Tag: Liberty

  • Internet Blackout

    Over recent years [read: under the previous Labour government] we have been increasingly concerned at ill thought out, badly drafted legislation that removes power from the judiciary and confers it on other bodies within society that are not subject to the rules of evidence and due process.

    The anti-smacking bill is an obvious example. The bill removed the defence of reasonable force for assault from the Crimes Act and instead placed discretion as to what is reasonable in the hands of the police as opposed to the court.

    The Seabed and Foreshore Act prevented private citizens from taking a property dispute with the Crown to court and instead the legislature, in a massive conflict of interest, simply declared that the property belonged to them.

    The weakening of due process is further evidenced by the abolition of an independent appeals court (The Privy Council) and the changes to double jeopardy and the requirement for jury unanimity.

    The Copyright Amendment Act, due to come into force on 28 February 2009, is another example. The Labour government wanted to tighten up copyright law, particularly around internet copyright violations so far so good. Except that bits of it were not drafted so well and despite the Select Committee deciding, unanimously, to delete the questionable section from the proposed law the Labour government decided to keep it in.

    The sections at the heart of the controversy are:

    92A Internet service provider must have policy for terminating accounts of repeat infringers

    (1) An Internet service provider must adopt and reasonably implement a policy that provides for termination, in appropriate circumstances, of the account with that Internet service provider of a repeat infringer.

    (2) In subsection (1), repeat infringer means a person who repeatedly infringes the copyright in a work by using 1 or more of the Internet services of the Internet service provider to do a restricted act without the consent of the copyright owner.

    At first glance this might seem a bit innocuous. However, as David Farrar points out:

    The bill did not define “reasonably implement”, “appropriate circumstances” or who decides if someone “repeatedly infringes”. It also turned ISPs into an unpaid enforcement arm for copyright holders.

    Farrar’s article explains the issue well citing intellectual property experts and is worth a read. Essentially, ISP’s will be subject to the threat of legal action if they allow a person who repeatedly offends to use their internet services. The problem is that without these terms being defined they simply will not know whether acting on or failing to act on a complaint subject them to legal action. Being on the wrong side of the law is costly so these providers will have to set in place fairly draconian policies to ensure they are indemnified. As the NZ Computer Society states, quoted by David Farrar, The law essentially places “ISPs in the position of potentially having to be the policeman, judge, jury and executioner in what are often vague and unclear situations”

    For some people a website is a bit of fun, a creative outlet, for others it is their business, their livelihood; for all, regardless of whether it is a source of income or not, a website and its contents is the private property of its owner. When a law is passed that allows a single citizen the power to lawfully deprive or interfere with another citizen’s property on the basis of a single accusation, with no requirement for evidence and no opportunity for a hearing, a first year law student should be able to tell you there is something wrong with the law.

    The National government needs to repeal this section. Like all governments they are more likely to do this if they feel there is wide spread community support (as lousy a reality as that is) so the internet community is banding together with an Internet Blackout from February 16-23 that calls the government to fix this legislation.

  • Guthrie Cards as an Inchoate Genetic Database

    I just stumbled across this from Kiwipolemicist; it seems that if you were born in New Zealand from 1969 onwards, chances are that the New Zealand government is holding a sample of your blood. Some 2.1 million blood samples taken from newborns via the ‘heel-prick’ test are still on file today stored on “Guthrie cards.”

    This is basically an inchoate genetic database; if the government wanted to, it could easily tap into this info and have the means get a substantial head-start on creating a DNA profile of all its citizens. The Hon Peter Dunne is quoted in a report by the Privacy Commissioner, at para 7.4, arguing that the database has the potential to be “a powerful weapon in the fight against crime.

    But hang on a minute, this powerful weapon would be obtained without probable cause; in this instance, evidence that a reasonable person would deem sufficient to conclude that a particular person will or has committed a crime. There are strong arguments to justify the New Zealand DNA Data-Bank’s holding of two crime based DNA databases, the National DNA Database (containing DNA profiles from those convicted of serious offences) and the Crime Sample Database (containing DNA profiles from crime scene samples). However, to talk of creating one from every citizen is to consider a serious breach of civil liberties; such liberties as the right for innocent people to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures on the part of the State.

