Tag: William Alston

  • The Euthyphro Objection Part I: Against Divine Commands & Avoiding Strawmen

    Perhaps the most common argument against an appeal to divine commands in ethical reasoning is the Euthyphro dilemma, first articulated by Plato and utilised by numerous critics of divine commands ever since. A representative example of this line of argument occurs in Peter Singer’s widely-acclaimed monograph Practical Ethics. In the first chapter of Practical Ethics, Singer offers the following argument.

    [E]thics is not something intelligible only in the context of religion. I shall treat ethics entirely independent of religion. Some theists say that ethics cannot do without religion because the very meaning of “good” is nothing other than “what God approves”. Plato refuted a similar view more than two thousand years ago by arguing that if the gods approve of some actions it must be because those actions are good, in which case it cannot be the gods’ approval that makes them good. The alternative view makes God’s approval entirely arbitrary: if the gods had happened to approve of torture and disapprove of helping our neighbours, torture would be good and helping our neighbours bad.[i]

    Several features of this critique are noteworthy. Singer identifies a position known as the divine command theory of ethics. He construes this position as the view that “the very meaning of “good” is nothing other than “what God approves.” He bases this on the testimony of “some theists”. Singer’s argument here consists of three stages. He proposes the famous dilemma proposed by Socrates in Plato’s dialogue, Euthyphro. He then claims that divine command theory makes God’s commands arbitrary. He asserts that acceptance of divine command theory entails that paradigmatically-evil actions such as torture could be good. He concludes that divine command theory makes God’s goodness redundant,

    Some modern theists have attempted to extricate themselves from this type of dilemma by maintaining that God is good and so could not possibly approve of torture; but these theists are caught in a trap of their own making, for what can they possibly mean by the assertion that God is good? That God is approved by God?[ii]

    In this three part blog series I will respond to the Euthyphro dilemma. In this post I will comment upon Singer’s description of his opponents’ position and suggest it is a straw-man. In the next two posts I will assess the arguments he proposes and argue they are unsuccessful. Contrary to what is commonly asserted in ethics textbooks and first year philosophy lectures, I do not think the Euthyphro dilemma is sound.

    As I stated above, Singer’s argument is an attack upon a position known in the literature as divine command theory or voluntarism. Schneewind notes that in the late Middle Ages two schools emerged as to the relationship between God and the existence of an objective law. The first and older position is known as Intellectualism. In this view, God does not create morality; rather, God’s will is guided by his intellectual knowledge of eternal moral standards. The second position is divine command theory. This position grounded the moral law not so much in God’s intellect but in his will. God himself creates the moral law.[iii]

    It is worth noting at this juncture that divine command theory is only one possible way of construing the nature of divine law and since Singer only offers an argument against this position, even if his argument is sound it fails to establish that the idea of divine law is problematic. Nevertheless, even as a critique of this theory the argument appears to attack a straw man.

    Singer construes divine command theory as claiming “the very meaning of ‘good’ is nothing other than ‘what God approves.’” It appears then that Singer characterises divine command theory as a theory about the meaning of the evaluative term “good”; however, this is a caricature.

    Few, if any, notable defenders of divine command theory propose it as a theory about the meaning of the term ‘good’. This is demonstrated by examining the literature of those contemporary theists who do defend versions of the theory. A notable, contemporary defender of divine command theory is Robert Adams. In Divine Command Ethics Modified Again and later in his monograph Finite and Infinite Good, Adams puts forward the view that “ethical wrongness is (i.e., is identical with) the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving God”.[iv] [Emphasis original]

    Note two things here; firstly, Adams does not offer a theory about ‘the good’ but explicitly limits his theory to deontological properties such as wrongness. Secondly, his theory is not about the meaning of terms; rather it is a metaphysical claim about identity.

