Category: Sunday Study

  • Sunday Study: Paul on Freedom of Conscience – Romans 14

    In the 14th chapter of Paul’s letter to the Romans there is an interesting discussion of strictures relating to the eating of meat. The discussion is interesting because it brings up issues which have application beyond the context Paul addressed. Specifically, Paul affirms in these passages the existence of a prima facie right to freedom of conscience and bases his conclusions on the existence of such a right.

    The context is as follows; under the laws of The Torah, Jews were forbidden to eat various meats that were considered unclean. These laws were laid down in Deuteronomy 15. The Torah, however, permitted Gentiles (non-Jews) to eat any meat that did not have “its lifeblood still in it” (probably meaning that the meat must be cut from an animal that is dead and not from a living animal). Both Jews and Gentiles were also commanded to refrain from idolatry.

    In the book of Acts we read that the first century Church contained both Jews and Gentiles and the food laws became a source of some contention. As I argued in a previous post series Sunday Study: Did Christ Abolish the Old Testament Law? Gentiles were not required to obey the entire law of Moses but were required to follow those laws, laid down in The Torah, which were considered to be binding on both Jew and Gentile.  Hence, Gentiles were permitted to eat any kind of meat. However, at the same time Gentiles were commanded to refrain from idolatry.

    This factor was complicated by the fact that, in the Gentile world, meat eating was often associated with idolatry. This could occur in two ways; first, it was common for public community meals to be held in the temple. A sacrifice to an idol was made and the meal formally devoted to a pagan deity. Paul condemns taking part in this kind of meal in 1st Corinthians 10:13-20 and in the apostolic decree recorded in Acts 15. The second way eating meat could be associated with idolatry was much more indirect. After a sacrifice had taken place any meat left over would be sold to merchants and then on-sold in the market place as normal meat. It was difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether meat purchased in the market had come from meat that had been part of a sacrifice (in its original killing devoted to idols). It appears evident from Paul’s epistles (Romans 14, 1 Corinthans 9-10) that some Christians believed that any meat eating was idolatrous, even if it was not eaten in a formal religious ceremony but merely bought at the market and eaten in a context where a Christian ate it in his own home and gave thanks to God for it. Such people, therefore, ate “only vegetables.” (Romans 14:2)

    Paul’s response to the problem is nuanced; three things need to be noted. First, Paul quite emphatically states that those who forbade the eating of meat per se were wrong. Paul stated, “As one who is in the Lord Jesus, I am fully convinced that no food is unclean in itself.” (v14) Further he argues that eating meat was not idolatrous because it did not take place in an idolatrous context. The believer who eats meat “eats to the Lord, for he gives thanks to God;” (v6) far from the meal being a sacrificial meal devoted to Zeus or Apollo it was a meal eaten in a Christian home out of gratitude and devotion to God. Paul goes so far as to suggest that those who abstain from eating all meat possess a faith that is “weak.” (v2)

    Second, Paul goes on to suggest that even though there is nothing wrong with eating meat, a person who eats meat who believes it is wrong, nevertheless, sins.  Paul states “I am fully convinced that no food is unclean in itself. But if anyone regards something as unclean, then for him it is unclean.” (v14) He goes on to state “But the man who has doubts is condemned if he eats, because his eating is not from faith; and everything that does not come from faith is sin.” (v23)

    Paul here seems to be drawing a distinction between objective and subjective duties. An objective duty is what our duty is in reality or actuality. A subjective duty, on the other hand, is what a person believes that their duty is. Obviously these two need not coincide, sometimes people mistakenly think that a particular action is permissible when it is not and similarly, a person can mistakenly believe they have a duty to perform an action when in fact they do not have such a duty.  Paul’s point is that while eating meat violates no objective duty, it is contrary to the subjective duties of those who believe God prohibits such conduct.

    This raises an interesting question. Why should we be concerned about a person who violates their subjective duties? After all, if there is, in fact, no objective duty to not eat meat then this person is, in reality, doing nothing wrong at all; he thinks he is, but his thought is mistaken, why would this be a problem?

    Something like this line of thought was expressed by Augustine of Hippo in the fourth century and was addressed by Aquinas some 800 years later. Aquinas starts by summarising Augustine’s inference,

    According to Augustine, the command of a lower authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority: for instance, if a provincial governor command something that is forbidden by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes proposes what is against the command of a higher power, namely, God Whose power is supreme. Therefore the decision of an erring reason does not bind. Consequently the will is not evil if it be at variance with erring reason.[1]

    By erring reason, Aquinas meant a mistaken deliverance of conscience; in other words, a subjective duty that did not correspond with an objective obligation. Aquinas’s response is straightforward,

    The saying of Augustine holds good when it is known that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the command of the higher authority. But if a man were to believe the command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in scorning the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of the emperor. In like manner if a man were to know that human reason was dictating something contrary to God’s commandment, he would not be bound to abide by reason: but then reason would not be entirely erroneous. But when erring reason proposes something as being commanded by God, then to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment of God.[2]

    Aquinas’s point is that when a person mistakenly believes that a certain action is morally required, they mistakenly believe that God has commanded them to perform the action. If they did not think this, if they believed God had prohibited the action, then they would know the action was wrong and hence it would not be a case of mistaken conscience.  But seeing as the person believes God has commanded the action, to not do it would be at least in terms of one’s mental intention, to spurn God and hence by not doing it, would be culpable. Donagan sums the position up well in his book The Theory of Morality noting the history of theological reflection on this passage. Donagan states,

    they [Christian Theologians] also ruled that an action done against conscience is always culpable A man is not merely held in culpable if he does something impermissible in accordance with his conscience, he is held culpable if he does not. The reason is simple. In acting against conscience, a violation of the moral law must be intended; and such intentions are always culpable, even though, because of the agents erroneous conscience, nothing materially wrong is done.[3]

    Aquinas suggested, correctly I think, that this was Paul’s point. While those weak in the faith have a mistaken conscience, they mistakenly believe God forbids them to not eat meat, their failure to act on this mistaken belief would be culpable and blameworthy. They would in fact be spurning what they believe to be God’s commands and hence sinning if they ate meat.

    Paul’s response to the Roman church then is interesting. He suggests that prima facie even a mistaken conscience should be respected;

    Therefore let us stop passing judgment on one another. Instead, make up your mind not to put any stumbling block or obstacle in your brother’s way. As one who is in the Lord Jesus, I am fully convinced that no food is unclean in itself. But if anyone regards something as unclean, then for him it is unclean. If your brother is distressed because of what you eat, you are no longer acting in love. Do not by your eating destroy your brother for whom Christ died.

    Paul’s basic point here is that it is wrong and contrary to God’s command, to try to pressure or coerce another person to act contrary to their own conscience, even where their conscience is mistaken. In fact, obedience to God requires one to avoid doing activities one knows to be objectively permissible in a context where one knows that doing so is likely to lead to a person being pressured or seduced into acting against their conscience.

