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God and Moral Grounding Power

October 6th, 2018 by Matt

A common objection to divine command theories of ethics (DCT) is that they make morality arbitrary. There are several ways this objection can be cashed out. The most common is what is called the ‘Horrendous deeds objection’. The Horrendous deeds objection can be formalised as follows:

(1) If the DCT is true, then if God commanded us to rape people we would be required to rape people.

(2) It is absurd that we could be required to rape people.

(3) God could command us to rape.

 (4) Therefore, DCT is absurd.

The key premise is (3), the assumption that it is possible that God could command horrendous actions like rape. Divine command theorists have responded by suggesting that (3) is dubious.  They assume a conception of God Whereby God is understood to be an immaterial person who is all powerful, all knowing, loving and just. So, as terms are defined, the claim that it is possible for God to command people to rape others would only hold if it is possible for an all-knowing, loving, and just person to command rape. This is unlikely. The very reason critics use the example of rape is that they view it as a paradigm action that no virtuous person could ever knowingly entertain.Jason Thibodeau

Suppose, however, it is possible for a just and loving, omniscient person to command rape. Divine command theorists point out, this would mean rape would be commanded in situations where a just and loving person, aware of all the relevant facts, could endorse it– and under these hypothetical circumstances, it’ s hard to see how (2) could be maintained.

  1. Jason Thibodeau’s Argument

In a recent article, published in Sophia, Jason Thibodeau updates the ‘Horrendous deeds objection’ to avoid this problem.[1] Jason starts by defining a concept which he refers to as moral grounding power. “Let us say that a being b has moral grounding power just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations.” He continues “unless it is able to deny that other possible divine beings have this power, it implies that there are possible worlds in which horrendous acts are obligatory”.

His argument for this conclusion is as follows:

(P1) If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power. (Premise)

(P2) Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has. (Premise)

(P3) In some possible world, there exists a being that is like God except that he is not omnibenevolent [henceforth this being will be called Yod]. (Premise)

(P4) If DCT is true, then Yod has moral grounding power. (From P1, P2, and P3)

(P5) In some possible world, Yod commands the gratuitous torture of children. (Premise)

(P6) If DCT is true, then there is a possible world in which the gratuitous torture of children is morally obligatory. (From P4 and P5)

(P7) There is no possible world in which the gratuitous torture of children is obligatory. (Premise)

(P8) DCT is false. (From P6 and P7) [2]

Recently Jason and I discussed this argument on Capturing Christianity, here I want to lay out in writing my main objection to it. Let me stress that Jason and I are discussing this back and forth and my thoughts may alter as the discussion continues.

A. Premise (P1): Does a Divine Command Theory entail that God has Moral Grounding Power?

Let me begin with (P1) the claim that Given Jason’s definition of moral grounding power; this premise affirms that: “if God a divine command theory is true, then Gods commands constitute moral obligations”. Is this correct? The answer is it depends on the kind of divine command theory proposed. Divine command theorists contend actions are morally required if and only if and because those actions are commanded by God. However, the word “because” here can be used to describe different kinds of explanatory relationships.

In an important article on this issue Stephen Sullivan[3] distinguishes between a causal explanation and an identity explanation. In a casual explanation, one explains the existence of A by citing some distinct thing B, which causes B to exist B. By contrast an identity explanation explains the existence of A by noting the existence of B and then saying that A just is (is identical with) B.

There are important differences between saying B caused A and saying B is identical to A.  In a causal relationship, the explanandum (the thing being explained) and explanans (the explainer) are distinct things; the former is an effect the latter a cause. As a cause, the explanans exists prior to the explandum, and there is an asymmetric dependence relationship between them: If B causes A to exist then B does not cause A to exist.  The effect depends on the cause for its existence but not vice versa.

In an identity relationship, the explandum (the thing explained) and explanans (explainer) are not distinct things at all; they are the same thing described in different terms. Because the explanans and explandum are identical, the explanans does not exist prior to the explandum, that would entail something existed prior to itself. Moreover, identity relationships are symmetrical: if A is identical to B then B is also identical to A. Sullivan subsumes identity relationships under a broader category of “constitutive” explanations which includes not just explanations in terms of identity relations but also relationships of non-reductive supervenience.