    One might argue that if the State has not made this move having had this database since 1969 it is not likely to. In addition to being, not the point, I think this is naive and KP agrees with me:

    [T]rusting the state to properly use personal information is like putting a dog and a steak in a closed room and expecting to find the steak untouched the next day.

    A Memorandum of Understanding regulating requests from the Police for access to the Guthrie Cards is already in existence and has been put to use, more than once. Further, we are all familiar with NZ governments, from both camps, being too loose with civil liberties when they have an end in mind.

    As Franklin said, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, so while I still can, I am going to apply to have mine and my children’s DNA returned.

  • Against Liberal Morality

    In debates over abortion, homosexual conduct, euthanasia, prostitution, drugs. Those who call themselves liberals often mount the same basic argument. A socially or morally permissive stance is necessitated towards such practices because people have a right to choose do what ever they like with their bodies. As Mill put it,

    The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. [1] [Emphasis added]

    Mill here draws a distinction between other-regarding actions, actions that harm other people and self-regarding actions, those that harm oneself. He argues that society, either by law or by social pressure, cannot justly regulate any action a person performs unless it is other-regarding; that is, it harms people other than the agent him/herself. As Mill’s position is typically interpreted harm is understood to be governed by the principle “volenti non fit injuria” (where there is consent there is no injury) and hence refers to things done to other people without their consent. On this interpretation, self-regarding actions are those that people consent to and that harm no non-consenting, third party. As Mill himself notes, a self-regarding action is that “which affects only himself, or affects others with their free and voluntary, and undeceived consent”.[2]

    Perhaps one of the more important counter-examples to this criterion is that of Gladiatorial Matches. Irving Kristol famously proposed this counter-example,

    [T]he plain fact is that none of us is a complete civil libertarian. We all believe that there is some point at which the public authorities ought to step in to limit the “self-expression” of an individual or group even where this might be seriously intended as a form of artistic expression, and even where the artistic transaction is between consenting adults. A playwright or theatrical director might, in this crazy world of ours, find someone willing to commit suicide on stage, as called for by the script. We would not allow that-any more than we would permit scenes of real physical torture on the stage, even if the victim were a willing masochist. And I know of no one, no matter how free in spirit, who argues that we ought to permit gladiatorial contests in Yankee stadium, similar to those once performed in the Coliseum of Rome-even if only consenting adults were involved.[3]

    Kristol notes several cases of unjust homicide, homicide that any person of common sense would condemn but where the victims all consent to be killed.

    In Harmless Wrongdoing Feinberg considers this as the most important and potentially-devastating counter-example and he spends considerable energy attempting to circumvent it. He offers three responses. Here I will argue that these responses fail.

    (a) Consent
    The first response is to question whether, in fact, such cases are really cases of consensual homicide. Feinberg suggests that Kristol is too complacent about “the problem of determining genuine ‘willingness’ and voluntary ‘consent’”.[4] He offers two lines of argument for this. Firstly, he notes that Kristol refers to such things happening in this “crazy world”. Feinberg states, “an agreement is hardly consensual if one of the parties is “crazy”. To exploit a crazy person in the way he describes is not distinguishable from murder”.[5]

    Feinberg is, of course, correct; people who are crazy in the sense of insane are not competent moral agents. However, it is doubtful that Kristol is, in fact, speaking of people who are crazy in the literal sense of the word. His reference is a colloquial comment on the kinds of depravity people will engage in if given the freedom to do so.[6]

    The second reason Feinberg offers is that if gladiatorial matches existed today one would need various mechanisms to ensure consent was actual; such licensing procedures would render the contests unobjectionable. Under the conditions necessary to discern consent, Feinberg suggests that both the contestants and the audience would agree to a set of rules that held that the contest must stop once one fighter has clearly gained his or her dominance.