    Of course this is only a prima facie obligation; Paul here is addressing a context where the mistake is not a serious one. A person, who fails to eat meat, does nothing seriously wrong and causes no one else any harm. It would be a mistake then to extend Paul’s point to cases where a person mistakenly believed God has commanded them to murder, rape or to commit incest, for example. Clearly there are times when an erroneous conscience must not be respected in this way. Nevertheless, Paul’s point is significant. Prima facie God commands that people respect other people’s moral and religious beliefs and not exert pressure on those people to violate them, even if these beliefs are mistaken. It was this insight of Paul’s that would become the foundation for later discussions of religious tolerance that found their way into the constitutional laws of today’s liberal democracies.


    [1] Summa Theologica II I Q 19 A5.
    [2] Ibid.
    [3] Alan Donagan The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) 136.

  • Sunday Study: The Bible and Rape – A Response to Michael Martin

    A little while ago I wrote a post criticising Michael Martin’s contention that the Bible commands a rape victim to marry her rapist, Does the Bible Teach that a Rape Victim has to Marry her Rapist? To summarise briefly, Martin cited Deuteronomy 22:28-29 and interpreted it as,

    Here the victim of rape is as treated the property of the father. Since the rapist has despoiled the father’s property he must pay a bridal fee. The woman apparently has no say in the matter and is forced to marry the person who raped her. Notice also if they are not discovered, no negative judgment is forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if you rape an unbetrothed virgin, be sure not to get caught.[1]

    In the post I noted that the word translated rape is tapas which simply means “to grab” or “hold;” the term itself is neutral as to whether this involves force. It can be used in a context where it is clear that force is involved but it also can be used in a context where no force is involved. All the text states then is that a virgin is grabbed by a man. I went on to argue that the context provided reasons for thinking that what was envisaged was actually a seduction.

    In discussing this I noted that a few verses prior to this one the text does envisage a rape. In the immediately preceding passage in Deuteronomy 22:23-27, the word chazak is used instead of tapas in reference to a bethrothed woman who screamed for help when a man attempted to have sex with her; chazak suggests a violent seizure.

    In regards to this text, Martin contends that “when rape is condemned in the Old Testament the woman’s rights and her psychological welfare are ignored.”[2] Martin argues

    In the case of the rape of a betrothed virgin in a city, the Bible says that both the rapist and victim should be stoned to death: the rapist because he violated his neighbor’s wife and the victim because she did not cry for help (Deut. 22: 23-25). Again the assumption is that the rapist despoiled the property of another man and so must pay with his life. Concern for the welfare of the victim does not seem to matter. Moreover, it is assumed that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would be heard and rescued. Both of these assumptions are very dubious and sensitive to the contextual aspects of rape.

    On the other hand, according to the Bible, the situation is completely different if the rape occurs in “open country.” Here the rapist should be killed, not the victim. The reason given is that if a woman cried for help in open country, she would not be heard. Consequently, she could not be blamed for allowing the rape to occur. No mention is made about the psychological harm to victim. No condemnation is made of a rapist in open country, let alone in a city, who does not get caught.[3]

    There are several points packed in here. First Martin contends that these passages teach that rape is an offence against a man’s property and do not condemn it out of concern for the woman’s welfare. Second, Martin suggests that the text does not condemn rapists who do not get caught. Third and perhaps most significantly, Martin suggests that the passage makes “dubious” assumptions about rape; it assumes, for example, “that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would be heard and rescued.” [Emphasis added] Martin states that this is something that fails to be sensitive to contextual factors of rape.

    This last point in particular is often emphasised by sceptics. To take a common example, suppose a rapist puts a knife to a woman’s throat and commands her not to scream. If this happens in the city she will not cry out and the passage, so the sceptics allege, will hold the woman unjustly responsible for her own rape.

    I think each of these points are mistaken.

    Turning to the first point, Martin contends that the passage teaches that rape is merely a property offence against the husband and is not concerned with the welfare of the woman. To asses the claim it is worth looking at the passage he refers to,

    If a man happens to meet in a town a virgin pledged to be married and he sleeps with her,24  you shall take both of them to the gate of that town and stone them to death–the girl because she was in a town and did not scream for help, and the man because he violated another man’s wife. You must purge the evil from among you.25  But if out in the country a man happens to meet a girl pledged to be married and rapes her, only the man who has done this shall die.26  Do nothing to the girl; she has committed no sin deserving death. This case is like that of someone who attacks and murders his neighbour, for the man found the girl out in the country, and though the betrothed girl screamed, there was no one to rescue her. (Deuteronomy 22:24-27 NIV)

    Two points need to be noted here. First, the text states that people who rape should be executed (I have argued that capital sanctions like this were not always intended to be taken literally in Capital Punishment in the Old Testament). Martin suggests that the fact that adultery is a capital crime means that this is merely a property offence. He states the “assumption is that the rapist despoiled the property of another man and so must pay with this life.” Actually the converse is true; Christopher Wright notes this point,

    The fact that the legal penalty for the wife who commits adultery is execution weighs strongly against the idea that wives in OT Israel are legally no more than the property of their husbands. If adultery is merely an offence against another man’s “property” why destroy the property as well as punishing the guilty man? Furthermore, it would be quite exceptional, in as much as no other property offence in the OT is punishable by death.[4]

    The second point to note is that Martin’s contention seems to be explicitly contradicted by the text in v 26. In this passage it states that rape is, “This case is like that of someone who attacks and murders his neighbour.” The text compares rape to a violent assault, a murder, not theft.

    Martin’s second point fares no better. Martin seems to argue that the text ignores the “woman’s rights and her psychological welfare” because “no condemnation is made of a rapist in open country, let alone in a city, who does not get caught.” It is hard, however, to see the force of this; all legal codes will only punish people who commit crimes once they are caught. Current New Zealand law on rape, for example, does not punish or condemn people who are not caught, tried and proven guilty of rape. No one thinks that this practice of observing due process is contrary to the rights of rape victims and correctly so, the fact that a woman is the victim of a heinous crime does not automatically cancel out the due process rights of anyone accused of a crime. The same is true here, the law punishes only those caught; if a person has not been caught committing a crime then the state does not know who committed the crime. To call the failure to punish the perpetrator of an unsolved crime a violation of a woman’s rights is hard to take seriously.

    Moreover even if one were to take this line of argument seriously, it proves too much. In Deuteronomy, for example, The Torah refers to a situation where a man has been murdered and the authorities, after careful investigation, cannot determine who committed the crime. The result is that the unknown perpetrator is not punished. Are we to infer from this that The Torah victimises men and treats them as property and expresses a sexist anti-male sentiment?

    This brings us to the final and perhaps most significant point. Martin notes that the law assumes “that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would be heard and rescued. Both of these assumptions are very dubious and sensitive to the contextual aspects of rape.” A rhetorical question will more vividly express this point; what if a women could not cry out, what if the rapist in a city put a knife to a woman’s throat and ordered her not to scream, what if a woman was set upon suddenly and was unable to scream? In these situations the rape occurs in a city and the woman does not scream for help. The above law then seems to teach that she is should be treated as guilty of a serious crime. If this is the case then surely this is insensitive to the rape victim? To have a law that condemns a woman in this situation is to have a law that ignores the specifics of the situation; it, in Martin’s words, ignores the “contextual aspects of rape.”

