He took her into the kitchen, and stripped her from neck to waist. He made her get upon the stool, and he tied her hands to a hook in the joist. After rolling up his sleeves, he commenced to lay on the heavy cow skin, and soon the warm, red blood came dripping to the floor … No words, no tears, no prayers, from his gory victim, seemed to move his iron heart from its bloody purpose. The louder she screamed, the harder he whipped; and where the blood ran fastest, there he whipped longest. He would whip her to make her scream, and whip her to make her hush; and not until overcome by fatigue, would he cease to swing the blood clotted cowskin.

Loftus is not alone, it is often affirmed as an incontestable and obvious truth that the Bible supports slavery. Atheist philosopher Walter Armstrong substantiated this accusation with a citation from the book of Leviticus, “as for your male and female slaves whom you may have: you may buy male and female slaves from among the nations around you” (Lev 25:44 ESV).

The ESV here uses the English word ‘slave’ to translate the Hebrew word ebed. The problem is that it is not at all clear that these two terms are analogous. In 1690 philosopher John Locke argued that an examination of the Old Testament’s references to an ebed shows that it is not the equivalent what we think of when we hear the term ‘slave.’ Locke is only one of many scholars who have come to the same conclusion.

The Oxford Dictionary defines a slave as a “person who is the legal property of another or others and is bound to absolute obedience, human chattel.” Rodney Stark utilises a similar definition, “A slave is a human being who, in the eyes of the law and custom, is the possession, or chattel, of another human being or of a small group of human beings. Ownership of slaves entails absolute control, including the right to punish (often including the right to kill), to direct behavior, and to transfer ownership.” Timothy Keller astutely observes that the English term ‘slave’ carries connotations of new-world slavery as it was practiced in the British Empire and made infamous in the antebellum southern states of the US.

In the British Empire and in many US states, slavery was governed under the Code of Barbados. This code was explicitly racist and described Africans as “heathenish, brutish, and an uncertaine, dangerous kinde of people.” It allowed owners to use, “unlimited force to compel labor without penalty even if this resulted in maiming or death.” It denied slaves due process rights and permitted owners to, in effect, kill their slave for any cause. It forbade slaves from marrying. It effectively prevented owners from setting their slaves free. Keller writes that, “The African slave trade was begun and resourced through kidnapping.” Stark notes that “20 to 40 percent of slaves died while being transported to the coast, another 3-10 percent died while waiting on the coast, and about 12 to 16 percent boarded on ships died during the voyage.”

However, what the Old Testament refers to differs from slavery, so understood, in several important respects.

First, an ebed was not acquired by kidnapping. Kidnapping a human being and selling that person as a slave was a capital offence in the Old Testament (Ex 21:16). Moreover, slave trading is implicitly condemned in the book of Revelation (Rev 18:13) and explicitly condemned by Paul as contrary to the law and sound doctrine (1 Tim 1:9-10).

In the Old Testament an ebed was usually person who offered to work for another, free of charge, in exchange for a debt being cancelled. It resembled a form of indentured servitude.

Second, the institution was not based on notions that ebed were of an inferior race. In fact, the opposite is affirmed. In the book of Job we read,

If I have rejected the cause of my male or female slaves [Hebrew: ebed amah] when they brought a complaint against me; what then shall I do when God rises up? When he makes inquiry, what shall I answer him? Did not he who made me in the womb make them? And did not one fashion us in the womb? (Job 31:13-15)

Here Job refers to an ebed as having a right to go to court and sue his or her “owner” in pursuit of his or her rights. Job bases this on the idea that both he and his ebed are equal, both are created by God.

Third, as Locke noted, an ebed was not the property of another and could not be disposed of. To deliberately kill an ebed was a capital offence (Ex 21:20-21). Similarly, it was illegal to strike an ebed (Ex 21:26-27).

However, some dispute this latter point on the basis of Exodus 21:20-21,

If a man beats his male or female slave with a rod and the slave dies as a direct result, he must be punished, but he is not to be punished if the slave gets up after a day or two, since the slave is his property.

Some interpret this passage to mean that because a “slave” is the property of another they can severely beat the slave and providing the beating is not fatal, there is no legal punishment. However, this fails to deal adequately with the context and the Hebrew text, the word translated as ‘property’ here is actually ‘silver’ (a reference to money) and the word translated ‘punishment’ here is not the usual word for punishment.

Old Testament scholar Christopher Wright notes that the word implies “the shedding of the blood of the master of the slave” and so refers to capital punishment. It is used in direct contrast with the same word in the previous verse where it is stated that deliberately killing an ebed is to be avenged. Therefore, it does not say the person will not be punished for beating a slave, it says he will not be executed for it unless he kills the slave. For further evidence that the passage is not a license to beat, a couple of verses later even causing a minor injury on an ebed, such as a bruise, is explicitly condemned. The same contrast occurs in the passage immediately preceding where a free man who struck and killed another was to be “held responsible” but not if the person survived. It is clear, however, that the person was in fact to be legally punished as v 19 states he had to compensate his victim for the injury. Hence, in context the ‘held responsible’ is referring only to being held responsible for murder and is not speaking to the lesser charges of assault. What Ex 21:20-21 says then, is that if a person deliberately kills his or her ebed then that person is to be held responsible for murder and executed. If the slave “gets up after a day or two,” then the person is not to be held responsible for murder because the ebed is his or her “silver.”

This makes sense as a few verses later, in Ex 21:26-27, striking a slave is explicitly prohibited and the legal punishment is for the ebed to go free. In The Old Testament, the penalty for assault was for the assailant to provide monetary compensation to the victim. This would create a quandary in this case as an ebed is in a position of servitude because he or she is in debt to the person he or she works for. In such a case the assailant would owe money to a person who owes him or her money. The Old Testament resolves the issue by declaring that even a trivial strike, such as causing a bruise (v21:25) should result in an immediate cancelation of the ebed’s entire debt, which would often result in a financial loss to the assailant. The New Testament similarly concurs, prohibiting “masters’ from even threatening their “slaves” (Eph 6:9) and to treat their “slaves” the way the “slave” is required to treat them.

Further, unlike new-world slavery which was life long and where, under the Barbados Code, emancipation was effectively prohibited, an ebed could not be held in service for more than six years (Ex 21:2). Upon release, their employer was morally required to give them sufficient resources for them to be set up on their own feet (Deut 15:12-18) and the community left resources for them to live on for a year (Ex 23:10-11, Lev 25:2-7).

These passages are often thought to refer only to Hebrew and hence Jewish slaves. Wright, however, argues that that in its original context the key word ibri designated a social class, not an ethnic group. This was the class of people who did not own land and in an agrarian economy survived by hiring themselves out to land owners.

In fact, in the passage immediately before the verse Armstrong cites the Old Testament forbids any Israelite taking another Israelite as a ebed on the grounds that they are a “ebed of God” whom God has redeemed. Paul applies the same teaching to Christians prohibiting Christians from being sold as ‘slaves’ (1 Cor 7:23). Similarly, the Old Testament commanded people to prevent family members from becoming an ebed by paying their debts for them (Lev 25:48). Further, Paul, after writing to the Corinthians and encouraging them to “retain the place in life that the Lord assigned,” encourages slaves to purchase their freedom and to not remain in this position if it was possible to do so (1 Cor 7:21-22).

Finally, if an ebed fled from an oppressive employer it was illegal to return him or her to “his master.” Instead, he or she was to live “wherever he likes and in whatever town he chooses” (Deut 23:15-16). It was forbidden to send an ebed back to his or her owner; contrast this with the practice in the antebellum south, the Fugitive Slave Act 1850 required the return of run-away slaves at penalty of law.

Contrary to what some contend, the Old Testament does not permit slavery. It is more accurate to say it tolerates indentured servitude under certain situations; the paradigm being where the servitude is voluntary, temporary, is done in exchange for payment of a debt where the alternative is starvation and destitution and only in situations where the servant is given the same basic legal rights as everyone else and is protected from abusive treatment. To suggest this picture fits with the opening quote above is a stretch to say the least.

I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the April 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

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Contra Mundum: The Judgmental Jesus

In chapters 7 through 12, [the book of Joshua] treats us to a chilling chronicle of the 31 kingdoms, and all the cities therein, that fell victim to Joshua’s, and God’s, genocidal policies. Time and again we read the phrases “he utterly destroyed every person who was in it,” “he left no survivor,” and “there was no one left who breathed.”[1]

Similarly, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong cites passages in Joshua with the same point in mind.[2]

The objection that Bradley and Armstrong raise in highlighting these passages is that Christians are committed to an inconsistent set of propositions.

[1] Any act that God commands is morally permissible.
[2] The scriptures are an authoritative revelation of God’s commands.
[3] It is morally impermissible for anyone to commit genocide.
[4] According to the book of Joshua, God commanded Israel to commit genocide.

If we are to rationally affirm both [1] and [2] then we must give up either [3] or [4]. So which one should we reject?

Philip Quinn has developed a way of addressing clashes such as this. He suggests that we can draw on a principle whereby “whenever two conflicting claims differ in epistemic status, the claim with the lower epistemic status is to be rejected.”

