Tag: Political Philosophy

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II

    In my last post, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I, I set out the doctrine of religious restraint and touched on some criticisms of it. In this post, I begin looking at and critiquing some of the key arguments in support of the doctrine of religious restraint.

    II         Arguments for the Doctrine of Religious Restraint

    Of the reasons advanced in favour of the DRR most fall into one of two categories, an appeal to respect or arguments around the dangers of religion.

    A         Arguments from Respect
    Two variants of the argument from respect are common in the literature; one appeals to the golden rule, that we should do to others what we would have them do to us, the other is that religious reasons are epistemically inaccessible.

    1          The golden rule
    Audi advances a version of the golden rule;[12]

    Let us apply the do-unto-others rule to that case: one would not like having a different religious group, with which one deeply disagrees, press for its religiously preferred policies solely for religious reasons of its own, even if a good secular reason could be offered. … We are especially likely to disapprove of the dominance of religious motivation if the policy or law in question is backed by severe punishments.

    Audi expands a hypothetical example offered by Kent Greenawalt[13] where people advocated voting for candidates on religious grounds because they would protect animals. [14]

    Suppose, however, that much money must be spent in enforcement and that many jobs will be lost through the changes in the food sector of the economy, so that human conduct is significantly restricted, even if meat consumption remains legal. Then one might ask the religious voters in question whether they would accept comparable restrictions of their conduct, as well as similar job losses or mandatory shifts, on the basis of coercive legislation protecting the dandelion as a sacred species.

    Audi’s example imagines a “religious group, with which one deeply disagrees,” and gives the example of a belief in “the dandelion as a sacred species.” However, it is not just that one is being subjected to coercion on religious grounds, it is that the grounds are ones that we consider to be false. Lydia McGrew explains,[15]

    A major reason, perhaps the only reason, why many of us would not want other people to impose their religious standards on us is that we think their religions false, not that there is something special about religion. …. So the Golden Rule argument turns out to have very little to tell us about religion, specifically. [Emphasis added]

    Imagine the situation where a false secular belief is being imposed; an environmentalist political party seeks to impose a policy that the aesthetic value of dandelions requires all adults within society to make the same substantial sacrifices Audi refers to. The policy could be reasonably objected to in spite of its grounds being secular. The same is true in reverse. Consider a policy most people strongly agree with being proposed on religious grounds; a Christian party advocates the abolition of female circumcision on the basis that the practice conflicts with its religious belief of the body being sacred. The policy could attract widespread support despite its grounds being religious.

    These examples suggest that the merits of the policy itself are what is important and not that the grounds used for its justification are religious or secular.[16] Audi disagrees;[17]

    Citizens in [a democracy] are naturally and permissibly resentful about coercion by religious factors…in a way in which they are not permissibly resentful concerning coercion by, for instance, considerations of public health. Even the moral errors of others are, for many, easier to abide as supports of coercion than religious convictions having the same result.

    McGrew responds by contrasting two cases; first she argues that, “A slave owner would not be permissibly resentful of the emancipation of his slaves on the grounds that their emancipation had come about as a result of religious arguments.”[18] Conversely she argues, a parent would “be permissibly resentful of the forcible administration to his perfectly healthy child of mind-altering drugs even if such a policy was argued for from secular premises.”[19] So it appears that[20]

    How permissible (if one means, as Audi must mean, something like “understandable” or “reasonable”) one’s resentment of some law is depends on how reasonable the law is. It does not depend upon the origin of the considerations that brought about the law but rather upon whether the law is good or bad, merely annoying or outrageous, and so forth.

    That we should do to others what we would have them do to us does not just apply to the religious. While it is true that most people would strongly object to having to abide by religiously-grounded policies they reject as false, it is also true that they would strongly object to having to abide by secularly-grounded policies they reject as false. Consider a Muslim woman who believes it is her religious duty to wear a burqa. The passage of a law requiring her to remove her burqa for her driver’s license photo would likely be offensive to her. A parallel golden rule argument would require us to oppose coercive laws drawn from secular grounds.

    2          Epistemic inaccessibility
    Simplified, the most prominent type of argument offered in support of the DRR is that in a pluralistic society, coercive legislation cannot be justified unless the reasons advanced can be grounded in the reasonably-held principles and beliefs shared by all people. People disagree over which religious views, if any, are correct; therefore, any coercive laws justified on religious grounds cannot be legitimate because not all reasonable people accept religious premises. As such, religious reasons are epistemically inaccessible. Eberle sums this up, “the norm of respect imposes on each citizen an obligation to discipline herself in such a way that she resolutely refrains from supporting any coercive law for which she cannot provide the requisite public justification.”[21]

    The paradigmatic and most influential version of this argument is that of John Rawls. Rawls argues that society [22]

    is always marked by a diversity of opposing and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. Some of these are perfectly reasonable, and this diversity among reasonable doctrines political liberalism sees as the inevitable long-run result of the powers of human reason at work within the background of enduring free institutions.

