Tag: Patrick Nowell Smith

  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and the Moral Scepticism Objection to Divine Commands

    In responding to William Lane Craig’s advocacy of a Divine Command Theory (DCT) Walter Sinnott-Armstrong makes the objection that,“The divine command theory makes morality unknowable.”

    He makes the following argument for this:

    To see why, consider whether or not it is immoral to eat pork. If the divine command theory is correct, we cannot answer this question simply by pointing out that eating pork causes harm to pigs or to us, unless we already know that God commanded us to avoid such harm. We also cannot know wether it is immoral to eat pork on the basis of other’s testimony or our own moral intuitions if we have no reason to think their testimony or our intuitions map onto divine commands, and we cannot have any such reason without knowing what God commanded. Thus, on Craig’s theory we cannot know what is morally wrong, if we cannot know what God commanded. Unfortunately, however we have no sound way to determine what God commanded.1

    Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument here is as follows:

    [1] If DCT is correct then we cannot know an action is wrong unless we know God prohibited it.

    [2] We have no sound way to determine what God has commanded or prohibited.

    From these it is concluded that

    [3] If DCT is correct we cannot know an action is wrong.

    In support of [1] he offers two premises,

    [1a] If DCT is correct then we cannot know an action a is wrong because it has property p, unless we know that God prohibits p

    [1b] If DCT is correct, then we cannot know an action a is wrong, on grounds g, unless we know that g “maps on to divine commands”.

    One serious problem with this argument is that [1] is false, as are the supporting premises [1a] and [1b]. According, to the DCT of Adams, Alston, and Evans, which Craig appropriates, the property of being wrong is constituted by the property of being contrary to Gods commands in the same way that the property of being water is constituted by the property of being H20. Sinnott-Armstrong thinks holding that moral duties are constituted by Gods commands, means, one cannot know if an action is wrong unless one knows it was forbidden by God. This seems to presuppose the following inference :

    I1: If A is constituted by B, then one cannot know if something is an A unless one knows it is a B.

    However, I1 is false. Consider the following counter example; water is constituted by H20. Yet people for thousands of years could perceive water, drink it, detect it, and use it etc without knowing anything about atomic theory. This example shows people can know something is an A (water), A can be constituted by something B (H20) and people not know A is a B.

    The same is true for [1a], the DCT claims that wrongness is constituted by God’s prohibition, Armstrong seems to think this means we cannot know if an action is wrong on the basis of some feature of that action unless we know that feature is prohibited by God. This seems to presuppose a similar inference

    I2: If A is constituted by B then we cannot know something is an A on the basis of it possessing p, unless we know that B has p.

    But again there are obvious counter examples to I2. Water is constituted by H20, if I2 is true it would follow one cannot tell that the cup of liquid I am drinking is water because of its taste unless I know that H20 tastes that way. But this is clearly false. Medieval men could recognize by taste a cup of water as well as any modern person despite not knowing anything about H20.

    [1b] faces similar difficulties, here Armstrong thinks, that if our duties are constituted by divine commands, this entails that we cannot know that an action is immoral on the basis of some ground, such as intuition or testimony, unless we have reasons for thinking that ground “maps onto divine commands”. But why think this? The argument seems to rely on the following inference

    I3. If A constitutes B, then one cannot know B exists on ground g, unless one has reason for thinking g reliably tracks A.

    But this is also false. Take the example I mentioned above. There are people do not know about atomic theory and yet know on the basis of perception that the glass in front of them contains water. These people do not need to have reasons for thinking that their eyesight tracts hydrogen and oxygen atoms before they can rationally trust their senses, they know about water quite independently of any knowledge about hydrogen or oxygen.

    So [1], [1a] and [1b] are all false. The error in each instance is the same, Armstrong assumes that the metaphysical claim that our duties are constituted by God’s commands entails that we cannot recognize or know whether an action is wrong unless we know what God commanded. This however is to conflate moral ontology with moral epistemology.

