Author: Matt

  • Marquis, Pruss and the Twinning Argument

    Augustine writes,

    And therefore the following question may be very carefully inquired into and discussed by learned men, though I do not know whether it is in man’s power to resolve it: At what time the infant begins to live in the womb: whether life exists in a latent form before it manifests itself in the motions of the living being.
    Augustine of Hippo, The Enchiridion, 85.

    I think Augustine’s comments ring true today. Like Augustine I believe there is good reason for thinking a fetus (a formed conceptus) is a human being and like Augustine I oppose destroying the conceptus at any stage in pregnancy. I am also inclined to agree with Augustine that prior to formation, the best stance to adopt is agnosticism if we do not know when the human being begins to exist; I have argued for this elsewhere.

    Madeleine asked Alexander Pruss to either help her understand or overcome an argument advanced by Don Marquis that had given rise to my agnosticism regarding the point at which a human being comes into existence (human being is defined as an organism, the killing of which constitutes homicide).

    My agnosticism is based on three things. The first is that I know of no reason for thinking an embryo is a human being at the time of conception. The second is that two arguments against this conclusion lead me to wonder if we can know this. The first is the twinning argument. The second is Don Marquis recent track-forward argument.

    Pruss, in his post, only addresses the twinning argument. Having read Pruss’s argument I think that he and I are in fundamental agreement; moreover, I think he provides reasons for accepting an agnostic position, at least with regard to identical twins.

    First, a brief summary of the twinning argument is necessary to give my readers some clarity as to what we are talking about.

    Prior to the time when an embryo receives a primitive streak, the group of cells which indicate the basic body plan of the embryo, an embryo can twin. Occasionally monozygotic twinning occurs and a single embryo splits to form two or more separate embryos. Many Theologians and Philosophers have argued that this fact provides strong evidence that human beings do not come into existence prior to 14 days post conception.

    The argument goes as follows. Suppose a human being comes into existence at conception, let’s call this embryo Bob. Bob symmetrically splits into two forming two embryos, embryo A and embryo B. The question arises, what happened to Bob?

    There are only four possibilities.

    (a) Bob ceased to exist and two new individual human beings come into existence at twinning;
    (b) Bob continued as embryo A and embryo B came into existence at twinning;
    (c) Bob continues as embryo B and embryo A came into existence at twinning;
    (d) Bob is identical with both embryo A and embryo B.

    The objector argues that each of these options is acceptable.

    Pruss gives two main responses to this argument. The first is to deny that all of the options (a) (b) (c) and (d) are all unacceptable. The second is to call into question whether symmetric twinning actually occurs.

    Are (a) (b) (c) and (d) all Unacceptable Options?
    Pruss does not argue for the acceptability of (d) and for good reason, (d) leads to a straightforward contradiction due to the transitivity of identity. According to the transitivity of identity, if an object x is identical to another object y and y is identical to x then x is identical z.

    In (d) embryo A is identical with Bob, Bob is also identical with embryo B, hence by transitivity of identity, Embryo A should be the same organism as embryo B but clearly is not; as I noted, two separate embryos came into existence at twinning and two separate organisms cannot be the same organism.

    As I stated, Pruss does not address this but he does defends the possibility of (a) (b) and (c).

    Let’s turn first to (a); Pruss here suggests that this option is “not absurd” and gives an example of an amoeba; Pruss notes that when an amoeba splits into two we normally think the original one is destroyed and two new ones come into existence. So when the conceptus twins, the original one is destroyed and two new organisms come into existence.

    Jeff McMahan and Peter Singer have offered a response to this line of argument. McMahan suggests adopting (a) “is an embarrassment” for anyone who opposes abortion on the grounds that life begins at conception because they are committed to the claim that “it’s a terrible loss when one of us dies in utero;” hence, anyone who thinks hominisation (the coming into existence of a human being) occurs at conception is committed to viewing monozygotic twinning as bad and as tragic as the death of a newborn infant due to the demise of the original conceptus.

    Now I am not convinced by this line of reasoning entirely; if a newborn split into two and two new, genetically identical, infants were formed, it is not clear to me that we would consider this occurrence tragic, our attitudes to infants notwithstanding.

    Similarly, with Pruss’ brain splitting example, I don’t think that if we conducted a brain splitting operation on a human being and placed the two hemispheres of the brain into two genetically identical bodies we would not consider this to be on par with homicide, despite the fact that we admit that an adult human is human.

    Now, if cases like this happened we would be genuinely perplexed as these cases are extremely strange and bizarre, if they could happen we would end up with two beings that do not differ, either psychologically or physiologically, from the being of origin. So I agree with Pruss that this situation is possible and is not clearly or obviously unacceptable.

    However, I find it interesting that while Pruss defends this option as acceptable he backs away from endorsing it; he states that “if x in fact is going to symmetrically split in the near future, then maybe x is not identical with any far-future entity”[Emphasis added] he then refers the reader to his discussion of the other two cases. I think he is correct to do this; to show that an option is not false is not to show there are any reasons for thinking it is true.

    Turning now to (b) and (c); the standard argument against adopting either claim is that to do so is arbitrary, one cannot provide any reason for identifying Bob with embryo A that is not also a reason for identifying Bob with embryo B. Pruss response is to argue

    There might be some law specifying which of y and z gets x‘s soul, either in terms of some minor asymmetry (nobody thinks the asymmetry is total, with each half having the exact same number of molecules, in exactly the same positions) or stochastically (maybe it’s random where the soul goes), with the other output entity getting a new soul. Or it might be that God decides where x‘s soul goes.

