Last week, I was scheduled to present the above paper at the Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society at Fort Worth, Texas. Unfortunately, Auckland’s lockdown prevented this, and the paper had to be cancelled due to the logistics involved. I did, however, pre-record the talk, so it is available below:
Abstract: A common objection to divine command meta-ethics (‘DCM’) is the horrendous deeds objection. Critics object that if DCM is true, anything at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent or horrendous. Defenders of DCM have responded by contending that God is essentially good: God has certain character traits essentially, such as being loving and just. A person with these character traits cannot command just anything.
Recently, Jason Thibodeau[1] has offered a new version of the horrendous deed’s objection. Thibodeau, asks us to imagine the existence of Yod, a being just like God, who lacks omnibenevolence. Thibodeau argues that if God’s commands can ground morality so can Yod’s and Yod can command horrendous deeds. In this paper I examine and refute Thibodeau’s argument. I look at three interpretations of Thibodeau’s of objection (a) the objection from God’s moral grounding power, (b) the objection from evil and indifferent deities, and (c) the objection from lesser deities. I will maintain all of them fail.
Appeals to moral-grounding power, malevolent, indifferent, or lesser benevolent deities, do not salvage the horrendous deeds objection.
[1] Thibodeau, J. (2019). God’s love is irrelevant to the Euthyphro problem. Sophia, 58(3), 437–453.