    Similar problems afflict Sinnott-Armstrong’s advocacy of [2] that “we have no sound way to determine what God commanded.” Immediately after making this claim Armstrong defends it by claiming the arguments from natural theology fail, he then states

    Theists often tell us what God commands, as if they knew, and the commands they ascribe to God are often (though not always) plausible. However, what makes us and them accept that God commands those actions rather than others is that we already and independently had a reason to think that certain acts are immoral. Assuming God is good, of course God would command us not to rape. But the only way we know God would issue that command is that we already know rape is wrong. There is no way to know what God does or would command without already knowing what is right or wrong.2

    Here Sinnott-Armstrong seems to contradict [2] when he contends that it’s plausible to claim God commands us not to rape and seems to countenance the conclusion that we can know what God would command on the basis of justified moral beliefs. But if this is true then [2] is false. Of course Sinnott-Armstrong contends such knowledge is dependent on moral beliefs and not revelation or natural theology. But, that is incompatible with [2], [2] does not state that we can’t know through revelation or natural theology it states we can’t gain such knowledge at all.

    Some of what Sinnott-Armstrong states here suggests he may have a different argument in mind. In “Morality: Religious and Secular”, Patrick Nowell-Smith refers to an argument that is “familiar to philosophers but of which the force is not always appreciated” which Smith contends refutes a divine command theory, the argument is:

    [We] must be persuaded independently of his goodness before we admit his right to command. We must judge for ourselves whether the Bible is the inspired word of a kind and benevolent God or a curious amalgam of profound wisdom and gross superstition. To judge this is to make a moral decision, so that in the end, so far from morality being based upon religion, religion is based upon morality.3

    James Cornman and Keith Lehrer have expressed essentially the same line of critique.4 I think this critique is based on a failure to make an important distinction. Take the claim that right and wrong is independent of God’s commands. This claim is ambiguous; it could mean (a), that ones knowledge of right and wrong is independent of ones knowledge of what God commands or (b), that right and wrong exist independently of God’s commands. The first claim states that beliefs about right and wrong are epistemologically independent of beliefs about divine commands. The second is that the existence of moral properties such as right and wrong are ontologically independent of God’s commands.

    Now the DCT denies (b). Divine command theorists claim that wrongness is constituted by the property of being contrary to God’s commands. Hence it postulates an ontological dependence between divine commands and moral properties such as wrongness. The arguments of Nowell-Smith above however do not refute this claim. If they show anything, they show not that (b) is the case but that (a) is the case. Nowell-Smith and Sinnott-Armstrong show that we can know what is right and wrong independently of knowing or believing in the existence of divine commands. Hence they show at most an epistemological independence.

    Showing that beliefs about right and wrong are epistemologically independent of beliefs about God’s commands does not show that right and wrong are ontologically independent of God’s commands unless epistemological independence entails ontological independence. The objector here assumes that if my knowledge of something does not depend upon my knowledge of something else then the two things can exist independently of each other.

    Again this assumption is false. The property of being water is constituted by the property of being H20; as such H20 and water are not ontologically independent. Yet, as noted, for thousands of years people could perceive water, drink it, detect it, and use it etc without knowing anything about atomic theory. Hence, our knowledge of water is independent of our knowledge of H20. Yet this fact does not mean that water is not constituted by H20. Sinnott-Armstrong’s objection therefore fails; it is hard to avoid Craig’s assessment that Sinnott-Armstrong’s critique is “pervaded by the conflation of moral ontology with moral epistemology.”5

    1. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 109.
    2. Ibid 110.
    3. Patrick H. Nowell-Smith, “Morality: Religious and Secular,” in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Ian T. Ramsey (London: SCM Press, 1966) 97.
    4. James W Cornman & Keith Lehrer, Philosophical Problems and Arguments (New York: MacMillan, 1979) 429.
    5. William Lane Craig “This Most Gruesome Guests” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 168.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Morality and Arbitrariness
    Van Inwagen, Divine Duties and the Deontological Argument from Evil
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Infantile Religious Morality
    Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I
    Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II

    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part II
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part II
    On a Common Equivocation

  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Infantile Religious Morality

    In “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” Walter Sinnott Armstrong criticises William Lane Craig’s contention that theism, if true, provides an adequate foundation for morality. Armstrong contends that Craig’s position is “incredible”[1] and subject to a “cavalcade of devastating objections.”[2] He goes on to conclude that his criticisms do not just call into question Craig’s argument for a theistic based system of ethics, he contends that his arguments are conclusive against any theistic account of ethics that is compatible with Christianity. He states, “Other theists might try to give better arguments for a religious view of morality, I don’t see how they could avoid all the problems in Craig’s account without leaving traditional Christianity far behind.”[3]

    In several posts (see the related posts below) I have criticised some of the arguments Armstrong makes in this article. In this post I want to turn to another. The claim that “divine command theory makes morality childish;” Armstrong states,

