Tag: Religion in Public Life

  • Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part I

    In this two-part series I will sketch and defend Alvin Plantinga’s proposal that evolution should not be taught as “the sober truth” in state schools. In Part I, I will sketch Plantinga’s position and the arguments he provides for it; in Part II, I will look at what should be taught and then I’ll defend this position against the most significant critique offered of it by Robert Pennock. I have developed this position partly out of reading and reflecting on the published debate between these two men but also through correspondence with Alvin Plantinga over the issue.

    Part I. The Argument against Teaching Evolution in State Schools
    Arguably the most sophisticated argument against teaching evolution in state schools has been made by Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga begins by offering a couple of qualifications; first, Plantinga’s inquiry is limited to whether evolution should be taught in the state schools of countries that display significant pluralism and diversity of opinion.[1] This would include, not just Plantinga’s own country, the United States of America but also New Zealand. Second, Plantinga limits his inquiry to whether “evolution should be taught as the sober truth of the matter” [Emphasis mine][2] as opposed to “the best current scientific hypothesis, or what accords best or is most probable (epistemically probable) with respect to the appropriate scientific evidence base.”[3] Plantinga’s conclusion is that it is unjust to teach evolution in this way. His argument proceeds in three stages.

    First Plantinga notes that American (and the same is true of New Zealand) society is “radically pluralistic; and here I am thinking in particular of the plurality of religious and quasi-religious views.”[4] Following John Rawls, he calls these religious and quasi-religious views “’comprehensive’ beliefs… deep ways of understanding ourselves and our world, other deep ways of interpreting ourselves and our world to ourselves.”[5]

    Second, Plantinga suggests that with state schools, “It is as if we are all party to a sort of implicit contract: we recognize the need to train and educate our children, but don’t have the time or competence to do it individually. We therefore get together to hire teachers to help instruct and educate our children, and together we pay for this service by way of tax money.”[6] However, given that “[for] most citizens, these comprehensive beliefs are of enormous importance… some even thinking that one’s eternal welfare is tied up with accepting them, parents will typically want their children to be educated into what they take to be the true and correct comprehensive beliefs;”[7] This, however, raises an immediate question of fairness,

    It would clearly be unfair, unjust, for the school, which we all support, to teach one set of religious beliefs as opposed to another–to teach that evangelical Christianity, for example, is the truth. This would be unfair to those citizens who are party to the contract and whose comprehensive beliefs–Judaism, naturalism, Islam, whatever–are incompatible with evangelical Christianity.[8]

    From these points Plantinga argues that parents possess what he calls a basic right that, “each of the citizen’s party to the contract has the right to not have comprehensive beliefs taught to their children that contradict their own comprehensive beliefs.”[9] A basic right expresses a prima facie right not an absolute right; that is, it is a right which can be overridden by other considerations. Teaching evolution clearly violates a basic right; a significant proportion of people hold comprehensive religious views, views that contradict evolution. Hence, their rights are being violated if evolution is taught as true in state schools. It follows then, that in the absence of other considerations, teaching evolution in state schools is unjust.

    The final step in Plantinga’s argument is to contend that, in the case of evolution, there are no other considerations that override this prima facie right. Commenting on a defence of the teaching of evolution made by Robert Pennock, Plantinga identifies two considerations made in favour of teaching evolution. The first is that evolutionary theory is true; the second is that it is an empirically supported theory, the best supported theory of origins in the biological sciences.

    In response to the first consideration Plantinga notes that even if evolution is true, it does not follow that it is just to teach it as true in a pluralistic society.

