Tag: Happiness

  • Does Moral Commitment Presuppose Belief in Providence?

    John HareLast week I had the privilege of hearing Professor John Hare, of Yale Divinity school, speak on God and morality at the Naturalisms in Ethics and APRA conferences. One idea Hare proposes, which fascinates me, is that commitment to morality presupposes belief in what he calls “strong providence” the position that “the world is so ordered that a person’s own virtue is consistent with her own happiness, whether other people are virtuous or not.”[1]

    Here is one line of argument he gives for this conclusion:

    “Consider the fact that we try to teach our children to be moral. We also want them to be happy. If we thought that being virtuous would make them miserable, we would be more ambivalent about teaching them virtue than we actually are. But many people persevere in the attempt to bring up their children to be morally good people even though they do not think their children will be living in a society in which most of their fellows are morally good people. … What lies behind such perseverance is surely a belief that the world is so ordered that when their children grow up, they can be both morally good and happy, and that this is secured not by general human virtue but by something else. The nature of this something else is often, I think, left indeterminate.”[2]

    This example is interesting because it focuses not on one’s own happiness but on the happiness of others. Appeals to self-interest and one’s own happiness are often dismissed as corruptions to moral motivation. In Hare’s example, one is concerned about the happiness of others, in particular one’s children, so the concerns he highlights are altruistic as opposed to egoistic.

    I am inclined to think there is something to Hare’s argument.  I do think that if we thought being virtuous would make our children miserable then a lot of parents might be less disposed towards bringing up their children to be pursue good. Most I talk to agree;  it is hard to comprehend how a loving and caring parent could teach children to be virtuous if doing so would result in their unhappiness. However, our practice of trying to teach our children to be moral suggests we do not believe being virtuous and being happy are incompatible.

    This has me wondering, does commitment to morality as an institution, where we attempt to follow its precepts and encourage them in others, commit us to assumptions about some kind of moral providential order to the world? What would happen to morality if we rejected this? Would there be something sadistic about inculcating moral virtue in our children or encouraging it in others?


    [1] John Hare Moral Faith and Providence, a paper presented at the 1996 Annual Wheaton Philosophy Conference, accessed 27 December 2010.
    [2] Ibid.

    Don’t miss hearing John Hare speak in Auckland next week, he is not in New Zealand for long. All the following events will be held at the University of Auckland and are open to the public, click on the links to get the details:

     

  • The Presumption of Theism

    Modern analytic philosophy of religion, so it seems, is largely dominated by purely theoretical and evidential considerations. That is, the question of whether or not theistic belief is rational is decided purely on the balance of total available public evidence as opposed to existential and pragmatic considerations. The addition of the term “public” to the last sentence is significant in that it exactly specifies the brand of evidence focussed on in academic philosophy of religion. That is, evidence available to all people as opposed to that available only to some. Clearly this generalization of academic philosophy of religion is not universally true (sans Plantinga, Alston, Wolterstorff, Flannagan et al), nevertheless it remains largely true that the prevailing attitude within the philosophical academy is that the rationality of theistic belief is tied, almost exclusively, to the total public evidence a person has.

    Myth of SisyphusHowever, I generally regard this perspective on religious epistemology as flawed. There doesn’t seem much reason to limit the question of whether or not theistic belief is rational to solely evidential considerations. Furthermore, it would employ demonstrably double standards in our reasoning to require that the rationality of theistic belief be determined by reference solely to evidential considerations while other rational beliefs remain immune to such scrutiny. Why, for example, should we subject the rationality of our belief in God to any greater scrutiny than we do to our belief that our cognitive faculties give us true ideas about reality?

    With that in mind, we also need to ask why it is that we should exclude existential/pragmatic considerations from determining whether or not theistic belief is rational. It is this that my article principally concerns itself with, i.e. whether or not existential/pragmatic considerations can confer warrant or justification on our theistic belief. Can the question of “liveability”, by which I refer to our ability to live consistently and happily within that worldview, confer justification on that belief? Framed negatively, the question is “can the “unliveability” (by which I refer to a general inability to live consistently and happily within that worldview) of a worldview count against that system?”

    It seems at least intuitively plausible that, aside from evidentiary considerations, the “liveability” of a possible worldview is a fairly major existential concern we have when deciding upon which to adopt. When I refer to “liveability”, I refer to our ability to live in such a way as to harmonize our worldview with other concerns in life such as happiness. Furthermore, it should seem at least intuitively plausible that where we lack determinate public evidence one way or the other, it is positively irrational to choose that worldview which is ultimately unliveable. For instance, suppose that on one worldview, if we live our lives consistently (that is to its logical consequences) then we can’t be happy. Suppose further, that in order to be happy on that worldview, we must delude ourselves and others. Suppose once again, that on another worldview we wouldn’t need to engage in such grand delusion in order to be happy. Suppose finally, that the total available public evidence between the two is ultimately (more…)