    Now on the face of it this does not appear to address the objection; the objector argues that one can never be rational in affirming that (b) is the case without also affirming (c). Pruss provides no reason for saying you can. His position is simply that either option remains possible.

    I think something important can be ascertained from Pruss’ objection here and that is that the objector does not show; that either (b) or (c) are false. At best one can only show that that we cannot affirm either option nor can we deny either option has occurred. What the objector tells us here is that we cannot know at this stage.

    It we look at Pruss’ response then it seems what he tells us is that when we ask the question regarding a set of monozygotic twins, did they come into existence at conception? we do not know. It is possible they did not both come into existence when twinning occurred and it is possible that one of the two began at conception though we do not know whether this is the case and even if we did, we don’t know which one of the two was prior.

    Does Symmetric Twinning Occur?
    Similar conclusions apply to the other main argument Pruss provides against the twinning argument. He writes,

    last time I checked, we did not actually know that embryonic splitting is in fact symmetric. If it turns out that embryonic splitting proceeds by budding, the argument falls flat. Thus, the argument rests on an empirical hypothesis which is merely speculative. This is a problem: obviously, if the case for the lack of a right to life on the part of some organism is based on a merely speculative hypothesis, we should treat the organism as if it had a right to life until that speculative hypothesis is checked.

    Here Pruss argues that we do not know whether symmetrical twinning actually occurs and he argues that in the absence of any reason for denying that an embryo is human we should treat it as though it is. Now I don’t deny the first premise, all it does is again point out that when we are dealing with monozgotic twins, we do not know whether either or both came into existence at conception, as we do not know whether twinning is symmetric, where the above puzzles arise, or asymmetric, whereas Pruss argues they do not.

    Pruss goes on to argue that when we don’t know we should treat the embryo as though it has a right to life. While I do not endorse this claim as it is phrased, I argued for a similar claim in my post; I argued that in cases where we do not know if an embryo is a human being it would be reckless and hence, gravely wrong to kill it because it might be.

    So in conclusion, I think that the twinning argument should give us pause about claiming that human beings come into existence at conception. We do not know whether twinning is symmetric or asymmetric. If it is the latter, we do not know whether anyone who is a monozygotic twin came into existence or conception or not. Either option is a possibility but we do not have the information to know which is option is correct.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Some Thoughts on Human Embryonic Stem-cell Research
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
    Sentience Part 1
    Sentience Part 2
    Viability
    Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
    Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction
    Imposing You Beliefs Onto Others: A Defence
    Published: Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criteria – A Critique
    Published: Abortion and Capital Punishment – No Contradiction

  • Some Thoughts on Human Embryonic Stem-cell Research

    Given Barack Obama’s reversal of the ban on federal funding for research on new lines of human embryonic stem-cells, I thought I might add my own thoughts on the issues around stem-cell research. My thoughts are somewhat tentative; largely because, unlike many in the media, I don’t see the issues as clear cut or as obvious as either side makes out.

    I want to address one really bad argument in favour of human embryonic stem-cell research which gets repeated ad nauseum in the media. This is the repeated claim that human embryonic stem-cell research holds “great promise;” this promise offers the hope of discovery of cures for numerous debilitating diseases. In the media this is often accompanied by stories about Hollywood stars such as Michael J. Fox and Christopher Reeves who suffer(ed) from Parkinson’s disease and spinal cord injuries respectively. We are informed that stem-cell research might hold the key to curing these kinds of conditions, the implicit assumption (not actually stated) is that: any action that promises to find a cure for horrible medical conditions is justified.

    Barack Obama apparently agrees with this argument as he stated,

    Medical miracles do not happen simply by accident … They result from painstaking and costly research from years of lonely trial and error, much of which never bears fruit and from a government willing to support that work.

    The problem with this line of argument is that this implicit assumption is false. Two examples will help illustrate the point; the first is from a leading proponent of abortion the second comes from a defender of human embryonic stem-cell research.

    Judith Jarvis Thomson points out that if a doctor painlessly kills a group of healthy patients and harvests their organs, an even greater number of people can be saved from potentially fatal conditions via organ donation.[1] It is, in fact, conceivable that forcing people to under go various medical procedures such as kidney or bone marrow transplants would result in numerous people being saved from fatal illnesses.

    Despite the ends, neither killing people nor enforcing compulsory transplants are permissible practices. Although such procedures may save people from or promote the happiness of others and in some cases might be life saving, they do so by unjust means; namely, killing and assaulting innocent human beings.

    Don Marquis suggests a second case regarding experimenting on human beings and refers to the Tuskagee study where participants were not informed of their syphilis status and without consent were denied treatment for the purposes of medical research, the infamous Willowbrook experiments which involved experimenting upon mentally retarded children in order to ascertain information for fighting diseases such as Hepatitis and the Nazi experiments upon concentration camp inmates to learn how to combat hypothermia. Regarding these experiments Don Marquis notes

    The Tuskegee, Willowbrook and Nazi studies were wrong, not because they were bad and useless science, but because the human subjects in them were treated inhumanely … There is now a consensus, both in society and in academic bioethics that this is wrong even when the research will clearly benefit the common good. In short conformity with a respect for human subjects principle is a necessary condition of morally permissible research whatever its benefits.[2]

    I contend that Marquis is correct in these sentiments. What made such experiments wrong was not that they failed to bring about the significant results they aimed at but rather that the means they used to do so were unjust and involved disrespecting and degrading human beings. Hence, even if important advancements in understanding what syphilis does to the human body, how to combat hypothermia or hepatitis have been achieved the experiments should still be condemned.