    Suppose Christianity is in fact true, as indeed I believe it is, would that mean that it is fair to teach it in public schools where most of the citizens, citizens who support those schools, are not Christians and reject Christian comprehensive beliefs? I should think not; that would clearly be unfair, and the fact that the system of beliefs in question is true would not override the unfairness.[10]

    Plantinga’s response to the second consideration is more nuanced. Plantinga has not claimed that evolution cannot be taught as “the best current scientific hypothesis, or what accords best or is most probable (epistemically probable) with respect to the appropriate scientific evidence base,”[11] his claim is that it should not be taught as true. The fact that evolution is the best scientific theory does not, by itself, entail that it is true. To get the conclusion that evolution is true one needs to conjoin the claim that evolution is the best scientific theory of origins with an epistemological claim that Plantinga labels PC,

    (PC) The right way to answer questions of empirical fact–for example questions about the origin of life, the age of the earth, whether human beings have evolved from earlier forms of life–is by way of science, or scientific method.[12]

    Plantinga notes that PC is not an empirical or scientific claim; it is rather a claim of philosophy or epistemology. Second, PC is a claim that contradicts the comprehensive beliefs of many parents. Hence, to justify teaching evolution as true, as opposed to just the best scientific hypothesis, educators would have to go beyond the mere scientific empirical evidence and teach substantive philosophical views that contradict the comprehensive views of parents.[13]

    Plantinga concludes that the considerations put forward to override the prima facie rights of parents do not override these rights, hence, “is that it is improper, unfair, to teach either creationism or evolution in the schools–that is so, at any rate for areas where a substantial proportion of the parents hold religious or comprehensive beliefs incompatible with either.”[14]

    In my next post, Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part II, I will look at what should be taught in state schools and I’ll address Robert Pennock’s criticisms of the position.

    [1] Alvin Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” in Robert Pennock Ed Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge, The MIT Press – Bradford Books, 2001) 779.
    [2] Ibid.
    [3] Ibid.
    [4] Ibid 780.
    [5] Ibid; John Rawls Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)
    [6] Ibid, 781.
    [7] Ibid.
    [8] Ibid.
    [9] Ibid, 780.
    [10] Ibid, 784.
    [11] Ibid, 779.
    [12] Ibid, 786.
    [13] Ibid.
    [14] Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part II

  • MandM on Opposing Views in Religion and Society

    We were contacted a while back by Opposing Views and asked if we would consider allowing them to link to us. We had a look at their site, liked what we saw and said yes. We are now featured on their Religion and Society page as a recommended site.

    “Dr Matthew Flannagan” is also officially in their pool of experts to call on for when they present their for and against articles on matters of religion and society. To suggest a topic they could use Matt on you can click on the contact link on their site and recommend him 😉

  • Stop Being a Christian and Start Being a Person

    No, not a call to give up Christianity – we just listened to Dr Glenn Peoples’ latest podcast, it is worth hearing. Excellent commentary on Christian sub-culture and our willingness to accept sub-standard music, scholarship, etc just because those offering it to us are part of our club. Glenn calls us to critically assess whatever we are presented with on its merits.

    Follow the link here and download or play; it plays easily even on fairly slow connections, like ours and does not seem to need any special programs to play.

    Glenn, despite his PhD in Philosophy, is very easy to listen to and you can play the podcast even as you are surfing the web as the file happily plays in the background. He is clever, funny and very relevant.

  • Rest In Peace Richard Neuhaus

    It is with sadness that I have just read that Richard John Neuhaus died on Thursday the 8th of January at age 72. There are various obituaries here

    For those New Zealand readers who won’t know. Neuhaus was a Lutheran turned Catholic priest who wrote and commented extensively on issues of religion and public life. His book The Naked Public Square was an important work challenging the modern liberal notion that religion should be privatised and not be utilised in public debate. Neuhaus was was a long time civil rights activist who marched in the civil rights movement, against Vietnam, and became a leading intellectual in the Neo Conservative movement. The journal he edited First Things brought together Jewish, Catholic and Protestant scholars with a conservative bent and produced some of the some of the most thoughtful and insightful commentary on issues related to religion and public life that I have read.

    Neuhaus and his excellent and often sarcastically witty columns will be missed.

