Children can give consent, by themselves or by proxy, to casual recreational activities.

Therefore, sex is not merely a casual recreational activity.

Now in no way do I think I was treated unfairly, it was afterall a Catholic School and this was something that was  obvious both from the name on the advertisement in the education gazette and from the website linked to from the same ad. The function of this school was not simply to impart information; it was to imbibe a particular religious way of life, some of it involving what Nicholas Wolterstorff calls “educating for responsible action,”

The ultimate goal of all education, as Christians see it, is that those who are taught shall live in such a way as to carry out their responsibilities to God and find joy and delight in so doing. … But if responsible action is to ensue, more is necessary than for the students to have knowledge of the relevant matters and the ability to perform the relevant actions. Knowledge and ability are not yet performance. It is also necessary that the students’ tendencies, ranging all the way from their unreflective habits to highly self-conscious commitments, be those of acting in accord with the normative laws for right action. Education, accordingly, must have among its goals to secure–always in morally defensible ways–the formation of right tendencies.[1] [Emphasis original]

Wolterstorff argues that modelling plays an important role in cultivating tendencies. He notes that a series of studies show that students who view other people resisting the temptation to act in an immoral or inappropriate way fortify their own resistance to temptation.[2] Wolterstorff states, “The evidence seems to be that not only do a model’s low standards influence the student to lower the standards which otherwise he or she would adopt, but also a model’s high standards influence the child to raise his or hers.”[3] [Emphasis original]. An important caveat of this is that studies show “the self-denial induced by a stringent model gives way rather readily when the subject is confronted by another model with lower standards.”[4] Because the school was seeking to train students to internalise a Catholic ethos, and an important part of the pedagogy of internalising such an ethos is modelling, it follows that leaders within communities committed to this goal must themselves follow and be committed to the basic moral teachings of the community. I was not. I am a protestant and so would buck (internally) against many of the tendencies the RE department were trying to teach.

This does not seem terribly controversial to me. Schools dedicated to inculculating a religious way of life into their students have the right to demand that the leaders in their schools be committed to and reflect this way of life. It is perfectly reasonable for Jewish schools to expect people in positions of leadership to be faithful followers of the Torah. It is perfectly reasonable for Muslim schools to expect leaders in their community to be faithful Muslims; for atheist schools devoted to promoting atheism to expect their leaders to be atheists.

I reflect on this because of the recent outcry in response to a Campbell Live story that a Christian school in Rangiora, Rangiora New Life School, expelled a student for getting pregnant and subsequently revoked the deputy head-boy status given to her fiancé, the father of her child. Now, in light of what the media has reported, I will say I am not in agreement with everything the school did (I should qualify this by stating that I have very little faith that the media to report events like this terribly accurately – so take that concession with a grain of salt).

For example, Ollie Sterrit the deputy head-boy and his fiancé Sara Etherington stated that “if we decided not to keep her [abort their daughter] they didn’t support it, and they still didn’t support us if we did keep it. So we were stuck in the middle and couldn’t do anything to please them.” The media reports that the teen couple “are engaged and determined to stay together.” Now, I am inclined to think that if a teenage couple respond to getting pregnant unmarried by taking their responsibilities seriously by refusing to kill their child, getting engaged, making a commitment to stay together and to continue their education they should be supported and commended for doing the right thing. They are of course not yet “legally married” but given their age, in this country, that is impossible; hence it is not clear cut to me that this couple’s choice should not be supported. In fact, I think that a scriptural case could be made that people in this situation can, in certain circumstances, be viewed as being in a constituted kind of common law marriage and that, in fact, it is the duty of the father to marry the woman he has impregnated and to take his responsibilities to her and the child seriously (which is what appears to be happening in this situation).  However, Sara’s parents tell a different story (see the second comment on the Campbell Live link) “We have consistently tried to encourage Ollie and Sara to see the bigger picture (others affected by there decisions) all along, their choice of course. Sara has had every love and support from RNLS  [the school] and her family.“

Whatever the truth is on the matter of the school supporting the couple, stripping someone of a position of leadership is not the same thing as not supporting them -  though not permitting Sara to finish her education (she was apparently asked to leave the school) might be. Also giving someone a position of leadership, knowing about the pregnancy and then removing it from them, perhaps demonstrated a lack of wisdom in the first place on the part of the school or some dud processes (or bad media reporting).

However, these issues are not the focus of my concern in this blog post. First, Dave Crampton at Big News seems to suggest that the school had no policy on sex outside of marriage and as such they could not claim that this was part of the ethos they were trying to impart, meaning the school had no right to suddenly make an issue of the sexual conduct of its students, “The schools handbook has no mention of policies on sex, although swearing and alcohol are forbidden in school grounds, as are piercings for males.” If you visit Rangiora New Life’s website a very different picture emerges. First of all, the name of the school  “New Life” immediately suggests it is evangelical or pentecostal. On the front page the school mission states “Providing quality Christian education that equips and inspires all students to reach their life’s potential in order to serve God’s purposes.” There is a clear indication by the use of words such as “their life’s potential” and “serve God’s purpose” that the type of education they are seeking to inculculate is holistic, they hope that it will impact all aspects of the students’ lives. Click through to their Mission, Vision and Values page and you’ll find under the heading “Vision,”

GODLINESS – Building character in the students that will enable them to lead by example.

LIFE SKILLS – Equipping students with skills in relationships, home-life and vocation.

EVANGELISM – Taking every opportunity to share the life changing message of the gospel.