    Rawls uses the fact of diversity of comprehensive viewpoints, present in a pluralistic society, to argue for his version of restraint. Any justification drawn from such distinct grounds will always be reasonably rejected by someone.[23] Given this, some form of restraint is necessary.

    Unlike most advocates of the standard view, Rawls’ version of the DRR does not only exclude religion but also other comprehensive secular doctrines that reasonable people disagree over. He notes,[24]

    Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.

    Note that the reason that Rawls excludes comprehensive views is that “[not] all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse [such views] in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.” Rawls argues that when comprehensive views are removed from consideration there remains sufficient common ground from which coercive laws can be justified to all reasonable people. Rawls refers to this “public reason,” which he explains as follows;[25]

    We start by looking to the public culture itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles. We hope to formulate these ideas and principles clearly enough to be combined into a political conception of justice congenial to our most firmly held convictions. We express this by saying that a political conception of justice, to be acceptable, must accord with our considered convictions, at all levels of generality, or in what I have called elsewhere, ‘reflective equilibrium.’

    Public reason should comprise[26]

    presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial … we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines–to what we as individuals or members of associations see as the whole truth–nor to elaborate economic theories of general equilibrium, say, if these are in dispute.

    Whilst the boundaries being drawn this way enables Rawls’ position to escape the charge of asymmetry, his critics and even many of those who also advocate some form of restraint on justificatory reasons claim that his position excludes too much.

    (a)        Incoherence
    Nicholas Wolterstorff identifies several problems; [27]

    No matter what principles of justice a particular political theorist may propose, the reasonable thing for her to expect, given any plausible understanding whatsoever of ‘reasonable and rational,’ is not that all reasonable and rational citizens would accept those principles, but rather that not all of them would do so. It would be utterly unreasonable for her to expect all of them to accept them. It would be unreasonable of her even to expect all her reasonable and rational fellow theorists to accept them; the contested fate of Rawls’ own proposed principles of justice is illustrative. What is reasonable for her to expect is that her proposals will stir up controversy and dissent not only at the point of transition from the academy to general society, but within the academy.

    In short, there is no more hope that reasonable and rational citizens will come to agreement, in the way Rawls recommends, on principles of justice, than that they will come to agreement, in the foreseeable future, on some comprehensive philosophical or religious doctrine. It is odd of Rawls to have thought otherwise; [Emphasis original]

    The divisions in society over welfare, abortion, state funding of social projects, euthanasia, pornography, genetic modification of foods, climate change, capital punishment, Maori seats and so on seem very broad; in most cases no argument or reasons advanced for these issues are likely to be accepted by all reasonable people. That reasonable people will disagree over what constitutes public reason does, prima facie, seem plausible. If this is the case then Rawls’ position is incoherent.

    Rawls argues that we have a moral obligation to reject any view that “[not] all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.” Public reason will “alone give a reasonable public answer to all, or to nearly all, questions involving the constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice.”[28] However, as Wolterstorff pointed out, even the deliverances of public reason are such “that not all reasonable people will agree.” Wolterstorff’s reference to the lack of consensus on Rawls’ own “principles of justice” supports this claim. In A Theory of Justice Rawls attempted to expound on his idea of public reason to develop principles of justice that a society could be ordered by.[29] The reception to A Theory of Justice was not a consensus in favour; present in the literature are a number of rejections, offered by reasonable people, on anything from the conclusions drawn, through to the methods used, to the principles themselves.

    If we have a moral obligation to reject any view that “[not] all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational” and principles drawn from public reason are themselves things that not all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse then, by Rawls, we have a moral obligation to reject any principles drawn from public reason.

    Matthew Flannagan agrees,[30]

    Rawls rejects appeals to comprehensive doctrines because people can reasonably reject them and argues that there is a duty to not decide questions of basic justice this way. If this is true then we should reject appeals to public reason as well; in fact, we have a duty to not follow public reason.

    In my next post, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III, I will look at the objection that the argument from respect is too thin, that applied consistently the argument from respect excludes too much. I will conclude by looking at Audi’s response to this.