    I am inclined to agree that if the law condemned a woman in these kinds of contexts it would indeed be unjust. The question needs to be asked, however, is does it? Is it plausible to assume that the law is intended to be applied in such a rigid, a-contextual, fashion?  I think the answer is no.

    Deuteronomy is an Ancient Near Eastern Legal text; it therefore is part of a literary genre from that period of time. We are aware of other texts from the same genre such as the ancient Hittite Laws, Middle Assyrian Laws and Code of Hammurabi, and its important to note that legal codes written in this Genre differ significantly from modern legal codes.  Hiller notes,

    [T]here is no evidence that any collection of Near Eastern laws functioned as a written code that was applied by a strict method of exegesis to individual cases. As far as we can tell, these bodies of laws served educational purposes and gave expression to what was regarded as just in typical cases, but they left considerable latitude to local courts for determining the right in individual suits. They aided local courts without controlling them.[5]

    The same point is made by Raymond Westbrook in his comparative study of Ancient Near Eastern Legal Codes. He notes that such laws “reflect the scribal compilers’ concern for perfect symmetry and delicious irony rather than the pragmatic experience of the law courts.”[6] The method used in legal texts was “to set out principles by the use of often extreme examples.” Christopher Wright calls this “paradigmatic law,” which he explains as “the detailing of specific circumstances with the view to giving judges basic principles and precedents on which to evaluate the great variety of individual cases that may come before them.”[7]

    Once the genre is understood it is not hard to see the flaw in Martin’s argument. Martin assumes that the law is a rigidly literal rule that inflexibly applies to all cases. In fact, the law probably did not function this way nor was it intended to. Instead it functioned as kind of paradigm illustrating a principle. The principle was this; women who have sex with a man are not to be considered adulterers or immoral if they do not consent. If it cannot be established whether a woman consented to a sexual act then she should be presumed innocent. Rape is not adultery, it is rather a serious assault or an attempted murder. At a more general level the case law vividly illustrates the principle that culpability entails consent.


    [1] Michael Martin “Atheism, Christian Theism, and Rape” accessed 27 September 2009.
    [2]
    Ibid.
    [3]
    Ibid.
    [4]
    Christopher Wright International Biblical Commentary: Deuteronomy, (Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 1996 ) 254.
    [5]
    Delbert R Hillers Covenant: the History of a Biblical Idea (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1969).
    [6]
    Raymond Westbrook “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law” in The History of Ancient Near Eastern Law Vol 1 ed Raymond Westbrook (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) 74.
    [7]
    Christopher Wright Deuteronomy 244.

  • Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II

    In a previous post, Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part I, I discussed some translations of the sixth commandment of the Decalogue. I began with the King James Version (KJV), “thou shall not kill.”[1] I looked at problems with this translation most famously raised by Augustine. The New International Version (NIV) and New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) translate the word rasah as “murder” in an attempt to avoid these problems. However, as I noted in my previous post, this translation fails to capture accurately the use of rasah in Hebrew and turns the command into an empty tautology.

    Augustine’s Interpretation
    I want to suggest that an adequate understanding or account of the sixth commandment was suggested by Augustine or at least can be constructed from his writings. In Book One of The City of God, Augustine addressed the question of whether suicide is lawful and concluded that it is not. What is interesting is how Augustine interpreted and applied the sixth commandment in doing this.

    Augustine’s argument against suicide consists of three observations. Firstly, Augustine takes the commandment fairly literally as forbidding homicide. He states, “The commandment is ‘Thou shall not kill man.’”[2] We saw in the last post that there is a sensible basis for this. The term literally means to slay and is predicated only of human beings; further, while in most instances it is used of unjustified killing, it can be used of a lawful execution. The slaying of humans is a common meaning to the different nuances that its use takes in the text.

    The obvious problem for such a reading is that elsewhere the scriptures seem to allow, even command, killing in certain instances. This does not perplex Augustine,

    However, there are some exceptions made by the divine authority to its own law, that men may not be put to death. These exceptions are of two kinds, being justified either by a general law, or by a special commission granted for a time to some individual. And in this latter case, he to whom authority is delegated, and who is but the sword in the hand of him who uses it, is not himself responsible for the death he deals. And, accordingly, they who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in conformity with His laws, have represented in their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, “Thou shalt not kill.”[3]

    Augustine’s answer is straightforward. The universal prohibition is the general rule while the specific commands are the exceptions to this rule. The law prohibits homicide; however, the law must be read in its context and not in isolation and, when this is done, one realises that other commands and prohibitions offer qualifications or exceptions to this general rule.

    There are several reasons for accepting this way of interpreting the sixth commandment. Firstly, it is in other areas a matter of common-sense; as Bahnsen notes,

    Human communication by means of language would come to a grinding halt if it were illegitimate ever to express yourself by way of generalizations which do not explicitly acknowledge qualifications and exceptions. Lawyers may specialize in the fine print of complicated legal contracts, but even they do not speak that way in ordinary discourse. A father who asserts that his son is a fine basketball player is not guilty of falsehood or deception simply because he does not add that, of course, his son has some bad games.

    Generalizations which state an accurate summary or the prevailing principle are not, as generalizations, faulty or inaccurate.[4]

    In fact, not only is this a matter of common-sense, it is a method followed elsewhere in scripture. For example in Exodus 21:12,

    Anyone who strikes a man and kills him shall surely be put to death. However, if he does not do it intentionally, but God lets it happen, he is to flee to a place I will designate. But if a man schemes and kills another man deliberately…

    Here we see a universal principle “Any one who strikes a man and kills him shall be put to death” and then immediately this principle is qualified in the proceeding verses. Moreover, contrary to Bahnsen, this type of writing is common even in legal circles. Even contemporary, legal codes often have a general, universal principle laid down regarding homicide or assault and then add specific exceptions which one can appeal to as a defence to committing actions which fall within the broad definition of the general rule.[5]

    As Madeleine has pointed out to me, the legal maxim ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’ (specific rules override general rules) is still used in legal interpretation today. She said,

    If my lecturer said to the class, I want you to go straight to the library and get started on your assignments but then he said, Madeleine and Matt I want to see you two before you leave he would not be saying that he did not want everyone to go straight to the library and start their assignments just because he gave a specific, contradictory instruction to Matt and I and he wouldn’t be saying that we did not have to go to the library to start our assignments after he had finished speaking to us (once the exception no longer applies) because his specific instructions to us do not override the general instruction to all.[6]

    Secondly, the hermeneutical principle of the analogy of scripture supports this kind of interpretation. We have a general command prohibiting homicide; then we have more specific rules commanding or permitting homicide in certain situations. To interpret the command as absolute and unqualified would be to render the text internally incoherent.

    This leaves two other options; either one understands the general prohibition as the exception to the more specific ones or the specific ones as exceptions to the general rule. The former option is problematic. If a command permitting killing in a certain context is subject to an exception that you can never kill at all then the specific command is redundant and pointless. On the other hand, a general rule that states “do not kill,” except in certain specified circumstances is not redundant. This then seems the more sensible approach.