SERVICE – Impacting our region and beyond through sacrificial service and giving. [Emphasis added]

Here we see concern with character, leading by example, reference to relationship skills, home-life and vocation tell us they mean more than relationships with their school peers and teachers. Evangelism and reference impacting the region and beyond show, again, the broader ethos of the school. The “guiding values” on this page continue these motifs and among these we find “Ensuring school relationships, procedures and policies reflect Biblical principles and the highest Christian conduct” and “Promoting personal responsibility in learning and conduct, and community responsibility by way of service and leadership skill.” Does anyone really think, on reading these, that banging your fellow teenage school peer and knocking her up is compatible with Rangiora New Life’s understanding of these terms and is the sort of example in leadership or high biblical standard that the school is seeking to promote by example and that this sort of conduct is what the other parents with kids in the school want modelled to their kids?

Now, as Madeleine points out, when contracts are formed (I’m getting at here Dave Crampton’s contractual suggestion) all aspects of the communication between the parties, the information freely offered about the parties states of mind, intent, etc as well as the surrounding documentation speak to how the minutae of the handbooks and policies should be read and interpreted. The school is clearly a conservative, pentecostal/evangelical bible believing Christian school. Did anyone miss the memo that people with such beliefs tend to frown on pre-marital sex and that such people have high expectations of the example of their leaders – that’s why church leaders being hypocrites is such a big deal.

Second, what is my concern is the widespread belief of some commentators that a religious school cannot demand that leaders in their community abide by the moral teachings of the religious ethos the school seeks to inculculate. Idiot/Savant of No Right Turn’s comments are typical,

This is clearly unlawful discrimination on the basis of marital status and family status, in violation of sections 21(1)(b) and s21(1)(l) of the Human Rights Act 1993. It may also constitute discrimination on the basis of religious belief in violation of s21(1)(c). Rangiora New Life School is a religious school, so it has an exemption for the latter – but not for the former. It can not legally exclude or punish students who have children or are in de facto relationships, any more than it can exclude or punish them for being divorced (or the children of people who are divorced).

Regardless of the merits (or lack thereof as Madeleine insists) of Idiot/Savant’s legal analysis here there is a moral point here worth addressing. Idiot/Savant seems to think that religious schools can discriminate on the grounds of religious belief but not on grounds of sexual behaviour. It is hard to see the sense in this because in many circumstances, and certainly in this case, a person’s religious beliefs include a set of beliefs about sexual morality. If we are to take this line of argument seriously a religious school can discriminate against people who believe that sex outside of marriage is wrong but they cannot discriminate against people who refuse to practice this belief. It is hard to see how such a view could be taken seriously; surely the whole point of these teachings is that they be followed.

Idiot/Savant continues,

But there’s another aspect to this: Rangiora New Life School is a state integrated school, and therefore effectively part of the state education system. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act therefore clearly applies. By discriminating against its students and denying them any involvement in the decisions about them, the school has violated the right to be free from discrimination and the right to justice. And that is something we should not be tolerating from any part of our government. Rangiora New Life School’s board must be told to obey the law, cease its discrimination, and reinstate the student it has excluded. And if they do not, they should be replaced.

Idiot/Savant here makes heavy weather over the fact that Rangiora New Life is an integrated school. While this is true, it is also a religious school which aims to inculculate a particular religious way of life. Integrated religious schools, with special characters allowing them to promote a particular religion, are extremely common. If Idiot/Savant’s, position is correct none of these schools should be allowed to require leaders in the school or students who attend the schools to uphold a certain religious ethos. This would of course make a mockery out of their mission to promote such a way of life.

Lurking behind this complaint is, I think, a mindset that schools that promote a particular religious ethos (or at least take the ethos seriously) should not get public funds; only secular schools should get such funds. In practice this means that a school that promotes a secular perspective antithetical to a particular religion will get state funds whereas a school that inculculates certain religious beliefs will not. It’s odd that people like Idiot/Savant who maintain the right to be free from discrimination on the part of the state would support such a policy that clearly discriminates against tax paying parents with religious views.

Wolterstorff notes a deeper problem,

there are parents within society for whom it is a matter of religious conviction that their children receive a religiously integrated education. … If those parents are forbidden by law to establish and patronize schools that teach in accord with their religious convictions, then the discrimination is embodied in law. If they not legally forbidden to establish and patronize such schools then the discrimination is embodied in economics. Were those parents to establish and patronize schools that teach in accord with their convictions, they would have to pay for those schools out of their own pockets, while still contributing to the general tax fund for the other schools, obviously there free exercise of religion is thereby infringed upon in a way in which that of others is not. They do not enjoy equal freedom to live their lives as they see fit.[5]

To insist that schools either forgo public funds or compromise the religious ethos they seek to inculculate is itself discrimination. Wolterstorff notes the only escape from this dilemma apart from privatising education entirely is to “fund equitably all schools that meet minimum educational requirements” and this means allowing schools to take public funding that will require strict standards of sexual morality from student leaders. Of course one could always admit that one does not actually support the right of all to be free from religious discrimination…

[1] Nicholas Wolterstorff Educating for Responsible Action (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co) 14-15.
[2] Ibid 51-55.
[3] Ibid 55.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Political Issues” Religion in the Public Square

RECOMMENDED READING:
Religious Restraint and Public Policy

While it is not central to my point I cannot ignore the fact that in two places now (see the second comment on the Campbell Live link for one) I have seen the parents express anger at Campbell Live’s intrusion into their home without their consent. They had apparently categorically told the producers that they did not give permission for their property to be used for the interview but Campbell Live ignored their wishes and waited til they were not home to film the piece. Appalling.