    [12] Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66, 30.
    [13]
    Kent Greenawalt Private Consciences and Public Reasons (Oxford University Press, New York, 1995) 67.
    [14]
    Audi, above n 12, 28.
    [15]
    Lydia McGrew “The Irrational Faith of the Naked Public Square” (2008) 1 The Christendom Review (at 2 October 2009).
    [16]
    Wolterstorff makes the same point, above n 3, 106.
    [17]
    Audi, above n 12, 32.
    [18]
    McGrew, above n 15.
    [19]
    Ibid.
    [20]
    Ibid.
    [21]
    Christopher Eberle Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 12.
    [22]
    Ibid 3-4.
    [23]
    The policy itself might be accepted as it may be able to be justified on grounds the person does accept, though these grounds are not immune from being reasonably rejected by other people. I am grateful to Glenn Peoples for the development of this point.
    [24]
    John Rawls Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York, 1993) 217. Note: Rawls limits his support of a form of the DRR in the policy areas of “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice.” Rawls’ critics argue that his position commits him to holding to his version of the DRR for all coercive legislation; see for example, Wolterstorff, above n 3, 106; Glenn Peoples Religion in the Public Square: Liberal Political Philosophy and the Place of Religious Convictions (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2007) 88; Matthew Flannagan Is Historic Christian Opposition to Feticide Defensible in the 21st Century? (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2006) 200.
    [25]
    Ibid 8.
    [26]
    Ibid 224-225.
    [27]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 67-120, 99.
    [28]
    Rawls, above n 24, 225.
    [29]
    John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1971).
    [30]
    Matthew Flannagan Is Historic Christian Opposition to Feticide Defensible in the 21st Century? (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2006) 195.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    In this series I set out the doctrine of religious restraint, the idea that in a pluralistic, liberal, society religious beliefs should not be utilised in the formation of public policy. I note that this doctrine entails an asymmetrical treatment of religious and secular beliefs, which appears to conflict with the central notion of liberal democracy that all people are equal and that the state should be neutral in respect to different conceptions of the good. I examine several key arguments in support of the doctrine and some defences of this asymmetry. I argue these arguments are subject to numerous difficulties and the asymmetry appears arbitrary and unjustified.

    As far back as the birth of liberal democracy commentators have proposed various forms of epistemological restraint on the nature and extent of the justifications offered for coercive laws. Justification is important because central to the concept of liberal democracy is the notion that all people are free and equal. Broadly speaking, the state must accord equal protection to all who come within its territory. Public policy must allow people equal freedom to live their lives as they see fit. Every adult must have an equal voice in the governance of society through the democratic process. Charles Larmore sums this up,[1]

    The familiar constitutional rights of free-expression, property, and political participation, though no doubt serving to promote the goal of democratic self-rule, also have an independent rationale. They draw upon that most fundamental of individual rights, which is the right [of every person] to equal respect.

    A diversity of beliefs, views and religions flourishes as people avail themselves of these liberties and come to different understandings about life, the world they live in, the meanings and purposes thereof. The fact of this plurality invites an important corollary to the concept of liberal democracy, typically formulated as the idea that the state must remain neutral with respect to the different religions and comprehensive viewpoints present within society.

    This is not to say that the state must hold that all views are equally true, just or good. Likewise, it is not a requirement that the state must adopt the incoherent stance of affirming (as a truth) that there is no such thing as truth. Nor that it should not concern itself with injustice or deleterious conduct. What is meant by this requirement is that, as a body that exists to serve the people, it is not the state’s role to rule on what is or is not the correct philosophy, worldview or religion; each person must be free to determine this. The state being neutral in this way shows equal respect for the freedom of all people.

    When state neutrality is conjoined with the concepts of all people being free, equal and worthy of respect, it follows that coercive legislation needs justification. If people are worthy of respect then there exists a prima facie presumption against state coercion. A commitment to state neutrality entails that justification must be drawn from neutral grounds. I will refer to this view of liberal democracy as “the standard view.”

    Common to almost all versions of the standard view is some form of restraint on religious reasons being offered as a form of justification. Richard Rorty, alluding to Jefferson’s famous reference to a wall of separation, describes this as [2]

    the happy, Jeffersonian compromise that the Enlightenment reached with the religious. This compromise consists in privatizing religion — keeping it out of … “the public square,” making it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy.

    The doctrine is more than just a restraint on religious reasons; Nicholas Wolterstorff expounds further;[3]

    Definitive of the position is a negation at this point: citizens (and officials) are not to base their decisions and/or debates concerning political issues on their religious convictions. When it comes to such activities, they are to allow their religious convictions to idle. They are to base their political decisions and their political debate in the public space on the principles yielded by some source independent of any and all of the religious perspectives to be found in society. … The source must be such that it is fair to insist that everybody base his or her political decisions, as well as public political debates, on the principles yielded by that source.