    It seems clear the inherent assumption that, any action that promises to find a cure for horrible medical conditions is justified, is false. In assessing a method of medical research one needs to focus not just on the potential benefits of the research but also the means by which these benefits are brought about. In particular, one needs to ask whether the research involves activities such as killing human beings or subjecting them to degrading treatment without their consent.

    The problem of course is that in the human embryonic stem-cell debate this is precisely what is at issue. Human embryonic stem-cell research involves destroying human embryos. Hence, the central question must be,

    Is an embryo a human being at the point such destruction occurs?
    (Embryonic destruction occurs prior to segmentation, segmentation occurs around 14-21 days post conception).

    If it is then the fact that Christopher Reeves could have regained the ability to walk or Micheal J. Fox might find a cure for Parkinson’s disease are irrelevant. The fact that you are a Hollywood actor or the President of the United States does not mean that other people can be destroyed and killed for yours or others medical welfare.

    So, is an embryo a human being prior to segmentation?

    Let me state categorically that I know of no argument for the conclusion that an embryo is a human being at this stage. I believe there are good reasons for thinking a fetus is a human being, which I spelt out in my PhD thesis and I have defended in my academic publications and on this blog. I think that the arguments against attributing humanity to a fetus, such things as the claim that a fetus is not viable, is not sentient, lacks brain function, lacks self-awareness, etc all fail. But the fact that there are good reasons for thinking a fetus is a human being does not entail that there are good reasons for thinking that an embryo is prior to 14 days post conception.

    However, this is not as significant as one might think, because while their may not be any argument for accepting that an embryo is a human being at conception, there may be no good argument against this either. Further, a plausible argument can be made that in the absence of any reasons one way or the other, the morally correct thing to do is to refrain from destroying embryos.

    Take this analogy, which I have adapted from James Humber,[3] suppose I am in the bush hunting deer. I am informed by radio that at some point on Friday morning a party of school children is going to be hiking along the deer trail where I am hunting. After 9:00am on Friday morning I hear rustling and see movement in the bushes. Despite careful examination I am unable to ascertain whether the movement I see is a deer, another animal, the wind or a human being. Am I justified in shooting at the target?

    The answer is clearly no; in fact, even if the deer I am hunting has unusual shaped antlers which I could sell for millions of dollars on Trade Me, the proceeds of which I plan to donate to a local children’s hospital which will help many children be cured of diseases, it would still be wrong to shoot. This is because

    (i) I know that at some point in the morning, in that place a human being will be present;
    (ii) It is morning and I am perceiving a living object in that place; and
    (iii) I am unable to identify whether what I perceive is human or not.

    It would be an act of gross recklessness or negligence to destroy the target because these three facts are in play. Something similar seems to occur in the case of human embryo destruction.

    I know that at some point that, between conception and the fetal stage, a human being comes into existence. I know that an embryo is in existence at this period of time. Hence, unless I have reasons for thinking it is not human it is seriously immoral to destroy it.

    So the real question is whether there are any reasons for thinking that an embryo prior to segmentation is not a human being. The arguments, however, are quite tricky and deal with some interesting metaphysical questions about identity. Perhaps one of them is successful, but even if it is, the continual pontification about Christopher Reeves, Michael J. Fox or the constant reminder about the diseases that human embryonic stem-cell research may lead to cures for does not provide any reasons, at all, for thinking an embryo is not human or that research of this type is ethical. In fact Barack Obama has stated that he does not know at what point in development an embryo becomes human; when asked this questions he answered:

    Whether you are looking at it from a theological perspective or a scientific perspective, answering that question with specificity is, you know, above my pay grade.

    The fact that so many people, including the President of the United States, support destroying a human embryo without even bothering to address this central question is deeply disturbing.

    [1] Judith Jarvis Thomson “Killing Letting Die and the Trolley Problem” The Monist Vol. 59, p 205.
    [2] Don Marquis “Stem Cell Research: The Failure of the New Bioethics” Free Inquiry, Winter 2002 Vol. 23 # v1.
    [3] James Humber, “Abortion the Unavoidable Dilemma” Journal of Value Inquiry 9:2 (1975): 286.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Marquis, Pruss and the Twinning Argument
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1

    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
    Sentience Part 1
    Sentience Part 2
    Viability
    Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
    Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction
    Imposing You Beliefs Onto Others: A Defence
    Published: Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criteria – A Critique
    Published: Abortion and Capital Punishment – No Contradiction

  • An Eye for an Eye and Turning the Other Cheek

    In The Autonomy of Ethics David Brink complains that “tradition and scripture may speak but in conflicting ways”;[1] in a endnote he cites a single example,

    Inconsistency is at stake, for example, when we juxtapose the Old Testament doctrine of an “eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:23, 24; Leviticus 24:19, 20; and Deuteronomy 19:21) and the New Testament doctrine of “turning the other cheek” (Matthew 5:38-42; Luke 6:27-31).[2]

    Brink contends that the “doctrine of an ‘eye for an eye’” (commonly called the lex talionis) and the New Testament teaching of “turning the other cheek” are contradictory. I will argue that this claim is mistaken; first I will respectively outline what the “doctrine of an ‘eye for an eye’” and the teaching of “turning the other cheek” are then I will ask whether Christ’s expounding of the latter is inconsistent with the former.