Here the victim of rape is as treated the property of the father. Since the rapist has despoiled the father’s property he must pay a bridal fee. The woman apparently has no say in the matter and is forced to marry the person who raped her. Notice also if they are not discovered, no negative judgment is forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if you rape an unbetrothed virgin, be sure not to get caught.[1]

In the post I noted that the word translated rape is tapas which simply means “to grab” or “hold;” the term itself is neutral as to whether this involves force. It can be used in a context where it is clear that force is involved but it also can be used in a context where no force is involved. All the text states then is that a virgin is grabbed by a man. I went on to argue that the context provided reasons for thinking that what was envisaged was actually a seduction.

In discussing this I noted that a few verses prior to this one the text does envisage a rape. In the immediately preceding passage in Deuteronomy 22:23-27, the word chazak is used instead of tapas in reference to a bethrothed woman who screamed for help when a man attempted to have sex with her; chazak suggests a violent seizure.

In regards to this text, Martin contends that “when rape is condemned in the Old Testament the woman’s rights and her psychological welfare are ignored.”[2] Martin argues

In the case of the rape of a betrothed virgin in a city, the Bible says that both the rapist and victim should be stoned to death: the rapist because he violated his neighbor’s wife and the victim because she did not cry for help (Deut. 22: 23-25). Again the assumption is that the rapist despoiled the property of another man and so must pay with his life. Concern for the welfare of the victim does not seem to matter. Moreover, it is assumed that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would be heard and rescued. Both of these assumptions are very dubious and sensitive to the contextual aspects of rape.

On the other hand, according to the Bible, the situation is completely different if the rape occurs in “open country.” Here the rapist should be killed, not the victim. The reason given is that if a woman cried for help in open country, she would not be heard. Consequently, she could not be blamed for allowing the rape to occur. No mention is made about the psychological harm to victim. No condemnation is made of a rapist in open country, let alone in a city, who does not get caught.[3]

There are several points packed in here. First Martin contends that these passages teach that rape is an offence against a man’s property and do not condemn it out of concern for the woman’s welfare. Second, Martin suggests that the text does not condemn rapists who do not get caught. Third and perhaps most significantly, Martin suggests that the passage makes “dubious” assumptions about rape; it assumes, for example, “that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would be heard and rescued.” [Emphasis added] Martin states that this is something that fails to be sensitive to contextual factors of rape.

This last point in particular is often emphasised by sceptics. To take a common example, suppose a rapist puts a knife to a woman’s throat and commands her not to scream. If this happens in the city she will not cry out and the passage, so the sceptics allege, will hold the woman unjustly responsible for her own rape.

I think each of these points are mistaken.

Turning to the first point, Martin contends that the passage teaches that rape is merely a property offence against the husband and is not concerned with the welfare of the woman. To asses the claim it is worth looking at the passage he refers to,

If a man happens to meet in a town a virgin pledged to be married and he sleeps with her,24  you shall take both of them to the gate of that town and stone them to death–the girl because she was in a town and did not scream for help, and the man because he violated another man’s wife. You must purge the evil from among you.25  But if out in the country a man happens to meet a girl pledged to be married and rapes her, only the man who has done this shall die.26  Do nothing to the girl; she has committed no sin deserving death. This case is like that of someone who attacks and murders his neighbour, for the man found the girl out in the country, and though the betrothed girl screamed, there was no one to rescue her. (Deuteronomy 22:24-27 NIV)

Two points need to be noted here. First, the text states that people who rape should be executed (I have argued that capital sanctions like this were not always intended to be taken literally in Capital Punishment in the Old Testament). Martin suggests that the fact that adultery is a capital crime means that this is merely a property offence. He states the “assumption is that the rapist despoiled the property of another man and so must pay with this life.” Actually the converse is true; Christopher Wright notes this point,

The fact that the legal penalty for the wife who commits adultery is execution weighs strongly against the idea that wives in OT Israel are legally no more than the property of their husbands. If adultery is merely an offence against another man’s “property” why destroy the property as well as punishing the guilty man? Furthermore, it would be quite exceptional, in as much as no other property offence in the OT is punishable by death.[4]

The second point to note is that Martin’s contention seems to be explicitly contradicted by the text in v 26. In this passage it states that rape is, “This case is like that of someone who attacks and murders his neighbour.” The text compares rape to a violent assault, a murder, not theft.

Martin’s second point fares no better. Martin seems to argue that the text ignores the “woman’s rights and her psychological welfare” because “no condemnation is made of a rapist in open country, let alone in a city, who does not get caught.” It is hard, however, to see the force of this; all legal codes will only punish people who commit crimes once they are caught. Current New Zealand law on rape, for example, does not punish or condemn people who are not caught, tried and proven guilty of rape. No one thinks that this practice of observing due process is contrary to the rights of rape victims and correctly so, the fact that a woman is the victim of a heinous crime does not automatically cancel out the due process rights of anyone accused of a crime. The same is true here, the law punishes only those caught; if a person has not been caught committing a crime then the state does not know who committed the crime. To call the failure to punish the perpetrator of an unsolved crime a violation of a woman’s rights is hard to take seriously.

Moreover even if one were to take this line of argument seriously, it proves too much. In Deuteronomy, for example, The Torah refers to a situation where a man has been murdered and the authorities, after careful investigation, cannot determine who committed the crime. The result is that the unknown perpetrator is not punished. Are we to infer from this that The Torah victimises men and treats them as property and expresses a sexist anti-male sentiment?

