Tag: Publication

  • Richard Carrier and the Arbitrariness Objection

    In, “Is ethical naturalism more plausible than Supernaturalism“, I criticised Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s objection that a divine command theory (DCT) makes morality arbitrary. Armstrong argued:

    “Let’s assume that God commanded us not to rape. Did God have any reason to command this? If not, his command was arbitrary, and then it can’t make anything morally wrong. On the other hand, if God did have a reason to command us not to rape, then that reason is what makes rape morally wrong. The command itself is superfluous. Either way, morality cannot Carrierdepend on God’s commands.”[1]

    This argument can be summarized as follows:

    [1] Either: (i) there is a reason, r, why God prohibits rape; or, (ii) there is no reason, r, why God prohibits rape.

    [2] If there is no reason, r, why God prohibits rape, then God’s commands are arbitrary.

    [3] If there is a reason, r, why God prohibits rape then, r, is what makes rape morally wrong.

    [4] If r is what makes rape morally wrong then God’s commands are superfluous.

    In response, I argued this argument commits the fallacy of equivocation because the word “makes” in premise [3] and [4] is ambiguous. I noted the word “makes” can be used in at least two different senses.

    One sense refers to constitutive explanations, such as when one affirms that what makes a cup of clear liquid a cup of water is that fact the liquid is H20. The second refers to a motivational explanation, as in, when I state that my love for my children makes me persevere in parenting. If the word makes is used in the constitutive sense, [4] is true but [3] is false. If it’s used in a motivational sense [3] is true but [4] is false. Either way the argument fails.

    Armstrong’s Dilemma
    In a footnote, Carrier dismisses this response as “hand waving” and “completely off point”:”When Armstrong says “reason [r] is what makes rape morally wrong” he simply means “r is the reason rape is morally wrong.” Thus “r is what makes rape morally wrong” simply means “rape is morally wrong when r.”[2]

    There are two problems with this response.

    First, Carrier’s assertion that Armstrong “simply means ‘r is the reason rape is morally wrong’” is not supported by the text. Two pages earlier, Armstrong explicitly states he intends (more…)

  • Philosophia Christi: Abstract Objects and Divine Command Ethics Down-Under

    In December we were told that Matt’s article “Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Problem of Evil”  had passed peer review and would be published in Philosophia Christi.  Issue, 13: 2  is  now out and if you look at the contents page you’ll see Matt’s article has now been published.

    The abstract to Matt’s article is as follows:

    Philosophia ChristiThis article criticises the deontological argument from evil proposed by Michael Tooley  in The Knowledge of God. I sketch Tooley’s distinction between deontological and axiological arguments from evil. Tooley rejects the axiological version because it rests  on “controversial ethical claims”, claims that are “likely to be rejected by many theists” and formulates a deontological version in its place. I argue that Alvin Plantinga’s criticism of the moral premises of this argument can be reformulated by appealing to a divine command theory of ethics. So reformulated, I argue that Tooley’s argument relies on controversial moral assumptions that many theists reject. I defend this response against potential criticisms found in the writings of Linda Zagzebski,  Tooley’s debate with William Lane Craig, and Peter Van Inwagen.

    Much of the focus of this issue is the topic of God and Abstract Objects. However, fortuitously, our good friend and fellow Kiwi, Glenn Peoples from Say Hello to My Little Friend,  has also been published in the same issue of Philosophia Christi immediately after Matt. His abstract is below:

    Of the objections to divine command ethics that still circulate in the literature, the epistemological objection is one of the two most common (the other being the objection from abhorrent commands). If morality is based on divine commands, the objection goes, then those who do not believe in God cannot know what is right or wrong. In this paper I explain the way in which this objection has been answered in the past (especially by Philip Quinn and Robert Adams) and I then look at a new attempt by Wes Morriston to resurrect and re-state the epistemological objection.  I explain the way in which this objection succumbs to responses that have already been made in the literature and is not new at all in spite of appearances, and I explain how it misconstrues the social nature of obligation in Robert Adams’ account of divine commands. In giving this explanation I flesh out the potentially difficult notion of a “sign” as an epistemic indicator of moral duty, and I argue that all the epistemological objections to divine command ethics this far fail because they have an underdeveloped concept of a “sign” as a central component of a command.

    Perhaps the theme for this issue should have been God, Abstract Objects and Divine Command ethics Down Under?

  • Published – Three Strikes: Proportion and Protection

    The editor of the New Zealand Law Students Association (NZLSA) publication LEX has just advised me that she has published my article “Three Strikes: Proportion and Protection.”

    In it I argue that the objections to the The Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (a.k.a the “Three Strikes Bill”) on the basis that it affronts the proportionality doctrine, which stems from the Bill of Rights, is flawed. I argue that criticisms of the Bill along these lines confuse appropriate force for punishment with defensive force.

    UPDATE:
    Not to be outdone, Matt just came in from the supermarket with the October edition of Investigate Magazine, which of course, features his regular Contra Mundum article – this month entitled, “God, Proof and Faith” complete with pullquote “the sceptic’s position eats its own tail … [it] is incoherent” and photo of Richard Dawkins labeled “delusional?” (you gotta love editor Ian Wishart). We’ll have a full copy of this article available on this blog at the end of the month; the editor prefers us to penalise those of you who don’t buy his magazine by making you wait.