    This last distinction is important. Contemporary philosophy of language offers several examples of this distinction between two terms having the same meaning and two things being identical. One of the most famous is the relationship between water and H20. Water is H20. This is a claim of identity. The liquid on earth that we call water is hydrogen hydroxide. However, this is not a claim of meaning. The claim that water is H20 is not an analytic truth that is true in virtue of the meaning of the words, rather it is a claim discovered by empirical investigation. Moreover, a competent language user could refer to water and understand the meaning of this term without needing to know about the atomic structure H20. Similar examples are available with such claims as ‘the morning star is the evening star’ or ‘Superman is Clark Kent.’ In each case, we have a statement of identity that is distinct from the claim that two words have the same meaning. Adams then explicitly denies he is proposing the position Singer attributes to modern theists.

    Similar things can be said about the other major defenders of divine command theory. William Alston holds that divine commands are constitutive of deontological properties and notes Adam’s identity claim as a paradigm of the type of relationship he is defending.[v]

    Philip Quinn defends a version of divine command theory that is limited to the deontological status of actions.

    In speaking of the deontological status of an action, I mean to refer to whether it has such properties as being morally permitted, being morally forbidden or prohibited, and being morally obligatory or required.[vi]

    Quinn argues that God’s commands cause or bring about these properties. He specifically denies that he is offering a theory of ‘the good’ in general or that the relationship between God’s commands and moral properties is one of meaning. In fact, he argues against such a view.[vii]

    Edward Weirenga defends a similar theory proposing that divine commands are those properties of actions that make them possess deontic properties such as right and wrong. He does not affirm that the word ‘good’ means commanded by God.[viii] Similarly, John Hare argues, “that what makes something obligatory for us is that God commands it”.[ix]

    This is not just true of contemporary defenders of divine command theory. In a survey of the historical literature, Janine Marie Idziak notes that, historically, divine command theory was usually understood as a theory about what makes actions right and wrong and not a theory about the meaning of moral terms.[x] Moreover, historically, divine command theorists such as Locke[xi] and Puffendorf limited it to deontological properties and not to broader axiological properties such as goodness.

    Robert Adams did defend a semantic theory in some of his earlier writings but, as noted, he later rejected his theory in favour of the one I sketched above. Moreover, the semantic theory Adams did initially defend bears little resemblance to the interpretation of divine command theory made by Singer. Adams explicitly asserted that his theory was limited to analysing the meaning of the word wrong and not broader notions such as goodness. Moreover, it was limited to an analysis of what the word means in Judeo-Christian discourse not what the word meant in general.[xii]

    It is difficult then to ascertain to whom exactly Singer is referring when he states “Some theists” hold this view and he fails to provide any citations as to whom he is referring. He appears to attack a straw man that has little resemblance to the theory as it has usually been articulated and defended in both historical and contemporary literature.

    Not only does Singer attack a straw man but attention to the arguments he uses reveals that in the very next sentence he changes his interpretation from a theory of meaning to a dependence or causal theory. Immediately after stating, “the very meaning of “good” [is nothing other than] what God approves”, Singer follows Plato in suggesting that either something is good because God approves of it or God approves of it because it is good.[xiii] However, this presupposes that the relationship between divine approval and goodness is some kind of asymmetrical relationship where one entity in the relationship is temporally or ontologically prior to the other.

    If, as Singer maintains, divine command theory is the claim that “the very meaning of ‘good’ is nothing other than ‘what God approves’,” then the relationship between divine approval and goodness is not an asymmetrical relationship but rather a relationship of meaning so this dilemma simply does not apply.

    Consider the following example. A person tells you that a bachelor is an unmarried man because the word bachelor means unmarried man. It would not make sense to respond to this claim ‘yes, but is he a bachelor because he is unmarried or is he unmarried because he is a bachelor?’ A person’s unmarried-ness is not prior to or the cause of his bachelorhood nor is his bachelorhood the cause of his being unmarried. His being unmarried is just a different way of referring to his bachelorhood. The relationship between a bachelor and an unmarried man is not causal; the relationship is one of meaning.