    This response is inadequate. It is unclear why contestants would agree to these provisions. Why, for example, could they not agree to a free for all or a fight to the death? Arneson notes, “Feinberg has projected a bit of his own nice character onto the world at large” and correctly adds “Feinberg’s liberal principles non-tendentiously applied would hold that we ought to let the free market decide how horrific or bloody the contests should become”.[7]

    Moreover, Arneson adds that even if the contestants and audience did agree to such rules, it is hard to see why the practice would then become unobjectionable.

    Feinberg’s response contains the disturbing suggestion that a state-regulated version of Kristol’s gory spectacles would be acceptable to the liberal … so long as some analogue of the Marquis of Queensberry rules is enforced (no bludgeoning your opponent when he is down; no slashing below the belt; no disembowelling your opponent once he surrenders), commercial combat with lethal weapons should in principle be tolerated by a liberal society. Many would consider this a reductio of the liberal position.[8]

    At one point in the discussion, Feinberg appears aware that it is a stretch to suggest that such matches could not be consensual.

    There could be a presumption that such a person doesn’t fully understand what he is doing, or is not fully free of neurotic influences on his choice, but these hypotheses are rebuttable in principle, and in some cases that we can easily imagine, only with minor difficulty and expense rebuttable in fact. The liberals second and third responses then are the more pertinent ones.[9]

    It is to these I now turn.

    (b) Harm to Third Parties
    Feinberg’s second attempt to circumvent Kristol’s counter-example is to argue that this case would inevitably involve harm to non-consenting, third parties. Reflecting upon the audience in a gladiatorial match Feinberg suggests,

    We cannot hold an image of these wretches in our minds without recoiling, for each of them alone will seem threatening or dangerous, and thousands or millions of them together will be downright terrifying. … When the bloody maiming and slaughtering of a human being is considered so thrilling and enjoyable that thousands will pay dearly to witness it, it would seem to follow that thousands are already so brutalized that there is a clear and present danger that some innocent parties (identities now unknown) will suffer at their hands.[10][Emphasis original]

    Like the former, this response is inadequate. First, the claim that such an activity will lead to the deaths of innocent, third parties is an empirical one. Feinberg simply asserts that it is correct but offers no evidence to prove this. In the absence of such evidence, the claim is speculative.

    A second problem reinforces this. The people killed in gladiatorial matches consent to the fight; the innocent third parties Feinberg mentions do not. In order for enthusiasm for death and killing in a gladiatorial match to spill over into the killing of innocents, fans of such matches must be unable to distinguish between consensual and non-consensual killing so that they are unable to limit their enthusiasm for one without endorsing the other.

    This assumption is implausible. For example, permitting people to engage in and enjoy consensual sodomy does not necessarily mean that those people will engage in sodomous rape. Allowing the consensual use of drugs will not mean that all drug users will then coerce others into drug use. Allowing people to watch pornography would not result in all people forcing others to have sex. Perhaps, even closer to the issue under discussion, allowing people to watch boxing matches does not appear to lead them to inevitably engage in assault. Why then should allowing people to watch consensual homicide lead them to engage in non-consensual homicide?

    (c) Bloated Mouse
    The final response Feinberg proposes is that these counter-examples are what he calls “a bloated mouse”.[11] He concedes that in cases like these we do have a case of unjust homicide that is consensual. However, he suggests cases like this are hypothetical, “[t]here seems little likelihood that they will ever occur, at least in the foreseeable future”.[12]

    It is worth noting that Feinberg again relies upon an unsubstantiated, empirical claim. He asserts, without any reason, that gladiator matches are unlikely to occur at all in the foreseeable future but why think this? Dueling to the death was practiced for centuries. People clearly have been willing to engage in such activities and did so for many years. Moreover, it is also plausible that people would choose to watch such spectacles, even ordinary people. Public executions were popular as late as the nineteenth century, suggesting that people are willing, if allowed, to watch real death and violence. The practice of the circuses in a civilised culture such as Rome shows the appeal of watching such spectacles. There appears no reason for thinking that such an activity is unlikely to occur at all given the history of the human race.