[3]Given this approach, if a particular interpretation of any passage conflicts with one of our moral intuitions then we should ask whether or not the case for that interpretation is as convincing as the principle that it clashes with. Now, the principle that genocide is wrong is, I think, a highly plausible one. Therefore, if one is to prefer [3] to [4] then the case for a literal reading must at least be this plausible, and preferably even more plausible. In this series of posts I will argue, perhaps surprisingly to some, that [4] is doubtful. While it is true that taken in isolation and interpreted in a strict literal fashion the book of Joshua does appear to state that God commanded Genocide, I contend that when the text is read in its literary and textual context this conclusion is far from evident and is, in fact, rather questionable.

In the tenth chapter of the book of Joshua we read,

They [Joshua and his troops] took the city, its king and its villages, and put them to the sword. Everyone in it they totally destroyed. They left no survivors. They did to Debir and its king as they had done to Libnah and its king and to Hebron. So Joshua subdued the whole region, including the hill country, the Negev, the western foothills and the mountain slopes, together with all their kings. He left no survivors. He totally destroyed all who breathed, just as the LORD, the God of Israel, had commanded. Joshua subdued them from Kadesh Barnea to Gaza and from the whole region of Goshen to Gibeon. (Joshua 10:39-41)

This text summarises Joshua’s campaign in southern Canaan. The northern campaign is summarised in a similar fashion in the following chapter,

So Joshua took this entire land: the hill country, all the Negev, the whole region of Goshen, the western foothills, the Arabah and the mountains of Israel with their foothills, from Mount Halak, which rises toward Seir, to Baal Gad in the Valley of Lebanon below Mount Hermon. He captured all their kings and struck them down, putting them to death. Joshua waged war against all these kings for a long time. Except for the Hivites living in Gibeon, not one city made a treaty of peace with the Israelites, who took them all in battle. For it was the LORD himself who hardened their hearts to wage war against Israel, so that he might destroy them totally, exterminating them without mercy, as the LORD had commanded Moses. At that time Joshua came and wiped out the Anakim from the hill country, from Hebron, from Debir, from Anab, and from all the hill country of Judah, and from all the hill country of Israel; Joshua utterly destroyed them with their towns. No Anakites were left in Israelite territory; only in Gaza, Gath and Ashdod did any survive. So Joshua took the entire land, just as the LORD had directed Moses, and he gave it as an inheritance to Israel according to their tribal divisions. Then the land had rest from war. (Joshua 11:16-23)

If these passages are taken in a strict literal fashion and read in isolation from the proceeding narrative they record the divinely authorised commission of genocide. Taken literally these passages state three things.

Firstly, that Joshua conquered and subdued the entire regions of southern and northern Canaan. Verse 11:23 states that “Joshua took the entire land” and then “gave it as an inheritance to Israel according to their tribal divisions.” This suggests that the region in question is the same land that is later divided between the Israelite tribes, which was the entire land of Canaan.

Secondly, the passage repeatedly emphasises that Joshua exterminated all the Canaanites in this region. Verse 11:21 states “Joshua came and wiped out the Anakim from the hill country, from Hebron, from Debir, from Anab, and from all the hill country of Judah.” Verse 11:22 states that no Anakites were left living in Israeli territory after this campaign.  Repeatedly it states that Joshua left “no survivors” and “destroyed everything that breathed” in “the entire land.” Alongside these general claims the text goes to identifies several specific places and cities where Joshua exterminated everyone and left no survivors and killed all who breathed. These include Hebron, Debir, the hill country and the Negev.

Thirdly, the text states that God commanded these actions. Verse 23 identifies the commands with those laid down in the Law of Moses, which refers back to passages like Deut 20:16-19 and Deut 7.1-5.

The first thing I want to note is that the text should not be read in isolation from the narrative in which this occurs. This hermeneutical point may seem rather obvious but when it is taken seriously immediate and obvious problems occur with a strictly literal reading of the ‘genocide passages’ I mention above. The most glaringly obvious issue relates to the opening of the book of Judges. In the first chapter of Judges we read of events that occurred after the death of Joshua (and, hence, after the campaigns mentioned in Josh 10 and 11). Here it is explicitly stated that Canaanites are living in the land which had been allotted to various Israeli tribes, the land that Joshua is said to have conquered and “left no survivors” in. Note that this was not a small remnant. They existed in such numbers that each of the tribes of Israel needed to fight in order to dislodge them from the land. Several of the tribes were unable to do so and so Israel failed to dislodge them.

Of particular interest, however, are the several cities and regions mentioned. In the first chapter we are told that the Canaanites lived Gaza (Judg 1:18), the Negev (1:9), in the hill country  (Judg 1:9) in Debir (Judg 1:11), in Hebron (Judg 1:10) and in the the western foothills (Judg 1:9). Moreover, they did so in such numbers and strength that they had to be driven out by force. These are the same cities that Joshua 10 tells us Joshua had annihilated and left no survivors in.  Moreover, the text explicitly states that Anakites are in Hebron, yet Joshua 11:22 tells us that “No Anakites were left in Israelite territory.” This seems rather odd if Joshua had exterminated everyone there and left no survivors. It is also odd given that Joshua is said, in the genocide passages, to have conquered and subdued the entire region.

Moreover, the account of what God commanded also differs in Judges 2:1. Here no mention of genocide or annihilation is made, instead we hear of how God had promised to drive them out and has commanded the Israelites to not to make treaties with them and to destroy their shrines. Taken in a straight-forward literal manner then, Joshua’s actions are at odds with the first two chapters of Judges.

It is not just Judges that this problem occurs in. There are numerous places within the book of Joshua itself where the same picture is presented. As noted, Joshua 11 ends by stating that “the entire land, just as the LORD had directed Moses” was given “as an inheritance to Israel according to their tribal divisions.” When the text turns to giving an account of these tribal divisions it is evident that the Israelites do not actually occupy it, but living, breathing, Canaanites do.

The allotments begin with God telling Joshua, “You are very old, and there are still very large areas of land to be taken over” (Josh 13:1). Moreover, when one examines the allotment given to Judah we see Caleb asking permission to drive the  Anakites (Josh14: 11) from the hill countries and we also hear how Caleb has to defeat Anakites living in Hebron and, after this, marches against the people “living in Debir” (Josh 15:13-19). Similarly it is evident with several of the other allotments that the people have yet to drive Canaanites entrenched in the area and that Israelites were not always successful in doing so.

We read, for example, that Ephraimites and Manassites “did not dislodge the Canaanites living in Gezer; to this day the Canaanites live among the people of Ephraim” (Josh 16:10). Similarly, in Chapter 17 it states “Yet the Manassites were not able to occupy these towns, for the Canaanites were determined to live in that region. However, when the Israelites grew stronger, they subjected the Canaanites to forced labor but did not drive them out completely” (Joshua 17:12-13). We hear that “Danites had difficulty taking possession of their territory, so they went up and attacked Leshem, took it, put it to the sword and occupied it. They settled in Leshem and named it Dan after their forefather” (Joshua 19:47). Here, we see the same land said to be subdued and conquered by Joshua in battles where he exterminated and left alive nothing that breathed. This land is yet to be occupied by the tribes of Israel and is occupied by Canaanites, often heavily armed and deeply entrenched (17:17-18).

Brevard Childs notes the apparent contradiction,

Critical scholars have long since pointed out the tension – usually it is called a contradiction – in the portrayal of the conquest of the land. On the one hand, the conquest is pictured in the main source of Josh. 1-12 as a unified assault against the inhabitants of the land under the leadership of Joshua which succeeded in conquering the entire land. On the other hand, there is a conflicting view of the conquest represented by Judges 1 and its parallels in Joshua which appears to picture the conquest as undertaken by individual tribes, extending over a long period beyond the age of Joshua, and unsuccessful in driving out the Canaanites from much of the land.[4]

More recently Kenneth Kitchen has taken issue with Childs’ picture of Joshua 1-12. He notes that, apart from the passages cited at the beginning of this post, a careful reading of Joshua 1-12 makes it clear that Israel did not actually occupy or conquer the areas mentioned at all. Kitchen notes that after crossing the Jordan the Israelites set up camp in Gilgal “on the east border of Jericho” (Joshua 4:19). He notes that after every battle in the next six chapters the text explicitly states that they returned to Gilgal,

The conflict with Canaanite city-state rulers in the southern part of Canaan is worth close examination. After the battle for Gibeon, we see the Hebrews advancing upon six towns in order, attacking and capturing them, killing their local kings and such inhabitants that had not gotten clear, and moving on, not holding on to those places. Twice over (10:15, 43), it is clearly stated that their strike force returned to base camp at Gilgal.  So there was no sweeping take over and occupation of this region at this point. And no total destruction of the towns attacked.[5]

Kitchen goes on to note,

What happened in the south was repeated up north. Hazor was both leader and famed center for the north Canaanite kinglets. Thus as in the south the Hebrew strike force defeated the opposition; captured their towns, killed rulers and less mobile inhabitants, symbolically burned Hazor and Hazor only[6] to emphasis its end to its local supremacy. Again Israel did not attempt to immediately hold on to Galilee: they remained based at Gilgal (14:6).[7]