    A third reason for Augustine’s interpretation follows from a voluntarist understanding of the moral law. In several previous posts I have defended a voluntarist (divine command theory) account of the moral law; one that states that actions are right or wrong in virtue of their being commanded by God. On this account, what is fundamentally wrong about homicide is that it violates the law of God. Now, just as homicide is wrong because it violates the law of God, when God commands or permits homicide in a certain context the very property that makes killing wrong ceases to be present and hence the law is not being broken in that instance. It follows then that the killing in question is not wrong in this instance. This voluntarist understanding of Augustine’s position has a long history and is suggested by Bernard of Clairvaux[7] and Aquinas,[8] as well as those 14th century voluntarists such as Andreas de Novo.[9] Contemporary defenders of this position are Philip Quinn[10] and William Lane Craig.[11]

    Augustine’s position then is to interpret the command as a prohibition on homicide, understanding that in its context it is subject to qualification and exceptions provided elsewhere in the other commands of the law. His basic insight is that the law lays down the general principle “thou shall not kill man;” given that this is the general norm, one is to assume that any given act of homicide is prohibited unless the law elsewhere qualifies this rule or lays down an exception.

    This means that in practice the commandment forbids killing a human being without justification, where justification is construed as an excuse or permission granted by God’s law. In the absence of any other command or permission to the contrary, one should refrain from homicide. In this respect homicide differs from an action that is permissible. One does not need a reason or justification for engaging in a permissible action as one can do it for any reason at all or even no reason. However, because God condemns homicide one needs a reason drawn from the law of God itself before one can engage in it licitly.

    This interpretation clarifies Augustine’s argument that suicide is unlawful. Augustine justifies his conclusion by defending two points. Firstly, “he who kills himself still kills nothing else than man.”[12] Secondly, “It is not without significance, that in no passage of the holy canonical books can there be found either divine precept or permission to take away our own life.”[13] He adds, “in the commandment, ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ there is no limitation added nor any exception made in favor of any one, and least of all in favor of him on whom the command is laid!”[14]

    In other words suicide is homicide and the law does not qualify or grant exclusions to suicide, so suicide is unlawful. It is clear that this inference presupposes the interpretation of the commandment I have defended above. Homicide is unlawful unless the law of God provides grounds or exceptions to the general rule.

    In summation, the sixth commandment offers a general prohibition on homicide. This prohibition is binding unless a specific exception or qualification is found elsewhere in the law of God showing that a particular instance of homicide is licit. The procedure in applying the law is then as follows; first, ascertain whether the action in question is homicide and then ask whether it falls under any lawful exception. If an act is homicide then prima facie it is unlawful and a positive argument from some other command is needed to justify the action if it is to be defensible.


    [1] Exodus 20:13 KJV.
    [2]
    Ibid, 1:20.
    [3]
    Ibid, 1:21.
    [4]
    Greg L Bahnsen “Cross Examination: In Defense of Theonomy” The Counsel of Chalcedon XIV:5-6 (1992).
    [5]
    I am thankful to David Simpkin for bringing this point to my attention.
    [6]
    I am grateful to my wife, Madeleine Flannagan, for sharing this example she developed from Paul Rishworth.
    [7]
    Bernard of Clairvaux On Precept and Dispensation III.6.
    [8]
    Aquinas Summa Theologicae I-II q 800, a. 8, ad 3.
    [9]
    Andrea de Novo Castro Primium Scripturum Sententiarium d 48, q 2, a 2 Concl. 2. I.
    [10]
    Phillip Quinn “The Recent Revival of Divine Command Ethics” Research Philosophy-and Phenomenological Research (Fall 1990) 345-365.
    [11]
    William Lane Craig & Edwin Curley “Does the Christian God Exist?” A debate held at the University of Michigan (5 February 1998).
    [12]
    Augustine City of God 1:21.
    [13]
    Ibid.
    [14]
    Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part I

  • Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part I

    One of the most well known biblical commands is the sixth commandment of the Decalogue (according to protestant enumeration). This commandment occurs in the 20th chapter of the book of Exodus and the fifth chapter of the book of Deuteronomy. In its most well-known rendition, the King James Version (KJV), this commandment states “thou shalt not kill.”[1] The Hebrew term translated as ‘kill’ here is rasah. The New International Version (NIV) and New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) translate it as “murder.”

    Both interpretations, kill and murder, face problems; in this post I will offer critical comments on both interpretations. Next week, in Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II, I will articulate and defend what I think to be the best approach to interpreting this passage, an approach advocated by Augustine of Hippo in the fifth century which has been dominant in Christian ethical thought ever since.

    The King James Version: Thou Shalt not Kill
    As stated, the most known formulation of the sixth commandment is rendered “thou shall not kill.” Taken on its own (and out of its context) this faces problems, some identified as far back as at least the time of Augustine. Eating plants or harvesting food involves killing plants, living creatures. As Augustine notes, “for though this class of creatures has no sensation, yet they also are said to live, and consequently they can die; and therefore, if violence be done them, can be killed.”[2] He then asks rhetorically, “Must we therefore reckon it a breaking of this commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”, to pull a flower?”[3] In fact, modern knowledge brings other perplexities. Scraping the inside of my mouth kills hundreds of living cells. Taking antibiotics kills bacteria. Understood strictly as a prohibition against all killing, the command is manifestly absurd.

    However, contemporary translators have noted that “kill” is not the best English equivalent of rasah, as rasah is not the general Hebrew term for killing. Rather, it is a term that is used only of killing humans; the word literally means “to slay.” For this reason, the N.R.S.V. interprets the noun as “manslay.” However, even as a term for homicide, rasah is comparatively rare in Hebrew. It appears only 46 times in the Hebrew Bible compared with other more frequently-used terms such as harag and hemit,[4] which also refer to killing. It is also not lost on readers of the Hebrew Bible that in many surrounding passages certain forms of homicide are either permitted, such as killing a thief in the night (Ex. 22: 1-2)[5] or even commanded, such as the execution of murderers, (Ex. 21:12).

    The Modern Version: You shall not Murder
    For this reason, most modern translations translate the verb as murder, as we saw in the NRSV and NIV. However, this is inadequate. Childs notes, “it was soon recognised that the basic distinction between murder and killing, namely the factor of intentionality, cannot be sustained for the verb r.s.h.”[6] In several places the verb is used to designate  accidental or unintentional killing. Koheler suggested that it probably prohibited taking the law into one’s own hands and hence had the sense of private killing.[7] However, as Smedes points out,

    As a matter of fact, however, rasah is used at least once for capital punishment (Num. 35:30) and also for accidental manslaughter (Deut. 4:41-43; Josh. 20:3). From a textual point of view, we do not have a clear case for limiting the commandment to private killings or murder.[8]

    One of the more thorough studies is that of Stamm. After analysing several uses of rasah, Stamm concludes that rasah means “illegal killing.” He suggests that the most concise English would be “you shall not manslaughter” which would be clarified along the lines that “the life of an Israelite” was to be protected from “illegal, impermissible violence.”[9]

    Stamm’s analysis is arguably one of the best to date; however, there are a couple of problems with it. Firstly, as Stamm himself admits, rasah is used at least once of a lawful execution and hence does have a range of meaning which includes killing in a context where killing is lawful. Secondly and perhaps frequently less noted, Stamm’s analysis turns the law into a tautology. To claim, “you shall not kill when it is against the law,” is hardly informative and somewhat states the obvious; of course it is wrong to kill when it is illegal. I think that the commandment is supposed to be saying something substantive so I doubt Stamm is completely on the mark here.