    A second objection is that the divine command theory makes morality childish. Compare a small boy who thinks that what makes it morally wrong for him to hit his little sister is only that his parents  told him not to hit her and will punish him if he hits her. As a result, this little boy thinks that, if his parents leave home or die, then there is nothing wrong with hitting his little sister. Maybe some little boys think this way, but surely we adults do not think that morality is anything like this.[4]

    Its worth noting that Armstrong’s sketch is something of a caricature; the picture is of a little boy who thinks hitting is wrong because his parents will punish him if he engages in hitting. This tacitly implies that divine command theorists believe that actions are wrong because God will issue punishments to us if we do them. No divine command theorist to my knowledge holds this view. What we typically hold is that an action is wrong for a person to perform if a perfectly good, omniscient being (identified as God) commands that person to refrain from the action in question. The fear of punishment does not come into it.

    This point, however, is largely tangential because the heart of Armstrong’s position appears to be based on three ideas.

    [1] That some children see morality as dependent on the commands of their parents.
    [2] That it is inappropriate, childish or infantile for adults to view morality as being dependent on the commands of a parent.
    [3] That the conception of morality proposed by a divine command theorist is analogous to basing morality on the commands of a parent.

    Hence, divine command morality is infantile or childish.

    In responding to this line of argument, it is worth noting Armstrong’s argument is not new. In fact, it simply summarises an early argument made by Patrick Nowell-Smith in his widely-anthologised essay Morality: Religious and Secular. In this article all three of Armstrong’s premises are defended in more detail than Armstrong provides in the short paragraph above. I think that by critically examining Smith’s argument one can see the problems with Armstrong’s.

    Like Armstrong, Nowell-Smith argued, “religious morality is infantile.”[5] Similarly, like Armstrong, it is clear that Nowell-Smith’s target was a divine command theory.[6] Nowell-Smith’s thesis is that a divine command theorist possesses an ethical consciousness that is frozen or arrested at the pre-critical stage of a child. A mature adult whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly would have outgrown it.

    In arguing for this thesis, Nowell-Smith draws upon the theories of moral development proposed by Piaget.[7] According to Piaget, children start out with a view of morality that Nowell-Smith labels deontological, heteronomous and realist. Children view morality as obedience to certain rules (deontology) which hold because an authority figure, usually the parent, has promulgated them (heteronomous) and wrongdoing is perceived as any external action that violates these rules (realism). This view of ethics is appropriate for small children; however, as they mature and become more rational their consciousness changes. They begin to see the point of certain rules and understand the reasons behind them and the function of such rules. This is the stage where ethics become in Nowell-Smith’s words “autonomous.” Instead of just accepting a parent’s word for it the child learns to figure these things out for him/herself.[8]

    Nowell-Smith goes on to argue that these same features of heteronomy, realism and deontology are present in “religious morality” or more specifically, divine command theory. Consequently, divine command theory reflects a childish way of viewing ethics, one not worthy of a grown-up, educated adult.[9]

    Nowell-Smith’s analogy between divine command theory and childish morality ignores a fundamental disanalogy between the case Piaget describes and that of the divine/human relationship. As Richard Mouw has pointed out, Piaget views the transition from heteronomy to autonomy as corresponding to the time when a child begins to be on an increasingly-equal footing with his or her parents. The infantile stage of morality is appropriate while the child is in infancy because of its limited rationality and knowledge. In this state the child is unable to make decisions as competently as the adult, hence it relies on and defers to the judgement of adults. However, as the child grows equal to the parent in these respects he or she ceases to rely on parental judgement. He or she is now just as competent to answer these questions as his or her parent is and so his or her thinking becomes autonomous.[10]

    Consequently, Piaget’s model of development applies to situations where the subordinate is temporarily in a stage of inferiority to the authority but is undergoing a process of growth towards equality. It is when this equality is reached that the authority relationship is no longer appropriate. However, the relationship between adult humans and God is fundamentally different. Adults are not growing into divinity so that when mature they will equal God in rationality and knowledge. Rather, they are permanently in a state where they are inferior to God in these respects. In this context the failure to reach a moral consciousness that is equal to God’s is not a sign of arrested development and the infantile charge loses its sting. It is inappropriate for adults to behave like children but not inappropriate for them to fail to think like God.[11]

    Nowell-Smith’s argument, therefore, is unsound. I think the same response can be attributed to Armstrong’s argument. Returning to Armstrong’s three premises,

    [1] That some children see morality as dependent on the commands of their parents.
    [2] That it is inappropriate, childish or infantile for adults to view morality as being dependent on the commands of a parent.
    [3] That the conception of morality proposed by a divine command theorist is analogous to basing morality on the commands of a parent.

