are concerned, no good justification, you also don’t want your fellow citizen to be treated that way either. Because we’re all equal, your fellow citizen, no less than you, is owed an explanation for why he or she is subjected to the laws that she is being asked to live by.

In short, the policies that you advocate need to be justified to your fellow citizen in the right way, or else you’re just coercing them and you’re not showing them proper respect as your equal.

20^th century political scientist Jown Rawls introduced the term overlapping consensus to describe the sorts of policies that are appropriate in a liberal democracy. Basically, the idea is that there are policies that are justified to you – justified by your own desires, beliefs, values goals, and so on. But of course the fact that they are justified to you doesn’t make them justified to anybody else. Everybody has their own set of beliefs, values, desires and so on, and their set makes a set of policies justified to them. Think of everybody’s set of justified policies as a large circle. Although it’s clear that these circles won’t share exactly the same outlines – because the liberal democracy is marked by pluralism – the fact that we share basic values, says Rawls, means that there will be considerable overlap. Think of all of us as a circle of beliefs, desires and values, and the area where we overlap in the middle is the area where those beliefs, values and desires overlap enough to support the same policies. There will, said Rawls, be an overlapping consensus on a range of policies. Those policies will be justified to all of us. To use Rawls’s language, there will be a consensus among reasonable citizens on a set of overlapping policy ideals, and it is those policies that meet the standard of justification that properly expresses respect for all our fellow citizens.

Before you support any policy with your vote – your voice as a citizen, Rawls says, it must be one that is justified to everyone else. The devil, however, is in the details. Rawls stressed that we’re only interested in the policies that our fellow citizens support in light of their reasonably held convictions, goals, values etc. And which beliefs, values, goals etc are reasonable? As good supporters of the liberal democracy, we don’t think racism is a reasonable set of values – or sexism. But what about socialism? Or strong views on private property rights and individualism? Or – and here’s where things get interesting – what about atheism? The father of classical liberalism, John Locke thought that atheism was such a despicable and dangerous view that it shouldn’t even be tolerated in a modern democracy. Or what about Islam? Or Buddhism? Or Christianity?

Part of the respect that is promoted in the modern liberal democracy is that we are accepting of pluralism. We don’t try to change the fact that we have pluralism, we accept that other people inhabit different circles and they are welcome to do so. Provided we take this open minded approach to what counts as a reasonable outlook, without imposing our beliefs upon others, the actual ground on which all those circles overlap starts shrinking.

Political philosopher Gerald Gaus was stating the obvious – even if slightly exaggerating – when he said “little, if anything, is the object of consensus among reasonable people.”[2] We recognise the danger in deferring too much to our fellow citizen, in a sense, showing them too much respect. If we give up our support of a policy just because there exists, somewhere, a reasonable person who doesn’t currently support it, the democratic state is likely to be paralysed.  What about same sex marriage? Which way should the law go? Should we use trade tariffs? Should charitable organisations – like churches – be tax exempt? Should churches be treated like charities? Should manufacturers and producers be required to regulate their business activities to take account of public concern over global warming? Is there a total consensus of reasonable people on any of these issues one way of the other? In fact there is not, and yet we do have policies one way of the other on these things, and we really can’t help doing so.

Let’s not swing too far the other way. We do want to respect our fellow citizens and not just coerce them with our will. But we have no power over what they accept and don’t accept. Justifying our policies to our fellow citizens in a way that treats them with adequate respect cannot mean that we can’t propose any policy that they don’t accept already. Just imagine advocating a policy on abortion only if it was supported both by those who believe in the sanctity of human life from conception and those on the extreme end of the pro-choice side of the issue, who think that even if the unborn child is a human person in the full sense, a mother has the right to terminate pregnancy at any stage. Good luck.

But if you don’t have to successfully convince people that your policy is the right one in light of what they believe and value, then what do you have to do? According to Gaus, and I think this moves us in the right direction, you have to idealise. You idealise or imagine away from what your fellow citizen is right now willing to accept, and you think of what, as far as you can tell, they – given what they now believe about reason and evidence – would accept if they were better informed and willing to fairly consider all the available reasons. As Gaus puts it when considering our hypothetical fellow citizen, Alf, to whom we owe a justification, “if Alf’s beliefs were subject to extensive criticism and additional information, does his viewpoint commit him to revise his beliefs?”[3] If so and if we offer reasons for him to think so, then we are doing our duty in terms of showing Alf that what we are proposing really does have something going for it. So according to this view, you’re not hamstrung by what your fellow citizen is currently willing to endorse. At the same time, you regard them as worthy of a justification and you offer them one in good faith – one that you are justified in believing that they should accept based on what they know and are capable of coming to understand, but recognising that they may in fact not accept it.

Where does this leave religion?

Once we’ve strengthened the notion of political justification to make it plausible and workable, we’ve got to sit back and ask, “OK, now does this actually leave us with any problems for policies that we support for religious reasons.” Take my stance on abortion or on marriage. Let’s say that I hold to my views on those issues for religious reasons – reasons that ultimately involve my beliefs about what God wants. Does that automatically mean that there is no form of justification that I could offer for those policies? Maybe – if we are pre-committed to the personal belief that there is no justification for any of these beliefs about God. If we assume that there are no reasons for our beliefs and hence our policies that we can give our fellow citizens, reasons that we reasonably believe that they should consider if they were open minded, willing to listen to reasons, consider all the arguments and evidence, and not reject considerations out of hand just because we’re talking about the supernatural.

But why assume that? To ask Christians to assume this is to basically ask them to assume that Christianity is intellectually indefensible. It may be that you think of religious faith as being irrational, unconcerned with reasons and basically being blind devotion. I regard that caricature as a symptom just the sort of ignorance and unfairness that modern secular liberals sometimes accuse religious people, ironically enough. Now, of course Christians realise that they aren’t going to successfully persuade everybody, just as defenders of a whole range of theories on ethics understand they aren’t going to actually persuade everybody, as scientists do also when it comes to one of their findings (but this should not stop them from urging people to support policies on, say, smoking, pollution or climate change). But to ask Christians to just assume that there exists no justification for their beliefs that they can offer is not neutral. It asks them to assume that at least some of their beliefs are false, namely their beliefs about just how defensible their beliefs are.

