Tag: Publications

  • The Naturalness of Belief: New Essays in Theism’s Rationality.

    The book The Naturalness of Belief: New Essays on Theism’s Rationality recently arrived from the publishers and is available on Amazon. Matt contributed a chapter to this book entitled “Divine Commands and the Euthyphro Dilemma: Some Naturalistic Misperceptions” The Naturalness of Belief is edited by Paul Copan (Palm Beach Atlantic) and Charles Taliaferro (St Olaf College) and published by Lexington Books.

    The table of contents is as follows:

    Introduction
    Part I: The Unnaturalness of Naturalism?
    1. Naturalism and Naturalness: A Naturalist’s Perspective
    —Graham Oppy
    Part II: Foundational Considerations
    2. Is Naturalism Natural?
    —Charles Taliaferro
    3. The Contraction and Expansion of Naturalism and the Theistic Challenge
    —Charles Taliaferro
    4. Taking Philosophical Naturalism Seriously
    —R. Scott Smith
    Part III: Theistic Belief, Science, and Naturalism
    5. In What Sense Might Religion Be Natural?
    —Justin Barrett and Aku Visala
    6. Science, Methodological Naturalism, and Question-Begging
    —Robert Larmer
    Part IV: Axiology and Naturalism
    7. Alienating Humanity: How Evolutionary Ethics Undermines Human Rights
    —Angus Menuge
    8. Divine Commands, Duties, and Euthyphro: Theism and Naturalist Misunderstandings
    —Matthew Flannagan
    9. Beauty: A Troubling Reality for the Scientific Naturalist
    —R. Douglas Geivett and James Spiegel
    Part V: Naturalism and Existential Considerations
    10. Existential Arguments for Theistic Belief
    —Clifford Williams
    11. Psychological Factors Contributing to Atheism: Bad Father Relationships and Just Bad Relationships as in Autistic Spectrum Disorders
    —Paul C. Vitz
    12. The Cultural Implications of Theism versus Naturalism
    —Paul Copan and Jeremiah J. Johnston
    Part VI: Naturalism, Freedom, and Immortality
    13. Theism, Robust Naturalism, and Robust Libertarian Free Will
    —J.P. Moreland
    14. Naturalism, Theism, and Afterlife Beliefs
    —Jonathan Loose

    The blurb from Amazon is as follows.

    Despite its name, “naturalism” as a world-view turns out to be rather unnatural in its strict and more consistent form of materialism and determinism. This is why a number of naturalists opt for a broadened version that includes objective moral values, intrinsic human dignity, consciousness, beauty, personal agency, and the like. But in doing so, broad naturalism begins to look more like theism. As many strict naturalists recognize, broad naturalism must borrow from the metaphysical resources of a theistic world-view, in which such features are very natural, commonsensical, and quite “at home” in a theistic framework.

    The Naturalness of Belief begins with a naturalistic philosopher’s own perspective of naturalism and naturalness. The remaining chapters take a multifaceted approach in showing theism’s naturalness and greater explanatory power. They examine not only rational reasons for theism’s ability to account for consciousness, intentionality, beauty, human dignity, free will, rationality, and knowledge; they also look at commonsensical, existential, psychological, and cultural reasons—in addition to the insights of the cognitive science of religion.

    Get your copy now, read it, and let us know what you think both here and on Amazon.

  • “Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis” Now Online

    Recently, Philosophia Christi published Matt’s article “Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis: A reply to Erik Wielenberg”. This article consisted of some critical commentary and responses to Erik Wielenberg’s bookdefaul1 Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.

    Since then Matt’s article has received a little bit of unexpected attention. One of my arguments was discussed in a dialogue between William Lane Craig and Erik Wielenberg that took place at North Carolina State University earlier this year, and on the back of this, we have received several received requests to read the paper. It is now available here: Flannagan Robust Ethics PC 19 2 (1)

    Permission has been granted from the Editor of Philosophia Christi to upload this contribution. Learn more about the Journal by going to www.epsociety.org/philchristi.

  • Is it Immoral to Believe in God? Matt responds to Michael Ruse

    The Christian Research Journal have published an online copy of an article I wrote for their journal last year:

    downloadIn a recent op-ed piece in the New York Times, the distinguished philosopher of science Michael Ruse raises the question, Is it morally wrong to believe in God? Some skeptics maintain there is something irrational about theism. But is it immoral?

    Behind the question is the rhetoric of the New Atheism represented in the writings of people such as Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, and Sam Harris. Ruse historically has been fairly critical of New Atheism and maintains that, although New Atheists are “self-confident to a degree that seems designed to irritate,” they display “an ignorance of anything beyond their fields to an extent remarkable even in modern academia.”

    However, behind their remarkable uninformed hubris is a “moral passion unknown outside the pages of the Old Testament.” Ruse notes that “atheists of Dawkins’ stripe don’t just say that believing in God is an intellectual mistake. They also claim that it’s morally wrong to believe in the existence of God or gods.” Ruse appears to have some sympathy with this motif of their thought and attempts to defend it.

    See the rest of my article here

  • Ethical Supernaturalism is still more Plausible than Naturalism: Carrier’s Preliminary Objections

    Last year I had an article Is Ethical Naturalism more plausible than Supernaturalism: A reply to Walter Sinnott Armstrong published in the journal Philo. In the comments section a reader asked me to comment on a response to that article published by classical historian Richard Carrier. This post will be the first of several where I do so.Carrier

    In, Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism, I did two things. Firstly, I briefly explicated a conditional that has recently been proposed explicitly by William Lane Craig but which is also defended by several others, and secondly I rebutted several arguments raised against this conditional by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Carrier argues my rebuttals fail, but before he does so he offers three preliminary arguments against the positive thesis I was defending against Armstrong. It is these that I will address in this post.

    The Contention

    The conditional I explicated as follows:

    Craig’s contention is that if theism is true then we can plausibly explain the nature of moral obligation by identifying obligations with God’s commands, analogous to the way “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H2O, or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion.” By “God” Craig means a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially orders the universe.[1]

    Note three things.

    First, this is a conditional, if affirms that if theism is true then then we can plausibly explain the nature of moral obligation by identifying obligations with God’s commands.

    Second, I define the concept of God used in this conditional as a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially orders the universe.

    Third, this conditional specifies the kind of grounding relationship I am addressing, one where the relationship between God’s commands and moral obligations is one of identity. It’s the same kind of (more…)

  • Published in Philo: Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

    Jeffery Jay Lowder  has informed me that my article “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong”  was  published in the Spring/Summer 2012 issue of Philo. The abstract is below:

    Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong“In many of his addresses and debates, William Lane Craig has defended a Divine Command Theory of moral obligation (DCT). In a recent article and subsequent monograph, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has criticized Craig’s position. Armstrong contended that a DCT is subject to several devastating objections and further contended that even if theism is true a particular form of ethical naturalism is a more plausible account of the nature of moral obligations than a DCT is. This paper critiques Armstrong’s argument. I will argue Armstrong’s objections do not refute a DCT and the ethical naturalism he defends is not more plausible than Craig’s ethical supernaturalism.”

    You can read “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong” here.