This brings us to the final and perhaps most significant point. Martin notes that the law assumes “that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would be heard and rescued. Both of these assumptions are very dubious and sensitive to the contextual aspects of rape.” A rhetorical question will more vividly express this point; what if a women could not cry out, what if the rapist in a city put a knife to a woman’s throat and ordered her not to scream, what if a woman was set upon suddenly and was unable to scream? In these situations the rape occurs in a city and the woman does not scream for help. The above law then seems to teach that she is should be treated as guilty of a serious crime. If this is the case then surely this is insensitive to the rape victim? To have a law that condemns a woman in this situation is to have a law that ignores the specifics of the situation; it, in Martin’s words, ignores the “contextual aspects of rape.”

I am inclined to agree that if the law condemned a woman in these kinds of contexts it would indeed be unjust. The question needs to be asked, however, is does it? Is it plausible to assume that the law is intended to be applied in such a rigid, a-contextual, fashion?  I think the answer is no.

Deuteronomy is an Ancient Near Eastern Legal text; it therefore is part of a literary genre from that period of time. We are aware of other texts from the same genre such as the ancient Hittite Laws, Middle Assyrian Laws and Code of Hammurabi, and its important to note that legal codes written in this Genre differ significantly from modern legal codes.  Hiller notes,

[T]here is no evidence that any collection of Near Eastern laws functioned as a written code that was applied by a strict method of exegesis to individual cases. As far as we can tell, these bodies of laws served educational purposes and gave expression to what was regarded as just in typical cases, but they left considerable latitude to local courts for determining the right in individual suits. They aided local courts without controlling them.[5]

The same point is made by Raymond Westbrook in his comparative study of Ancient Near Eastern Legal Codes. He notes that such laws “reflect the scribal compilers’ concern for perfect symmetry and delicious irony rather than the pragmatic experience of the law courts.”[6] The method used in legal texts was “to set out principles by the use of often extreme examples.” Christopher Wright calls this “paradigmatic law,” which he explains as “the detailing of specific circumstances with the view to giving judges basic principles and precedents on which to evaluate the great variety of individual cases that may come before them.”[7]

Once the genre is understood it is not hard to see the flaw in Martin’s argument. Martin assumes that the law is a rigidly literal rule that inflexibly applies to all cases. In fact, the law probably did not function this way nor was it intended to. Instead it functioned as kind of paradigm illustrating a principle. The principle was this; women who have sex with a man are not to be considered adulterers or immoral if they do not consent. If it cannot be established whether a woman consented to a sexual act then she should be presumed innocent. Rape is not adultery, it is rather a serious assault or an attempted murder. At a more general level the case law vividly illustrates the principle that culpability entails consent.

[1] Michael Martin “Atheism, Christian Theism, and Rape” accessed 27 September 2009.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Christopher Wright International Biblical Commentary: Deuteronomy, (Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 1996 ) 254.
[5] Delbert R Hillers Covenant: the History of a Biblical Idea (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1969).
[6] Raymond Westbrook “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law” in The History of Ancient Near Eastern Law Vol 1 ed Raymond Westbrook (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) 74.
[7] Christopher Wright Deuteronomy 244.

Loftus is not alone in contending that the Bible teaches that rape victims had to marry their rapists. Michael Martin states that,

when rape is condemned in the Old Testament the woman’s rights and her psychological welfare are ignored.[15] For example: “If a man meets a virgin who is not betrothed, and seizes her and lies with her, and they are found, then the man who lay with her shall give to the father fifty skelels of silver, and she shall be his wife, and he may not put her away all of his days (Deut:22; 28-29).” Here the victim of rape is as treated the property of the father. Since the rapist has despoiled the father’s property he must pay a bridal fee. The women apparently has no say in the matter and is forced to marry the person who raped her. Notice also if they are not discovered, no negative judgment is forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if you rape an unbetrothed virgin, be sure not to get caught.[1] [sic]

Meredith Kline: “The seducer of an unbetrothed virgin was obliged to take her as wife, paying the customary bride price and forfeiting the right of divorce” (Treaty of the Great King: The Covenant Structure of Deuteronomy, p. 111).

Matthew Henry: “. . . if he and the damsel did consent, he should be bound to marry her, and never to divorce her, how much soever she was below him and how unpleasing soever she might afterwards be to him” (Commentary on the Whole Bible, ad loc.).

J. A. Thompson: “Seduction of a young girl. Where the girl was not betrothed and no legal obligations had been entered into, the man was forced to pay the normal bride-price and marry the girl. He was not allowed, subsequently, to send her away (Deuteronomy: Introduction and Commentary, Tyndale Series, p. 237).
In Israel’s Laws and legal Precedents (1907), Charles Foster Kent (professor of Biblical Literature at Yale University) clearly distinguished between the law pertaining to rape in Dt. 22:25-27 and the law pertaining to seduction in Dt. 22:28-29 (pp. 117-118).

Keil and Delitzsch classify Deuteronomy 22:28-29 under the category of “Seduction of a virgin,” comment that the crime involved was ‘their deed” – implying consent of the part of both parties – and liken this law to that found in Exodus 22:16-17 (Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament, vol. 3, p. 412).

John Calvin: “The remedy is, that he who has corrupted the girl should be compelled to marry her, and also to give her a dowry from his own property, lest, if he should afterwards cast her off, she should go away from her bed penniless” (Commentaries on the Four Last Books of Moses Arranged in the Form of a Harmony, vol. 3, pp. 83-84.

J. C. Connell: “Although she consented, it was still his responsibility to protect her from lifelong shame resulting from the sin of the moment by marrying her, not without payment of the regular dowry” (“Exodus,” New bible Commentary, ed. F. Davidson, p. 122).

Adam Clarke: “This was an exceedingly wise and humane law, and must have operated powerfully against seduction and fornication; because the person who might feel inclined to take advantage of a young woman knew that he must marry her, and give her a dowry, if her parents consented” (The Holy Bible . . . with a Commentary and Critical Notes, vol. 1, p. 414).