Now if we turn to (P1), Jason states “If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power” where “a being b has moral grounding power just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations”. This assumes that divine command theorists are offering a constitutive explanation of moral requirements. But unless qualified,this assumption is dubious. It is true that some divine command theorists do this. Edward Wierenga (who Jason cites as an example) seems to have in mind a non-reductive supervenience relationship between moral requirements and Gods commands. Similarly, the divine command theories of Adam’s, Craig, Evans, Forrest, and Alston all contend that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God, and so they also offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements in terms of Gods commands.

However, other divine command theorists, do not offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements. One important proponent of a divine command theory was Philip Quinn. Quinn explicitly offered a causal explanation of moral requirements in terms of Gods commands. Quinn argued that the property of being willed by God and the property of being morally required are not identical properties but distinct properties. God’s act of willing that a person performed an immediately caused it to be the case that a moral obligation to do this action existed.

Strictly speaking then (P1) is false. Divine command theories per se do not entail that Gods commands constitute moral obligations. Some divine command theories do, and some do not. Of course, the most significant divine command theories defended today involve identity explanations, and so these theories do have the entailment Jason refers to. For this reasons one might think my qualifications are a tad pedantic. However, the difference between causal and constitutive divine command theories will become important when we examine further premises.

B.Premise (P4): Is the Inference Valid?

Before, examining premise (P2), let me first say something about the Jason makes in (P4).

 (P4) If DCT is true, then Yod has moral grounding power. (From P1, P2, and P3)

Notice that (P4) draws an inference from (P1) (P2) and (P3). It takes the fact that a divine command theory entails that God has “moral grounding power” and, the fact that omnipotent beings have the same powers, and infers from this that any omnipotent being will have moral grounding power. If this inference is valid, the word “power” must have the same meaning in (P1) as it does in (P2). When Jason states in (P2) that Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has, the word “powers” must include the kind of moral grounding power he refers to in (P1). If  this isnt the case the inference commits the fallacy of equivocation.

C. What does the word “power” mean in (P1) and (P2)?

It’s precisely on this last point however that I think Jason’s argument falls down.  Jason supports (P2)   by asking us to imagine a being like God, who is omnipotent but lacks the property of benevolence: He then asks whether such a being would “in virtue of his malevolence, lack the power to flood the earth, destroy a planet or create the universe? “. He concludes “If the being is omnipotent, this seems unlikely, it’s hard to see how the mere absence of benevolence would limit Gods power in this way. “

I find this claim intuitively plausible, but note carefully the examples Jason uses here. He gives the examples of “lacking the power to flood the earth” “destroy a planet” “create a universe” these are all acts of causal power, where God by his actions causes something distinct from himself to come into existence or go out of existence.

However, in his first premise (P1), Jason uses the word power in a different sense. He refers to “moral grounding power” which a being has  “just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations”. Moral grounding power then isn’t the power God has to cause moral obligations to come into existence its rather the God’s ability or power to constitute moral requirements with his commands. We saw above that, in the context of divine command theories, constitutive explanations can involve the postulation a non-reductive supervenience relationship between Gods commands and moral requirements. However, in most cases, divine command theorists who offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements are offering an “identity” explanation.  Divine command theorists like Craig, Evans, Adams, Forrest, all contend that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God.

This means that the phrase “moral grounding power” is often just a technical way of saying that, the property of being commanded by God is identical with the property of being morally required.  The property of being obligatory isn’t something that is caused to come into existence by Gods commands; it just is the property of being commanded by God by a different name. Just as the morning star and evening star are the same thing under different descriptions. The property of being morally required and being commanded by God are the same property under different descriptions.

The problem is that while (P2) is intuitively plausible if you are referring to causal powers. It is not so obvious when one is talking of something like a moral grounding power.  To say God has moral grounding power could just mean that God has the power to perform actions which are identical with God’s actions under a different description. However, it is impossible for any person who is not God to have this kind of power. This is because the relationship of identity can only hold between a thing and itself. It is impossible for any being, no matter how powerful, who is not God to perform actions which are identical with God’s actions. This is an incoherent idea.