    What is the Lex Talionis?
    Brink refers to Exodus 21:23-25.

    If there is serious injury, you are to take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot,25 burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.

    This passage is repeated in several other passages.[3] The Phrase expresses a legal formula which is expounded in proverbial form. The principle is that whatever punishment is imposed (in the immediate case the punishment is a fine) must be proportionate to the harm inflicted on the victim.

    Sarna notes, “[r]abbinic tradition understood the biblical formulation to mean monetary payment and not physical retaliation”[4] and he defends this interpretation. Drazin notes that the Halacah in b. B.K 84a and Sanhedrin 79a and Mek each understand the phrase to refer to a principle of commensurate compensation.[5] Plaut states that “few passages in the Torah have been so thoroughly misunderstood” and suggests the text is best understood as requiring “the value of an eye for the loss of an eye”, “the value of a limb for its loss and so on”.

    I have defended this way of interpreting talionic formulae in the Torah in a previous post, here I will add that the context makes this evident. Verses 26-27 apply the principle expounded in v 23-25 to an assault upon an ebed (ebed is often incorrectly translated with the English word slave, it actually refers to a form of indentured servitude).

    If a man hits a manservant or maidservant in the eye and destroys it, he must let the servant go free to compensate for the eye. And if he knocks out the tooth of a manservant or maidservant, he must let the servant go free to compensate for the tooth.

    An ebed is a person working off a debt. The requirement to release his servant forces the assailant to write off the debt his/her victim owes him/her. The context clearly understands the lex talionis as the payment of commensurate monetary compensation.

    What is Turning the Other Cheek?
    Christ expounds the “teaching of turning the other cheek” as follows, “If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also.” Contrary to common misconceptions, this is not referring to a serious assault. David Daube notes that in the rabbinic law of the period, a slap on the cheek was viewed as a paradigm case of an insult where there was no actual harm or damage to the victim. Moreover, the rabbinic exegesis of the period ruled that one could sue a person who insulted him or her in this fashion for damages proportionate to the shame or damage done to their pride. Something that appears borne out by Christ’s observations a few verses earlier where he states that a person who insults his brother (a fellow Jew) “is answerable to the Sanhedrin.”

    Turning the other cheek, then, means refusing to demand compensation for mere insults that do not do any serious damage. Christ is not talking about serious assaults here, as Daube notes, if he did “would the case of a slap in the face not have been an excessively weak illustration of his new position? [Would it not have been necessary] to give a far more serious example”?[6]

    It is also clear that “turning the other cheek” is not incompatible with standing up for oneself. In John 18:23-24 when Jesus himself is struck in the face he does not lash back and demand compensation but he does rebuke the person in question. “If I said something wrong, … testify as to what is wrong. But if I spoke the truth, why did you strike me?”

    Juxtaposing the Two Teachings
    Brink suggests that “when one juxtaposes the Old Testament doctrine of an ‘eye for an eye’” and “the New Testament doctrine of ‘turning the other cheek’” there is an inconsistency. Ironically Christ himself juxtaposes both doctrines in Matt 5:38-39, a passage Brink himself cites; Christ states,

    You have heard that it was said, ‘Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth.’ But I tell you do not retaliate against an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also.”

    Brink apparently believes that Christ is here citing the Old Testament teaching and then in uttering “but I say to you” contradicting it with his own teaching.

    The problem is that this goes against the context and genre of the text. At the beginning of the sermon, in which the above juxtaposition occurs, Christ tells his readers not to interpret his comments as a rejection of Old Testament commands, he states emphatically

    Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them[7] … Anyone who breaks one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices and teaches these commands will be called great in the kingdom of heaven”[8]

    The contrast Christ draws in v 20 is not between the torah and his own teaching but between faithful obedience and the obedience of the scribes and Pharisees. This suggests that Christ is contradicting, not the torah per se, but a particular interpretation.

    Daube provides confirmation of this. Daube notes the contrast in this pericope between “you have heard it said” and “I say to you”. This, Daube points out, was a common way of setting out rabbinic teaching. The rabbi would contrast an excessively formalistic interpretation of the torah that people had “heard” with a fuller correct one that the rabbi himself expounded. This observation fits precisely other parts of the Sermon on the Mount where the same formula is used.

    In v 20 Christ contrasts “You have heard that it was said to the people long ago, ‘Do not murder’” with his own teaching (“but I say to you”) to avoid unjustified angry feuds and insults. In v27 he contrasts “You have heard that it was said, ‘Do not commit adultery’” with his own teaching to not look at another person’s spouse lustfully. In both cases it is evident that Christ is not rejecting the Old Testament teaching; he is clearly not saying that it is permissible to murder or commit adultery; rather he is rejecting an excessively formalistic interpretation of these commandments.

    When these factors are taken into account it is clear, I think, that Christ is not offering a teaching antithetical to the Old Testament. The original law in the Old Testament permitted a victim of assault to gain compensation from his assailant. The lex talionis existed to limit the damages that could be taken to only that which was proportional to the harm done and no more. Some rabbinic teaching of Christ’s time applied this very strictly so that even a person who had suffered an insult, but no actual tangible damage, could sue his insulter. Christ’s response was to reject this as petty and prideful and as such, a wrong application of this law; in cases of insults it was better to simply let it go rather than seeking exact recompense. Nothing in the passage whatsoever suggests that victims of serious harm are not entitled to proportionate compensation from their assailants.