    The study of Reventlow modifies Stamm’s position somewhat. Reventlow argues that the vast majority of uses of the verb rasah relate to the idea of “blood vengeance.”[10] This is an idea which has origins in Genesis 4; in some cases of killing the victim’s blood metaphorically cries out to God for vengeance, guilt and responsibility for the crime attaches to the person who committed it, and, in certain circumstances, the land and community in which it occurs. This is atoned for only by the death of the murderer, if the killing was premeditated or the natural death of the high priest, in cases where the killing was accidental or a sacrifice, only in cases where the community authorities are unable to ascertain who is guilty. Milgrom elaborates this motif,

    The most vivid examples of this belief appear in connection with unlawful homicide, where innocent blood (dam naki’; Jonah 1:14) cries out for vengeance (Gen. 4:10). Rejected by the earth (Isa. 26:21; Ezek. 24:7), it attaches itself to the slayer and his family, literally “dancing around their heads”(2 Sam. 3:28-29) for generations (2 Sam. 21:4-6 2 Kings 9:26) and even affecting his city (Deut. 21:1-9; Jer. 26:15), nation (Deut 19:10,13), and land (Num 35:33-34). The latter two citations illustrate the variant grounds that provide the rationale for homicide laws in the Deuteronomic and priestly texts. In the former, the people Israel bear bloodguilt; in the latter, it is the land that is polluted by it. The technical term for bearing bloodguilt damo bo or damo be-ro’sho, meant originally “his blood [remains] on him/on his (the murderer’s) head” (Josh. 2:19; I Kings 2:33; Ezek. 33:5), and the legal formula mot yumat damav bo (Lev 20:9-16) means that in the case of lawful execution, the blood of the guilty victim remains on his own person and does not attach itself to the executioner.[11] [Emphasis original]

    Reventlow suggests that rasah means a homicide liable for blood vengeance. The problem with this analysis is that it appears to get things backwards. A killing is liable for blood vengeance and requires punishment or atonement presumably because it is wrong or unlawful. It is not unlawful because it requires punishment. The commandment must be prior to the ground for blood vengeance not vice versa. This observation also leads to a conclusion that does not really differ from Stamm’s. After all, a killing is liable for blood vengeance only if it is wrong so a killing liable for blood vengeance and an unlawful killing are in fact co-extensive.

    By itself then neither interpretation seems entirely correct. In my next post, Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II, I want to suggest a way of interpreting the passage which avoids the above problems. It is hardly original; it was suggested by Augustine of Hippo in the fifth century.


    [1] Exodus 20:13 KJV.
    [2]
    Augustine The City of God 1:21.
    [3] Ibid.
    [4]
    Johann J. Stamm The Ten Commandments in Recent Research (London: S.C.M. Press, 1967) 98.
    [5]
    This passage is perhaps best illuminated by a passage in Job 24:14, “When daylight is gone, the murderer rises up and kills the poor and needy; in the night he steals forth like a thief.” This suggests that a person who broke in at night could not be distinguished from a person with murderous intent. The law also contrasts with Ancient Near Eastern case law of the same period, which allowed a person to summarily execute a thief caught on his property. The Torah states by contrast, “A thief must certainly make restitution, but if he has nothing, he must be sold to pay for his theft.” Hence, it teaches that a thief cannot be executed for theft; a thief can be killed only if he or she is perceived to be a threat to one’s life. If not, the thief must pay restitution.
    [6]
    Brevard S Childs Exodus: A Commentary (London: SCM Press, 1974) 419-420.
    [7]
    Ibid, 420.
    [8]
    Lewis B Smedes “’Respect for Human Life’ Thou Shall not Kill” in On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics Ed. Stephen E Lammers & Allen Verhey (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987) 144.
    [9]
    Stamm The Ten Commandments in Recent Research 99.
    [10]
    Childs Exodus 420.
    [11]
    Jacob Milgrom Numbers: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the new JPS Translation (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1990) 509.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II

  • Sunday Study R 13: Romans, Revelations and the Role of the State

    In a previous post, Sunday Study: 666 The Number of the Beast, I exegeted Revelation 13’s infamous reference to the mark of the beast, in that post I argued that the first beast is a reference to Rome; a world empire, built on seven hills that ruled over all the nations of the earth at the time of John’s writing. The historical context of the book was the emperor cult; the roman state, in the person of the emperor, was considered a god and was to be worshiped. The reference to 666 (616 in some early manuscripts) was probably a Jewish literary technique known as gematria applied to Nero Caesar, who was the sixth roman emperor after the “Five” [who] have fallen”; and hence; is the one “who is.” In its historical and literary context then Revelation 13 was exhorting Christians, who lived during the Neroian persecution, to resist the emperor, to refuse to worship the state as divine and to resist Christian or Jewish religious authorities who encouraged them to do so. To see my full argument for these conclusions, readers should read the linked post above; here I simply want to revisit one important point that occurs in the text;

    And the dragon stood on the shore of the sea. And I saw a beast coming out of the sea. He had ten horns and seven heads, with ten crowns on his horns, and on each head a blasphemous name. The beast I saw resembled a leopard, but had feet like those of a bear and a mouth like that of a lion. The dragon gave the beast his power and his throne and great authority.(Re 13:1-2)

    The first beast, the roman emperor, is said to get its “power,” “great authority” and “throne” from the dragon. The imagery of the dragon is explained later in Rev 20 as “that ancient serpent, who is the devil, or Satan.” The text then explicitly states that the Roman Empire and the emperor’s authority, was satanic. While space does not allow me a full treatment here, the text goes on to predict the destruction of the Roman Empire and those who support it.

    Why the excursus into apocalyptic literature? Because it is important to put in context another, more well known passage, which is widely quoted; the locus classicus passage on obedience to the state in Romans,

    Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and he will commend you. For he is God’s servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also because of conscience. This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are God’s servants, who give their full time to governing. Give everyone what you owe him: If you owe taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then revenue; if respect, then respect; if honor, then honor. (Romans 13:1-7)

    The contrast here is important, in both Revelation 13 and Romans 13 we have a reference to the roman emperor. In Romans the emperor’s authority has been established by God and he is a servant (minister) of God, Christians are called to submit, obey and to not resist the state. In Revelations 13 the Roman emperor and empire is said to gain its authority from Satan, is implicitly said to be a minister of Satan and Christians are called to not submit to or obey its demands to absolute obedience and worship.

    The contrast is fairly evidently explained by the different contexts the passages occur in. The book of Romans was written around 55-57 AD; this puts it just after the death of Claudius and during the early part of Nero’s reign. During this time, Nero was strongly influenced by Seneca the Younger and Barrus and his rule was widely considered to be competent and relatively enlightened. Revelation 13 is written later, after the great fire of Rome in 64 AD where Nero had transformed into the infamous persecuting, brutal, power-hungry tyrant he is immortalised as.

    Similarly, the specific literary context makes the differences clear. In Romans 13, after commanding Christians to submit to authority, the text goes on to give reasons as to why Christians are to do this, “He [the state] is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also because of conscience.” The reason we submit out of conscience i.e due to a moral requirement, is because the state is God’s servant and this is explicated as “an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer.” The context makes this clear when after spelling out that governments are God’s servants the text explicates this as “he [the state] is God’s servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer.” In other words, the government acts as an agent of God in its function of commending good and punishing evil.

    Revelation 13, however, is not talking about the emperor punishing wrongdoing and commending good;

    The dragon gave the beast his power and his throne and great authority…. Men worshiped the dragon because he had given authority to the beast, and they also worshiped the beast and asked, “Who is like the beast? Who can make war against him?” The beast was given a mouth to utter proud words and blasphemies and to exercise his authority for forty-two months. He opened his mouth to blaspheme God, and to slander his name and his dwelling place and those who live in heaven. He was given power to make war against the saints and to conquer them. And he was given authority over every tribe, people, language and nation. All inhabitants of the earth will worship the beast–all whose names have not been written in the book of life belonging to the Lamb that was slain from the creation of the world. (Rev 13)

    Here the context is quite different; rome is a world empire, which makes war against other nations and through violence gains dominion over every tribe, nation and language. It is a state that demands worship and absolute obedience and which persecutes and murders innocent people. In this context, Christians are called to resist it and its authority is said to be from the dragon.

    This is vitally important because some people apparently misinterpret Romans 13 to support absolute dictatorship. A correspondent of Madeleine’s once wrote the following,

    “Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established.” To be blunt the above makes me feel sick. I don’t think the Nazi regime, or fascist Italy can be compared to the individualism that occurred in the birth of the United States. How can you hold these in the same regard under the excuse that they’re established by God? The only bromidial, evasive and ludicrous comeback that the victims under those totalitarian regimes got was “its God’s purpose and plan” even if you don’t understand it just have faith and follow Christ.

    Madeleine’s correspondent here interprets Romans 13 to teach that dictatorships and totalitarian regimes are instituted by God and are morally on par with limited governments. He also seemed to think that throughout history Christian theologians have never addressed this issue but have just told people to “have faith and follow Christ” in the face of being governed by dictators and tyrants.

    Apart from the flawed understanding of the history of theology, the author here misunderstands the passage. Romans 13 needs to be read next to Revelation 13. When one does this one sees that the picture is quite different. Romans 13 says that states that use force, “the sword,” to punish the guilty and to defend the innocent act as Gods agents and hence, have legitimate authority which must be respected. Revelation 13 states that when states grossly exceed their mandate like the Nazi unjust conquest of other nations, persecution of the innocent and Hitler’s deification of the state are not exercising a legitimate, God given, authority but rather are portrayed as something satanic.

  • Sunday Study: Does the Bible Teach that Children Should be Executed for Swearing?

    One command in the Old Testament which is frequently lampooned by sceptical readers is Leviticus 20:9,

    If anyone curses his father or mother, he must be put to death. He has cursed his father or his mother, and his blood will be on his own head.

    Some contend that that this passage commands the courts to execute small children who swear at their parents. Given such a command would be harsh and disproportionate, it is inferred the Old Testament here teaches something unjust and absurd.

    There are several assumptions behind this reading of the Old Testament. First, it assumes the text is referring to the actions of children. Second, it assumes that the word “curse” refers to “swearing” at someone. Third, it assumes that the text constitutes a command to the courts to execute those who do this, which it is intended that the courts will carry out.

    In a previous series, Capital Punishment in the Old Testament, I have addressed the third assumption; I noted that capital sanctions in the Old Testament were probably not intended to be carried out by the courts, rather they served an admonitory function and in practice the courts substituted capital punishment for a monetary fine to be paid to the victim. I also think the first assumption is questionable, though in this post I will not pursue this line of argument, instead I want to address the assumption at hand, the idea that “cursing,” when this word is used in the Old Testament, refers to swearing at someone.

    The Hebrew word translated “curse” here is qalal which basically means to “despise or treat with contempt.” By itself this is somewhat vague and context is needed to determine what exactly it refers to. In their commentary on Exodus, Jonathan Walton and Victor Matthews note, “Contrary to the NIV translation, studies have shown that the infraction here is not cursing but treating with contempt. This is a more general category and would certainly include the prohibition of 21:15 which forbids striking a parent.” They go on to note that the commandment is intended to ensure, “that each subsequent generation provide their parents with the respect, food and protection they deserve.” The studies Walton and Matthews refer to are comparative studies of the Pentateuch with other ancient near eastern legal codes, which provide interesting information about the cultural and legal context into which the Old Testament spoke. Walton and Matthews note how “contempt for parents” was understood in ancient near eastern codes such as the Code of Hammurabi and various Sumerian laws. According to the case law of the time, contempt for one’s parents involved such things as disowning them when they were old and physically assaulting them; it was considered a serious legal matter.

    This understanding of the word “curse” is borne out by its use elsewhere in scripture. In the proto-history flood story God states, “I will never again curse the ground for man’s sake, although the imagination of man’s heart is evil from his youth; nor will I again destroy every living thing as I have done.” Here “curse” is clearly not God swearing at the ground; the idea is that God treated the land with contempt by flooding it.

    In Gen 12, God tells Abram, “I will bless those who bless you, And I will curse him who curses you; And in you all the families of the earth shall be blessed.” Here again the issue is not merely swearing; the word curse is antithetical to the word bless and the context tells us that Abram will bless all nations, this blessing involves bring salvation to the Gentiles. When the word “curse” is being used here then the idea is of people who express contempt for Israel by trying to harm them.

    Perhaps the clearest example is seen in a similar context which occurs only a few verses before the one in Leviticus 20:4, this is the use of the word “curse” in Lev 19:14, “You shall not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling block before the blind, but shall fear your God: I am the LORD.” Here cursing the deaf is condemned; the word translated “curse” is the same word used in Leviticus 20:4 and the context, grammar and genre are sufficiently similar to suggest the word is being used the same way. Yet it is evident, I think, that the word “curse” here does not mean swearing; the reason for this conclusion is that the command to “not curse the deaf” occurs alongside another command to not “put a stumbling block in front of the blind.” Given a blind person cannot see, putting a stumbling block in front of them could cause them to trip, fall and injure themselves. Hence, what is being condemned is an attempt to cause a person an injury. Hence, the command to “not curse the deaf” occurs alongside a command to not attempt to injure the blind.

    What makes this significant is that, frequently in Hebrew literature, writers will use a method of parallelism whereby two clauses are placed side by side that have a similar meaning. It is clear from an examination of Leviticus 19 that a type of parallelism is being utilised in this chapter, consider the following examples from the immediate context,

    10 Do not go over your vineyard a second time or pick up the grapes that have fallen. Leave them for the poor and the alien. I am the LORD your God.