    Immediately after stating that divine command theory is a theory about the meaning of terms, Singer offers an objection that presupposes it is not a semantic theory but a causal one. However, only a few lines later he offers the following objection to the theory “what can they [theists] possibly mean by the assertion that God is good? That God is approved by God?”[xiv] Here Singer’s objection relies on the claim that good means approved by God in order to generate the trap he refers to. Not only does Singer attack a straw man but also his target appears to change throughout the discussion. In fact, it appears to change in order to fit the objections raised.

    In Part II I look at arbitrariness.

    [i] Singer, Practical Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3.
    [ii] Ibid., 3-4.
    [iii] Jerome Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 8-9.
    [iv] Robert Adams, “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again,” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979): 76.
    [v] William Alston, “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists,” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 303-304.
    [vi] Phillip Quinn, “An Argument for Divine Command Theory,” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 291.
    [vii] Ibid., 293.
    [viii] Edward Weirenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into the Divine Attributes, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 215-27. See also “Utilitarianism and the Divine Command Theory,” American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984): 311-318 and “A Defensible Divine Command Theory,” Nous 17 (1983): 387-408.
    [ix] John Hare, God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands and Human Autonomy, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001), 49.
    [x] Janine Maree Idziak, “In Search of Good Positive Reasons for an Ethics of Divine Commands: A Catalogue of Arguments,” Faith and Philosophy 6:1 (1989): 60.
    [xi] For a defence of the claim that Locke was a voluntarist see Francis Oakley & Elliot W. Urdang, “Locke, Natural Law and God,” Natural Law Forum, 11 (1966): 92-109.
    [xii] Robert Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness” In Divine Commands and Morality, ed. Paul Helm (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 83-108.
    [xiii] Singer, Practical Ethics, 4.
    [xiv] Ibid., 3-4.
    [xv] Ibid.
    [xvi] Ibid., 40.

    RELATED POSTS:
    The Euthyphro Objection Part II: Arbitrariness
    Euthyphro Objection Part III: The Redundancy of God is Good

  • On Believing Without Proof: Some reflections on Faith and Reason

    Recently in correspondence with non believer I have repeatedly meet with the following argument. This is usually touted as a kind of self evident mantra.

    [1] There is no proof that God exists [2] Its irrational to believe something unless you have proof . Therefore: [3] belief in the existence of God is irrational.

    Now we need to elaborate what is meant by proof here; in Philosophical Theology the word is historically used for the various philosophical arguments that purport to show God exists. Such, things as the Cosmological, ontological, teleological, and moral arguments for Gods existence as well as the 2 dozen or so other arguments that have been proposed. I take it then that claim then that there is no proof means that these arguments all fail.

    I think this argument is a bad one. I’ll elaborate why below.

    First note there is an interesting relationship between [1] and [2] , in that if [2] is true then a person should not believe in [1] unless they have some arguments for the truth of [1] merely asserting [1] is not enough. If I believe [1] in the absence of a reason for doing so I am, according to [2] irrational, and hence in the very same epistemic situation the proponent of this argument claims a theist is in. Consequently, the first thing, that needs to be asked is: what’s the basis for asserting [1]?. In order to rationally accept this premise, the objector would need take me through the most sophisticated versions of the cosmological, teleological, moral and ontological arguments being proposed in the literature today and demonstrate that they all fail. Now few atheists I know can do this, most in fact have never even read these arguments and have next to zilch familiarity with the literature on these arguments. It seems to me then that these people hold to an incoherent irrational position. They maintain [1] without any proof or reason at all and then assert in [2] that one should not maintain things without proof or reason.

    However, to be fair, some atheists have studied this literature and believe they have rebuttals of the arguments in question. So to advance the argument let us assume they are correct, this takes us to [2], but here I think several problems arise.

    First, [2] leads to a regress problem, suppose I believe P, to be rational I need proof, therefore I need an argument and I need to be able to rationally believe the premises of this argument. But then by [2] I need proof for these premises. But then I have to believe further premises and I will need proof for this and so on. Unless we stop at some point and believe something without proof, we will be irrational in believing everything.