Kitchen notes that the first “real indication of a move in occupation beyond Gilgal comes in 18:4.” This is after the first allotment of “lands to be occupied are made” and as we saw above the Israelites did not find occupying these allotments easy. He concludes, “these campaigns were essentially disabling raids: they were not territorial conquests with instant Hebrew occupation. The text is very clear about this.”[8]

So a straight-forward, literal, reading of the passages cited at the beginning of this post does not cohere with the rest of the narrative. The best account I have come across for explaining this apparent contradiction between a literal reading of the “genocide passages” and the rest of Joshua and Judges is one recently defended by Nicholas Wolterstorff.[9] Wolterstorff suggests that the phrases such as, “Everyone in it they totally destroyed,” “They left no survivors,” etc are not intended to be read literally but function as hyperboles. The analogy he gives is of a high school student who, after a baseball game states, “we totally slaughtered the opposition, we annihilated them just as coach told us to.”[10]

Plantinga suggests a similar line as a possibility. That phrases such as, “put to death men women infants and cattle” are to be understood more like a person who in the context of a boxing match states, “knock his block off, hand him his head” or  in a football or baseball game where it is stated that the team should “kill the opposition” or that “we totally slaughtered them.”[11] Understood in a non-literal sense the phrases probably meant “something like, attack them, defeat them, drive them out; not literally kill every man, woman, child donkey and the like.”[12] Wolterstorff elaborates,

When a high-school basket ball player says his team slaughtered the other team last night he’s not asserting, literally now, that they slaughter the other team. What is he asserting? Not easy to tell. That they scored a decisive victory? Maybe, but suppose they barely eked out a win? Was he lying? Maybe not. Maybe he was speaking with a wink of the eye hyperbole. High school kids do.[13]

In the same way,

To say Joshua struck down all the inhabitants with the edge of the sword is a way of saying something like Israel scored a decisive victory and once you recognise the presence of hyperbole it is not even clear how decisive the victories were. Joshua did not conquer all the cities in the land nor did he slaughter all the inhabitants in the cities he did conquer. The book of Joshua does not say that he did.[14]

In my next Sunday Study, Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part II,  I will attempt to defend Wolterstorff’s position.

[1] Raymond Bradley “A moral Argument for Atheism” Presented at the University of Western Washington, May 27, 1999, and–in a revised form–at the University of Auckland, September 29, 1999.
[2] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 110.
[3] Philip Quinn “Religion and Politics” in ed William Mann The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 316.
[4] Brevard Childs An Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Fortress Press Philadelphia: 1979) 247.
[5] Kenneth Kitchen On the Reliability of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003) 162.
[6] See Joshua 11:13 “But Israel burned none of the towns that stood on mounds except Hazor, which Joshua did burn.”
[7] Kitchen, above n 5.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Nicholas Wolterstorff “Reading Joshua” a paper presented to “My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible” Conference at the centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame, Saturday 12 September 2009
[10] Ibid.
[11] Alvin Plantinga “Comments on Evan Fales’ Satanic Versus: Moral Chaos in Holy Writ” a paper presented to “My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible” Conference at the centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame, Friday 11 September 2009.
[12] Ibid – stated by Plantinga in the Q&A session.
[13] Nicholas Wolterstorff “Response to Louise Anthony” a paper presented to “My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible” Conference at the centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame. Saturday 12 September 2009.
[14] Wolterstorff, above n 9.

RELATED POSTS:
Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part II

Now I did not do this, and for good reason. It is generally not a good look for a doctoral student to go around insulting other students simply because they said things about my religion that I disagreed with – people would justifiably be outraged at me and denounce me as bigoted. But, isn’t this the point?

I recalled this event this morning as I heard that the controversial Christmas billboard, put up by St Matthews in the City, has been taken down. For those outside of Auckland, St Matthews in the City is an Anglican congregation that propounds, what they like to call, “progressive Christianity.” They recently put up a billboard showing Mary and Joseph in bed, not looking too happy, with the line “poor Joseph, God was a tough act to follow.” The billboard implies quite clearly that God not only literally had sex with Mary, was a fantastic orgasmic lover but it also, by implication, entails that God committed adultery, and so did Mary.

I am glad the billboard is down (though I will not endorse the  reported method) for the obvious reason that it is insulting to other people and, prima facie, it is wrong to insult other people. Of course, there can be situations, such as where a person does something wrong, that the appropriate response is to insult them but absent such situations, charity dictates that we refrain from doing so. Millions of people world-wide worship God and millions of Roman Catholic venerate Mary, this billboard affirmed that persons they love and adore are adulterers.

Of course some are saying that this is just a joke and we Christians should get a sense of humour. I always find this response disingenuous. Suppose I, for a joke, put a picture of the vicar of St Matthews, Glyn Cardy and his wife, outside my Church, made both of them look not so happy, and added the phrase “Glyn Cardy is as soft and floppy as his theology,” right there, in public – outside my church let’s not forget - for all to see. Would the response, ‘oh come on it’s only a joke, get a sense of humour,’ wash with anyone? I doubt it. If I were a gambler I would bet we would hear another of Cardy’s little sermons about how this is proof of the narrow-minded intolerance that non-progressive Christians like me expound. But then wouldn’t it be evident that neither Cardy nor anyone else believes that humor justifies making insulting personal comments of this nature?

Of course in many ways this whole event shows up the intellectual shallowness that so called “progressive Christians” show towards others. Take Cardy’s justification for the billboard according to Stuff, Cardy states,

St Matthew’s church says the aim is to provoke conversation about spiritual matters by lampooning the literal Christian conception story and inviting people to think again about what a miracle is … He said the idea behind the billboard was to move a debate that was inside the church to outside it ”and certainly people in all sorts of places are talking about it”. He didn’t doubt that some people had been offended by the billboard, but ”the literalness of a male God impregnating Mary needs to be laughed at”.

Note two things here, first Cardy clearly caricatures the “literal conception story” yet mainstream Christendom, who believes this story, do not hold that God is literally a man and that he had sex with Mary. God in traditional theology is immaterial, he has no sex organs and the story of a virginal conception is just that, a virginal conception. Cardy, of course, being theologically trained, knows this. Second, Cardy on calling for “debate” means that people who hold orthodox Christian views “needs to be laughed at.” So Cardy’s understanding of theological debate apparently involves deliberately distorting and caricaturing the views of other people and then responding, not with reasoned argument, but ridicule.

I might be a bit too conservative and old fashioned but in my book theological argument involves trying to understand another’s position by trying to grasp the best representative examples of it so one can articulate it accurately and then offer sound arguments or reasons for rejecting it or for showing where and why it is flawed. It also involves treating ones interlocutors with respect. Of course I do not always live up to this ideal but it is one that I think Theologians should aspire to.

The fact that Cardy and St Matthews thinks otherwise tells us a bit about them and their “progressive Christianity.” People who think it is ok to ridicule and insult people simply because they hold a different religious perspective to them, who will dishonestly distort other’s views and responds to being challenged on this, not by reason, but by self-confident ridicule is not “progressive” and no amount of relabeling it will change this fact.

What: STAANZ Conference on Eschatology and Pneumatology
When: Thursday 19 November – Friday 20 November 9:00am-5:30 pm
Where: Ponsonby Baptist Church, 43 Jervois Rd, Auckland
Cost: $15

Pre-conference prayer will be held at 8:00am at All Saints in Ponsonby, 284 Ponsonby Rd, Auckland.
Dinner at a local restaurant will be organised for the Thursday night.

Speakers are as follows: [UPDATED]

Thursday
“Holy Spirit in the theology of Walter Kasper” – Hugh Bowron
“Backgrounding Walter Kasper’s Early Thought”- John Dunn
“Wandering between two worlds: 19th Century Reflections on Hope and Hell” – Carolyn Kelly
“Conscious Awareness of the Spirit in Symeon the New Theologian” – Jim McInnes
“Searching for Embers” – Susan Adams & John Salmon

Friday
“Abortion, Harm and Eschatology” – Matthew Flannagan
“Infant Salvation: Is God’s Mercy Enough?” – Myk Habets
“Participatory Glory : The Eschatological Direction of Karl Barth’s Theology of the Cross”— Rosalene Bradbury
“The Spirit and Longing” – Judith Brown
“Filioque, Personhood and Ecclesiology” – Scott Kirkland

The abstract for Matt’s topic “Abortion, Harm and Eschatology” is as follows:

In No Harm No Foul: Abortion and the Implications of Fetal Innocence Kenneth Einar Himma offers what I shall call ‘the eschatological argument for abortion rights.’ Himma argues that because a fetus lacks the mental capacity to be culpable for any sin, a plausible Christian eschatology entails that a person who kills a fetus does not actually harm the fetus. Instead feticide benefits the fetus by sending the person killed straight to the afterlife, thus avoiding the possibility of any risk of future sin and consequent damnation. Given abortion does not harm the fetus, and as one should only legally proscribe harmful actions, it follows that abortion should be considered a woman’s right. In this paper I will criticise the eschatological argument for abortion, arguing it has absurd implications that entail infanticide and killing the disabled. Further, that even if one grants the eschatological assumptions implicit in Himma’s critique, abortion does, in fact, harm the fetus.

Whilst Matt’s paper will find its way onto this blog, it is always nicer to hear it delivered in person so if you are free Friday morning he will be delivering it from 9:00-10:00 am.

The theme of the conference, as outlined on Notre Dame’s webpage,  is as follows;

Adherents of the Abrahamic religious traditions contend that human beings are made in the image of God and that modeling the character of God in one’s life represents the pinnacle of human flourishing and moral perfection. Defenders of this tradition commonly point to passages in the canonical texts of the Jewish and Christian faiths that portray God as loving, merciful, patient, etc. in support of such a position. Since the seventeenth century, however, numerous critics of these Abrahamic traditions have argued that God, especially in the Hebrew Bible, is often portrayed as anything but a moral role model.

On the one hand, historical narratives in these texts describe God apparently committing, ordering, or commending genocide, slavery, and rape among other moral atrocities. On the other hand, a number of commands purportedly issued by God seem to commend bigotry, misogyny, and homophobia. In recent days, similar criticisms of the Abrahamic traditions have been raised by philosophers (Daniel Dennett), scientists (Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris), social commentators (Christopher Hitchens), and others.

Are these apparent commendations and commands of the Hebrew Bible consistent with the claim that the Abrahamic God is perfectly good and loving? Those defending this tradition have two avenues of response open to them. The first response would be to argue that the aforementioned troubling narratives or commands should simply be rejected. Those taking this approach would have to explain how they think such passages could be rejected without placing in peril the Abrahamic religions, which have traditionally claimed that the Hebrew Bible is, represents, or contains the inspired word of God. The second response would offer explanations aiming to show that the apparently untoward consequences can be avoided without rejecting the narratives or commands. Those taking this approach must explain either why the untoward consequences do not follow, or why they are not, in the end untoward.

However, while defenders of this tradition have both routes available to them, few of these defenders seem to have taken the challenge to heart. Despite these recent, forthright criticisms, only a handful of theologians or philosophers in these traditions have sought to respond to the criticisms.

The present conference aims to remedy this deficiency, taking as its focus the charge that the Abrahamic tradition should be rejected because of its foundation in the Hebrew Bible, which portrays God as immoral and vicious.  The presenters and commentators include philosophers—both theistic and nontheistic—as well as Biblical scholars.

For those who are interested, Michael Rea from Notre Dame has put the entire conference online (including the Q & A).

Enjoy :-)

There are a range of Christian theories on the moral acceptability of lying.

The issues around lying seem difficult to fully categorise in English. The problem is a lack of simple words to express subtle differences in meaning. To illustrate this note that the concept of lying can be considered analogous to killing. With killing we have sub-terms such as murder, manslaughter, and capital punishment. We also recognise killing in a variety of situations such as warfare and self-defence. The debate about the morality of types of killing is more transparent because we agree on meaning, even if we disagree or the moral acceptability of them.

Whereas “lying” merely means distorting the truth irrespective of the circumstances. There are terms such as deception, falsification, untruthfulness, but these are basically synonymous. There are situational terms though, such as perjury.

So is falsehood a single conceptual category? I have long thought it meaningful that the 9th commandment is not, “You shall not lie,” but rather, “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour.” I have previously distinguished between reality and what one perceives as reality stating that affirming a false belief is not lying. I have also made the distinction between voluntary and forced disclosure of information which I wish to expand on here.

The moral debate is that either:

• lying (or specific types or lying) is objectively wrong, that is, various forms of absolutism; or
• lying is not intrinsically wrong (for all people), (though it may be preferable to avoid in certain situations for other reasons), that is, forms of subjectivism.

Christianity claims that morality has its source in the moral law giver, thus it views the morality of truth telling as objective: the same rules for all people at all times. Here are particular forms of such absolutism.

1. Unqualified Absolutism

Lying is always wrong. People should never lie ever. No matter what the situation or consequences.

Doug Beaumont explains such unqualified absolutism.

Unqualified Absolutism is based on the idea that most moral actions are intrinsically right or wrong, and because sin is always avoidable there can be no actual moral conflict. Given a choice between telling the truth or lying to avoid a murder, for example, one must choose telling the truth for in that instance it is not the one speaking, but the murderer who is sinning. In that case it is better to permit sin than to commit it. This view states that moral “oughts” are viable regardless of their consequences, for any moral philosophy that has exceptions results in relativism. Moral law is based on God’s unchanging nature, therefore moral law itself is unchanging. Logically, if an act is intrinsically evil, it cannot become good because of a changing situation. Finally, God can always provide a third alternative to sinful actions.

This is how many people view lying. It is a somewhat reasonable but it lacks depth. Exceptions to rules don’t intrinsically mean relativism. True, exceptions can be special pleading or hypocrisy, but they may be legitimate (eg. age based rules). And as I note below, unqualified absolutism may conflate intrinsically different actions.

2. Conflicting Absolutism

Lying is wrong, but it needs to be considered within the situation. If lying conflicts with another moral commandment then one must do obey the higher moral. But lying, while required, is still sinful.

Such a position acknowledges that we have moral conflict (at least in this age). I think this is an improvement as it notes that as bad as lying may be, it may not be the greatest evil (though lying is a bigger evil than many acknowledge). This position encourages people to do good and love their neighbour.

It fails in that it suggests at times all options a man may have involve sin. However if we wish to do right, Scripture suggests we are able to do so (thru God). Further, how much less are we to blame when others have placed us in a dilemma, rather than our own prior choices.

3. Graded Absolutism

Lying is wrong unless it conflicts with a higher moral commandment. Obeying the higher moral by lying is not wrong or sinful.

This resolves the dilemma or not being able to make a right choice. It affirms moral conflict, but it claims that the choice to do the better is good. And not sinful if a greater good is being done. There may be some support from Jesus’ words to the Pharisees. It discussing tithing garden herbs Jesus states

“But woe to you Pharisees! For you tithe mint and rue and every herb, and neglect justice and the love of God. These you ought to have done, without neglecting the others.”

While one could claim that tithing herbs and doing justice are morally equal—Jesus does say not to neglect the former—the context would suggest that doing justice is a higher moral command. Apologists for unqualified absolutism could argue Jesus commands they do both, but there is no conflict between moral obligations set up here, so unqualified absolutism cannot be proven from the passage. I am merely illustrating that moral commands are graded.

It is important to note that this is not arguing that the end justifies the means. Yes, the end is considered, but for the sake of doing good, not for preferred result. Doing good may have unpleasant consequences.

4. Libertarian Absolutism

Lying is wrong if one is voluntarily giving information. One need not tell the truth if one is being compelled to divulge information. I am responsible for my actions, not yours.

This has the advantage over graded absolutism in that it recognises that voluntary information and compelled information are categorically different. It is somewhat analogous to saying that predatory killing is sinful but self-defensive killing is not.

Interestingly Jesus’ words may shed some light on our understanding here.

After this Jesus went about in Galilee. He would not go about in Judea, because the Jews were seeking to kill him. Now the Jews’ Feast of Booths was at hand. So his brothers said to him, “Leave here and go to Judea, that your disciples also may see the works you are doing. For no one works in secret if he seeks to be known openly. If you do these things, show yourself to the world.” For not even his brothers believed in him. Jesus said to them, “My time has not yet come, but your time is always here. The world cannot hate you, but it hates me because I testify about it that its works are evil. You go up to the feast. I am not going up to this feast, for my time has not yet fully come.” After saying this, he remained in Galilee.

But after his brothers had gone up to the feast, then he also went up, not publicly but in private. The Jews were looking for him at the feast, and saying, “Where is he?” And there was much muttering about him among the people. While some said, “He is a good man,” others said, “No, he is leading the people astray.” Yet for fear of the Jews no one spoke openly of him.

About the middle of the feast Jesus went up into the temple and began teaching. (John 7, emphasis added)

Jesus said he wasn’t going but then he did. This implies that Jesus’ answer was not true. In fact some manuscripts say, “I am not yet going up to this feast.” Which would seem to make Jesus’ answer more honest. Looking at the passage it is clear Jesus wished to go without others initially knowing he was there. He is asked if he is going, however Jesus does not wish to tell this person. Being evasive may be construed as a yes. Jesus says that he is not going to this feast. Within the libertarian absolutism view a request is made of Jesus to divulge information he does not wish to give and he is at liberty to answer in a way that does not divulge same information.

This position is distinct from graded absolutism in that one is not weighing up morality in conflict. The distinction is in will for informing.

Although one could think nothing one hears in conversation is reliable, the solution is listen to what people wish to tell you.

5. Authoritative Absolutism

Non aggressive version

• Lying is wrong in non-aggressive situations. Self-defence against an aggressor allows for lying. Authorities are owed the truth.

Libertarian version

• One need not tell the truth if one is being compelled to divulge information unless being compelled by a legitimate authority.

Authoritative absolutism states the voluntary information must be true as per libertarian absolutism, or that all information must be true unless facing an aggressor. It states that, in general, compelled information does not need to be true though there can be variation on what is meant by compulsion.

But this position does allow an appropriate authority to force information (whereas strict libertarian absolutism would not). A person following libertarian absolutism would allow one to lie in court if he did not wish to divulge the truth. Non-aggressive absolutism would mean that it is eumoral (morally good) to tell the truth in legitimate courts and immoral to withhold it. Note the caveat: obeying a lesser authority is not required if that means disobeying a higher one. Obeying a policeman, a ruler, or a court is necessary even unjust ones, or in unpleasant circumstances; unless doing so compromises a higher earthly ruler or God.

Conclusion

People may argue for the legitimacy of any of these options within Christian theology. Unless one recognises that the concept of lying may include more than one category, graded absolutism is as far as one can advance and this seems to be the best approach. However the knowledge of a permissible sub-categorisation based on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary knowledge sharing allows for more nuanced views.

Having a Beer… for the Glory of God!

What?… I did put it in the singular… “a beer,”… lest we also forget 1 Cor. 10:31, unless you are planning other excursions for the liquid refreshment?!

No, I don’t believe that this will be a candidate for the next issue in the Tui billboards dotting themselves over various parts of the Islands of NZ [for all you unfortunate individuals who are not so domiciled, these are somewhat tongue-in-cheek, culturally relevant statements, attached to the phrase "Yeah Right."].

… and No, I haven’t had one, let alone a few, quiet ones, before I sat my repository of blogging thoughts down before my little friend, the computer… I can talk to it for days and it will listen to every word, unlike some other people I know… Yes, I am referring to my fixer.

I am Jonny King is not a big fan of the amber ale as a drink of choice.  Maybe, it is an acquired taste, but surely such shows that I have probably not inculcated myself to such a reality.  Or, maybe, I need to pay for the privilege.  Therefore, whatever you think of my liquidity, I am not pushing my barrow in the pursuit of guilt-free cravings.

I, in fact, prefer something even darker… Now, there’s no need to be racial I am Jonny King, but what grabs me and torments my taste buds is not some sort of hedonistic home-brew!  Unfortunately, to burst the burgeoning bubble, I must affirm that Pepsi is my thirst quencher.  Yes, the sugary delights of caffeinated-to-carbonated Kool-aid… what more could a white boy want?

Nevertheless, the present fomenting could surely set the Tea-totallar straight to the pantry for another lump or three from the sugar refinery.  I realise that such a header could be bringing more heat than light to one’s present disposition, but let me invoke some authorial imagery and thump the pulpit, with the exclamation that I am indeed thinking in this pursuit… well, at least I think I am!

Let me digress a little and lead you along a little more, O naive follower, and let you listen a little, as you read out loud to all your workmates… slacker!

I am the son of an individual [no way, fancy that, such explains everything] who was a Pastor for the majority of my years [until recently] in the Salavation [no typo] Army, where drinking anything alcoholic was about as popular as a smacking parent at one of “surely we can now Sue” Bradfords greeny-get-togethers, where such would be cause to bring in the sliding scale to question one’s spirituality.

A woman in close relative proximity to Jonny King am I was so keenly committed to keeping her palate pure on one occasion many years back, when she found out that a cake she was presently enjoying had ingredients of the liquor variety, [although, as any old pro will tell you, such would have had its goose cooked... out], she responded to such information by disposing of the aforementioned contraband… perish the thought.  We have attempted to begin redemptive remedial action, by using such beverages in subsequent cook-offs.  I can confirm, she is making progress!

Therefore, the obscure point that I was covertly moving toward is this.

I understand the culture of abstinence, and I have no problem with an individuals personal pursuit, per see.  As a recovering Salvo [this is humour... giggle people], I am also aware of the damage that excessive and out of control amounts of “drink” can have on an individual, familial, and societal level, with such a reality, enough to cause the conscientious thinker to wonder if a certain coloured drink that goes through a given process is really worth the effort!

I am also aware that what I am trying to affirm can be misconstrued… after all, who would prostitute themselves to the point of postulating such prose… for the love of alliterated peas [it's that Green party again]!

However, I am wanting to do something quite novel in this area, do my best to think God’s thoughts after Him.  I know, in an area like this, it may seem to lead to an abolition of hope, but such a situation, “I object,” only affirms our religious condition, which is this… As each subsequent era of rabbinic school would subsequently build upon [e.g. Sophrim, Tana'im], the wanting-to-be-orthodox Jew who built a somewhat impressive fence [from a voluminous perspective] around the law of Moses, with the Oral Law [that they will claim was given by God to Moishe at Sinai], which in kind, we Christians have and are also presently doing a pretty good job ourselves in erecting our own fence around the law of Christ with the addition of various restrictions that don’t meet our cultural standards, with such a rambling reminiscent of such reality!

Maybe you are presuppositionally presupposing that drinking alcohol is fodder for the wrath of any number of authorial figures, but let me state what is generally accepted by many… the consumption of alcohol per see is not sinful… or should I say unbiblical… in the right and God-honouring quantities one should note.

In fact, while I like the good graces of grape juice [with the bubbles I will have you know], “red” preferably, which I do affirm tastes rather good on a good occasion, it does not seem to have the desired effect on gladdening the heart [Psalm 104:15], which makes sense as wine, if my fading memory serves me correctly, is a biblical symbol for “joy”… Smile Sinner!  [Hold the Phones, Stop the Pressing Sinner... I have just looked at my ESV Study Bible Notes {Every Bible Study must have the Study Bible contributor who is more than ready to share their notes} which says in connection with John 2:3 that an OT background that viewed wine {but never drunkenness} as a sign of joy and God's blessing {Psalm 104:15; Prov. 3:10; cf. Matt. 26:29}... so there you go].

When Jesus turned water into [John 2:1-12]… well, what did He turn it into?… Yes, the English text says wine, but who can trust scholars who are reading and interpreting the original languages, who have also committed themselves to this pursuit?  After all, everyone knows that it is the KJV that is the inspired version!  Such tomfoolery from I am Jonny King could lead one to perceive that I have an intoxication of the most absurd kind.

Nevertheless, there are those who will tell you that it was not wine, but grape juice… trust them. Inconveniently, there are two words in both the Hebrew and Greek that differentiate between the two.  Yes, I am also aware that such “wining” was probably more watered down, but when we are exhorted not to be drunk with… wine, but to be filled with the Spirit [Eph. 5:18], the presupposition should be clear for all to taste!… and when Timothy was encouraged to have a little wine for his stomach [1 Tim. 5:23], I am thinking it was a little more than “Just Juice!”

I am also aware that gluttony is a sin, and it is not phat to be… well, you get the burgeoning idea.  However, I am not thinking it spiritually prudent to abstain from calorising my interiors, and play make me a super model.

Such is often the case with much philosophic reflecting by Christians, as their thinking is often framed in the context of worst case scenarios where such individuals decide to get drunk with wine, instead of being filled with the Spirit [Eph. 5:18 again, which is clearly wrong].  However, such is no more reason to refrain from alcohol as an absolute rule, then it would be to refuse to eat food because individuals can not be “Spirit-filled” in such an area as filling their face, and there are too numerous examples in our culture… church, that is, where people are completing church growth in all the wrong areas… taking the body analogy totally out of context!

Such a situation also fails to integrate the Spirit’s job of maturing the child of God in all areas of life [Phil. 1:6], which means that such a reality gets circumvented when personal conviction gets substituted for legalism that is not a sign of maturity, but the very antithesis of it!

Lest I become a hoarse… Nay… I am not trying to be overtly flippant or culturally relevant at the expense of being biblically concise, in what I am thinking, or in what I will propose… but merely biblical in theory and so in practice, which is why, even though drinking alcoholic beverages is not biblically negated directly out of hand, there is the example of the weaker, more susceptible follower of Christ who might be lead down out of the Garden by the pathway of your decision, and if such could be the case, your love for the individual Christologically compels one to set aside our freedom in this pursuit for their Godly good [Romans 14:1-23], as love for God as exercised through your fellow follower Donald Trumps such freedoms.

Remember what they said about Jesus [Luke 7:34]… whom did He eat and drink with?  Yet, read verse Luke 7:35!  Now while one could claim that all that affirms is that Jesus spent time in those places in the mission, let me also say, as an side, Christians in removing themselves from the culture that Beer often represents, have also decided that such places are not a-ok for the believer, unless it is asking for cash for clunkers [now who could that be?]!

Let us spend a few more moments together, as what was formally was foundational to what will follow, as it is my conviction that the Christian exodus from the culture of “drink” is both harmful for our Gospel, and signals a detour for the message that we need to desperately communicate!

The situations where the culture of “drink” will impact on the believer are numerous, from work, to play [rugby], to the pub, our culture, and cultures worldwide, are “intoxicated” with its impact.

How do we Christians respond in such contexts and on such occasions?

More than likely, many of us will view such an as opportunity to return to our bunker and ride out the storm, which only affirms that we fail to follow the example of Christ, and fail to really think through our theory to practice.  Such does not mean that every opportunity that arises in such a context is wisdom from above for the believer, but it does affirm that on too numerous occasions we have not redeemed such an opportunity for the glory of God, by putting ourselves in the midst of the culture, showing how Christ makes a difference in that time and in that place.  We have, in effect, thrown our hands in the air and allowed a significant opportunity and cultural group to be devoid of a gospel witness, at a time when they may be most open to our forthcoming.

The result being that nowadays, Christians struggle to connect with a society that views alcohol as a significant part of relaxing and enjoying times of social and un-social activity.

Surely there is a better way!

Yes, there will be examples where such contexts are not appropriate because of age and/or maturity, but if such is not the case, how has one responded when the occasion has arisen?  After all, I am not suggesting you to become a Keg for Christ!

These are the places we need to be… a city on a hill, showing and affirming that such is only a drink to quench a thirst, not a culture to fit one’s life into, not a drug to control ones life, and like Jesus, we are sent!

Are we waiting for them to come?

Not only have we removed our witness from such contexts, in doing so, we have sent a confusing message of the Gospel to a world that is ignorant at the best of times! The general cultural perception is that Christians do not drink alcohol, and while I am not encouraging you the reader to do anything stupid in this area [as getting drunk is WRONG, and obeying the laws of the land is mandatory minor], I do believe that in removing ourselves from the culture that this past-time has in NZ, we have done damage to the witness of the Gospel that could be so potent in such contexts, and consequently, we have unintentionally put a fence around the Gospel that has sent a confusing message that salvation is about our works, not His work.

God, in Christ, has called us to be in the World, but not controlled by this world system.  In speaking out against excessive drinking [which is a good], I am wondering-thinking if we have unintentionally, by our practice [in removing ourselves, and so not speaking from the group with more credibility, which leads to understanding], encouraged the perception that drinking alcohol is one of the church-named “sins’ that one can not complete to be accepted into the group, thereby saying that those who practice such things are unacceptable, which means we have in-effect, presented to the public a confusing and inconsistent Gospel message [Read the words of Martyn Lloyd-Jones in this post].

Such can be illuminated by the following question, If there is not something wrong in such contexts [as a general rule], why is it so devoid of a Gospel witness?

Such a reality clouds the pure unadulterated Gospel message in an area where there is a good deal of freedom in Christ, according to the Words of the living God. The result is that Christians are perceived to be rules keeper, and while this is true from our perspective, as we are saved to good works, not by good works, the general Publican does not grasp such distinctions, and views Christians as those who don’t do this and don’t do that [which is true, but not as they perceive], instead of like-sinners saved by the love and grace of God, through the life, death, and resurrection of the Son of Man [I Cor. 15:3-4]… Now it is also true that many will not grasp such reality as the outworking of 1 Cor. 1:21 affirms, but this is no excuse for our adding to their ignorance.

I am becoming more convinced that we need to re-balance the scales on such a reality, and re-enter the domains of the drinker [not to ask for donations... trust me, they don't need it], showing to a lost world that Christians can drink [even if it will be Pepsi], responsibly and with full reality, as we really are the “lucky ones,” who have been given the cake and can eat it, in the power of the Holy Spirit, as we are a true HSV [Holy Spirit Vehicle] .

We are the ones, in the power of the Holy Spirit, who can speak to those, in their cultural context, on their terms, about the One whose love leading to joy lasts longer than a one night crawl, thereby removing the beer glasses from their vision, so that they see the Gospel for all that it is in its beauty, simplicity and grace that will truly radicalize ones existence.

Therefore, dear reader, think through what I am Jonny King is saying… Chew and Spit!… If such is not the biblical witness of the Spirit, through faith, you must act accordingly [Rom. 14:23].

However, for the love of the lost, I think it is at least time that we thought better how to connect with a culture that feels comfortable with a beer in hand, that feels free in the local, and that wants to have a quiet one in “their” quiet time, as we should be wanting to passionately pursue people to passionately pursue Christ.

If our past will be our future, we will have some “dry” days in our spiritual future in answering such a challenge!

If one is willing to follow Christ to the ends of the earth, around the corner is really not a world away that many in our churches perceive that it is!

It is time to engage!

Until Next Time

I am Jonny King (guest posting on MandM)

Here the victim of rape is as treated the property of the father. Since the rapist has despoiled the father’s property he must pay a bridal fee. The woman apparently has no say in the matter and is forced to marry the person who raped her. Notice also if they are not discovered, no negative judgment is forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if you rape an unbetrothed virgin, be sure not to get caught.[1]

In the post I noted that the word translated rape is tapas which simply means “to grab” or “hold;” the term itself is neutral as to whether this involves force. It can be used in a context where it is clear that force is involved but it also can be used in a context where no force is involved. All the text states then is that a virgin is grabbed by a man. I went on to argue that the context provided reasons for thinking that what was envisaged was actually a seduction.

In discussing this I noted that a few verses prior to this one the text does envisage a rape. In the immediately preceding passage in Deuteronomy 22:23-27, the word chazak is used instead of tapas in reference to a bethrothed woman who screamed for help when a man attempted to have sex with her; chazak suggests a violent seizure.

In regards to this text, Martin contends that “when rape is condemned in the Old Testament the woman’s rights and her psychological welfare are ignored.”[2] Martin argues

In the case of the rape of a betrothed virgin in a city, the Bible says that both the rapist and victim should be stoned to death: the rapist because he violated his neighbor’s wife and the victim because she did not cry for help (Deut. 22: 23-25). Again the assumption is that the rapist despoiled the property of another man and so must pay with his life. Concern for the welfare of the victim does not seem to matter. Moreover, it is assumed that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would be heard and rescued. Both of these assumptions are very dubious and sensitive to the contextual aspects of rape.

On the other hand, according to the Bible, the situation is completely different if the rape occurs in “open country.” Here the rapist should be killed, not the victim. The reason given is that if a woman cried for help in open country, she would not be heard. Consequently, she could not be blamed for allowing the rape to occur. No mention is made about the psychological harm to victim. No condemnation is made of a rapist in open country, let alone in a city, who does not get caught.[3]

There are several points packed in here. First Martin contends that these passages teach that rape is an offence against a man’s property and do not condemn it out of concern for the woman’s welfare. Second, Martin suggests that the text does not condemn rapists who do not get caught. Third and perhaps most significantly, Martin suggests that the passage makes “dubious” assumptions about rape; it assumes, for example, “that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would be heard and rescued.” [Emphasis added] Martin states that this is something that fails to be sensitive to contextual factors of rape.

This last point in particular is often emphasised by sceptics. To take a common example, suppose a rapist puts a knife to a woman’s throat and commands her not to scream. If this happens in the city she will not cry out and the passage, so the sceptics allege, will hold the woman unjustly responsible for her own rape.

I think each of these points are mistaken.

Turning to the first point, Martin contends that the passage teaches that rape is merely a property offence against the husband and is not concerned with the welfare of the woman. To asses the claim it is worth looking at the passage he refers to,

If a man happens to meet in a town a virgin pledged to be married and he sleeps with her,24  you shall take both of them to the gate of that town and stone them to death–the girl because she was in a town and did not scream for help, and the man because he violated another man’s wife. You must purge the evil from among you.25  But if out in the country a man happens to meet a girl pledged to be married and rapes her, only the man who has done this shall die.26  Do nothing to the girl; she has committed no sin deserving death. This case is like that of someone who attacks and murders his neighbour, for the man found the girl out in the country, and though the betrothed girl screamed, there was no one to rescue her. (Deuteronomy 22:24-27 NIV)

Two points need to be noted here. First, the text states that people who rape should be executed (I have argued that capital sanctions like this were not always intended to be taken literally in Capital Punishment in the Old Testament). Martin suggests that the fact that adultery is a capital crime means that this is merely a property offence. He states the “assumption is that the rapist despoiled the property of another man and so must pay with this life.” Actually the converse is true; Christopher Wright notes this point,

The fact that the legal penalty for the wife who commits adultery is execution weighs strongly against the idea that wives in OT Israel are legally no more than the property of their husbands. If adultery is merely an offence against another man’s “property” why destroy the property as well as punishing the guilty man? Furthermore, it would be quite exceptional, in as much as no other property offence in the OT is punishable by death.[4]

The second point to note is that Martin’s contention seems to be explicitly contradicted by the text in v 26. In this passage it states that rape is, “This case is like that of someone who attacks and murders his neighbour.” The text compares rape to a violent assault, a murder, not theft.

Martin’s second point fares no better. Martin seems to argue that the text ignores the “woman’s rights and her psychological welfare” because “no condemnation is made of a rapist in open country, let alone in a city, who does not get caught.” It is hard, however, to see the force of this; all legal codes will only punish people who commit crimes once they are caught. Current New Zealand law on rape, for example, does not punish or condemn people who are not caught, tried and proven guilty of rape. No one thinks that this practice of observing due process is contrary to the rights of rape victims and correctly so, the fact that a woman is the victim of a heinous crime does not automatically cancel out the due process rights of anyone accused of a crime. The same is true here, the law punishes only those caught; if a person has not been caught committing a crime then the state does not know who committed the crime. To call the failure to punish the perpetrator of an unsolved crime a violation of a woman’s rights is hard to take seriously.