The fact is, the disagreement over whether or not any religious beliefs are properly justified is just as evident as the disagreement over religious beliefs themselves. To claim that religious convictions must not drive public reason, and to claim the justification test as our reason for this, is simply to take a controversial stance on religious matters. It is to veil an anti-religious bias in the name of neutrality.

In a liberal, pluralistic society, of course you are welcome to the private belief that all religious beliefs lack appropriate justification, and the belief that nobody should be convinced to hold them. But to require everybody else stay out of the political game altogether until they are prepared to live in accordance with that belief steps way over the line of what is acceptable in a free society. You are welcome to advocate policies that are compatible with your beliefs, as long as you are willing to engage your fellow citizen conscientiously, as an equal with you, only propose policies that are compatible with this doctrine of equality, and therefore genuinely offer your fellow citizen justifications for your policy that you think there are good reasons to accept. But to suppose that only people whose beliefs are not religious are morally permitted to do this is to manifest a kind of bigotry that has no place in a modern, pluralistic and democratic society.

A few weeks ago, as part of Jesus Week at the University of Auckland, Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union hosted an event entitled A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? This event was a conversation between Theology, Philosophy and Law and featured Matthew Flannagan - Analytic Theologian, Glenn Peoples - Philosopher and Madeleine Flannagan - Legal Scholar. The video is still being edited and will be available soon but for now, this 3-part series comprises the written speeches of each speaker.

Matthew Flannagan – Analytic Theology

Recently, many Christian ethicists have defended the central place of God’s commands in Theological ethics. In this talk I want to discuss one important objection to appeals to God’s commands; this is the claim that, while it is perfectly appropriate for believers to appeal to purported divine commands when regulating their private conduct or the conduct of voluntary religious communities who believe in such commands, it is morally wrong to appeal to theological beliefs of this sort in any discussion of social ethics. When doing Ethics as a public enterprise i.e. engaging in debates over social policy or offering criticism of cultural and social practices, Christian Ethicists are morally bound to only appeal to secular considerations. I will argue that this position, though widely accepted inside and outside of the church, is mistaken.

The Objection
So what is the problem with appealing to divine commands in social ethics? Christian theological convictions ought to impact the whole of life both in the private and public spheres; this is what is meant by the idea of an “undivided life”, where Jesus is Lord of all aspects of our lives.

Yet this consequence of Christian faith conflicts with a pervasive contemporary attitude: the view that that religion is fundamentally a private matter. It is accepted that a Christian is free to utilise theological convictions when they make decisions about their own life but in a pluralistic society it is increasingly deemed inappropriate to bring such convictions into public discussions about morality, law, politics, economics, education, scholarship and so on. The desire to influence society with Christian ideals or to convert others to the faith is viewed by many as an intolerant desire to impose one’s private views onto others.

It is widely accepted that theological convictions can govern churches and the private lives of believers yet we are told that the public square – government, public policy, the courts, the academy, education, business, arts, media, etc – should be secular only.The problem is nicely summarised by Stephen Carter Christian theological convictions ought to impact the whole of life both in the private and public spheres; this is what is meant by the idea of an “undivided life”, where Jesus is Lord of all aspects of our lives.

Yet this consequence of Christian faith conflicts with a pervasive contemporary attitude: the view that that religion is fundamentally a private matter. It is accepted that a Christian is free to utilise theological convictions when they make decisions about their own life but in a pluralistic society it is increasingly deemed inappropriate to bring such convictions into public discussions about morality, law, politics, economics, education, scholarship and so on. The desire to influence society with Christian ideals or to convert others to the faith is viewed by many as an intolerant desire to impose one’s private views onto others.

It is widely accepted that theological convictions can govern churches and the private lives of believers yet we are told that the public square – government, public policy, the courts, the academy, education, business, arts, media, etc – should be secular only.

This event looks at this issue. The conversation will span Theology, Philosophy and Law led by a panel made up of Christian representatives from each discipline along with you the audience:

“One good way to end a conversation – or start an argument – is to tell a group of well educated professionals that you hold a political position (preferably a controversial one such as being against abortion or pornography) because it is required by your understanding of God’s will. In the unlikely event that anyone hangs around to talk with you about it, chances are that you will be challenged on the ground that you are intent on imposing your religious beliefs on other people. And in contemporary political and legal culture, nothing is worse.”[1]

Carter cites the objection that appealing to God’s commands in public moral debate involves imposing one’s religious beliefs onto other people, and points out that such impositions are morally wrong. Note that the objection is not that such divine commands do not exist or that it is irrational to believe that they do. The objection is a specifically moral one. It is morally wrong to appeal to such beliefs; doing so violates a moral obligation people have to not impose their religious beliefs onto others. Something like this moral objection is widely held, both inside and outside the church. In response to this I will make four points.

I

First, unqualified, the claim it is wrong to impose your moral beliefs onto others is problematic. Consider acts such as rape, assault or infanticide. I personally believe each of these practices is wrong for me to engage in and I support the commission of these acts being considered a crime punishable by the state. However, if it were wrong to impose moral beliefs onto others then my position on rape, assault or infanticide would be unacceptable. I would have to leave others free to choose whether they wished to rape, assault or kill children – to do otherwise would be to impose my moral beliefs onto others.

II

So there cannot be an unqualified obligation to not impose one’s beliefs onto other people. This brings me to my second point. Carter’s example is not unqualified. It explicitly mentions religious beliefs about what God wills. Carter alludes to what Richard Rorty dubbed as:

“The happy, Jeffersonian compromise that the Enlightenment reached with the religious. This compromise consists in privatizing religion — keeping it out of … ‘the public square,’ making it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy.”[2]

A particularly rigorous elaboration of this stance comes from Robert Audi. Audi argues that one should not advocate any “[policy] restrictions on human conduct unless one has, and is willing to offer an adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support”.[3]  By ‘secular reason’ he meant a reason that “does not depend on the existence of God (such as through a divine command) or on theological considerations (such as a sacred text)”.[4] So qualified, the objection is that religious believers have a moral obligation to not advocate policies or positions that restrict others on the basis of beliefs about God’s commands. In discussions in public they are to appeal to secular premises that do not invoke God, scripture or specific theological authorities.