    There is a subtle equivocation in this argument; turning to premise [2] that it is inappropriate, childish or infantile for adults to view morality as being dependent on the commands of a parent, as we saw, this is because an adult child has grown to a position where he or she is on par in terms of maturity, rationality, insight, knowledge, and so on, to the parent. The problem is once this is clarified [3] is false. The conception of morality proposed by the divine command theorist is not analogous to basing morality on par with the commands of a parent who is an equal as no divine command theorist thinks of adult human beings as being on par with God in terms of maturity, rationality, insight, knowledge, and so on.

    Of course there are other respects whereby the conception of morality proposed by divine command theorists is analogous to a conception that sees morality as dependent on the commands of a parent, so in this sense [3] is true. The problem is that these respects do not include the features of the relationship between an adult child and their parent that makes the conception inappropriate and so if correct then [2] would no longer be true. Either way the argument fails.


    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 106.
    [2]
    Ibid. 108.
    [3]
    Ibid. 114.
    [4]
    Ibid. 109.
    [5]
    Patrick H. Nowell-Smith “Morality: Religious and Secular,” in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy ed. Ian T. Ramsey (London: SCM Press, 1966) 95.
    [6]
    Ibid. 96. Nowell-Smith characterises the view he critiques as follows, “They have simply assumed that just as the legal propriety of an action is established by showing it to emanates from an authoritative source, so also the moral propriety of an action must be established in the same way; the legal rightness has the same form as moral rightness, and may therefore be used to shed light on it. … Morality, on this view, is an affair of being commanded to behave in certain ways by some person who has a right to issue such commands; and once this premise is granted, it is said with some reason that only God has such a right.”
    [7]
    Ibid. 100.
    [8]
    Ibid. 100-103.
    [9]
    Ibid. 103-108.
    [10]
    Richard Mouw The God Who Commands: A Study in Divine Command Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 12.
    [11]
    Ibid. 12-14.

    RELATED POSTS:
    On a Common Equivocation
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Morality and Arbitrariness
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part II
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part II

  • On a Common Equivocation

    Recently I did a post on relativism and in earlier posts I have defended a divine command theory of ethics against various objections. In the comments section Mark V raised an interesting and thoughtful response. I hope Mark does not mind if I pick up on his points because the themes he raises are well worth discussing. Mark writes

    You have earlier stated that if God exists we are obliged to obey him, presumably you mean we are obliged to obey his commandments. There are many commandments in the Bible, particularly in Deuteronomy that no theist today would ever dream of obeying. So even theists today use their reason and the facts to decide what is ethical and what is not. In doing so they appeal to a standard of ethics that is outside the Bible.

    I think that Mark’s interpretation of the Deuteronomy is probably mistaken. However, putting his exegesis of the Torah to one side, Mark’s central point here, if I understand him correctly, is that we often know what is right and wrong independently of our beliefs about what God commands, in fact often we use our beliefs about what is right and wrong to help us decide what God’s commands are hence ethics is not dependent on God’s commands. This line of argument is common in the literature. In Morality Religious and Secular Patrick Nowell-Smith refers to an argument that is “familiar to philosophers but of which the force is not always appreciated”

    [W]e must be persuaded independently of his goodness before we admit his right to command. We must judge for ourselves whether the Bible is the inspired word of a ind and benevolent God or a curious amalgam of profound wisdom and gross uperstition. To judge this is to make a moral decision, so that in the end, so far from morality being based upon religion, religion is based upon morality[1]

    In Philosophical Problems and Arguments. James Cornman and Keith Lehrer express the same point.

    Consider what we would do if we read that Moses had returned with such commandments as ‘make love to thy neighbor’s wife,’ ‘steal thy neighbor’s
    goods,’ and ‘take advantage of thy parents.’ We would decide that what-ever was revealed to Moses, it was not the will of God, because these are immoral commandments. We do not justify that something is moral by showing it is God’s will, because the only available way to evaluate conflicting claims about what God wills is by finding which one is in accordance with what is moral.[2]

    Several of the essays in Is Goodness without God good enough: A debate on Secularism, Faith and Ethics also make this point. In this book Paul Kurtz gives numerous arguments to the effect we can know right and wrong and live a moral life even if we do not believe that God exists.[3] The fact that ones knowledge of right and wrong is independent of and in some instances prior to ones knowledge of what God commands also figures prominently in the essays of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong[4] and Lousie Anthony[5]. In fact atheist populariser Christopher Hitchens frequently makes this point.