Moreover even if one were to take this line of argument seriously, it proves too much. In Deuteronomy, for example, The Torah refers to a situation where a man has been murdered and the authorities, after careful investigation, cannot determine who committed the crime. The result is that the unknown perpetrator is not punished. Are we to infer from this that The Torah victimises men and treats them as property and expresses a sexist anti-male sentiment?

This brings us to the final and perhaps most significant point. Martin notes that the law assumes “that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would be heard and rescued. Both of these assumptions are very dubious and sensitive to the contextual aspects of rape.” A rhetorical question will more vividly express this point; what if a women could not cry out, what if the rapist in a city put a knife to a woman’s throat and ordered her not to scream, what if a woman was set upon suddenly and was unable to scream? In these situations the rape occurs in a city and the woman does not scream for help. The above law then seems to teach that she is should be treated as guilty of a serious crime. If this is the case then surely this is insensitive to the rape victim? To have a law that condemns a woman in this situation is to have a law that ignores the specifics of the situation; it, in Martin’s words, ignores the “contextual aspects of rape.”

I am inclined to agree that if the law condemned a woman in these kinds of contexts it would indeed be unjust. The question needs to be asked, however, is does it? Is it plausible to assume that the law is intended to be applied in such a rigid, a-contextual, fashion?  I think the answer is no.

Deuteronomy is an Ancient Near Eastern Legal text; it therefore is part of a literary genre from that period of time. We are aware of other texts from the same genre such as the ancient Hittite Laws, Middle Assyrian Laws and Code of Hammurabi, and its important to note that legal codes written in this Genre differ significantly from modern legal codes.  Hiller notes,

[T]here is no evidence that any collection of Near Eastern laws functioned as a written code that was applied by a strict method of exegesis to individual cases. As far as we can tell, these bodies of laws served educational purposes and gave expression to what was regarded as just in typical cases, but they left considerable latitude to local courts for determining the right in individual suits. They aided local courts without controlling them.[5]

The same point is made by Raymond Westbrook in his comparative study of Ancient Near Eastern Legal Codes. He notes that such laws “reflect the scribal compilers’ concern for perfect symmetry and delicious irony rather than the pragmatic experience of the law courts.”[6] The method used in legal texts was “to set out principles by the use of often extreme examples.” Christopher Wright calls this “paradigmatic law,” which he explains as “the detailing of specific circumstances with the view to giving judges basic principles and precedents on which to evaluate the great variety of individual cases that may come before them.”[7]

Once the genre is understood it is not hard to see the flaw in Martin’s argument. Martin assumes that the law is a rigidly literal rule that inflexibly applies to all cases. In fact, the law probably did not function this way nor was it intended to. Instead it functioned as kind of paradigm illustrating a principle. The principle was this; women who have sex with a man are not to be considered adulterers or immoral if they do not consent. If it cannot be established whether a woman consented to a sexual act then she should be presumed innocent. Rape is not adultery, it is rather a serious assault or an attempted murder. At a more general level the case law vividly illustrates the principle that culpability entails consent.

[1] Michael Martin “Atheism, Christian Theism, and Rape” accessed 27 September 2009.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Christopher Wright International Biblical Commentary: Deuteronomy, (Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 1996 ) 254.
[5] Delbert R Hillers Covenant: the History of a Biblical Idea (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1969).
[6] Raymond Westbrook “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law” in The History of Ancient Near Eastern Law Vol 1 ed Raymond Westbrook (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) 74.
[7] Christopher Wright Deuteronomy 244.

Augustine’s Interpretation
I want to suggest that an adequate understanding or account of the sixth commandment was suggested by Augustine or at least can be constructed from his writings. In Book One of The City of God, Augustine addressed the question of whether suicide is lawful and concluded that it is not. What is interesting is how Augustine interpreted and applied the sixth commandment in doing this.

Augustine’s argument against suicide consists of three observations. Firstly, Augustine takes the commandment fairly literally as forbidding homicide. He states, “The commandment is ‘Thou shall not kill man.’”[2] We saw in the last post that there is a sensible basis for this. The term literally means to slay and is predicated only of human beings; further, while in most instances it is used of unjustified killing, it can be used of a lawful execution. The slaying of humans is a common meaning to the different nuances that its use takes in the text.

The obvious problem for such a reading is that elsewhere the scriptures seem to allow, even command, killing in certain instances. This does not perplex Augustine,

However, there are some exceptions made by the divine authority to its own law, that men may not be put to death. These exceptions are of two kinds, being justified either by a general law, or by a special commission granted for a time to some individual. And in this latter case, he to whom authority is delegated, and who is but the sword in the hand of him who uses it, is not himself responsible for the death he deals. And, accordingly, they who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in conformity with His laws, have represented in their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, “Thou shalt not kill.”[3]

Augustine’s answer is straightforward. The universal prohibition is the general rule while the specific commands are the exceptions to this rule. The law prohibits homicide; however, the law must be read in its context and not in isolation and, when this is done, one realises that other commands and prohibitions offer qualifications or exceptions to this general rule.

There are several reasons for accepting this way of interpreting the sixth commandment. Firstly, it is in other areas a matter of common-sense; as Bahnsen notes,

Human communication by means of language would come to a grinding halt if it were illegitimate ever to express yourself by way of generalizations which do not explicitly acknowledge qualifications and exceptions. Lawyers may specialize in the fine print of complicated legal contracts, but even they do not speak that way in ordinary discourse. A father who asserts that his son is a fine basketball player is not guilty of falsehood or deception simply because he does not add that, of course, his son has some bad games.

Generalizations which state an accurate summary or the prevailing principle are not, as generalizations, faulty or inaccurate.[4]

In fact, not only is this a matter of common-sense, it is a method followed elsewhere in scripture. For example in Exodus 21:12,

Anyone who strikes a man and kills him shall surely be put to death. However, if he does not do it intentionally, but God lets it happen, he is to flee to a place I will designate. But if a man schemes and kills another man deliberately…

Here we see a universal principle “Any one who strikes a man and kills him shall be put to death” and then immediately this principle is qualified in the proceeding verses. Moreover, contrary to Bahnsen, this type of writing is common even in legal circles. Even contemporary, legal codes often have a general, universal principle laid down regarding homicide or assault and then add specific exceptions which one can appeal to as a defence to committing actions which fall within the broad definition of the general rule.[5]

As Madeleine has pointed out to me, the legal maxim ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’ (specific rules override general rules) is still used in legal interpretation today. She said,

If my lecturer said to the class, I want you to go straight to the library and get started on your assignments but then he said, Madeleine and Matt I want to see you two before you leave he would not be saying that he did not want everyone to go straight to the library and start their assignments just because he gave a specific, contradictory instruction to Matt and I and he wouldn’t be saying that we did not have to go to the library to start our assignments after he had finished speaking to us (once the exception no longer applies) because his specific instructions to us do not override the general instruction to all.[6]

Secondly, the hermeneutical principle of the analogy of scripture supports this kind of interpretation. We have a general command prohibiting homicide; then we have more specific rules commanding or permitting homicide in certain situations. To interpret the command as absolute and unqualified would be to render the text internally incoherent.

This leaves two other options; either one understands the general prohibition as the exception to the more specific ones or the specific ones as exceptions to the general rule. The former option is problematic. If a command permitting killing in a certain context is subject to an exception that you can never kill at all then the specific command is redundant and pointless. On the other hand, a general rule that states “do not kill,” except in certain specified circumstances is not redundant. This then seems the more sensible approach.

A third reason for Augustine’s interpretation follows from a voluntarist understanding of the moral law. In several previous posts I have defended a voluntarist (divine command theory) account of the moral law; one that states that actions are right or wrong in virtue of their being commanded by God. On this account, what is fundamentally wrong about homicide is that it violates the law of God. Now, just as homicide is wrong because it violates the law of God, when God commands or permits homicide in a certain context the very property that makes killing wrong ceases to be present and hence the law is not being broken in that instance. It follows then that the killing in question is not wrong in this instance. This voluntarist understanding of Augustine’s position has a long history and is suggested by Bernard of Clairvaux[7] and Aquinas,[8] as well as those 14^th century voluntarists such as Andreas de Novo.[9] Contemporary defenders of this position are Philip Quinn[10] and William Lane Craig.[11]

Augustine’s position then is to interpret the command as a prohibition on homicide, understanding that in its context it is subject to qualification and exceptions provided elsewhere in the other commands of the law. His basic insight is that the law lays down the general principle “thou shall not kill man;” given that this is the general norm, one is to assume that any given act of homicide is prohibited unless the law elsewhere qualifies this rule or lays down an exception.

This means that in practice the commandment forbids killing a human being without justification, where justification is construed as an excuse or permission granted by God’s law. In the absence of any other command or permission to the contrary, one should refrain from homicide. In this respect homicide differs from an action that is permissible. One does not need a reason or justification for engaging in a permissible action as one can do it for any reason at all or even no reason. However, because God condemns homicide one needs a reason drawn from the law of God itself before one can engage in it licitly.