  • Some More Thoughts on Religion and Public Life: Robert Audi’s Critique of Wolterstorff

    In two earlier posts, I discussed John Rawls’ defence of the contention that theological premises should be bracketed or excluded from public discourse. In particular, I appropriated the criticisms of Rawls’s position made by Nicholas Wolterstorff.

    In “Wolterstorff on Religion, Politics, and the Liberal State” in Religious Beliefs in the Public Square, Robert Audi argues that Wolterstorff’s conclusion is mistaken. He argues that Rawls’ position is more qualified than Wolterstorff appears to think. Audi points out that Rawls is only, “speaking above all about coercive state power in relation to matters of basic justice, not about every political issue. … Moreover, the emphasis is not on actual agreement, … but on its realistic possibility given rationality.”[1] [Emphasis original] Audi suggests that concerning issues of constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice there are “some very basic moral intuitions that are common to mature rational adults who are conscientiously devoted to living together in harmony”.[2]

    However, Wolterstorff has not just argued that public reason is problematic because it will not deliver actual agreement. His argument was that such agreement was not a realistic possibility. He said, “It would be utterly unreasonable” for a person using Rawls’ method to “expect anything else than disagreement”. Wolterstorff claims that agreement is not a realistic possibility because while some will agree, some will not. “[T]he reasonable thing … to expect is not that all reasonable people who use their common reason will agree with … [the] results, but that not all reasonable people will agree.”

    Audi’s other points seem to be that Rawls limits his position to “basic issues of justice” and “constitutional essentials” and that on these matters agreement is a realistic possibility. However, I noted above that on many substantive matters there is not a realistic possibility of agreement. The question then needs to be asked, are these matters of basic justice or constitutional essentials? If they are, then Audi’s position appears false. On these types of matters, it is simply not true that there are sufficient common sets of intuitions for a reasonable hope of agreement to occur.

    On the other hand, if these are not matters of basic justice or constitutional essentials then Rawls’ position lacks any bite. If, for example, the question of feticide is not a question of basic justice or constitutional essentials then Rawls’s position entails no objection to appeals to divine law on this topic. It is only on constitutional essentials and basic justice that such appeals are wrong and this is not such an issue.

    Note that if Audi is correct here, much of the sting is taken out of Rawls’ position. One cannot appeal to comprehensive doctrines in contexts where there is widespread agreement on basic issues; one can only appeal to such doctrines where there is widespread disagreement. Therefore, on deeply contentious issues like abortion, euthanasia, homosexual rights, etc appeals to divine law are perfectly appropriate. Appeals to divine law are only wrong when there is widespread consensus amongst rational people.

    However, Wolterstorff does address this issue in the article Audi refers to. In “The Role of Religion in Political Issues” Wolterstorff states, “if my using reasons that I know you do not endorse really does constitute my not treating you as equal, then it constitutes that whether or not the issue is constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice”.[3] On this, he seems correct. Consequently, if Rawls’ claims about why one should bracket comprehensive beliefs on such matters are cogent then we should bracket them on other matters as well. This would of course mean that on many questions of public debate, if not most, no answers would be forthcoming. Moreover, as Wolterstorff himself points out, it would mean one could not appeal to the values of political liberalism either. Liberalism presumably is a comprehensive doctrine so again Rawls position would be rendered incoherent.[4]

    On the other hand, if Rawls’s reasons for bracketing comprehensive beliefs are incorrect with regards to non-constitutional matters, if on these issues of coercive legislation one can appeal to theological beliefs that are rejected by rational people yet not disrespect them, then it is hard to see how they can become incorrect just because the topic has changed. Hence, it is doubtful that Rawls can limit his restriction in the way he wants to and given this, all the problems of applying public reason to non-constitutional issues apply with full force.

    These responses all assume Audi’s contention that on matters of basic justice and constitutional essentials, agreement between reasonable people can be reasonably expected. Audi bases this claim upon a rhetorical question.