III

This brings me to my third point; why single religious out beliefs in this way? If there is no general obligation to refrain from imposing one’s beliefs onto others then why are religious beliefs different in this respect? By limiting the moral restriction to religious beliefs and allowing non-theological secular beliefs to play a role in public discourse that religious beliefs do not, Audi’s position shows that “There is an important asymmetry between religious and secular reasons in the following respect: some secular reasons can themselves justify state coercion but no religious reason can.”[5] Audi’s position appears to privilege secular ideologies and doctrines in public debate whilst relegating religious or theological perspectives to the private sphere. But why are theological beliefs singled out in this way? Three lines of argument seem to be common.

1. Wars and Conflict

The first is an appeal to religious wars and violence. It is contended that the only way to keep social peace and prevent the kind of violence that Europe witnessed in the 17^th century is to adopt a moral rule requiring that all political discussions take place on secular terms and that religious reasons be bracketed from such discussions.

However, this assumes that appeals to theological moral beliefs cause wars and appeals to secular reasons protect us against such wars. This is dubious. Christopher Eberle and Terence Cuneo note that the religious wars of the 17^th century were caused not by the appeal to religious reasons per sé but rather by the violation of religious freedom. Moreover, even in the 17^th century, religious persecution was typically justified on secular grounds. In addition, they note that some of the most important defences of religious persecution and defences of religious tolerance, such as those proposed by John Locke and Pierre Bayle, appealed to explicitly theological grounds.[6]

Nicholas Wolterstorff makes a similar point, he notes that much of “the slaughter, torture, and generalised brutality of our century has mainly been conducted in the name of one or another secular cause–nationalism of many sorts, communism, fascism, patriotisms of various kinds, economic hegemony.”[7] He also stated that “many of the social movements in the modern world that have moved societies in the direction of liberal democracy have been deeply and explicitly religious in their orientation.”[8] He cites examples such as the abolitionist and civil rights movements and various other resistance movements as examples.

The point is that secular and theological reasons are on par in this respect. Particular types of religious reasons in particular political contexts can lead to wars and abuse, whereas appealing to other types of religious reasons in other contexts can be beneficent. Similarly, certain types of secular reasons can be dangerous in particular contexts and other types of secular reasons are not. To single religious reasons out as being ‘too dangerous to be aired in public’ and insisting on a default to secular reasons seems ad hoc and unjustified.

2. Division

Similar things can be said about the objection that appeal to theological premises will be divisive. Robert Adam’s notes  “nothing in the history of modern secular moral theory gives us reason to expect that general agreement on a single comprehensive moral theory will ever be achieved or that, if achieved, it would long endure in a climate of free inquiry. His conclusion is that “the development and advocacy of a religious ethical theory, therefore, does not destroy a realistic possibility of agreement that would otherwise exist”.[9]

3. Pluralism

The main reason offered for excluding theological premises from public debate is that not everyone accepts the truth of such premises. Any policy decisions based on a purported divine law would be binding upon these people in spite of the fact they do not accept theological doctrines or that they do not accept these theological doctrines.

Michael Tooley states, “For it is surely true that it is inappropriate, at least in a pluralistic society, to appeal to specific theological beliefs … in support of legislation that will be binding upon everyone.”[10] Audi argues, “as advocates for laws and public policies, then, and especially for those that are coercive, virtuous citizens will seek grounds of a kind that any rational adult citizen can endorse as sufficient for the purpose.”[11] [Emphasis added]

One obvious problem with this line of argument is that exactly the same thing can be said about many secular, non-theological, beliefs. Phillip Quinn articulates this point,

“…If the fact that religious reasons cannot be shared by all in a religiously pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in fairness also to be excluded on the same grounds.”[12]

Quinn notes correctly that secular moral theories such as Utilitarianism or Kantianism, Intuitionism, Socialism, Libertarianism, can all be reasonably rejected in a philosophically-pluralistic society.

“Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies would be morally justified, a conclusion that would, I suspect, be welcome only to anarchists.”[13]

If we are to exclude appeals to theological beliefs because not all reasonable people accept such beliefs then we should be consistent and exclude from public discussion appeals to all secular moral, political, philosophical, beliefs about which reasonable people do not agree. This would gut public discussion of any substantive content.

IV

My final point is that suppose a religious person does, as Carter mentions, take a “controversial political position … because it is required by their understanding of God’s will”? The objection Carter mentions is a specifically moral one, the objection is not that such divine commands do not exist, or that it is irrational to believe that they do.

On the face of it, this seems very odd. The objection entails that a person can be morally obligated to act contrary to what he rationally and correctly believes God’s will requires of him. A person who believes that a rational, all knowing, perfectly just and loving person requires a certain action of him is morally obligated to not take that action in public.

Normally when one assesses a moral question one should take into account all the relevant information – not just some of it. If it is true that God has issued certain commands, and this is relevant to the question, then it would be prima facie irrational to not take these factors into account.

The Christian believes her theological beliefs are true, and the objector does not contest this. Further the objection is not that her belief in such commands is irrational or subject to philosophical difficulties. The objector contends that, even if the Christian’s beliefs are true, and rationally believed, she is morally obligated to ignore them in such discussions.

This entails that when doing social ethics believers are morally required to act in accord with beliefs they rationally believe to be false. The objector appears to suggest that, in a pluralistic society, believers can hold certain beliefs as true in private but in public they must deny these beliefs; even though these beliefs may be both true and rationally held. This would seem to force believers to live a divided life where their intellectual and religious commitments are incoherently compromised. I contend that there is no good reason for thinking believers are under any moral obligation to do this.

If God truly is sovereign then his commands govern the whole of life, both private and public; believers should strive to live an undivided life of loyalty to him. The fact that other people do not share this commitment does not entail that it is wrong for them to follow it.

Part II of A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? features Glenn Peoples’ talk from the perspective of Philosophy.

The Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture recently advertised a call for papers for its 2011 Flagship Fall Conference, “Radical Emancipation:  Confronting the Challenge of Secularism.” The stated aim of the conference is:

“… to bring together a large number of respected scholars representing all the main academic fields, from Catholic, Christian, and secular institutions, to engage in a spirited discussion of this theme from the perspectives of philosophy, theology and religious studies, law, history, the social sciences, literature and the arts, as well as other fields of intellectual inquiry and endeavor.”

Given that the conference will be held only a few days before the San Francisco cluster of conferences, given that both Madeleine and I work in religion in public life from within our separate disciplines of philosophy of law and analytic theology and both of us draw from the writings of Notre Dame scholars, we decided to both put in papers. It seems that a lot of other people had the same idea as an announcement appeared on the website “Record number of conference abstracts submitted!” This is not surprising given the reputation and calibre of the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture so when we saw this we thought neither of us stood a chance.

So, you can imagine our delight, and how proud I was of my wife, when she received the following email notification yesterday,

“I am pleased to accept your paper proposal for presentation at the conference to be held at the University of Notre Dame from November 10-12, 2011. Congratulations! … This year, we turned down an unprecedented number of worthy paper proposals: well over 200 individuals submitted abstracts for consideration.”

My paper was not successful but I have been invited to chair a session

Madeleine wrote a very good abstract:

“No Privileges, No Penalties” and the De-Privileging of Secularism

Madeleine Flannagan – University of Auckland, New Zealand

The dominant Establishment Clause jurisprudence reflects a separationist reading of the First Amendment that advances and protects the hegemony of secular perspectives in public life. Each test, Lemon, Endorsement and Coercion, requires the State to place a restraint on the exercise of religion in public life that effectively privatizes religion and contributes to the radical emancipation of man from God.[1]

I will argue that the requirement of public conformity to secular perspectives exceeds the traditional understanding of separation of church and state by privileging secular perspectives over religious ones. A clear asymmetry in the way religious beliefs are treated by the State is visible in the requirement that religious believers bracket beliefs they hold as true, important and relevant when they participate in public life while secular citizens are free to utilize the beliefs central to their perspective.

Vincent Phillip Muñoz has argued for a move away from Separationist jurisprudence and towards a test found in the writings of Founding Father James Madison, a “no privileges, no penalties” test.[2] I will argue that a “no privileges, no penalties” test could uphold freedom of religion and separation of church and state by permitting religion to have a place in public life as long as those who engage in public religious conduct do not gain a privilege for doing so and those who do not wish to participate are both free to opt out and are not penalized for doing so. The adoption of a “no privileges, no penalties” test would ensure that those seeking to bring balance to our secularized culture would not be restrained by the State from doing so.

This idea is often enforced in the courts with public displays or manifestations of religion being challenged on freedom of religion grounds. This has recently been seen in European countries; recent laws and cases have seen bans on religious emblems being worn in schools, employment situations and in public generally. The UK courts recently ruled that Christians could not foster children out of fear their private beliefs about homosexual conduct might be taught to the children.

In the US, a confusing, and often contradictory, array of cases on everything from public displays of the ten commandments, home-schooling, school vouchers and so on has rendered the position in the position more and more hostile towards religion being exercised in public and the law has become more and more difficult to comply with because of increasing lack of clarity as to how it works.

Increasingly in the West we are seeing the idea of religion being something private being accepted by Christian believers who feel that while they personally believe something it is inappropriate for them to apply or utilise these beliefs when thinking about or going about issues that may affect others.

An increasing body of theological, philosophical and legal scholarship has called this orthodox view into question. These scholars have argued that the orthodox view is unjust, contradictory and arbitrary. It is unjust in that it places moral and social restraints on religious advocacy that are not imposed on non-religious views. It is arbitrary and contradictory in that the reasons typically offered for this view, if sound, seem to apply with equal force to any controversial view whether religious or secular and, in fact, to many doctrines central to liberal thought itself. Moreover, it suggests that even if religious beliefs are true and relevant to public issues, believers are to conduct themselves in public in a manner which ignores these beliefs or treats them as if they are not true if they cannot be justified from a secular viewpoint; in private they are free to believe what they want.

Critics of orthodoxy contend this separation of faith and self in public is unrealistic at a psychological level and that it fails to understand how religions function in the lives of believers who believe their religion to be true and not merely just a personal private preference.

New Zealand jurisprudence has not seen the litigation on this subject that the United States and Europe has so it is largely untested. The practice of being influenced by international precedent from the commonwealth and US jurisdictions coupled with our secular society which contains strong factions in favour of the liberal view – secular humanist groups, some politicians, scholars, media, bloggers – suggests that it will fall the way of the rest of the western world unless a robust counter-view is developed and advanced in the New Zealand across disciplines.

Further to the issue of justice, the tendency to view religious beliefs as a merely private preference that is isolated from one’s public actions, decisions and choices is pervasive in the New Zealand evangelical church and it leads to a view of religion that ignores questions of truth and focuses instead on private benefit and piety of religious belief.

For these reasons it is important this conversation be had across disciplines; particularly the three disciplines of theology, philosophy and law need to understand and hear each other so we can work together on this problem.

With this backdrop in mind, Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union bring you, as part of Jesus Week, the following event:

A Godless Public Square:

Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life?

7pm Wednesday 3 August
Lib B28 (Library Basement, 5 Alfred St) University of Auckland

Organised by: Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union
Format: Panel Discussion followed by Q&A
Moderated by: Patt Brittenden
Speakers: listed in the order they will speak in:

Theology – Matthew Flannagan PhD
Is it unjust for Christians to appeal to their “private” theologically based moral beliefs in public discussion or is the demand that such discussions be “secular” actually itself an arbitrary and unfair restriction on Christian believers telling them they are free to believe their beliefs are true in private but they must treat them as untrue when in public? How should Christians reconcile the requirement to live an undivided life with the expectation that they keep their religion private?

Philosophy – Glenn Peoples PhD
Liberal views on religion in public life claim that the public square should be neutral, it should not privilege one viewpoint over another when discussing public matters. For this reason the public square should be secular – but can this demand be consistently made? Can liberal thinkers consistently maintain that secular beliefs are neutral and that religious beliefs are not? Or are they in fact privileging their own secular viewpoint over all others?