This interpretation clarifies Augustine’s argument that suicide is unlawful. Augustine justifies his conclusion by defending two points. Firstly, “he who kills himself still kills nothing else than man.”[12] Secondly, “It is not without significance, that in no passage of the holy canonical books can there be found either divine precept or permission to take away our own life.”[13] He adds, “in the commandment, ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ there is no limitation added nor any exception made in favor of any one, and least of all in favor of him on whom the command is laid!”[14]

In other words suicide is homicide and the law does not qualify or grant exclusions to suicide, so suicide is unlawful. It is clear that this inference presupposes the interpretation of the commandment I have defended above. Homicide is unlawful unless the law of God provides grounds or exceptions to the general rule.

In summation, the sixth commandment offers a general prohibition on homicide. This prohibition is binding unless a specific exception or qualification is found elsewhere in the law of God showing that a particular instance of homicide is licit. The procedure in applying the law is then as follows; first, ascertain whether the action in question is homicide and then ask whether it falls under any lawful exception. If an act is homicide then prima facie it is unlawful and a positive argument from some other command is needed to justify the action if it is to be defensible.

[1] Exodus 20:13 KJV.
[2] Ibid, 1:20.
[3] Ibid, 1:21.
[4] Greg L Bahnsen “Cross Examination: In Defense of Theonomy” The Counsel of Chalcedon XIV:5-6 (1992).
[5] I am thankful to David Simpkin for bringing this point to my attention.
[6] I am grateful to my wife, Madeleine Flannagan, for sharing this example she developed from Paul Rishworth.
[7] Bernard of Clairvaux On Precept and Dispensation III.6.
[8] Aquinas Summa Theologicae I-II q 800, a. 8, ad 3.
[9] Andrea de Novo Castro Primium Scripturum Sententiarium d 48, q 2, a 2 Concl. 2. I.
[10] Phillip Quinn “The Recent Revival of Divine Command Ethics” Research Philosophy-and Phenomenological Research (Fall 1990) 345-365.
[11] William Lane Craig & Edwin Curley “Does the Christian God Exist?” A debate held at the University of Michigan (5 February 1998).
[12] Augustine City of God 1:21.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.

RELATED POSTS:
Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part I

Both interpretations, kill and murder, face problems; in this post I will offer critical comments on both interpretations. Next week, in Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II, I will articulate and defend what I think to be the best approach to interpreting this passage, an approach advocated by Augustine of Hippo in the fifth century which has been dominant in Christian ethical thought ever since.

The King James Version: Thou Shalt not Kill
As stated, the most known formulation of the sixth commandment is rendered “thou shall not kill.” Taken on its own (and out of its context) this faces problems, some identified as far back as at least the time of Augustine. Eating plants or harvesting food involves killing plants, living creatures. As Augustine notes, “for though this class of creatures has no sensation, yet they also are said to live, and consequently they can die; and therefore, if violence be done them, can be killed.”[2] He then asks rhetorically, “Must we therefore reckon it a breaking of this commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”, to pull a flower?”[3] In fact, modern knowledge brings other perplexities. Scraping the inside of my mouth kills hundreds of living cells. Taking antibiotics kills bacteria. Understood strictly as a prohibition against all killing, the command is manifestly absurd.

However, contemporary translators have noted that “kill” is not the best English equivalent of rasah, as rasah is not the general Hebrew term for killing. Rather, it is a term that is used only of killing humans; the word literally means “to slay.” For this reason, the N.R.S.V. interprets the noun as “manslay.” However, even as a term for homicide, rasah is comparatively rare in Hebrew. It appears only 46 times in the Hebrew Bible compared with other more frequently-used terms such as harag and hemit,[4] which also refer to killing. It is also not lost on readers of the Hebrew Bible that in many surrounding passages certain forms of homicide are either permitted, such as killing a thief in the night (Ex. 22: 1-2)[5] or even commanded, such as the execution of murderers, (Ex. 21:12).

The Modern Version: You shall not Murder
For this reason, most modern translations translate the verb as murder, as we saw in the NRSV and NIV. However, this is inadequate. Childs notes, “it was soon recognised that the basic distinction between murder and killing, namely the factor of intentionality, cannot be sustained for the verb r.s.h.”[6] In several places the verb is used to designate  accidental or unintentional killing. Koheler suggested that it probably prohibited taking the law into one’s own hands and hence had the sense of private killing.[7] However, as Smedes points out,

As a matter of fact, however, rasah is used at least once for capital punishment (Num. 35:30) and also for accidental manslaughter (Deut. 4:41-43; Josh. 20:3). From a textual point of view, we do not have a clear case for limiting the commandment to private killings or murder.[8]

One of the more thorough studies is that of Stamm. After analysing several uses of rasah, Stamm concludes that rasah means “illegal killing.” He suggests that the most concise English would be “you shall not manslaughter” which would be clarified along the lines that “the life of an Israelite” was to be protected from “illegal, impermissible violence.”[9]

Stamm’s analysis is arguably one of the best to date; however, there are a couple of problems with it. Firstly, as Stamm himself admits, rasah is used at least once of a lawful execution and hence does have a range of meaning which includes killing in a context where killing is lawful. Secondly and perhaps frequently less noted, Stamm’s analysis turns the law into a tautology. To claim, “you shall not kill when it is against the law,” is hardly informative and somewhat states the obvious; of course it is wrong to kill when it is illegal. I think that the commandment is supposed to be saying something substantive so I doubt Stamm is completely on the mark here.

The study of Reventlow modifies Stamm’s position somewhat. Reventlow argues that the vast majority of uses of the verb rasah relate to the idea of “blood vengeance.”[10] This is an idea which has origins in Genesis 4; in some cases of killing the victim’s blood metaphorically cries out to God for vengeance, guilt and responsibility for the crime attaches to the person who committed it, and, in certain circumstances, the land and community in which it occurs. This is atoned for only by the death of the murderer, if the killing was premeditated or the natural death of the high priest, in cases where the killing was accidental or a sacrifice, only in cases where the community authorities are unable to ascertain who is guilty. Milgrom elaborates this motif,

The most vivid examples of this belief appear in connection with unlawful homicide, where innocent blood (dam naki’; Jonah 1:14) cries out for vengeance (Gen. 4:10). Rejected by the earth (Isa. 26:21; Ezek. 24:7), it attaches itself to the slayer and his family, literally “dancing around their heads”(2 Sam. 3:28-29) for generations (2 Sam. 21:4-6 2 Kings 9:26) and even affecting his city (Deut. 21:1-9; Jer. 26:15), nation (Deut 19:10,13), and land (Num 35:33-34). The latter two citations illustrate the variant grounds that provide the rationale for homicide laws in the Deuteronomic and priestly texts. In the former, the people Israel bear bloodguilt; in the latter, it is the land that is polluted by it. The technical term for bearing bloodguilt damo bo or damo be-ro’sho, meant originally “his blood [remains] on him/on his (the murderer’s) head” (Josh. 2:19; I Kings 2:33; Ezek. 33:5), and the legal formula mot yumat damav bo (Lev 20:9-16) means that in the case of lawful execution, the blood of the guilty victim remains on his own person and does not attach itself to the executioner.[11] [Emphasis original]

Reventlow suggests that rasah means a homicide liable for blood vengeance. The problem with this analysis is that it appears to get things backwards. A killing is liable for blood vengeance and requires punishment or atonement presumably because it is wrong or unlawful. It is not unlawful because it requires punishment. The commandment must be prior to the ground for blood vengeance not vice versa. This observation also leads to a conclusion that does not really differ from Stamm’s. After all, a killing is liable for blood vengeance only if it is wrong so a killing liable for blood vengeance and an unlawful killing are in fact co-extensive.

By itself then neither interpretation seems entirely correct. In my next post, Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II, I want to suggest a way of interpreting the passage which avoids the above problems. It is hardly original; it was suggested by Augustine of Hippo in the fifth century.

[1] Exodus 20:13 KJV.
[2] Augustine The City of God 1:21.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Johann J. Stamm The Ten Commandments in Recent Research (London: S.C.M. Press, 1967) 98.
[5] This passage is perhaps best illuminated by a passage in Job 24:14, “When daylight is gone, the murderer rises up and kills the poor and needy; in the night he steals forth like a thief.” This suggests that a person who broke in at night could not be distinguished from a person with murderous intent. The law also contrasts with Ancient Near Eastern case law of the same period, which allowed a person to summarily execute a thief caught on his property. The Torah states by contrast, “A thief must certainly make restitution, but if he has nothing, he must be sold to pay for his theft.” Hence, it teaches that a thief cannot be executed for theft; a thief can be killed only if he or she is perceived to be a threat to one’s life. If not, the thief must pay restitution.
[6] Brevard S Childs Exodus: A Commentary (London: SCM Press, 1974) 419-420.
[7] Ibid, 420.
[8] Lewis B Smedes “’Respect for Human Life’ Thou Shall not Kill” in On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics Ed. Stephen E Lammers & Allen Verhey (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987) 144.
[9] Stamm The Ten Commandments in Recent Research 99.
[10] Childs Exodus 420.
[11] Jacob Milgrom Numbers: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the new JPS Translation (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1990) 509.

RELATED POSTS:
Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II