    12 Do not swear falsely by my name and so profane the name of your God. I am the LORD.

    13 Do not defraud your neighbor or rob him. Do not hold back the wages of a hired man overnight.

    15 Do not pervert justice; do not show partiality to the poor or favoritism to the great, but judge your neighbor fairly.

    16 Do not go about spreading slander among your people. Do not do anything that endangers your neighbor’s life. I am the LORD.

    18 Do not seek revenge or bear a grudge against one of your people, but love your neighbor as yourself. I am the LORD.

    In each instance above what is prohibited in the first half of the verse is the same type of action which is prohibited in the second half. In fact, in most cases what comes in the second half explains and illuminates what is forbidden in the first half. In v 10 what occurs side by side are gleaning and taking all the grapes from ones field leaving none for the poor. In v 13 defrauding is a kind of robbing and it is evident that the issue is withholding pay. In v 15 showing partiality to the poor is condemned then favouring the wealthy is too. In v 16 spreading slander is condemned alongside endangering a neighbours life (the concern with slander relates to the bearing false witness in a capital crime, which allows us to see the parallel here). In v 18 bearing a grudge and taking revenge are juxtaposted. The immediate context then suggests that when two commands occur side by side in the manner they do in v 14 that the commands address the same basic fundamental issue. Treating the disabled with contempt (cursing them) involves actions such as attempting to injure or harm them.

    Two other lines of evidence suggest this; the first is the command in Leviticus 20:9, which is a repetition of the same command in Exodus 21, “If anyone curses his father or mother, he must be put to death. He has cursed his father or his mother, and his blood will be on his own head.” It is interesting to see the context that this law occurs in,

    Anyone who strikes a man and kills him shall surely be put to death. However, if he does not do it intentionally, but God lets it happen, he is to flee to a place I will designate. But if a man schemes and kills another man deliberately, take him away from my altar and put him to death. Anyone who attacks his father or his mother must be put to death. Anyone who kidnaps another and either sells him or still has him when he is caught must be put to death. Anyone who curses his father or mother must be put to death. “If men quarrel and one hits the other with a stone or with his fist and he does not die but is confined to bed, the one who struck the blow will not be held responsible if the other gets up and walks around outside with his staff; however, he must pay the injured man for the loss of his time and see that he is completely healed. “If a man beats his male or female slave with a rod and the slave dies as a direct result, he must be punished, but he is not to be punished if the slave gets up after a day or two, since the slave is his silver.” If men who are fighting hit a pregnant woman and she gives birth prematurely but there is no serious injury, the offender must be fined whatever the woman’s husband demands and the court allows. But if there is serious injury, you are to take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.” If a man hits a manservant or maidservant in the eye and destroys it, he must let the servant go free to compensate for the eye. (Ex 21:12-26)

    The command to, “put to death” a person “who curses his father or mother,” occurs in the midst of a series of commandments that all deal with violent assaults on other people. All the immediate verses deal with contempt expressed in violence in the form of assault, kidnapping or homicide. Clearly, the kind of contempt being expressed here is, if one takes the context seriously, more than simply a verbal insult.

    The second and perhaps for Christians, more important line of evidence is that Christ himself cites this passage. In Matthew 15 Christ is challenged by the Pharisees as to why he does not follow certain oral traditions about washing. His response is to go on the counter attack,

    Jesus replied, “And why do you break the command of God for the sake of your tradition? For God said, ‘Honor your father and mother’ and ‘Anyone who curses his father or mother must be put to death.’But you say that if a man says to his father or mother, ‘Whatever help you might otherwise have received from me is a gift devoted to God,’ he is not to ‘honor his father ‘ with it. Thus you nullify the word of God for the sake of your tradition. (Matthew 15:3-6)

    Here Jesus cites the command about not cursing one’s parents and applies it not to swearing but to attempts to escape the duty to provide for one’s aged parents by devoting the money to the temple. Jesus contends that traditions that sanction such subterfuge violate the command to not curse one’s parents. He clearly understands the command in terms of contempt and in terms of the kind of case law Walton and Matthews refer to. It is worth bearing in mind that in an ancient society like this, with no state superannuation, failure to provide for one’s parents in their old age could have terrible results. Hence, far from being unjust or absurd the commandment is quite understandable.

    [1] Jonathan Walton and Victor Matthews “The IVP Bible Background Commentary: Genesis Deuteronomy” (Downers Grove Il: Intervarsity Press) 112.
    [2] Ibid 113.

  • Sunday Study: 666 The Number of the Beast

    On 29 March 1982 Iron Maiden released the album The Number of the Beast; this album’s self-titled song was to become one of the most influential heavy metal songs of all time and stirred up a firestorm of controversy. Apparently Iron Maiden’s bassist, Steve Harris, had been up late one night watching Damian: Omen II, which is a fictional movie about a boy called Damian who is the predicted anti-christ and has 666 tattooed into his head. The movie caused Harris to have a nightmare which inspired the lyrics. Iron Maiden’s song in many ways epitomises how the book of Revelation is understood in contemporary culture. The idea is that it predicts a future person, the anti-christ, who will take over the world. Associated with this person is the number 666 which is literally tattooed into people’s heads or (in more sophisticated versions) is placed inside the code of a micro-chip which is placed in people’s hands and foreheads or is encoded in barcodes. The inspiration for this story is the picture of two beasts described in the 13th chapter of Revelation. In this post I want to argue that this picture is mistaken and that what the two beasts tell us is something very different to Iron Maiden’s imagery but something nevertheless important.

    The first beast is introduced in chapter 13,

    And the dragon stood on the shore of the sea. And I saw a beast coming out of the sea. He had ten horns and seven heads, with ten crowns on his horns, and on each head a blasphemous name. The beast I saw resembled a leopard, but had feet like those of a bear and a mouth like that of a lion. The dragon gave the beast his power and his throne and great authority. One of the heads of the beast seemed to have had a fatal wound, but the fatal wound had been healed. The whole world was astonished and followed the beast. Men worshiped the dragon because he had given authority to the beast, and they also worshiped the beast and asked, “Who is like the beast? Who can make war against him?”

    The second beast is introduced a few verses later.

    Then I saw another beast, coming out of the earth. He had two horns like a lamb, but he spoke like a dragon. He exercised all the authority of the first beast on his behalf, and made the earth and its inhabitants worship the first beast, whose fatal wound had been healed. And he performed great and miraculous signs, even causing fire to come down from heaven to earth in full view of men. Because of the signs he was given power to do on behalf of the first beast, he deceived the inhabitants of the earth. He ordered them to set up an image in honor of the beast who was wounded by the sword and yet lived. He was given power to give breath to the image of the first beast, so that it could speak and cause all who refused to worship the image to be killed. He also forced everyone, small and great, rich and poor, free and slave, to receive a mark on his right hand or on his forehead, so that no one could buy or sell unless he had the mark, which is the name of the beast or the number of his name. This calls for wisdom. If anyone has insight, let him calculate the number of the beast, for it is man’s number. His number is 666.

    Most English translations mention the number 666, this is an accurate translation of the number contained in many Greek manuscripts of the New Testament; lesser known, is that some manuscripts contain the number 616 (the significance of this will be explored later). Here I will simply note that the passages quoted above clearly contain imagery; no one, to my knowledge, understands them to refer to an actual seven-headed monster.