Critics of the liberal view argue that it is more just to have a more pluralistic public square; one where all views, including religious views, are openly advocated, discussed and debated.

Law – Madeleine Flannagan LLB
In New Zealand the law around public expressions of religion is a little contradictory; on the one hand we have a right to freedom of religion and a right to manifest that freedom in public in the Bill of Rights Act but then there are other laws which privilege secularism, such as the Education Act. There has been very little litigation here which raises issues as to what precisely the law is.

The current law and jurisprudence in New Zealand arguably could permit the solution Glenn alludes to of having a more pluralistic public square that allows religion to participate but the liberal view has strong support in many quarters whilst the alternative view is not widely known or discussed by those quarters that might support it. An alternative jurisprudence, which encompasses the spirit of the solution advanced in philosophy, is being advocated by some Jurists and it is compatible with both our laws and our limited case law to date.

RSVP on Facebook or just bring your friends and turn up – the event is free and lay friendly.

We will be videoing it so if you cannot make it keep an eye out here at MandM or at Thinking Matters for the video.

A Godless Public Square:

Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life?

A Jesus Week Panel Discussion
7-9pm Wednesday 3 August
Lib B28 (Library Basement) University of Auckland

Christian theological convictions ought to impact the whole of life both in the private and public spheres; this is what the idea of an “undivided life” means, Jesus is Lord of all aspects of our lives.

Yet this consequence of Christian faith conflicts with a pervasive contemporary attitude: the view that that religion is fundamentally a private matter. It is accepted that a Christian is free to utilise theological convictions when they make decisions about their own life but in a pluralistic society it is increasingly deemed inappropriate to bring such convictions into public discussions about morality, law, politics, economics, education, scholarship and so on. The desire to influence society with Christian ideals or to convert others to the faith is viewed by many as an intolerant desire to impose one’s private views onto others.

It is widely accepted that theological convictions can govern churches and the private lives of believers yet we are told that the public square – government, public policy, the courts, the academy, education, business, arts, media, etc – should be secular only.

This event looks at this issue. The conversation will span Theology, Philosophy and Law led by a panel made up of Christian representatives from each discipline along with you the audience.

Up for discussion are issues like:

- Is it wrong for Christians to impose their ‘private’ religious beliefs onto others?
- Is secularism the neutral perspective it is claimed to be?
- Are public expressions of religion regulated by law?

Bring your own questions and ask them at the Q & A session.

This is a free event open to the public, which will be lay friendly – a university degree is not necessary in order for you to attend!

Panel:

• Dr Matthew Flannagan – PhD in Theology
• Dr Glenn Peoples – PhD in Philosophy
• Madeleine Flannagan – LLB and Post-Graduate Law Student

Moderator:

• Patt Brittenden – Talkback Radio Show Host

RSVP on Facebook here (or just turn up with your friends)

The 9/11 terrorist attacks reinvigorated a fear that has lain dormant in the western psyche since at least the 17^th century. This fear is encapsulated in an objection to belief in God known as the argument from historical atrocities. Many critics of religion refer to the religious wars that tore Europe apart during the 17^th century, citing events such as the Inquisition and Crusades — although lately the Taliban have been the image of choice.

Recently, whilst debating the viability of religious morality at the University of Notre Dame, best-selling author Sam Harris repeatedly cited the Taliban as a representative example of theological ethics. One need not read far into the literature of contemporary free thinkers to uncover this line of argument. Consider Jim Peron of the Institute for Liberal Values:

“To admit religion into the “public arena” is “dangerous.” And long term the results will be just as bloody and violent as they were in the past. … To put religion into that sector is to ignore centuries of history and return to the conflict-ridden, bloody world of the Dark Ages.”

Peron went on to refer to common motifs of the Inquisition: “crazy Puritans”, Servetus’ execution in Calvin’s Geneva and so on. Similar themes abound in the writings of Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens. The citation of historical cases is not in itself an argument so it is hard to discern the exact objection here. It appears to consist of two claims. Firstly, that some people who believe in God have committed atrocities against other people. Secondly, that if people who hold a belief commit atrocities then that belief is either false or should be avoided by liberal-minded people.

Historians Ronald Numbers and David Lindberg point to recent research having discredited the portrayal of the early Middle Ages as “the Dark Ages” brought about by Christianity. Similarly, research into Inquisition archives reveal that while such tribunals did exist, many popular beliefs are based on embellishment, exaggeration and propaganda rather than a sober assessment of facts. The picture of the Inquisition that emerges from these studies is significantly more benign than has popularly been thought. Similarly, historian Leland Ryken’s studies on the Puritans have questioned many of the popular stereotypes Peron referred to.

Take Peron’s allusion to the execution of Servetus. In his study on the life of Calvin, Oxford Theologian Alister McGrath argues that Calvin’s role in Servetus’ execution has been greatly exaggerated and contends that such heresy prosecutions were not typical in Geneva contrary to the image popularly peddled by rationalists. McGrath has also relentlessly exposed several cases of outright distortion and myth perpetuated about the so-called “dictator” of Geneva. This is not to say that atrocities did not occur, nor that such atrocities should be justified, but it is important to be accurate and fair. The evidence suggests that much of what people believe today about religious history is based on discredited 19^th century rationalist propaganda stereotypes and consequent cultural prejudice.

Perhaps more interesting is the second claim. While this claim is seldom made explicit, something like it is necessary if the existence of atrocities entails that belief in God is false or that religious belief and practice should be avoided.

Philosopher Glenn Peoples provides several counter examples to this claim. The belief that the atom could be split is one that has been used to kill thousands of people yet that belief is true and it is an important scientific discovery. The belief that theft is wrong has, in the past, led to the lynching of thieves. Does this show that theft is not really wrong and we should not oppose it?