    When one examines the teachings of the Old and New Testaments carefully, taking into account such things as literary and historical context of the relevant passages, it is far from obvious that the Old Testament doctrine of an ‘eye for an eye’ and the New Testament doctrine of ‘turning the other cheek’ are inconsistent. Here, as elsewhere, Brink’s objection to theological ethics is based on a superficial exegesis of the traditions he is objecting to.

    [1] David O Brink “The Autonomy of Ethics” The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 159.
    [2] Ibid, 164.
    [3] Exodus 21:23, 24; Leviticus 24:19, 20; and Deuteronomy 19:21 as cited by Brink.
    [4] Nahum Sarna J P S Commentary: Exodus (New York: Jewish Publication Society, 1991) 126.
    [5] Israel Drazin, Targum Onkelos to Exodus (New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1990) 215.
    [6] David Daube The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism (London: Athlone Press, 1956) 256.
    [7] Matt 5:17.
    [8] Matt 5:19.

  • Studying at Otago University no Riot

    From 2002-06 I had the pleasure of studying at Otago University. I also taught there in various roles as a researcher, tutor and fill-in lecturer for the Theology, Philosophy and Law schools. Otago was an intellectually rigorous and stimulating place; it’s reputation for being the one of the best Universities in New Zealand and the best in my own fields of Philosophy and Theology is well deserved.

    One thing I discovered first hand, however, was the darker side of the student culture, particularly from undergraduates. At Otago my wife and I dared speak out against some of the actions and stances promoted by the Otago University Students Association (OUSA). The reprisal was merciless.

    At the time Madeleine was battling obesity (a medical condition she has since overcome having lost around 55kg), the student newspaper, Critic (a subsidiary company of OUSA), found a link to her weight-loss support site that showed progress-pictures of her weight-loss (despite her name never featuring on it) and encouraged students to visit the site and laugh at her. They published pictures of fat women eating hamburgers on their website and said it was her and regularly permitted comments about her allegedly stuffing her face to be published.

    Critic also published false comments about my wife flashing her “bush” in public. It also published discussions of what it would be like to have sex with someone as “hideous” as her. She was repeatedly referred to as “middle-aged” and a “mother” in a derogatory manner.

    Then came the obsession with her breasts; someone in Critic claimed falsely that Madeleine had accused a Labour MP of fondling her breasts. I informed them this was false, offered to show them what Madeleine had actually said (they had originally reported it almost accurately) but it was to no avail. They continued to run with the breast story, making reference to it several more times throughout the year, culminating in nominating her breasts for an end of year award and published false claims that she deliberately thrust her breasts in front of people.

    When Critic nominated Madeleine as the New Zealander of the Year they cited, as one of the reasons, her success at managing “to distance herself … and her young daughters from [Graham Capill’s] penis.”

    When, as a student, I formally complained about all this to the University I was told it was not their jurisdiction as the student newspaper was not part of the University. Complaints to OUSA were dismissed on the grounds that this was just good humour; something I was apparently lacking. Of course it all ceased to be funny when later the same year an issue of Critic was banned by the chief censor for its infamous date-rape article, an article in which the author laughed at and mocked the rape of women who are overweight and Christian. I found the coincidence rather eerie.

    Towards the end of my study the infamous riots broke out on Castle Street. Critic defended the students claiming it was the police getting out of hand. When the University suggested a code of conduct for students, OUSA threatened legal action if anyone was expelled under it.

    I remember discussing the issue with a crowd of students that I regularly met with in the Union building. The response I got from one was telling, when it was suggested that maybe some of the ridiculous drunken antics shouldn’t be tolerated, there was a gasp followed by: “what’s the point of being a student then?” My response of “maybe to study and get a degree” seemed fairly novel to my interlocutor.

    Living in this environment all the time perhaps dulled my perception. However, when I graduated PhD in 2006 the way many locals saw things became apparent. I had no immediate employment and so had taken a night-shift job stacking shelves at the local 24 hour supermarket. On my first night, I was ridiculed by drunken students in the wee hours of the morning. Some students approached me (a complete stranger) in the store and mocked me for being “so thick” that I had to work at the supermarket. I was informed that if I was smart as them then I could go to Uni and get a degree but I was obviously too stupid to do this. My supervisor informed me this sort of thing was common and he regularly issued trespass notices to students for this sort of behaviour. I later witnessed one student and his girl friend try and take a joy-ride with a forklift. Another of the staff was indecently propositioned. I only worked there for a few weeks before coming to Auckland yet the management told me that this sort of thing was common from students.

    I recall a conversation I struck up once with a local. He told me how the streets around the University used to look when he was younger. He went on to tell me how gradually residents moved further away from the University due to the behaviour of their student neighbours and how now the area was a dump. He wasn’t wrong about the latter claim, the student quarter featured fifthly flats, beer bottles and pizza boxes and other rubbish littered all over the place. His story appeared to be one many locals could tell. During Orientation Week the town became full of smart-arsed, disrespectful jerks who had no respect for anyone.

    Given all of the above, I was not at all surprised to see the news about Otago’s annual toga party getting out of control. I was even less surprised to hear the OUSA President on tonight’s TV3 news trying to convince the country that the problems were mostly caused, not by students, but by passers by throwing objects at students. Please spare me. One angry resident stated “Why should we tolerate this here? I don’t think there would be anywhere that this would be tolerated.” I often wondered this myself when I was studying there too. Let’s hope we don’t see more Otago University TV commercials telling us to “get over it.”