    But is there not a strong consensus, at least among citizens of democratic societies, that justice requires not only equal protection of the laws but also laws that protect liberty, including political and religious liberty and freedom of speech, up to a certain level? There are of course disagreements on matters of detail…[5]

    The problem here is that each of these examples involves appeal to an ambiguous and vague notion. However, as soon as an attempt is made to fill out these concepts with substantive content the apparent consensus disappears.

    Consider the example of freedom of speech. Audi notes that most people agree that there should be freedom of speech, however, what does this mean? Free from what? From prior restraint? From the initiation of force? From no restraint upon content but not upon the manner of expression? Is this a negative freedom so that it forbids merely coercive attempts to prevent speaking? Is it a positive freedom so that the state has a duty to provide public funds to subsidise expression? Reasonable people can be expected to disagree on the answers to these questions. Moreover, these are not just matters of detail, they are disagreements over the very meaning of the term ‘freedom’ in the phrase ‘freedom of speech’. It may be true that people use the same terms but the substantive content and the meaning that they understand the terms to denote differs widely.

    Similar disagreement arises over what sort of speech is referred to in the term ‘freedom of speech’. Does it include a right to engage in hate speech? Does it include speech denying the Holocaust occurred? What about racist and sexist speech? Does it include speech that is blasphemous or defamatory? Again, reasonable people disagree; not only do they disagree over the meaning of the term “freedom” they also disagree over what types of speech one is free to engage in.[6]

    I think the same thing occurs concerning freedom of religion. In his book Foreordained Failure, Steven Smith demonstrates that there is no such thing as a right to freedom of religion. Instead there is a spectrum of views about religious tolerance that comes in degrees; no state tolerates all religious sects and very few states tolerate none. He notes that Aquinas, Cromwell, Locke and Mill all advocated and defended forms of religious tolerance. However, each disagreed as to which religions such tolerance should apply to and the proper limits upon those they disagreed with.[7]

    Smith argues further that these differing accounts of freedom of religion all depended upon comprehensive views and one cannot adjudicate between them without appeal to such views. Attempts to articulate a right to freedom of religion from a neutral or public stance are quite hopeless.[8] Similar things can be said about the idea of ‘equality’ within the term ‘equal protection of the laws’. Hence, it appears that even on these issues of basic justice and constitutional essentials public reason will not utilise principles that all reasonable people can be expected to endorse, nor will one be able to get very far without utilising comprehensive doctrines of some sort.

    I think the difficulties Rawls’ position faces are illustrative of a general problem with the dialectic over theological beliefs in the public square. If one attempts to exclude theological beliefs from public discourse, because reasonable people can reject them, then secular comprehensive beliefs must also be excluded as reasonable people can and do reject secular beliefs. If one does not exclude secular beliefs then special pleading is going on. If one does exclude both secular and religious beliefs then what is left will be insufficiently thick to address many public issues. One would have to appeal to some comprehensive belief to answer the questions that one faces but such restrictions upon comprehensive beliefs would render one’s position incoherent.

    [1] Robert Audi, “Wolterstorff on Religion, Politics, and the Liberal State,” in Religion in the Public Square; The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, ed. Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1997), 133-134.
    [2] Ibid., 134.
    [3] Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Political Issues,” Religion in the Public Square; The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, ed. Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1997), 106.
    [4] Ibid.
    [5] Audi, “Wolterstorff on Religion, Politics, and the Liberal State,” 132.
    [6] Ibid. Audi argues that in these types of situations one means substantially the same thing by the term, agrees on the paradigms of its application and yet offer differing definitions. This is because “providing definitions is a demanding task” and “many different definitions can be applied to the same finite range of cases”. However, this misconstrues the situation. As noted it is not that these people use the term the same way but that they use it and understand it in a very different way. They disagree over the paradigms and hold to a different range of finite cases even if there is some overlap between them.
    [7] Steven Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
    [8] Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Rawls on Religion and Public Life Part 1
    Rawls on Religion and Public Life Part 2

  • Rawls on Religion and Public Life Part 2

    In part 1, I outlined Rawls’ position on Religion and Public Life and now I will offer some critical comments on this position drawing from Nicholas Wolterstorff.

    There are numerous problems with Rawls’ contention here. Wolterstorff sums some of them up.

    Suppose, then, that someone has followed that strategy; she has analyzed our political mentality into its constituent ideas and has elaborated these ideas into principles of justice. I submit that no matter what those resultant principles of justice may be, the reasonable thing for her to expect is not that all reasonable people who use their common human reason will agree with her results, but that not all reasonable people will agree. It would be utterly unreasonable for her to expect anything else than disagreement. The contested fate of Rawls’ own principles of justice is an illustrative case in point. There’s no more hope that all those among us who are reasonable and rational will arrive, in the way Rawls recommends, at consensus on principles of justice, than that we will all in the foreseeable future, agree on some comprehensive philosophical or religious doctrine.[1] [Emphasis original]

    Here Wolterstorff emphasises two points. Firstly, he suggests that the contents of public reason are such that it is to be expected that reasonable people will disagree over them. Secondly, Wolterstorff hints that this renders Rawls’ position incoherent. Rawls rejects appeals to comprehensive doctrines because people can reasonably reject them and there is a duty to not decide questions of basic justice this way.[2] If this is true then we should reject appeals to public reason as well; in fact, we have a duty to not follow public reason. However, if we cannot follow public reason and we cannot follow comprehensive doctrines, we are left with nothing; few restrictive laws or policies could be morally justified. This is precisely the implication that Quinn suggested.

    Wolterstorff’s argument depends on his claim that it is reasonable to expect disagreement over the contents of public reason. He cites Rawls’ own theory of justice in support of this. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls attempts to develop an account of basic justice based on public reason.[3] However, there is widespread disagreement amongst reasonable people not only over the conclusions reached but the methods and implicit principles themselves.

    Of course, merely appealing to one case is unpersuasive; it is possible this is a single anomaly. However, in an earlier work Wolterstorff cited other examples where public reason appeared unable to be used in a manner that would be agreed upon by reasonable people.[4] In “The Role of Religion in Political Issues,” Wolterstorff cites the work of Kent Greenawalt to illustrate that not only is public reason incapable of resolving questions of contentious political issues but also on many issues it is “simply irrelevant”,[5] public reason has “nothing to say”.[6]

    For example, Wolterstorff refers to the debate about whether the state has a duty to provide social welfare.[7] In this debate not only is there disagreement about the conclusions but also debate about the very basic principles or concepts involved. Both supporters and opponents of state welfare appeal to such things as ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ but have radically different conceptions as to what freedom and equality are. Also involved in this debate are different assumptions about whether there are property rights and if there are, how such rights are weighed against social utility. It is unlikely that the consensus populi, common sense and uncontroversial science provide answers to these questions that all reasonable people would accept.

    Wolterstorff is not alone in these observations. Christopher Eberle makes similar observations about such things as abortion and freedom of religion.[8] De Marneffe argues that on contentious moral and social issues public reason will fail to offer any substantive answer.[9] Jean Hampton suggests that public reason cannot provide an answer to the question of abortion.[10] Quinn makes similar observations.[11] The point is, that if we genuinely limit ourselves to principles upon which no reasonable person can be expected to reject, what we are left with is inadequate to provide answers to many, if any, substantive questions. Only if we supplement these with premises drawn from some comprehensive doctrine will answers be adequate.

    The case of abortion that these authors refer to is particularly instructive. Rawls’s own comments on this issue unwittingly confirm this. When discussing how public reason would address the question Rawls simply asserts that reasonable people will agree that in the early stages of pregnancy the right to equality overrides our due concern for human life. However, he seems to countenance the idea that reasonable people may limit abortion in the second trimester in certain circumstances. Now this, clearly, is not an obvious intuition shared by all reasonable people – unless one wishes to stipulate ‘reasonableness’ to rule out anyone who does not hold Rawls’s substantive normative views on abortion.