Alan Cole: “If a man seduces a virgin: . . . he must acknowledge her as his wife, unless her father refuses” (Exodus: An Introduction and Commentary, Tyndale Series, p. 173).

James Jordan: “the punishment for the seducer is that he must marry the girl, unless her father objects, and that he may never divorce her (according to Dt. 22:29)” (The Law of the Covenant, p. 148).

Walter C. Kaiser, Jr.: “Exodus 22:16-17 takes up the problem of the seduction of a maiden who was not engaged . . .. Here the seducer must pay the ‘bride-price’ and agree to marry her” (Toward Old Testament Ethics, p. 107).[16]

They [rape and seduction] coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to the virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by force from her father’s house. Again, the force employed in rape differs in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by force from her parents’ house, and is forcibly violated: while sometimes, though taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act of marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is employed.[18]

Key states he voted against civil unions because the majority in his electorate were opposed it. This is clearly an inadequate stance, suppose that same-sex sex is wrong, contrary to the laws of God. If this is the case, Key is suggesting that he would follow the beliefs and will of the majority over the beliefs of an omniscient, all knowing, perfectly-good God. This is irrational to say the least. The mistaken views that are popular are more authoritative than the decree of God.

On the other hand, suppose there is nothing wrong with same-sex sex. Suppose that discriminating against such unions is on par with discriminating against inter-racial unions. Then Key is suggesting he would follow the racial prejudices of the majority even though he abhors this prejudice himself.

Such a position is bizarre. For my part I expect legislators to be people of integrity and have the courage of their convictions to stand against evil and injustice even when it is unpopular to do so.

Key dismisses the argument that “civil unions undermine marriage” in a far too cavalier manner. Though I myself do not endorse this argument, I believe a critique of it should be based on an accurate and fair interpretation which must also be a valid argument. Key’s is neither. Key responds by saying, “I have been married for 22 years and the fact that a gay couple may choose to have a Civil Union would have absolutely no impact on my marriage to my wife”. But that is not the issue. Opponents of civil unions claimed it would undermine the institution of marriage not that it would under mine one particular person’s marriage.

Of course Key is not alone in dismissing the arguments of others simply by a cavalier caricature, but this fact does not alter the spuriousness of doing so.

Key states “I don’t care what people’s sexual preferences are” and states that a persons sexual preference “is their business and their business alone.” Several things can be said here; first whether Key cares about an issue is irrelevant. The issue is whether certain actions are right or wrong and this is not determined by Key’s personal feelings.

Second, if a person’s “sexual preferences” are “their business alone” why does he have no problem with the State solemnising and legally recognising a person’s sexual union. If it is no one else’s business then why is it the states business?

Thirdly, contrary to what Key says, a person’s “sexual preference” is relevant. Some people prefer little children; by definition this is a sexual preference. If Keys’ trite sounding slogan were correct, this is their business alone and no one else’s.

Similarly Key notes that “We have friends who are gay and lesbian, just as we have dozens of friends who are heterosexual.” This may be true but it is beside the point. The fact that you know people who do something does not mean the State should endorse their activity through recognising and solemnising it. I have had friends who sleep around and regularly get intoxicated. Does that mean that the government should set up state funded clinics for those who want casual sex or provide tax payer funded alcohol?

In discussing the origins of same-sex attraction Key states “I believe it is innate. I am not an expert in these areas but I have had all these religious groups in my electoral office trying to argue that this is learned behaviour, personally I believe that is crap.” It is not just religious people who make that claim (and not all religious people do anyway). Socially liberal New York University Sociologist, Dr David Greenberg, in his book “The Construction of Homosexuality” concluded that homosexual conduct is socially learned. He based this on a huge survey of cross-cultural studies. This work may be mistaken, but I think Key is reaching if he thinks his credentials warrant writing off such research as “crap” because of what his consciousness tells him.

Key goes on to note: “I think we largely live in a secular society, I think there are many religions operating in NZ and it is in the best interests of the state to make decisions that are on a secular basis so they don’t discriminate. I’m no supporter of these hard right religions. [For instance,] I was never offered, I would never have accepted any financial support from the Exclusive Brethren. I met them as a constituency MP, as I would meet anyone as a constituency MP on constituency issues as I believe it’s wrong to discriminate.”

There is so much here it is hard to know where to begin.

Key states “we live in a secular society”. This mantra is trotted out by politicians of the left and right continually, but it is spurious. The fact that society currently displays a trait does not mean it ought to display that trait, we currently live in a Labour led society, does Key think that means Labour ought to continue to lead?

Key goes on to state he does not believe in discrimination. However, he then immediately notes that he does not “support hard right religions.” His position is contradictory; unless Key does not support any groups at all (which is clearly false he supports National) he is discriminating against these groups as he is supporting some but not others.

Moreover, legislation by its nature discriminates. A law regulates human conduct, it states that people who engage in certain actions will be censured (incarcerated or fined) while people who do not engage in those actions will not. This is discrimination. Contrary to what Key states discrimination in and of itself is a morally neutral concept. Some types of discrimination are wrong i.e. depriving people of their life on the basis of their race, and others are not, depriving people of liberty because they have committed murder. The fact that such an elementary and obvious point is lost on someone who seeks to lead the country speaks volumes for the intellectual and moral acumen of today’s politicians.

However, Key’s core argument is “I think there are many religions operating in NZ and it is in the best interests of the state to make decisions that are on a secular basis so they don’t discriminate.” The argument here seems to be that because there are many differing religious groups in NZ, it would be discriminatory to base the laws on moral principles taught by only some of these groups. Hence legislation should be based on secular (i.e non-religious) values and ideals.

The problem is that if this argument is not sound. If it were, there is an equally sound argument for the claim that we should not base laws on secular values and ideals.

Consider, there are many secular philosophies operating in NZ. They disagree on all sorts of matters. Compare the Socialist Workers Party with the Objectivist Society, or both with the New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists. Hence, if we follow Key’s logic, to avoid discrimination we need to base laws on “non-secular aims”.

In fact one can push this silly argument further, there are numerous different political parties in NZ, hence to avoid discrimination we should not base laws on the aims or values of any political party. Which means that if elected Prime Minister, Key will not support any National Party policies being implemented.

Does any of the above mean that people should not vote for National? Not necessarily. While Key is clearly mistaken on these issues, it does not follow that he is mistaken on every other issues. Moreover, it could be (lets face it, it is probably the case…) that the alternative to National will contain people who are more mistaken on more issues. John Key has a lot of faults but he has one big tick in his favour, he is not Helen Clark.

Over the weekend my family was over and my brother in law was hassling me about my call to the radio. He and my sister are somewhat left of centre (as in, Labour are too right wing) so we often good naturedly disagree on things and sure enough he was not happy with aspects of my call. He went on to offer a critique and I offered a defence, we went back and forward and then he finished with “well anyway I was most peeved to have to listen to your call twice, the first time when you rang in was bad enough but when you won caller of the week and the announcer thought you were so onto it I got really mad because you were wrong!” He then asked where the wine from Landmark Estate was anyway and hassled me for serving substandard wine. It then dawned on me that perhaps I had been caller of the week after all.

Despite having a blog and being rather into political debates I do not frequent talk back shows. We were driving home from Mt Albert pools and I heard the announcer say that the government were considering adding a question on sexual preference to the census form and listeners were invited to call in with their thoughts. On a whim I phoned the station, Matt was driving so what the hey!

I commented on the methodological flaws of the government gathering this data, citing Kinsey’s report which utilised analogous methodology. The gist went basically that you are unlikely to obtain reliable results as the sort of people who volunteer to answer questions on their sexual preferences tend to be the sort of people whose sexual preferences are more ‘out there,’ those who are very private about their sexual preferences tend to be more conservative and are less likely to volunteer that sort of info. Kinsey’s study invited people to participate and as such he found there to be a much higher number of more ‘out there’ sexual practices than other studies using better methodology which led to random samples. I concluded by asking why the government felt they had a place in our bedrooms anyway? I speculated that the purpose behind the proposed move was so they could rubber stamp their social agenda and stated that they should stick to law, order and defence.

My brother in law’s issue was that on the radio I stated that Kinsey invited people to call in and in actual fact Kinsey’s study was not a phone survey, the interviews were done face to face. My brother in law was quite right to pull me up on this factual error but he was wrong to suggest that my criticisms failed because of it. Kinsey interviewed a disproportionately high number of criminals, particularly sex offenders, Laumann writes in The Social Organisation of Sexuality: Sexual Practices in the United States (Chicago University Press, 1994):

Kinsey roamed far and wide in selecting his subjects … Kinsey also purposefully recruited subjects for his research from homosexual friendship and acquaintance networks in big cities.

Anyway, this led me to email Newstalk ZB and ask if indeed I was the caller of the week. I will update with their reply.

UPDATE: Newstalk ZB have confirmed I was caller of the week. Still waiting to hear if I get the Landmark Estate wine prize given I did not call in when it was announced.

UPDATE: A knock at the door yesterday saw the arrival of my prize along with this letter:

Dear Madeleine,
Congratulations
Newstalk ZB – Caller of the Week
2 Bottles of wine – just for you.

One bottle of Chardonnay one bottle of Sauvignon Blanc from Landmark Estate Wines. Matt and I polished off the Chardonnay last night, very nice – not remotely vinegary like some chardonnays. The Sauv is on hold til Sunday night – I must see if the promised repairs to my cupboard doors eventuates – otherwise my brother in law just gets a toast!

Kay writes: “The M & M blog is scarier because their posts almost make sense … over the top hatred like www.godhatesfags.com is so extreme that its hard to take it seriously. M&M sound plausible & reasonable …”

Kaiwai agrees: “… some of the things I agree with … don’t dismiss everything he [Matt] says.”

Kind Kit adds: “Yes, Matt and Mads are certainly cogent, and even logical after a fashion. Dr Flannagan wears his philosophical training rather well. They are not frothing lunatics by any means… “

Cale concludes: “I do know what you mean though about them being persuasive, they managed to gather enough people together to block the Otago campus support for the CUB bill and Madeleine spoke dangerously well.”

We would like to clear up a couple of things though:

1. The MandM blog is NOT “sponsored by the Elusive Brethren & Right Wing American Fundamentalists” but if either of the afore mentioned wish to sponsor us please send cheques to Private Bag 93119, Henderson, Waitakere City….

2. Kaiwai wrote of us: “I don’t set out to impose my views by way of legislation – if I want to ‘change the world’, I’d sooner set an example by living the life I preach, then hope that it’ll rub off on others.”

Holding to classical liberal and libertarian political views respectively and being evangelical Christians means we believe in less State and in changing the world in precisely the manner Kaiwai expressed. For example we don’t just oppose the Civil Unions Act but also the Marriage Act because both are outside the legitimate functions of the State.

3. Depraved claimed: “The problem with Matt – they’re pro-life and yet, anti-sex education and anti-condom. They’re against the very things which would drastically reduce unwanted pregnancies. An example, someone is in an accident, they’re killed – the autopsy says that the individual could have survived had they worn a seat belt. Matt’s solution is ‘ban the car’ when the common sense approach would be to make safety belts compulsory and improve driver training.”

We are not Catholic, we have no problem with condoms beyond the fact that using them is like having a shower wearing a raincoat (we use other forms of contraception). Our children’s knowledge of sex education is more than thorough and they could give a family planning sex educator a run for their money. But I suspect what Depraved is alluding to is our opposition to the State teaching sex education at all, and, in the amoral, relativistic manner they do.

Further, I am not in favour of banning cars but I do believe that it should be illegal for people to use cars to kill other people with. Nothing strikes me as more absurd as a pro-choice social policy that says let’s legalise dangerous driving and allow people to freely and deliberately smash their cars into pedestrians on demand and when the body count for this practice (suprisingly) gets rather high, respond to this by increasing education on seatbelt use in schools.

Matt

OK, I see. So you were referring to the politician who replied that he thought that it would be ‘unrealistic’ when asked about teaching abstinence in schools because a study showed that abstinence wasn’t really being observed elsewhere?Did he say why it wasn’t realistic? I would tend to agree that saying something isn’t realistic because it’s just too popular is a silly argument. And you’d be right to highlight it with the exaggeration of other, more emotive, examples.But if he was saying that it wasn’t realistic because there is no rational reason to teach abstinence for other reasons (like studies of teen pregnancies where abstinence is taught or that there is no rational moral issue with consensual casual sex) then I’d have to side with the politician. But first I’d want to know his reason.I’ve read your second link and perused the first.

You seem to trying to find extremes to justify your stance on casual sex. I don’t use the Bible as my reference point for my morals and I believe that most of life is filled with non-absolutes where we have to draw sometimes awkward lines that occasionally need adjusting. You didn’t really address what would actually be wrong if (assuming I wasn’t married) I went out on the town, hooked up with someone else who had the same expectations of a casual fling, and had consensual casual sex. What do you see is wrong with this? And why do you feel you have a right to try to stop it from happening?

1. Damien argues that abstinence education should not be taught in schools, because (a) there are studies which show it’s less effective at lowering teen pregnancies and (b) there is no rational moral basis for the normative principle prohibiting sex outside of a monogamous life long union.

Now I agree that abstinence education should not be taught in public schools that’s because I don’t think anything should be taught in public schools. I think public schools are problematic and unjust. Despite this I think, the reasons Damien’s suggests for opposing abstinence teaching are flawed.

Re b. Damien’s simply asserts that this principle has no rational basis. However asserting a religious teaching is irrational provides no one with any reason for thinking it is.

Re a. assuming the studies in correct are accurate, the conclusions each are beside the point. The issue is not what method achieves the desired results more efficiently, but whether it achieves these results by morally licit means. Sterilising teenagers as soon as they reach puberty would undoubtedly be extremely effective at reducing teenage pregnancy, yet that does not mean we should do this, because the results are brought about by unlawful means.

2. In several places I have critiqued the “liberal” position that an Damian responds to this critique by stating that “seem to trying to find extremes to justify your stance on casual sex. “
This, misunderstands my argument. I am not arguing that causal sex is wrong by appealing to extremes. Rather I am rebutting a common argument for numerous permissive policies (including causal sex) by pointing out that the core premise is false. It’s false because if it were true it would entail that actions which are self evidentially abhorrent are in fact merely permissive life style choices. The fact that these abhorrent practises can be classified as “extreme” is nether here nor there. The point is that they are entailed by the premise in question.

In fact by recognising them as extreme Damien reiterates my point, if what he professes were true they would not be extreme cases at all, merely the lifestyle preferences of one minority group.

3. Damian’s main line of argument however is to spell out his own position and then ask me to answer the question “why is causal sex wrong?”

I think my answer to this question is clear. I am a Voluntarist (or divine command theorist) hence I believe that what makes things right or wrong is their conformity with or divergence with the commands of God. Hence what makes causal sex wrong is ultimately the fact that it is contrary to Gods commands. Damian asserts he does not believe in the existence of a divine law but this has no bearing on whether the answer I have provided is correct. The fact that someone does not believe something is true does not mean it is not true.

To avoid caricatures however, let me articulate a little how I understand this. In a recent discussion of sexual morality Mark Murphy notes that appeals to divine law are “not a stop gap where a theory of normative ethics has failed” any more than “an appeal to the existence of a civil law prohibiting driving at over 65 miles per hour is a desperate turn to the civil law where normative ethical theories ‘fail’ to describe why people are bound to not drive more than 65 miles an hour” Murphy goes on to note that “ Just as human legislators can give reasons, rooted in the human good, for such a human law, even if the law does not dictate a particular speed limit” So “we as human beings can give some account, grounded in the good of rational creatures, as to why God would lay down this type of command”

I think Murphy’s understanding of the relation of divine law to human good in this context has some promise. We can see good reasons, such as the protection of life, property etc to have a speed limit. We can also recognise that because of the substantial benefits of travelling in cars some speed limits are unreasonable (i.e. one requiring people to only travel at 5 Klm). But none of these reasons dictates that the speed limit must be 100klm over say 95 klm or 110. This however does not lead us to question the law. Because there are good reasons for having one, and this rule is, in light of the dangers of driving not irrational, even if the dangers do not require a rational, virtuous person to endorse this particular speed limit as opposed to another. Because the state chooses this particular rule we are legally bound to follow it.