  • Maori and Pakeha are Not Partners to the Treaty of Waitangi

    [For the benefit of our international readership: Maori are the indigenous people of New Zealand; Pakeha is a term used to describe Caucasian New Zealanders; The Treaty of Waitangi is a significant founding document of our nation over which many historical and current differences have arisen around its role, interpretation and application.]

    Recently I read a document that stated, “This institution seeks to honour the partnership between Pakeha and Maori that is laid down in The Treaty of Waitangi.” I have seen this type of statement numerous times before in the mission statements of many different kinds of New Zealand institutions. I think this claim is nonsense. Below I will argue why.

    At the heart of this kind of statement is the notion that The Treaty of Waitangi (The Treaty) constitutes a partnership between Maori and Pakeha; Maori and Pakeha apparently entered into an agreement which contains mutual obligations.

    The problem with this claim is that only persons can enter into contracts. Persons are either rational self-conscious agents, such as adult human beings or legal persons which are an organisation of rational agents into an institutional structure of some sort. One cannot enter into a contract with concrete objects that are not persons such as rocks or trees; nor can one enter into contracts with abstract objects such as the colour blue. One would have thought this was an obvious point which did not need pointing out.

    ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha,’ however, are not persons. Individual Maori people and individual Pakeha people are persons, and individuals of either race can organise themselves into an institution which will have a legal personhood separate from their own individual personhood, but the racial groups ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha are not persons.

    The term Pakeha is an abstraction, it is simply a reference to an aggregate of individuals who share a particular genetic trait. It is false that everyone who has these genetic traits signed The Treaty. In fact, as The Treaty was signed in 1840, no individual alive today signed The Treaty. It is equally false that simply because someone with the same genetic traits as me at some point in history signed a treaty that it follows that all members of my race signed a treaty.

    What is accurate is to say is that two institutions entered into an agreement, the Crown and various Maori tribes. No Pakeha individual can be identified as the crown and no Maori individual can be identified as a tribal group unless the individuals are acting in an official capacity as the agent of these institutions. Hence, no Maori or Pakeha individual is bound by The Treaty; no individual is responsible or culpable for breeches of The Treaty.

    Someone might object that the Crown being the head of a representative government acts on behalf of all Pakeha and hence, Pakeha can be said to have entered into a partnership via The Treaty. I think this claim is mistaken. It assumes that whenever a government performs an action one can attribute the actions of the government to any and all private citizens of that government.

    This error is precisely the error we condemn when terrorists target a civilian population. When terrorists target non-combatants they assume that because a government has unjustifiably committed aggression against them that it follows that the citizens of that government can be attacked. The principles of non-combatant immunity, however, deny this. If a state engages in aggression then the military personal who act as the state’s agents can be attacked but citizens who are not acting as agents for the state cannot be. They are innocent third parties.

    Maori and Pakeha, therefore, did not enter into a partnership at the time of The Treaty was signed, and private individuals from either race have no obligations to each other under The Treaty. To suggest they do is to commit the error of attributing personhood to racial groups as opposed to individual members of that group. It suggests that the actions of one person who has a particular genetic trait can be attributed to everyone who has that trait. The implication of this is that whenever a Maori gang member commits a crime one could justly claim that ‘Maori’ committed the crime. This is of course racist and would justifiably be condemned in any other context. It should equally be condemned in the context of discussions over The Treaty of Waitangi.

    Of course this is not to say that Pakeha and Maori individuals do not have duties to each other. The normal duties to not steal from each other or vandalise each others property, to refrain from rape and assault, etc still apply. These apply because these are general duties laid down by God. I am not bound to fulfil them because some other person signed a contract with a third party. Moreover these have nothing to do with race. I have a duty to not steal from a Maori individual because I have a duty to not steal from any human being. The duty would hold whether the person in question was Maori, Chinese, Persian or Tongan. The duty has nothing to do with a historical event in 1840.

    Nor are my comments meant to deny that one party to The Treaty was treated unjustly and unfairly by the other. There is probably good historical evidence that they were. My comments simply point out who the parties in question are. They are not Maori and Pakeha. They were the Crown and certain Maori groups.

    By all means let’s have a discussion about what the Crown should do to honour its obligations under The Treaty. I have no problem with the idea that a state should keep its obligations to other states and parties. I have no problem with the idea that government should both protect and respect the property rights of its citizens regardless of their race. I also have no problem with courts demanding the state compensate its victims if it can be proven in a court of law that the state has not done these things – one of the insidious features of the former government was its continual rejection of these principles. But stop suggesting that Maori and Pakeha are “partners” under The Treaty and that they and private individuals have obligations under it. They do not. As Dr Martin Luther King said, individuals should be judged by the content of their character not the colour of their skin.

  • Brink on Dialectical Equilibrium

    In my last two posts, I have criticised David Brink’s appeal to scripture in order to argue against the appeal to divine commands in ethics. Brink anticpates the kind of argument I have offered and states,

    A common theistic response to these interpretative puzzles is to endorse the interpretation of tradition and scripture that yields the morally more defensible conception of divine will. This moralized approach to interpretation makes good sense for the theist … God’s omnscience and perfect goodness ensure that his will perfectly tracks all morally relevant facts. But, on this conception of interpretation, so far from our knowledge of God’s will supplying evidence about the nature of morality, it is our beliefs about the nature of morality that are supplying evidence about God’s will. The moralized interpretation of religious scripture and tradition shows religion to be dependent on morality, rather than morality dependent on religion.1

    Brink raises several issues here. First, he refers to a “moralized” interpretation of scripture. As I noted in my previous posts, however, it was not primarily moral concerns that motivated this interpretation of The Torah, it was also such things as understanding the Genre, the context, the cultural milleniu into which The Torah speaks. That said, I do agree with Brink that if one interpretation of divine commands coheres better with our moral intiutions than another then that fact constitutes evidence for the former interpretation. All else being equal, an interpretation that coheres with out pre-theoritical moral intuitions is always preferable.