    Moreover, it appears that one cannot adjudicate any dispute between Rawls and a critic on this issue without appealing to a comprehensive doctrine. Suppose, for example, that a fetus is a person in the first trimester of pregnancy then Rawls’s suggestion that the value of equality overrides in the first trimester but may not always in the second is false. Why would it be acceptable in the name of equality for a woman to kill a person in one trimester and not the other in otherwise identical circumstances? It seems that Rawls’s intuition is justified only if one assumes that a first trimester fetus is not human. On the other hand, if one assumes that a fetus is human at this point then Rawls’s position is erroneous. Hence, only by addressing this issue can such a debate be settled.

    However, addressing this issue by appealing to public reason or common sense can hardly provide an answer. As Quinn notes, “common sense is divided on or simply perplexed on the question of abortion”.[12] Uncontroversial science can tell us facts of fetal development but it cannot tell us the moral significance of those facts or what facts are important for determining personhood. In addition, there is no consensus populi on this issue; the political culture of many countries is divided on this question. It seems impossible to offer any argument one way or the other without utilising a premise drawn from some comprehensive doctrine over which reasonable people do not agree.

    Similar points apply to Rawls’ claim that a right to abortion is necessary so as to give the right to equality “substance and force”. This follows only if one assumes a particular understanding of equality yet neither the consensus populi nor common sense will produce this conclusion. In fact, it is arguable that much of the popular appeals to equality are confused and ambiguous.[13] Moreover, even if such a consensus on the nature of equality were available, it does not follow that a right to abortion is necessary for giving it force unless one supplements this concept with understandings of sexuality and gender drawn from some comprehensive perspective.[14]

    I do not think abortion is an isolated case. The same would apply to other substantive questions such as homosexual marriage, affirmative action, capital punishment, welfare, etc. Wolterstorff’s contention that public reason will not, un-supplemented with comprehensive doctrines, provide information that all rational people can be reasonably expected to accept or even provide an adequate base for deciding many substantive issues appears justified. If this is so, Rawls’s position is incoherent or ad hoc.

    [1] Wolterstorff, “Why We Should Reject What Liberalism Tells Us,” 174.
    [2] I am grateful for discussions with Dr Glenn Peoples for helping me to develop this argument.
    [3] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
    [4] Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Political Issues,” 102-104.
    [5] Ibid., 102.
    [6] Ibid.
    [7] Ibid., 103-104.
    [8] Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics, 217-222.
    [9] de Marneffe, “Rawls’s Idea Of Public Reason,” 232-250.
    [10] Jean Hampton, “The Common Faith of Liberalism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 75 (1994), 208-209.
    [11] Quinn, “Liberalism and Their Exclusions of the Religious,” 149-150.
    [12] Ibid.,150.
    [13] See Louis Pojman, “Theories of Equality: A Critical Analysis,” Behavior and Philosophy 23:2 (1995): 1-27, and his “Equal Human Worth: A Critique of Contemporary Egalitarianism.” http://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:CvaEU_1lw5IJ:www.louispojman.com/equalworth.pdf+Equal+Human+Worth+Pojman&hl=en&gl=nz&ct=clnk&cd=8.
    [14] See de Marneffe, “Rawls’s Idea of Public Reason,” 234-235.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Rawls on Religion and Public Life Part 1
    Some More Thoughts on Religion and Public Life: Robert Audi’s Critique of Wolterstorff

  • Rawls on Religion and Public Life Part 1

    In a two part series I will reflect on John Rawls’ widely celebrated discussion on religion and public life. In part 1, I will outline Rawls’ position and then in part 2 I will offer some critical comments on this position drawing from Nicholas Wolterstorff.

    One common line of argument for excluding theological premises from public debate is that not everyone accepts the truth of such premises. Any policy decisions based on such a purported divine law would be binding upon these people in spite of the fact they do not accept such theological doctrines.