Other examples illustrate the absurdity of this claim. The “reign of terror” during the French Revolution was justified by appeals to liberty, equality, fraternity and the rights of humankind; one victim of the guillotine famously remarked, “Oh, Liberty, what crimes are committed in your name”. Millions have been slaughtered by appeals to the greater good of society or the liberation of the oppressed classes and it is well known that people have defended wars on the basis of justice and social peace. Should we therefore avoid liberty, equality, opposing oppression, seeking justice and social peace?

A third problem with the “argument from atrocities” is that an analogous argument can be used against atheism and secular philosophies. Millions have lost their lives in wars fought in the name of secular ideologies such as Communism — wars far more brutal and total than those that occurred during the Middle Ages. Millions have been killed in socialist states in show-trials every bit as hysterical and rigged as any witch trials were. And, as some medievalists have noted, with irony, the Committee for Public Safety in Enlightenment France was, in numerous respects, much worse than the Inquisition. If the fact that Christians engaged in historical atrocities entails belief in God is false or that religious belief is to be avoided then parity of reasoning entails atheism is false and that secular belief systems should be avoided.

At this point the sceptic will start to make qualifications. One rejoinder is that whilst atheists like Pol Pot, Mao and Stalin committed atrocities, these were not done in the name of atheism or due to their atheist beliefs. Religious atrocities, however, were committed because of religious beliefs.

However, such rejoinders fail. As Peoples explained, Stalin and Pol Pot persecuted religious groups precisely because they were atheists and saw religion as socially pernicious — the very thing people who press the historical atrocities argument are trying to contend. Richard Wurmbrand, a victim of communist persecution in Romania, stated that “communist torturers often said there is no God, no hereafter, no life after death, we can do what we wish.” The fact that atheism was not the motivation for these actions seems to be news to those who actually witnessed them.

So, many atrocities were committed on the basis of atheism. The purported rejoinder also fails due to the fact that many atrocities cited by religious critics were not committed for religious reasons but for secular ones. Christopher Eberle and Terence Cuneo noted in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy that the religious wars of the 17th Century were caused not by the appeal to religious reasons, per se, but rather by the violation of religious freedom. They noted further that even in the 17th Century religious persecution was typically justified on secular grounds,

“When such rights have been violated, the justifications offered, even by religious believers, appeal to alleged requirements for social order, such as the need for uniformity of belief on basic normative issues. One theological apologist for religious repression, for example, writes this: ‘The king punishes heretics as enemies, as extremely wicked rebels, who endanger the peace of the kingdom, which cannot be maintained without the unity of the faith. That is why they are burnt in Spain.”

Medievalist Régine Pernoud argued that heretics were burnt or tortured during the 12^th Century due to the revival of Roman Law, which allowed torture to gain a confession and burning as punishment for treason. The torture and burning of heretics had as much to do with ancient Roman legal customs as it did with biblical exegesis. In fact, the Inquisition used torture more sparingly, passed death sentences more rarely and had more humane prisons than most secular courts of the same time. This suggests inquisitors actually moderated already accepted harsh Roman practices. Now, this does not justify such practices but it does question the thesis that religious reasons were the driving motivation for them or the thesis that they would not have occurred if a more secular context had prevailed. In a similar vein the Crusades were originally called to protect pilgrims from attack, to recover annexed territory and to protect the eastern Roman Empire from invasion — all secular reasons that could have been utilised to justify war quite independently of any religious rationale. Was World War II not fought to recover annexed territory, protect innocent people and protect Europe from invasion? How many millions were killed for that?

When these qualifications fail it is contended that not all atheists support these practices. This is true. It is also true that not all religious people support the practices cited by these sceptics. In fact, historically, some of the most important criticisms of religious persecution and defences of religious tolerance, such as those proposed by John Locke and Pierre Bayle, appealed to explicitly theological grounds.

Yale Philosophy Professor, Nicholas Wolterstorff, notes that “many of the social movements in the modern world that have moved societies in the direction of liberal democracy have been deeply and explicitly religious in their orientation.” Wolterstorff cites examples such as the abolitionist, civil rights and other resistance movements as examples.

So the appeal to historical atrocities, on examination, seems often based on a fairly selective analysis of the evidence. The Bin Ladens and Hitlers of this world are clearly dangerous but so too are the Stalins, Pol Pots and secular groups like the Tamil Tigers who pioneered the practice of suicide bombing before Al-Qaeda came on the scene. People fight and kill for a number of reasons; sometimes these are religious, more often they are secular – sometimes both. When people care deeply about something, sometimes they will kill to protect it. Religion is not an exception.

Bin Laden is dead; however, as commentators incessantly tell us, the legacy of religious terror he represents will continue. What also will continue are the prejudices of some secular groups who use his example to stereotype and smear all religions as dangerous and fanatical. It is far easier to kill a terrorist than it is to kill irrational prejudice but at least one can expose it for the shallow line of thought that it is.

I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled “Contra Mundum.” This blog post was published in the June 2011 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

Letters to the editor should be sent to:
editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

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The established religion in New Zealand is Maori animism. In historical terms it is a pagan and primitive religion, riddled with superstition and idolatry. It is an offence and provocation to the Living God. But none who want official and public respect in New Zealand dare criticise the Establishment. Those, however, who fear God more than man are prepared to call it for what it is: stale hokey pokey–a thoroughly sour, ignorant and stupefying batch of mouldy ice-cream. Every Christian who understands what the Bible says about idolatry and false gods has no hesitation in flatly rejecting Maori animism. In so doing, we have become the new dissenters.

Wavering Christians may well be offended at such a stand because they fear it will cause offence to Maori. Not causing offence has regrettably become for some of our brethren, not the eleventh commandment, but the only commandment. To these brethren we say, “harden up”. Fear God, not man. These weaker brethren have not yet realised that when it comes to a choice between offending the Living God, on the one hand, or man on the other, Christians must offend man a thousand times over. We must never, ever wilfully offend our God.

We will drive out any idol, never tolerating any in His presence. We will be as jealous of God’s honour as God is Himself. We will never bow down or honour any image of God, which makes all graphical representations of God idolatrous. We will never tolerate His Name being used in an empty or vain fashion. We will honour His holy day. This is what former generations called the First Table of the Law.