    Second, Brink assumes that his conception makes “religion to be dependent on morality, rather then morality to be dependent on religion.” By dependent here, Brink means epistemologically dependent, adopting it that “so far from our knowledge of God’s will supplying evidence about the nature of morality, it is our beliefs about the nature of morality that are supplying evidence about God’s will.” Brink’s contention is that if I rely on my antecedant moral beliefs to test purported interpretations of God’s will then religion is (epsitemically) dependent on morality. I think Brink is mistaken. in fact this claim contradicts the very method that he advocates in constructing a secular ethical theory.

    In setting out his methodology, Brink draws a distinction between particular moral claims “as in the claim that it would be wrong for Ben to break his promise to Sam” and rules “as in the claim that one ought to keep one’s promises.”2 Brink distinguishes rules from principles which are more general still.3 Brink suggests that there may be “a plurality” of basic principles or “there might be only one master principle, such as the principle of utilitity-which demands that one ought to perform actions that promote human happiness-or Kant’s categorical imperative-which demands that one always treat rational agents as ends in themselves and never merely as means.”4 Brink goes on to note that there is an asymetrical dependence relationship between moral claims at these levels. Particular moral actions are made right or wrong in virtue of general rules, and general rules are made right and wrong in virtue of principles.

    Brink goes on to note, correctly, that this does not entail that we always gain knowledge of what is wrong in the particular case from our knowledge of what is wrong in more general cases. Brink notes that “asymetrical metaphysical dependence does not imply asymetrical epsitemic dependence” this is of course entirely correct; I made the same point in my post, On a Common Equivocation. Brink states that in some instances he is more certain that “the holocaust was wicked” than he is “about the truth of utilitarianism or Kant’s categorical imperative.” One way to determine which principles are correct is to test them against particular cases.

    Brink affirms that “this conclusion suggests a methodology for secular moral theory”5 which is that,

    We can try to resolve uncertainty or disagreement at more particular levels of moral thought by trying to find plausible or common ground at a more general level. But we can also try and resolve uncertainty or disagreement at a more general level by testing the implications of a potential moral principle for particular case against our own independent assesment of those cases.6

    Brink refers to this method as “dialectical equilibrium,”7

    If a principle has counter intuitive implications, this counts against it. But if this counter intuitive implication is fairly isolated, and the principle explains our views better than alternative principles, then this is reason to revise the particular moral judgment or moral rule that conflicted with the principle. Ideally, we modify our principle, considered moral convictions, and other views in response to conflicts, as coherence seems to require, until our ethical views are in dialectical equilibrium…. As such, we have some reasonable expectation that any acceptable theory should accommodate many of our considered moral convictions. On the other hand, dialectical equilibrium is an ideal that none of us now meets and we can at most approximate. Therefore, we should expect dialectical equilibrium to force some revisions in our moral beliefs, and its hard to say in advance just how revisionary the moral principles with the best dialectical fit would be.8 [Emphasis added]

    Note that dialectical equilibrium allows our antecedant moral judgements to test, revise and correct theoritical beliefs about the nature of morality. But it also allows theoritical beliefs to correct one’s moral judgements. Brink insists on this fact, a moral theory must accommodate many of our considered judgements but he also acknowledges that we would expect a moral theory to also force revisions of some of them. Moreover, one cannot say in advance “how revisionary the moral principles with the best dialectical fit would be.”

    Now I think something like what Brink proposes here is probably correct and something like this method is widely accepted ethical methodology. What Brink seems to not notice, however, is that this methodology is inconsistent his contention of a “moralized interpretation of religious scripture and tradition shows religion to be dependent on morality, rather than morality to be dependent on religion.” Suppose, as Brink points out, people do rely on their antecedant moral beliefs to test and revise purported interpretations of what God commands. This is quite compatible with them also using beliefs about God’s commands to “force revision” of their antecedant moral beliefs. In fact, on Brink’s account, this is compatible with substantive revision of our antecedant moral beliefs on the basis of God’s commands. In many instances then, one’s knowledge of God’s commands will be prior to and the basis for one’s knowledge of right and wrong.

    1 David O Brink “The Autonomy of Ethics” The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 159.
    2 Ibid 155.
    3 Ibid.
    4 Ibid.
    5 Ibid 156.
    6 Ibid.
    7 Ibid.
    8 Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 1
    Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 2

  • Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 2

    In Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 1 I suggested that the capital sanctions found in The Torah in most cases were not intended to be carried out, that instead there operated an implicit assumption that a person who committed a serious crime had forfeited their life and hence was to pay a ransom as decided by the courts as a substitute. One area where this claim seems to make particular sense is in the laws governing adultery that occur in the book of Deuteronomy.

    In the article I cited in the previous post, David Brink, addresses Deuteronomy 22: 13-21. Brink claims this teaches “that the community can and should stone to death any women whose husband finds she was not a virgin on her wedding night.”