Let me illustrate this: By waving my hand I can make it the case that Matthew Flannagan Has waved his hand. However, it is not possible for anyone else, even an omnipotent being to do this. An omnipotent being has the causal power to make me wave my hand. If he becomes incarnate in human form, he could himself wave his hand. However, he could not make it the case that his standing up is identical with me standing up. That is because his actions are not identical to my actions.  Nor is it possible for him a distinct person from me to perform actions which are identical with actions I perform. If you want to refer to this ability as a power, then it is a power that it is metaphysically impossible for anyone but me to have. The only person who can perform actions numerically identical to my actions is me.

Conclusions:

Above I noted that the inference he draws in P4 is valid. Only if the word “power” is used the same way in both premises P1 and P2. The kind of power, God, is said to have when Jason states “Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has” must include the kind of power he has in mind when he states “If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power”.

We have seen that this is not the case. In our discussion of P1, we noted that the claim “If the DCT is true, then if God commanded us to rape we would be required to rape” is true only of divine command theories which do not postulate a causal explanation of moral requirements. In other words (P1) is true only in cases where the word “power” excludes causal relationships. (P2) however is defensible only if the word power refers to causal powers. If it is understood more broadly to refer to constitutive explanations of Gods commands (P2) is false. It isn’t true that any omnipotent being can perform an action which is identical with the action of another being. The crucial premise (P4) then commits the fallacy of equivocation.


 

[1] Jason Thibodeau, “God’s Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem” Sophia:1-17 (forthcoming)

[2] Jason Thibodeau, “God’s Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem” 9,

[3] Stephen Sullivan, “Arbitrariness, divine commands, and morality” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 33 (1) (1993) 33-45

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1 response so far ↓

  • Matt,
    Thank you very much for your thoughtful and challenging criticism. I will try to offer an equally compelling response.

    Consider the following possibility: God creates an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient being. Call this being Mazda. Suppose that Mazda issues the same commands that God does. Now consider the following question: Do Mazda’s commands constitute moral obligations?

    Suppose the answer is yes. If so, then it cannot be that the property of moral wrongness is identical to the property of being commanded by God. The property of moral wrongness would be multiply realizable, in which case there is no true strict identity relation between God’s commands and moral obligations. Further, this would also entail that the power to make it the case that an action is morally obligatory by commanding it is a power that more than one being has. The analysis of moral grounding power that you offered would not be correct. Further, we would be able to ask metaphysical questions about the basis of this power and assert that it is possible for other omnipotent beings to have this power.

    If Mazda’s commands constitute moral obligations, then it makes sense to say that both God and Mazda share a power: the very power that I called “moral-grounding power.” It would be plausible to think that any omnipotent being shares this power.

    Consider further: In addition to Mazda, God creates Yod, an omnipotent, omniscient being who is not perfectly benevolent. Suppose Yod is good but not perfectly good. All of the commands that Yod issues are issued by God and Mazda but God and Mazda issue some commands that Yod does not issue. Now consider this question: Do Yod’s commands constitute moral obligations?

    There is no new problem if the answer to his question is yes. But if the answer is no, then we will want to ask a new question: Why is it that when God or Mazda issues a command, that command constitutes a moral obligation, but when Yod issues the very same command, that command does not constitute a moral obligation? I take it that this is a substantive metaphysical claim. God and Mazda have a power that Yod lacks. What explains this lack?

    Return now to the question of whether Mazda’s commands constitute moral obligations. Suppose that the answer is no. We will still want to know why this is: Why is it that God’s commands constitute moral obligations but Mazda’s commands do not?

    In our previous communication about this sort of question (asked not about Yod but about Asura), you’ve indicated that it can only be read as an epistemological question; it is a question about why would think that God’s commands (rather than those of Asura’s) constitute moral obligations. And you’ve suggested that God’s commands have the kind of features that we know, on independent grounds, moral obligations have. But since Mazda is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, his commands have these same features. Thus the fact that God’s commands have these features this will not help us understand why God’s commands but not Mazda’s constitute moral obligations.

    Regardless, the question still makes sense: If Mazda’s commands do not constitute moral obligations, then since he issues the same commands that God does and it also omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, we need some account of why Mazda’s commands do not constitute moral obligations. If we have no such account, then it would be unreasonable to conclude that Mazda’s commands do not constitute moral obligations. Further, it seems likely that the question is a metaphysical one.