    Interestingly, Feinberg admits this elsewhere in his monograph. In a footnote he notes that the example of gladiatorial contests is no worse and in some respects better, than some forms of commercial brawling that exist in the U.S. He then cites disapprovingly the examples of “tough guy” contests where people fight bar-room brawls with no holds barred, no rules and often on racial lines. The sources he quotes note that such contests are popular, “the newest rage in spectator entertainment”.[13] It is hard to understand then why Feinberg thinks that such things are unlikely to occur in the future.

    ***

    It seems then the Feinberg fails to escape the counter example proposed by Kristol. Liberal Morality provides no basis for condemning blood sports and Gladiator matches and as such it is inadequate.

    [1] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin Classics, 1985), 69.
    [2] Ibid. 71.
    [3] Irving Kristol “Pornography, Obscenity and the Case for Censorship” New York Times Magazine March 28 1971.
    [4] Feinberg Harmless Wrong Doing: Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 4. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 127
    [5] Ibid. 130.
    [6] This highlights another feature of Feinberg’s discussion. Feinberg appears to find it difficult to accept that a sane person would ever choose to engage in the depraved activities outlined in various counter examples. However, if one believes that human beings are capable of evil then much of what he says is implausible.
    [7] Arneson “Liberalism, Freedom and Community” 373, 374.
    [8] Ibid. 374.
    [9] Feinberg Harmless Wrong Doing: 130.
    [10] Ibid. 131.
    [11] Ibid. 130.
    [12] Ibid.
    [13] Ibid. 353.

  • Kiwisaver or why I am not a centrist

    A little while ago a friend and I were discussing New Zealand politics with an American associate. My friend spoke of how he was an economic centrist and I informed him I was not. The topic got to kiwisaver, a policy with which he agreed. I thought his comments were interesting. Basically he cited anecdotal evidence to support the contention that many New Zealanders do not save money. He then noted that kiwisaver will mean that they do, seeing this was a good result one should support kiwisaver. The conversation was prematurely ended. But I thought my friend had revealed something important about how social policies are often justified in New Zealand.

    Now let’s assume for the sake of argument that the conclusion he supported with anecdotal evidence is also supported with empirical evidence and is also true. The argument then is something like this:

    [1] Kiwisaver results in more people saving

    [2] A policy that results in more people saving is justified

    Therefore

    [3] Kiwisaver is justified

    Now this argument is formally, valid and I have granted that [1] is true. However, [2] is clearly flawed. To see why imagine the following; suppose that one discovered that you could convince people to save by threatening to kill them if they did not. A state policy of issuing such threats would therefore bring about more people saving, and hence by [2] be justified. But such a policy is not justified, why? Because it achieves this good result by unlawful means; by threatening violence against innocent people consequently, the fact a policy results in my people saving by it’s self is insufficient to justify it.

    It seems then that [2] needs amending, what is needed is something like

    [2’] A policy that results in more people saving, and achieves this by lawful means is justified

    But now [1] and [2] do not entail [3], to entail [3], [1] needs to be amended to [1’]

    [1’] kiwi saver results in more people saving and achieves this by lawful means

    However, the problem now is that affirming [1’] is not justified by the evidence I granted for the sake of argument above. There I assumed that the evidence suggested that Kiwisaver resulted in more people saving. This does not show us that it does this by lawful means, this latter claim is a moral or normative claim not an empirical or sociological one.

    Moreover not only is [1’] not supported by the evidence, I am inclined to think that [1’] is false. We need to remember that kiwisaver is taxpayer funded. What does this mean? It means that kiwisaver works this way. Person P signs a contract with another person Q where Q agrees to pay P in exchange for labour. The state however, steps in and threatens P, telling him that if he does not give the government some of the money he has worked for and is entitled to by contract the government will separate him from his wife and kids and lock him up (violate his liberty). In other words Kiwisaver achieves its goals by threatening violence against others. Threatening to violate there liberty rights if they do not comply.

    Don’t get me wrong here, I am not an anarchist; I am not saying that the state is never justified in threatening people or taking their life liberty or property. What I do think however is that one needs justification for this. If we are to avoid tyranny, then it cannot be the case that the state can just do this whenever some good consequence or cause would be furthered by doing so. Policies like kiwisaver appear to be premised on the denial of this principle they suggest that merely helping others save is sufficient justification for threatening others with violence.