The ignorance and stupidity of Maori animism has been on display in recent days. A church youth group had a fantastic day out, climbing Mount Taranaki, packing up a couch and BBQ by hand. Quite a feat. At the top they reclined for a celebratory meal. After enjoying the Lord’s creation and celebrating his goodness, they decamped taking their gear and detritus with them.

On returning to the land of the living dead they were assailed by a government official: an outraged Taranaki Department of Conservation boss, Phil Mohi. Now, Phil it turns out is a Maori who has returned to the religion of his ancestors and is a card carrying animist. He has taken it upon himself to speak out in the name of his god. His god is the mountain (Mt Taranaki). The top of the mountain is tapu–sacred ground, in the eyes of Phil and his colleagues. To eat up there is to eat on his god’s head. (We are not making this up. One shudders to think the depths of outrage that would be disembogued were anyone forced to relieve themselves up the mountain.) According to a media report entitled “Mt Taranaki summit cook-up ‘tapu offence’“:

He said the summit barbecue was disappointing because the young people there probably didn’t realise or hadn’t learnt that the mountain and especially the summit is a very sacred place for iwi of Taranaki. “We discourage camping at the summit and try to make people aware that the very highest part is the most sacred of all – and ask climbers to avoid standing there. “There’s a difference too between eating prepared food for sustenance and actually cooking on the summit,” he said.

Ah, the casuistry of the animist. How quaint. Now the young Christians were taken aback by this outburst. They apologised. They did not want to cause offence, they said.

What they should have said is something like this: “Mount Taranaki is holy to us because it belongs to the Living God Who owns the cattle on a thousand hills and the wealth in every mine. All the earth is His. We went up the mountain to celebrate His glory and His majesty. We ate and drank with Him and feasted with Him and communed with Him. We gave thanks to Him for our food. We praised Him for His greatness displayed in the grandeur of Mount Taranaki which He has created. People need to respect our faith. All the earth is the Lord’s and the fullness thereof.”

Sadly, these young folk were not mature enough to understand that this is how they ought to have responded. Instead they apologised for offending animists because they had not respecting their beliefs. Sad. But, hey, they will mature.

Now all of this may have been a mere debate between opposed religions–except that Phil Mohi was speaking as an officer of the Government of New Zealand. This is why we have argued that Maori animism is now the Established religion of our nation.

Mr Mohi said that was a good reflection on the group and he encouraged and applauded all those that made use of the park. “But part of our management role is to promote and protect the mountain’s cultural and spiritual values,” he said.

He said the summit barbecue presented a timely reminder that the mountain is of huge significance to a great many people and that such actions show little respect to a very special place. DOC’s interpretation panels do explain the overall significance of the mountain but Mr Mohi said that staff will be exploring other ways to build greater awareness among the public. (Emphasis, ours.)

OK, Phil–let’s build greater awareness of each other. What you are promoting is deeply offensive to Christians and to God. It is also a lie. Your gods do not exist. Your beliefs offend and anger the Living God. Such idolatry ripens New Zealand and our people for judgment. It calls down the curses of the Covenant upon our land. Have we not already begun to taste His cup of wrath. Are we not being left once again in this country to demons from the ancient world? Are we not bloated upon the carcasses of our abused and aborted children? Are we not enslaved to drink, drugs, and crime? Are we not subjected to criminal gangs that imprison, enslave, rape and maim all who fall into their clutches? The fact that your paganism is now the Established Religion of our nation makes it all the worse.

That our government will stand four square behind Phil, supporting him in his imperialistic animist beliefs and tacitly promoting them with the force of rule, regulation, law and taxes, condemns the nation–that is, all of us–to wrath. But we Christians want no part of it. We are called to come out from among them, and be separate, and to touch not the unclean thing. (II Corinthians 6: 16-18)

The “unclean thing” is Maori animism; the clean thing is the creation, for it belongs to the Lord alone. Therefore, we will go up the mountain again, as often as we consider it appropriate, and eat and drink and feast and be merry before the Lord. Maori animism be damned–literally.

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Guest Post: No Official Religion in God’s Own?
Maori and Pakeha are Not Partners to the Treaty of Waitangi
The Foreshore and Seabed Repeal: The Inconvenience of Due Process
Sovereignty and The Treaty of Waitangi

The first two sentences of the document exhibit a confusion which is inherent throughout (and commonly found in discussions of church and state):

“The NZARH strongly believes that government should be secular; that is dealing with the issues of this world rather than following a religious agenda. Our law should not give one set of beliefs privilege over another and the state should treat religious organisations the same as any other organisation.”

An equivocation on the meaning of the word “secular” in the very first sentence is immediately apparent.

Stephen Smith notes that the word secular has two distinct meanings. Etymologically, “secular” refers to things pertaining to this world and life as opposed to the next. In this sense of the word “secular” is not opposed to religion; many religious beliefs and values pertain to life in this world, beliefs about: marriage, sex, human life, killing,  justice for the poor, what one’s duties are in this life, what God’s purposes are in this life and so on are all secular beliefs in this sense. The second and more common meaning of “secular” is to say it excludes, is in opposition to beliefs and values that are religious in nature; this is usually the first definition one will find in a dictionary.

The NZARH use both meanings in the first sentence of their “Tolerant Secular State” document. They start by defining secular in the first of these senses, in terms of “dealing with the issues of this world.” The switch to the second definition occurs immediately in the claim that a secular state must not follow a “religious agenda.” From what the NZARH subsequently argues it is clear that this second sense is what it really has in mind as much of what it says simply does not follow from the first sense.

It is important to note here what the NZARH mean by “privilege” in ”our law should not give one set of beliefs privilege over another.” The NZARH specifically mean that the viewpoint of religion must not be a source of law or public policy and by implication, cannot be a motivation or a justification for a source of law or public policy. If this is not what they mean by privilege then their argument makes no sense; the claim that the government must not follow “a religious agenda” and must “be secular” is supported by the contention that religious beliefs should not be privileged. If basing a law on a religious agenda is not privileging it then the argument does not follow.

That clarified, the NZARH’s argument is essentially:

1) The government should be secular, not religious;

This means the state should make a clear distinction between secular views and non-secular views and it should treat them differently. It should base its policies on the former type of view and not the latter. As such, on the understanding of “privilege” outlined above, the State should privilege secular beliefs over religious ones.