    One obvious problem with this line of argument is that exactly the same thing can be said about many secular, non-theological, beliefs. Phillip Quinn articulates this point,

    … if the fact that religious reasons can not be shared by all in a religiously pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in fairness also be excluded on the same grounds.[1]

    Quinn notes correctly that secular moral theories such as Utilitarianism or Kantianism, Intuitionism, Socialism, Libertarianism, can all be reasonably rejected in a philosophically-pluralistic society.

    Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies would be morally justified, a conclusion that would, I suspect, be welcome only to anarchists.[2]

    One influential attempt to avoid these problems is proposed by John Rawls in Political Liberalism.[3] Rawls defends the thesis that it is wrong to appeal to religious or theological beliefs in debates pertaining to “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice”.[4] Rawls does this on the same grounds that Quinn refers to above; such beliefs can be “reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy”.[5] Rawls states,

    Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.[6]

    On the other hand, Rawls concedes Quinn’s point; “it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens in a pluralistic democracy”.[7] Rawls acknowledges this and argues that it is not just wrong to appeal to theological premises but also, “no comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a political conception”.[8] [Emphasis added] Rawls maintains that contemporary society,

    [I]s always marked by a diversity of opposing and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. Some of these are perfectly reasonable, and this diversity among reasonable doctrines political liberalism sees as the inevitable long-run result of the powers of human reason at work within the background of enduring free institutions.[9]

    In summary, Rawls states there is a plurality of comprehensive doctrines that are irreconcilable with each other. Each doctrine is reasonably held by some people and reasonably rejected by others. Yet, respect for others forbids us to appeal to premises that we can expect reasonable people to reject.[10] It follows then, that in questions of “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice” that no one should appeal to premises that require the truth of a comprehensive doctrine that some people can and/or do reasonably reject.[11]

    However unlike Quinn, Rawls denies that this has anarchistic implications. He rejects Quinn’s claim, as cited above, that this rationale entails that “in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies would be morally justified”. Instead, Rawls maintains that one can construct answers to “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice” by utilising what he calls “public reason” the basic idea is that if a people will address basic questions of “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice” by appealing only to ideas implicit in the shared political culture of society. Nicholas Wolterstorff calls this the “consensus populi”.[12] Rawls explains this process:

    [B]y looking to the public culture itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles. We hope to formulate these ideas and principles clearly enough to be combined into a political conception of justice congenial to our most firmly held convictions. We express this by saying that a political conception of justice, to be acceptable, must accord with our considered convictions, at all levels of generality, or in what I have called elsewhere, ‘reflective equilibrium.’[13]

    In addition to appealing to the consensus populi, public reason can utilise “presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial”.[14] However, in using public reason people, “are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines”.[15]

    Continued in part 2.

    [1] Phillip Quinn, “Political Liberalism and their Exclusion of the Religious,” in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, ed. Paul Weithman (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 144.
    [2] Ibid.
    [3] John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
    [4] Ibid., 214.
    [5] Quinn, “Political Liberalism and their Exclusion of the Religious”, 144.
    [6] Rawls, Political Liberalism, 217.
    [7] Quinn, “Political Liberalism and their Exclusion of the Religious”, 144.
    [8] Rawls, Political Liberalism, 135.
    [9] Ibid., 3-4.
    [10] Christopher J Eberle argues that Rawls’ rationale here is incoherent as it conflicts with the method that purports to justify it. See Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 140-150.
    [11] I am grateful for discussions with Dr Glenn Peoples for helping me to develop this argument.
    [12] Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,” in Religion in the Public Square; The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, ed. Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1997), 91.
    [13] Rawls, Political Liberalism, 8.
    [14] Ibid., 224.
    [15] Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Rawls on Religion and Public Life Part 2
    Some More Thoughts on Religion and Public Life: Robert Audi’s Critique of Wolterstorff