    This is why I am not a centrist, and why I am not a leftwinger. While the left claim to be opposed to violence they really are not. They in fact have a very low threshold of opposition to opposing violence and are willing to use it for almost any reason at all. The left tend to oppose violence when its being used against criminals, such is in cases of capital punishment or in just wars where aggressive or tyrannical regimes are being resisted by force. However, when it comes to innocent people, people who have committed no crimes the left will justify violence for almost any reason. If a policy has a good consequence, such as helping people save, or helping a person educate there children, or helping people artists paint a picture, or whatever, they will allow the state to threaten innocent people to do so.

    I find this morally perverse, justice requires distinguishing between the innocent and the guilty, those who are threatening others and those who are not. A just state concentrates threats of violence and if necessary uses violence against the latter and not the former. The state can collect taxes for this purpose but it cannot threaten people for any reason it likes no matter how socially useful such violence may be. Yet the political left have distorted our culture that people now, apparently in large numbers, will justify threatening their law abiding neighbour to help them save money.

    This opposition to violence, and wanting it limited by principle is central to me; My faith in fact teaches that God opposes such violence and we have a sacred duty to avoid it. This is why I oppose killing unborn children who are not threatening the lives of their mothers. It’s why I do not oppose executing criminals or fighting in just wars, and it’s why I oppose economic policies that justify threatening people with violence and utilise coercion to bring about monetary or economic gain. Violence must be used to punish the guilty and protect the innocent from attack. Not turned against the innocent for social gain.

    And that is why I am not a centrist. If opposing arbitrary violence against the innocent makes me a “rightwing extremist” so be it.

  • Democracy and Legitimacy

    The founding statement of liberal political theory, John Locke’s Two Treaties of Civil Government, opens with the following statement:

    Reader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning government; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not worth while to tell thee. These, which remain, I hope are sufficient to establish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William; to make good his title, in the consent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any prince in Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin.

    Locke states his purpose in writing is to defend a military coup. Locke goes on to argue that a government derives its powers from the consent of the government for the purpose of protecting the rights of its citizens. Specifically a citizen’s right to life, liberty and property. He argues that if a government turns against these rights the people can justly overthrow it.

    The US declaration of independence reiterates this claim.

    We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from
    the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.

    Two of the founding documents for liberal democracy maintain that a government can be legitimately overthrown if it uses its powers to infringe, as opposed to protect, the rights of its citizens. In some instances, the military have a duty to do this; often the military have sworn duty to defend the rights of its citizens with force. If the government begins to threaten these rights then this duty means the military have a duty to resist the government with force. This is not some crackpot, novel idea, it is part of our liberal heritage, it is also incidentally part of our Christian heritage. Aquinas argued in a similar vein, as did numerous Puritan writers such as Mornay, Rutherford, Milton, Buchanan.

    I say this because at 7:30 PM tonight on Campbell live a military coup was announced in Fiji. The immediate reaction from every commentator I saw was one of disgust because a democratically elected government had been overthrown. Now I am not saying I agree with the coup, I am quite willing to concede that the Military are acting unjustly. However, the mere fact that the government of Fiji was democratically elected does not mean its wrong to over throw them with a coup. If the government uses its power to punish the guilty with proportionate and humane punishments and they defend the rights of the innocent against aggression then I agree it is unjust to over throw them. But if the government of Fiji has used its power to deprive innocent people of there rights and to acquit those guilty of crimes then in certain circumstances the military are within their rights in staging a coup. The fact that the government was lawfully elected is irrelevant.

    When commentators in the media claim that a coup is wrong because the government is elected. They are in essence promoting the tyranny of the majority. They are suggesting that we have a duty of unqualified obedience to any leader which 51% of our peers support on election day, regardless of what this government does or orders us to do. They are deifying the majority and placing a democratic government in the place of God.

    A state’s legitimacy depends on what it does, not on how many people support it or how popular it is the year of an election. If upholds the law of God and the rights this law confers upon us it is worthy of support. If it turns against these, it is not. God and God alone is the only person worthy of unqualified obedience.