Matt’s article, “Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis: A reply to Erik Wielenberg” has been published in the winter issue ( Vol 19 Num. 2 – Winter 2017) of Philosophia Christi.  An overview of the contents of the full issue can be found here.  The editor has given Matt permission to upload the article in a couple of months. For now here is the abstract:

In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism, Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defenses of the autonomy thesis to date. Wielenberg argues that (I) the divine command theory is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers; (II) Godless normative robust realism (GRNR) can be formulated in a way that avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis; and (III) GRNR provides a better account of intrinsic value. In this paper, I will argue Wielenberg’s defenses of the autonomy thesis fails. I will argue that his objection to divine command theories fails, that he fails to address two standard challenges to the autonomy thesis adequately, and, finally, that Wielenberg fails to show that GRNR better accounts for the intuition that certain things are intrinsically good than various forms of theistic alternatives.

Tags:   Divine Command Theory · Erik Wielenberg · God and Morality · Philosophia ChristiNo Comments