Similarly we can see good reasons, such the risk of STD’s, the economic and emotional burden of raising children, the danger of exploitation, emotional harm, the temptation to have an abortion etc, to have some rules regulating sexual conduct. We can also recognise that because of the substantial benefits of sex, (such as the creation of new life, pleasure, expression of intimacy and love) some rules (such as requiring celibacy of all people) would be unreasonable. None of these reasons dictates that the traditional rules be adopted over all possible alternatives. However this should not lead people to question the rule. Because there good reasons for having one , and the traditional rule is, in light of the dangers of involved in sex, not irrational, even if the dangers do not require a rational person to endorse this rule. Because God promulgated this particular rule we are morally bound to follow it.

I am also sceptical that anyone has ever come up with a reason why a rational person should reject this rule, or that “liberal alternatives” are any more defensible, plausible, or coherent or viable in light of the risks. At best the rule is unfashionable and (like the speed limit) widely flouted. For reasons I expounded in the aforementioned post, principles should not be based on fashion or popularity. We should not conduct ethical and theological discussions as glorified teenagers doing and believing X because all the other cool people do.

4. Finally Damian asks me “why do you feel you have a right to try to stop it [casual sex] from happening? Here I think Damian fails to note that being opposed to something happening is simply an implication of thinking it is wrong. To state an action is wrong is to express opposition to it to express a volition that it not be performed. Of course this does not mean one should use coercion or force to prevent the action occurring. Sometimes this is justified (like when a person shoots a rapist about to attack his daughter) but sometimes it is not. But the idea that one can simultaneously think an action is wrong and also not oppose the performance of the action is, I think, incoherent.

If Damian’s concern is that I am not incoherent then I make no apologies, the fact that some liberals think contradicting themselves is trendy or cool only underscores the foolishness of their position.

What was interesting was the reaction by some that this study as somehow validated permissive sexual mores. To cite one typical example, at the recent family first forum a question was asked from the floor about what would be taught in sex education courses at public schools. The response, from at least one politician, was that this study showed that encouraging people outside of a monogamous sexual relationship to practise abstinence was unrealistic.

Now this morning we see another study has come out this study suggests that sexual molestation of children is prevalent in NZ it suggests that one in four women have been sexually molested. I note the almost universal response from our politicians and media and quite rightly so, is to condemn these practises and exhort NZers to change any actions and attitudes that lead to such behaviour.

I am confused: I thought that when a significant number of people engaged in a sexual practise, then it was unrealistic to condemn it? I thought the state was supposed to simply accept contemporary practise and alter their values to fit it. Can the politicians who make the aforementioned argument about sex ed answer me this: When are you going to advocate that the state to teach safe child molestation techniques in public schools?

The reality is that we do not look to contemporary practise to determine what’s right and wrong. Rather we use principles of right and wrong to critique contemporary practise. Despite their trendy sloganising, our politicians know this, or at least they do when it suits them, but conveniently forget when it doesn’t. If contemporary liberals want to justify their values to others, they need to provide arguments for them. Not assurances that these practises are fashionable or trendy or that “all the cool people are doing it” or that “Kinsey showed 10% of people do this” etc. Unlike some people in parliament and the media many of us grew out of our teens sometime ago.

Now Cullen stated that he wanted to tighten up regulations so Schools could dismiss teachers like this. He stated it was unacceptable that a person like this should be teaching teenage girls. He seemed to take this latter claim as obvious and there was no apparent disagreement from anyone in the clip.

Let’s be clear what Cullen is saying here. He is suggesting that it should be permissible to refuse to employ someone on the basis of private sexual behaviour they engage in with other consenting adults (under NZ’s laws a 17 year old is not considered a minor when it comes to sex and hence is a consenting adult). Moreover, he is also suggesting that a person’s private consensual sexual behaviour can be grounds for considering them unfit to teach at public schools. Moreover Cullen appeared to think this was obvious and certainly no one appeared to disagree in this instance.

If this is so the question I have for Cullen and the Labour party is this. If you believe this, why have you repeatedly stated the opposite in the past? This is the party whose activists have repeatedly stated that it’s wrong to discriminate against people on the basis of their private consensual behaviour.

I also have another question. Suppose this teacher had instead of advertising for a member of the opposite sex on a website he had been cruising for causal sex with another man in a local gay bar. Would Cullen say this person was unfit to teach teenage children? Suppose he had advertised for causal in Express magazine? Would that be grounds to discriminate against him and to claim he is unfit to teach at public schools?

I suspect I know the answer to this question. If a person were to make this argument about a homosexual teacher Cullen and his supporters would denounce the person as a bigot and an intolerant homophobe. No doubt the person would be compared to the Nazis and to the Taliban (as though somehow saying that a person is unfit to teach at a school is the same as engaging in mass murder and genocide).

But this raises an obvious question; If it’s obvious that a heterosexual male is unfit to teach because he advertises for sex on the net. Why is a homosexual male who advertises for causal sex in a Gay bar or on the pages of express not also unfit? In both cases the sex is consensual in private. The only difference is the gender of his partner. I thought Labour believed it was wrong to treat same sex relationships differently to heterosexual ones?

If we are to believe what Labours activists have told us then either one of two things is true either (a) Cullen is a pro Taliban Nazi bigot or (b) much of what Labour has told us about consenting sex in private is false and much of the character assassination it has dished out to Conservatives is unjustified. Which is it?

A rational person should not prescribe a principle unless he is willing to also prescribe the logical implications of that principle. If you prescribe a rule but are unable to accept its implications because you find them intuitively absurd then you have good grounds for rejecting the rule. No amount of denouncing others as bigots can change this fact.

The claim that its wrong to discriminate against people on the basis of their private consensual sexual activities has counter intuitive implications. Hence in the absence of compelling arguments for this claim it should be rejected.