    What is less appreciated is that in this type of genre, an ancient style of writing called Apocalyptic writings, much of the imagery is well known and can fairly straightforwardly be interpreted. I cannot go into everything here so will sketch a few highlights. The first beast is said to [1] get its authority from the dragon, [2] resemble a leopard, a bear and a lion, [3] have 7 heads and 10 horns, we know also that [4] everyone will worship this beast and no one can defeat it in battle. I will suggest that when one examines this imagery, by looking at its use elsewhere in the same genre, one can get a reasonably accurate picture of what the author is getting at.

    The first point [1] is fairly straightforward. The dragon, is identified as “the ancient serpent.” The allusion here is to the story of Adam and Eve in the first three chapters of Genesis; there the serpent is a crafty creature that tempts Adam and Eve to try to be like God and encourages them to disobey God’s commands. The imagery in [2] is also familiar, the picture comes from the book of Daniel,

    Daniel said: “In my vision at night I looked, and there before me were the four winds of heaven churning up the great sea. Four great beasts, each different from the others, came up out of the sea. “The first was like a lion, and it had the wings of an eagle. I watched until its wings were torn off and it was lifted from the ground so that it stood on two feet like a man, and the heart of a man was given to it. “And there before me was a second beast, which looked like a bear. It was raised up on one of its sides, and it had three ribs in its mouth between its teeth. It was told, ‘Get up and eat your fill of flesh!’ “After that, I looked, and there before me was another beast, one that looked like a leopard. And on its back it had four wings like those of a bird. This beast had four heads, and it was given authority to rule.” After that, in my vision at night I looked, and there before me was a fourth beast–terrifying and frightening and very powerful. It had large iron teeth; it crushed and devoured its victims and trampled underfoot whatever was left. It was different from all the former beasts, and it had ten horns.

    The picture here is very similar to that in Rev 13 except here there are four beasts, whereas the first beast in the book of Revelation is a composite of all of them; the imagery is explicitly interpreted and explained by Daniel;

    I, Daniel, was troubled in spirit, and the visions that passed through my mind disturbed me. I approached one of those standing there and asked him the true meaning of all this. So he told me and gave me the interpretation of these things: The four great beasts are four kingdoms that will rise from the earth. [Emphasis added]

    The lion, leopard and bear in Daniel therefore symbolise kingdoms and are probably a reference to the Babylonian, Medio-Persian and Macedonian empires respectively. In Revelation 13, the first beast is a world empire of some sort, [4] tells us it is an empire that is being worshipped and which no one can defeat in battle.

    This leaves [3] which gives us a more precise identification; this symbolism is again explained elsewhere in the scriptures, specifically in Revelation 17:9-14;

    This calls for a mind with wisdom. The seven heads are seven hills on which the woman sits. They are also seven kings. Five have fallen, one is, the other has not yet come; but when he does come, he must remain for a little while. The beast who once was, and now is not, is an eighth king. He belongs to the seven and is going to his destruction. The ten horns you saw are ten kings who have not yet received a kingdom, but who for one hour will receive authority as kings along with the beast. They have one purpose and will give their power and authority to the beast. They will make war against the Lamb, but the Lamb will overcome them because he is Lord of lords and King of kings–and with him will be his called, chosen and faithful followers.

    Here we are told what the seven heads and ten horns symbolise; the seven heads have a two-fold meaning. First they “are seven hills on which the woman sits,” the women in context symbolises a city. An ancient reader would have immediately got the point; in the first century Rome was famous for being a city built on seven hills. The world empire then is identified as the roman empire.

    Second, the seven heads symbolise “seven kings. Five have fallen, one is, the other has not yet come; but when he does come, he must remain for a little while.” If one follows the order of Suetonius and other forms of apocalyptic literature such as The Orac Sibyl 5:12 and II Esd 12.15, the first king of Rome was Julius Caesar, the second was Augustus, the third Tiberius, the fourth Caligula, the fifth was Claudius, the sixth who “now is” would then be Nero Caesar, the seventh who “has not yet come” but who will “remain for a little while” would be Galba who reigned for seven months.

    Interestingly, Nero was called “the beast” by some of his contemporaries. John AT Robinson notes that he established the emperor cult in Rome setting up a statute of himself; in his time the emperor and the empire were worshipped as Gods.[1]

    The first beast then was not some future anti-christ leading a coalition of nations that one sees in Hollywood movies, it refers to the Roman Empire represented in the person of Nero at the time of John’s writing.

    This also sheds light of the infamous number of the beast. In Greek and Latin the letters and numbers are interchangeable; for this reason one can add up the letters of peoples names to get numerical figures that stand for their name. In Hebrew writings a system of Gematria developed (though it is also found in Greek and Roman writings) whereby a person would assign a numerical value to a word or phrase. Interestingly when the Greek word Nero Caesar is translated into Hebrew the system of Gematria yields the number 666. If one transliterates the Latin instead of the Greek one gets 616; not only then does Nero fit the picture given in the text and make a historically plausible candidate for the “number of the beast” but this account also explains why some manuscripts have 666 and others 616. In the first century, Greek was the international language of the Roman Empire and was native to much of the eastern empire. Latin, however, was the language of the Romans. If the beast was Nero then it makes sense that some communities would cite his name in Greek and others would use Latin.

    These insights make it evident as to what the second beast of Revelation 13 refers to; the second beast has “two horns like a lamb, but he spoke like a dragon.” The lamb in Revelation refers to Christ; this is an institution that appears to speak on behalf of God but in fact tempts people into doing wrong. It exercises “all the authority of the first beast on his behalf, and made the earth and its inhabitants worship the first beast” suggesting it was in fact acting on behalf of the Roman Empire advocating that people worship the emperor. The reference to a mark on one’s hand and forehead is used in the Old Testament frequently as an idiom for devotion and appears to be used in this way in the very next verse in Revelation 14:1. What the text does then is warn against false prophets who, claiming to speak on behalf of God, command people to worship the state.

    When one examines Revelation understanding its genre as apocalyptic genre, a literary style that is highly symbolic which uses stock symbols drawn from elsewhere in the Old Testament and pays attention to the symbols used then Revelation 13 does not teach the existence of a future anti-christ who implants the number 666 into people or advocates the kind satanic rituals described by Iron Maiden. What it teaches is that the state can be satanic; while Romans 13 teaches that the state is God’s servant, that it has legitimate authority to punish wrongdoing and commend those who do good, Revelation 13 warns that when the state makes itself into an empire, dominants the world by military power and demands absolute allegiance and devotion from human beings, it is satanic; it tempts human beings to be like God. Religious organisations that advocate this sort of statism may appear Christian but in fact are a dangerous temptation. Fidelity to God may mean refusing to give absolute obedience and allegiance to human rulers. This I think is an important message, one that should not be clouded or distorted by fantastic stores about future anti-christs, world governments, micro chips and barcodes.

    [1] John AT Robinson Redating the New Testament (London: SCM Press, 1975) 236.

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    616, That Other Number of the Beast