    Despite its pervasive appeal I think this inference is flawed. I think it’s based on a failure to make an important distinction. Take the claim that right and wrong is independent of God’s commands. This claim is ambiguous: it could mean (a) that ones knowledge of right and wrong is independent of ones knowledge of what God commands or it could mean (b) that right and wrong exist independently of Gods commands. The first claim states that beliefs about right and wrong are epistemologically independent of beliefs about divine commands. The second is that the existence of moral properties such as right and wrong are ontologically independent of God’s commands.

    Now the divine command theory denies (b) Divine command theorists claim that wrongness is (i.e. is identical with) the property of being contrary to God’s commands. Something cannot exist independently of itself. Hence it postulates an ontological dependence between divine commands and moral properties such as wrongness. The arguments above however do not refute this claim, what they show is not that (b) is the case but that (a) is the case. The arguments of Cornman, Lehrer, and Nowell-Smith, Anthony and Armstrong show that we can know what is right and wrong independently of knowing or believing in the existence of divine commands. Hence they show at most an epistemological independence.

    Showing that beliefs about right and wrong are epistemologically independent of beliefs about God’s commands does not show that right and wrong are ontologically independent of God’s commands unless epistemological independence entails ontological independence. In other words, the objector here assumes that if my knowledge of something’s does not depend upon is my knowledge of something else then the two things can exist independently of each other.

    This assumption however is false. Take a straightforward example of identity; the property of being water is identical with the property of being H20 as such H20 and water are not ontologically independent. Yet people for thousands of years could perceive water, drink it, detect it, use it etc without knowing anything about atomic theory. Hence, our knowledge of water is independent of our knowledge of H20. Yet this fact does not mean that water is not identical with H20. Two things can be identical without people knowing that they are identical.

    As Mark Murphy[6] and William Lane Craig[7] point out those theists who defend divine command theories and or maintain that morality cannot exist independently of religion almost always have ontological dependence in mind. The same is typically true of atheists and nihilists who argue that the “death of God” entails nihilism. John Mackie for example argued that the kind of entities that exist in a naturalistic universe. A universe where the only things that exist are the things postulated by our best scientific theories is a universe where properties like rightness and wrongness do not exist.[8] As Craig notes these people are raising the question of the “ontological foundation for ethics not its epistemological foundations”[9] Pointing out that our knowledge of ethics is independent of theological claims people know or believe avoids rather than addresses this issue.

    [1] Patrick H. Nowell-Smith, “Morality: Religious and Secular,” in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Ian T. Ramsey (London: SCM Press, 1966) 97.
    [2] James W. Cornman & Keith Lehrer, Philosophical Problems and Arguments (New York: MacMillan, 1979), 429.
    [3] Paul Kurtz “The Kurtz/Craig Debate: Is Goodness Without God Good Enough” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 25-49.
    [4] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008),101-116.
    [5] Louise Anthony “Atheism as Perfect Piety” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008),67-84
    [6] Mark Murphy “Theism, Atheism, and the Explanation of Moral Value” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008)117-118.
    [7] See his comments in William Lane Craig “The Kurtz/Craig Debate: Is Goodness Without God Good Enough” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 25-49 and also “This Most Gruesome of Guests” in “The Kurtz/Craig Debate: Is Goodness Without God Good Enough” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 168 and also n 5
    [8] John Mackie Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin Books, 1977 )
    [9] Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests”, 168-167

  • Patrick Nowell Smith on Divine Commands

    In a widely-anthologised essay Morality: Religious and Secular. Patrick Nowell Smith offers a influential criticism of “religious morality” It is clear from his definition of religious morality that it is Voluntarism ( or a Divine Command Theory of Ethics) he has in mind. Smith states that the religious moralist has “assumed that just as the legal propriety of an action is established by showing it to emanates from an authoritative source, so also the moral propriety of an action must be established in the same way; the legal rightness has the same form as moral rightness, and may therefore be used to shed light on it.” He goes on to state “ … Morality, on this view, is an affair of being commanded to behave in certain ways by some person who has a right to issue such commands; and once this premise is granted, it is said with some reason that only God has such a right” Smith’s critique then should be interpreted as a critique of Voluntarism.