The basis for this is that,

2) Our laws should not privilege any one view over another, the state should treat religion the same as any other view.

So let us get this straight. Secularism is a type of viewpoint that 1) the NZARH seeks to privilege over religion but then 2) states that viewpoints must not be privileged.

Of course, if one assumes from the outset that secularism is not a specific view and is somehow some kind of neutral position that everyone can subscribe to then the statements read together might make sense but that is an erroneous assumption.

Secularism is a Viewpoint under New Zealand Law
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990), which the NZARH’s “Tolerant Secular State” document holds out as “key legislation that upholds the principles of the fair and tolerant society” identifies and treats secularism as a view or a set of beliefs. The Bill of Rights has three relevant sections:

13 Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief, including the right to adopt and to hold opinions without interference.
14 Freedom of expression
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form.
15 Manifestation of religion and belief
Every person has the right to manifest that person’s religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, or teaching, either individually or in community with others, and either in public or in private.

The gist of these three sections is that in New Zealand anyone can form and identify with whatever belief, viewpoint or idea they please, find out more about it, discuss and share it with others and act in accord with it, in public as well as private, as long as they do so with regard to the other rights present in the Bill of Rights. What a lot of people miss however is how the Bill of Rights treats viewpoints.

Section 13 is typically thought of as the Freedom of Religion section. But read it closely you’ll see that “thought”, “conscience”, “religion” and “belief” are listed – all described as “opinions” not religious views. Had the drafters wished to make s13 solely a religion section then they would have kept the language that of religious terminology only.

Sections 14′s “information and opinions of any kind and in any form” and s15′s “religion and belief” tell us that under New Zealand law non-religious beliefs are intended to be treated and dealt with by the state in precisely the same way as religious beliefs.

This is backed up in the various commentaries and government documents that have been published on these sections of the Bill of Rights – here are a couple from New Zealand Human Rights Commission Documents. (I note that the NZARH’s Tolerant Secular State document also praises the Human Rights Act 1993 which was the source of law which created the Human Rights Commission). The first is speaking of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990;

“What religions or beliefs are covered?
Religion or belief includes mainstream religions, minority or atheistic beliefs and the right not to have a belief.”

[The Right to Freedom of Religion and Belief]

This one is a reference to the International Bill of Rights of which New Zealand has bound itself by and which is widely acknowledged to form part of the source of  the wording and meaning of our Bill of Rights:

“What is the right to freedom of religion and belief?
The right to freedom of religion and belief includes the right to hold a belief, the right to change one’s religion or belief, the right to express one’s religion or belief, and the right not to hold a belief. The right to believe is not limited to religion. It also includes atheistic beliefs, as well as matters of conscience such as pacifism and conscientious objection to military service.”

[Chapter 9: The right to freedom of religion and belief]

Evidence that these sections of the Bill of Rights Act were intended to include non-religious beliefs such as atheism, agnosticism, humanism, secularism, etc and place them on par can be found in this document put out by the Ministry of Justice, “The Guidelines on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A Guide to the Rights and Freedoms in the Bill of Rights Act for the Public Sector:”

Further discussion on the meaning of section 13
The protection in section 13 is far-reaching. The section is likely to include “freedom of thought on all matters, personal conviction and the commitment to religion or belief“. The freedom extends to thoughts and beliefs of any kind including theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs.

…

How should I interpret the term ‘religion or belief’?
The United Nations Human Rights Committee states the terms “religion” and “belief” should be interpreted broadly to include theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs. The protection in section 15 extends beyond obligatory doctrine and applies to all religions and beliefs, even those without the established doctrines and customs of traditional religions.

Now given the NZARH’s principle 2) that no one view should be privileged over another, all views should be treated equally, this is all perfectly compatible but this reading of the Bill of Rights Act (and the International Bill of Rights) conflicts radically with the NZARH principle 1). It also radically conflicts with the vision for New Zealand that the NZARH have clearly held out as aspirational in the six examples they identify in their document as areas of public life which need improving on. Their proposed solutions for the examples they have set out clearly demonstrate a call for one view (theirs) to be significantly privileged over another.

The most telling is their section on education which I will now briefly fisk:

“The New Zealand public education system was set up to be secular and still is in most cases.”

The education system must inculcate one type of viewpoint alone: secular views and not non-secular views.

“There are however too many cases where those running a school try to force their own beliefs on their students through religious observance.”

But it is ok for secular beliefs to be forced on students through the inculcation of unchallenged secular viewpoints in the classroom.

“The Education Act (1964) has incorporated a loophole to allow primary schools to “close” sections of the school for religious instruction where outside volunteers indoctrinate the children whose parents haven’t opted them out.”

and

“The NZARH strongly believes that public education should be free, secular and available equally to all children.”

The teaching of secular viewpoints are to be taught at all times, to all children – teachers can teach no other viewpoint. Religion can only figure if the school is willing to close and volunteers are available and parents choose to not opt students out. This is an extremely asymmetrical treatment of two types of viewpoints, secular viewpoints and religious viewpoints but even this asymmetry is not good enough for the NZARH, they want to tip the weight even further towards the bias of secularism, they strongly believe that all state funded education should be secular. Any citizen who wishes for an alternative to their view must pay more than citizens who do not.

As Paul Rishworth, Professor and outgoing Dean of Law at the University of Auckland, an expert in New Zealand’s Rights and Freedoms law, stated to the Human Rights Commission’s Diversity Forum on Religion in Schools:

Though I am perhaps the only person in the world who has not read Harry Potter, the point is well made in an extract from the seventh and last volume (p. 210):

“What’s Voldemort planning for Hogwarts?” she [Hermione] asked Lupin. “Attendance is now compulsory for every young witch and wizard,” he replied. “That was announced yesterday. It’s a change, because it was never obligatory before. Of course, nearly every witch and wizard in Britain has been educated at Hogwarts, but their parents had the right to teach them at home or send them abroad if they preferred. This way, Voldemort will have the whole Wizarding population under his eye from a young age.”