    I’ll start with two minor points. First, Brink assumes that this is addressed to “the community,” by which I assume he means contemporary communities. This is false; it is addressed to ancient Israel’s community as any reading of the opening chapters of Deuteronomy clearly show. How The Mosaic Law relates to contemporary Christians is a detailed and vexed topic of biblical hermenutics yet Brink ignores the issues and simply assumes that it addresses us directly.

    Second, this text deals with adultery and not pre-marital sex. As Gordon Wenham notes pre-marital sex is addressed a few lines later in Deuteronomy 22: 28-29.[1] Wenham notes that the case Brink cites (Dt 22:13-21) deals with adultery.[2] In ANE law, betrothal was considered a binding marriage; women were betrothed young and often some time before they consummated the marriage. This case deals with betrothed women who after betrothal and prior to consummation has sex with a third party. As I note in footnote 15, this is a minor point. I am sure Brink is not allayed by the fact that she is to be executed for adultery as opposed to pre-marital sex, his problem is clearly execution related; that said, it is important that one not exaggerate what the text says.

    Third, as I argued in Part I, when The Torah prescribes that a person be executed, the implict assumption is that this will not be carried out but some lesser financial penalty will be inflicted as a ransom. This seems to be borne out by an examination of this law.

    Brink refers to Deuteronomy 22:13-21, in particular “if … the charge is true and no proof of the girl’s virginity can be found … the men of her town shall stone her to death.” What Brink does not focus on is the sentence if the charges prove to be false; if the husband is simply slandering his bride. In this instance the husband suffers three penalties, first he is subjected to some unspecified punishment which would be at the discretion of the court. It is clear that this is not execution because the text assumes that he will continue to be married to the women in the future. Second the husband shall pay “100 shekels of silver” to the father and lose his right to divorce. Wenham explains the rationale for this price:

    The husband claims that by giving him a dud wife (for his 50 shekels) his father in law had in effect stolen the sum from him. Two legal principles are therefore applicable those dealing with theft and false witness. The penalty for theft of deposited property is double restitution according to Ex xii7. But according to Deut xix19 and other ancient near eastern laws false witnesses were punished with the punishment the accused would have suffered if substantiated”[3]

    This explains the 100 shekels; the problem is that it raises an issue which Wenham is aware of. “[A]ccording to Deut xix19 false witnesses were punished with the punishment the accused would have suffered if substantiated.” If this law meant that substantiation of the husband’s accusation would actually result in the execution of his wife then the failure to substantiate his claim would mean that the husband would be executed, but he is not. Apart from the fine to the father, his other punishment is an unspecified punishment (which is not execution) and loss of his right to divorce. It appears then that the actual execution of the woman was not envisaged. Wenham suggests then a substitute must have been envisaged in this text if it was to be read as coherent and consistent with the other laws in Deuteronomy.

    This conclusion seems to be strengthened by several other passages that deal with the same topic. Two chapters later, Deuteronomy 24:1-5, The Torah deals with a case where a man divorces his wife, “who becomes displeasing to him because he finds something indecent about her.” This same passage is cited by Jesus in the synoptic gospels. David Instone-Brewer has argued, convincingly, that the reference to “something indecent” is interpreted by Christ as referring to adultery.[4] This passage then deals with the same situation as Deuteronomy 24; the text tells us she is divorced and by implication loses her mohar money but is silent on any other punishment. However, the woman is clearly not executed as she marries another man in v 2. This makes sense if the capital sanctions for adultery function as admonitory devices and in practice, a ransom was made as a substitute (possibly alongside a lesser sentence) but it does not make sense if a women who was discovered to have committed adultery by her husband was required to be executed.

    A similar picture emerges in a second passage Wenham cites. In the book of proverbs the author warns his son about adultery and refers to the judicial consequences that will ensue if he does not heed this warning.[5] It is clear that a ransom substitute is envisaged, moreover, it suggests that if the husband refuses to accept a ransom payment the adulterer will suffer blows and disgrace, note that execution is not envisaged. In fact, the discussions in Proverbs suggest the consequences will be financial loss and social ostracism. This all makes sense on the hypothesis mentioned in Part 1 but does not make sense if adultery was in fact punished by death. Wenham notes this point and draws the conclusion that in Deuteronomy 22:13-21 the law envisaged a substitute.

    In conclusion, sceptics like David Brink often cite passages like Deuteronomy 22:13-21 in horror to discredit Christianity. However, they erroneously assume superficial literalistic renditions of the passages in question. In this instance, the genre of the passage, in light of the common ANE legal practices and customs suggests that capital sanctions function as a kind of hyperbole and in practice a ransom was paid and the punishment mitigated.

    This practice is implicitly assumed in many of the Old Testament laws about homicide. Further, reading it this way renders the laws in Deuteronomy consistent with each other and with the reference to adultery in the book of Proverbs. I will add finally, that it also coheres better with our moral intuitions in the way a literalistic reading does not.

    [1] In “Bethulah: A Girl of Marriageable Age,” Vetus Testamentum 22 (1972) 326-348, Gordon Wenham points out that the same law is also spelled out in Exodus 22:15 and it is treated as a relatively minor offense; the penalty is simply that the man must pay the “mohar” to the bride’s father. A mohar was security money (50 shekels) that the groom paid to the bride’s father. It was held in trust for the woman in case the man later abandoned her or divorced her without just cause. See the discussion in David Instone Brewer Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible: The Social and Literary Context (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).
    [2] Wenham “Bethulah: A Girl of Marriageable Age.”
    [3] Ibid 332.
    [4] Brewer
    Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible.
    [5] Proverbs 6.


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    Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 1