    Readers of this blog will know I have considerable sympathy for Voluntarism. I have defended it against some common objections in previous posts. So it will not suprise anyone that, despite the popularity of Smith’s essay, I think his criticisms fail. Here I wish to comment on two lines of argument he proposes.

    1. One major contention Smith makes is that “religious morality is infantile” Smith’s thesis is that a Voluntarist possesses an ethical consciousness that is frozen or arrested at the pre-critical stage of a child. A mature adult whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly would have outgrown it.

    In arguing for this thesis, Smith draws upon the theories of moral development proposed by Piaget. According to Piaget, children start out with a view of morality that Smith labels deontological, heteronomous and realist. Children view morality as obedience to certain rules (deontology) which hold because an authority figure, usually the parent, has promulgated them (heteronomous) and wrongdoing is perceived as any external action that violates these rules (realism). This view of ethics is appropriate for small children; however, as they mature and become more rational their consciousness changes. They begin to see the point of certain rules and understand the reasons behind them and the function of such rules. This is the stage where ethics become in Smith’s words “autonomous”. Instead of just accepting a parent’s word for it the child learns to figure these things out for him/herself.

    Smith goes on to argue that these same features of heteronomy, realism and deontology are present in “religious morality” or, more specifically, Voluntarism. Consequently, Voluntarism reflects a childish way of viewing ethics, one not worthy of a grown-up, educated adult.

    Smith’s analogy between Voluntarism and childish morality ignores a fundamental dis-analogy between the case Piaget describes and that of the divine/human relationship. As Richard Mouw has pointed out, Piaget views the transition from heteronomy to autonomy as corresponding to the time when a child begins to be on an increasingly-equal footing with his or her parents. The infantile stage of morality is appropriate while the child is in infancy because of its limited rationality and knowledge. In this state the child is unable to make decisions as competently as the adult, hence it relies on and defers to the judgement of adults. However, as the child grows equal to the parent in these respects he or she ceases to rely on parental judgement. He or she is now just as competent to answer these questions as his or her parent is and so his or her thinking becomes autonomous.

    Consequently, Piaget’s model of development applies to situations where the subordinate is temporarily in a stage of inferiority to the authority but is undergoing a process of growth towards equality. It is when this equality is reached that the authority relationship is no longer appropriate. However, the relationship between adult humans and God is fundamentally different. Adults are not growing into divinity so that when mature they will equal God in rationality and knowledge. Rather, they are permanently in a state where they are inferior to God in these respects. In this context the failure to reach a moral consciousness that is equal to God’s is not a sign of arrested development and the infantile charge loses its sting. It is inappropriate for adults to behave like children but not inappropriate for them to fail to think like God.

    2.Another argument Smith utilises appeals to the epistemic priority of moral principles over theological ones. Smith offers an argument that is “familiar to philosophers but of which the force is not always appreciated”. The argument essentially points out,

    [W]e must be persuaded independently of his goodness before we admit his right to command. We must judge for ourselves whether the Bible is the inspired word of a kind and benevolent God or a curious amalgam of profound wisdom and gross superstition. To judge this is to make a moral decision, so that in the end, so far from morality being based upon religion, religion is based upon morality.

    In Philosophical Problems and Arguments. James Cornman and Keith Lehrer express the same argument.

    Consider what we would do if we read that Moses had returned with such commandments as ‘make love to thy neighbor’s wife,’ ‘steal thy neighbor’s goods,’ and ‘take advantage of thy parents.’ We would decide that what-ever was revealed to Moses, it was not the will of God, because these are immoral commandments. We do not justify that something is moral by showing it is God’s will, because the only available way to evaluate conflicting claims about what God wills is by finding which one is in accordance with what is moral.

    This objection notes that in order to know whether a given action is, in fact, the type of thing God has commanded, one first needs to know whether the act is wrong. Therefore, ethics is prior to, and independent of, theology.

    This objection again confuses the question of epistemological priority with the question of metaphysical independence. What these examples show is that we can know certain ethical truths prior to and independently of our knowledge of theological truths. However, it does not follow from this that deontic principles are metaphysically independent of, or non-identical to, theological ones. Consider the following analogy. In order to know that a clear liquid in front of me is water I need to examine its atomic structure to see if it is H20. It would not follow from this that water is not H20. Similarly, the fact that in certain contexts one needs to examine the moral appropriateness of commands to ascertain whether they are from God or not does not make it follow that wrongness is not the property of being contrary to God’s commands.