    Paul Rishworth writes, “some have contended that the nature of religious belief is such that, while it may be integral to individual autonomy and development, it has no proper role in public policy debates and that these ought to be conducted exclusively in secular terms that are equally accessible to all.”[4]

    Christopher Eberle and Terence Cuneo refer to this position as the doctrine of religious restraint (DRR) that they define canonically as[5]

    The DRR: a citizen of a liberal democracy may support the implementation of a coercive law L just in case he reasonably believes himself to have a plausible secular justification for L, which he is prepared to offer in political discussion. [Emphasis original]

    Eberle and Cuneo explain the implications of the DRR, “if a citizen is trying to determine whether or not she should support some coercive law, and if she believes that there is no plausible secular rationale for that law, then she may not support it.”[6]

    I           The Doctrine of Religious Restraint

    As Wolterstorff identifies in the quotes above, the restraint is negative; justifications for coercive laws must not be religious. The extent and nature of the independent source that acceptable justifications may be drawn from varies depending on which advocate one reads; all agree that a coercive law must be able to be justified by a plausible secular justification if it is to be neutral.

    Defenders of the DRR claim that it need not be codified. It is a moral requirement upon people regardless of their role within society; some form of censure rather than legal stricture is what is suggested. Rorty reflects this when he refers to it being “bad taste” to bring religion into the public square. Stephen Carter puts it clearly;[7]

    One good way to end a conversation – or start an argument – is to tell a group of well educated professionals that you hold a political position (preferably a controversial one such as being against abortion or pornography) because it is required by your understanding of God’s will. In the unlikely event that anyone hangs around to talk with you about it, chances are that you will be challenged on the ground that you are intent on imposing your religious beliefs on other people. And in contemporary political and legal culture, nothing is worse.

    There is an asymmetry present in most versions of the DRR; state coercion can be justified by some secular justifications but it can never be justified by religious justifications. In reviewing a definitive defence of the DRR advanced by Robert Audi, Philip Quinn observes;[8]

    These principles impose burdens on religious people that Audi nowhere suggests imposing on nonreligious people. … Audi does not propose that nonreligious people must be sufficiently motivated by adequate religious reason for their advocacy or support of restrictive laws or politicise. The lack of symmetry is striking.

    Eberle and Cuneo, in their discussion of the DRR, note the same asymmetry;[9]

    There is an important asymmetry between religious and secular reasons in the following respect: some secular reasons can themselves justify state coercion but no religious reason can. This asymmetry between the justificatory potential of religious and secular reasons, it is further claimed, should shape the political practice of religious believers. According to advocates of the standard view, citizens should not support coercive laws for which they believe there is no plausible secular rationale, although they may support coercive laws for which they believe there is only a secular rationale.

    Not surprisingly, the DRR is controversial despite its current orthodoxy. Religious believers are required to omit beliefs they understand to be true or hold as important when they grapple with public policy. Stephen Carter captures the sentiment well when he labels this “the separation of church and self.”[10] Yet defenders of the DRR maintain that some form of religious restraint is not only in accord with the notion of liberal democracy but essential to it, as Rorty puts it, “we shall not be able to keep a democratic political community going unless the religious believers remain willing to trade privatization for a guarantee of religious liberty.”[11]

    For the DRR to be as pervasively held in the literature, in society generally and within religious-freedom jurisprudence there must exist good reasons as to how the DRR does uphold the concepts of equal protection, freedom, voice and neutrality in spite of the charges critics level against it.

    In my next posts in this series, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II, I will look at some of the arguments for the doctrine of religious restraint. These are mostly variants of appeals to respect (such as the golden rule, epistemic inaccessibility) or arguments around the dangers of religion.


    [1] Charles Larmore quoted in Michael J Perry Under God? Religious Faith and Liberal Democracy (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003) 36.
    [2] Richard Rorty “Religion as a Conversation-Stopper” (1994) 3:1 Common Knowledge 1, 2.
    [3] Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 67-120, 73.
    [4] Paul Rishworth “Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion” in Paul Rishworth, Grant Hushcroft, Scott Optican and Richard Mahoney (eds) The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2003) 277-307, 279.
    [5]
    Christopher J. Eberle and Terence Cuneo “Religion and Political Theory” (2008) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (at 9 August 2009).
    [6]
    Ibid.
    [7]
    Stephen Carter The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialise Religious Devotion (Basic Books, New York, 1993) 23-24.
    [8]
    Philip Quinn “Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate” (2000) 60:2 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 486, 487 (book review).
    [9]
    Eberle and Cuneo, above n 5.
    [10]
    Carter, above n 7, 1.
    [11]
    Rorty, above n 2, 3.

    This series was written as a supervised research paper in pursuit of my LLB. I am very grateful to a number of people who personally encouraged me, gave feedback, recommended  resources  or were good enough to supply me with their own – particularly my supervisor, Paul Rishworth; philosophers: Glenn Peoples, Lydia McGrew, Alexander Pruss, Francis J Beckwith, Nicholas Wolterstorff and my husband, Matthew Flannagan.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI