The Naturalisms in Ethics conference will be running at the University of Auckland from 14-15 July and will feature this blog’s own Matthew Flannagan.
Here is the blurb from organiser Chris Tucker’s page (which includes registration information – see also the Facebook Event page):
‘Naturalism’ is a multiply ambiguous term—hence the title Naturalisms in Ethics— but it is related to a range of questions concerning the relationship of morality to science, evolution, biology, religion, and natural properties (whatever those are). Many otherwise disparate moral theories have been labeled as ethical naturalisms, including virtue ethics (both neo-Aristotelian and neo-Humean), moral functionalism, Cornell realism, and natural law theories. Some potential paper topics include the following (but the list is hardly exhaustive):
- What are the different types of ethical naturalism?
- Why should we endorse/reject ethical naturalism or some specific version thereof?
- What can science or evolution tell us about morality, moral psychology, or the rationality of moral judgments?
- Are naturalistic accounts of morality better off than theistic ones?
Speakers include:
- Rosalind Hursthouse (University of Auckland)
- Stephen Finlay (University of Southern California)
- John Hare (Yale Divinity; Seelye Charitable Trust Distinguished Fellow
- Mark Murphy (Georgetown University; Auckland University Distinguished Visitor)
- Glen Pettigrove (University of Auckland)
- Charles Pigden (University of Otago)
- Neil Sinhababu (National University of Singapore)
- Christine Swanton (University of Auckland)
- Erik Wielenberg (DePauw University)
Matt’s paper, “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong” will be chaired by Erik Wielenberg of DePauw University. Matt’s abstract is below: (more…)