    Second, [2] leads to scepticism, since at least the time of Hume it has been fairly clear that some of the most important beliefs we hold cannot be proved. Consider the belief in a physical world that exists independently of our senses. It has proven difficult if not impossible to find any argument for the existence of this world which does not assume the external world’s existence as an implicit premise. Familiar Sci Fi scenarios where a person is plugged into a virtual reality machine show its logically possible for the world to not exist and us think it does and have all the current experiences we do and hence deductive arguments from the way things appear are unsound. Inductive arguments appear also to fail. For an inductive argument to work one need’s to assume that the future will resemble the past, that there is uniformity in the world. But the existence of the world is what one is trying to prove. William Alston has argued, cogently I believe that the existence of the external world cannot be proven, neither can for that matter the existence of other peoples thoughts and feelings, the existence of moral rightness, the existence of a past and numerous other things. So if [2] is true we are in serious epistemological trouble.

    Third [2] is incoherent, suppose [2] is true, then it follows I should not believe anything without proof. But then I should not believe [2] without proof. Until I become aware of some compelling argument for [2] its irrational to accept it and if the skeptic has no argument to offer me, he is irrational accepting it as well. I think the points above show that such an argument is impossible. Any such argument will employ premises which will need to be justified by other premises, which will need other premises and so on and seeing even things such as the existence of the physical world cannot be proven its doubtful such an argument can get off the ground.

    The claim that one is never rational in believing in something without proof “on examination consists of a mass of incoherence. The objector contends that the theist is irrational why? Well because according to a claim for which he has no proof, one should not accept things without proof, oh and according to another claim he has not proved, theism has not been proved. Hardly compelling stuff if the premises are true we should reject them, and if they are not true then the argument is unsound.

    When I began studying Theology and Philosophy I discovered that some important Christian traditions claim that not all beliefs require proof to be rational in order to know anything at all, some things need to be taken for granted unproven. On this they are clearly correct. Second, and interesting they maintained that certain theological beliefs about God should be accepted this way.

    Now this does not mean that there is no place for rational argument in assessing theological claims, or in thinking about this issues. If one starts assuming belief in God is true, one still need to reason *from* this and see if it can provide coherent answers to various, metaphysical, moral and existential questions. One still needs to ask whether various arguments against belief in God is sound. One still needs to show the implications of what one believes are not contrary to obvious facts. And one needs to be able to examine whether theism is able to cohere with and be consistent with other things we know. One requires arguments to do all these things and if a one cannot do these things reason may provide us grounds for rejecting theism.

    But the claim that one cannot prove theism from the outset does not. The traditions I mention deny one needs to be able to do this, one does not rebut them by simply asserting their claims are false one needs to provide them with an argument, and the incoherent nonsense which is often provided is not a very good argument.

  • Caricature at no god zone

    As a person who studies theology and philosophy I have, over the years, read some brilliant skeptics; John Mackie and Paul Draper come to mind. I also have become reasonably informed about the debate over theism in the literature. Consquently, I have a good idea when the issues are being caricatured.

    Unfortunately rebuttal of a theological position by caricature is all too common in New Zealand. A good example is the blog no god zone this claims to be a site devoted to critiquing theism. However, after briefly examining the site, there appeared to be no discussion of the arguments of Plantinga, Swinburne, Craig, Alston, Van Inwagen or any other representative proponents of theism. Instead what exists is mostly caricature and what’s worse the caricatures are usually responded to not by robust counter argument but by vitriolic abuse.

    A good example of this is an attack on my wife, and fellow MnM blogger, Madeleine. Here is what the blogger godlesszone writes:

    A Madeleine Flannagan repeats the same rot saying “Hell Pizza will never again see a cent of my family’s money for their utter disregard of parental rights.” Again the Christianists seem to think that there is a right which controls the actions of others to prevent anything they find offensive. I’m sure people find this woman offensive so would her waddling down the street violate the “parental rights” of others? Of course not. Once again this moron has no idea as to what it means to have a right.

    Note godlesszone’s argument here; he quotes a portion of what Madeleine said on a forum and then asserts, on the basis of this quote, that Madeleine believes there is a parental right to not be offended. He then offers an insulting counter example to the existence of this right, calls her a moron and then concludes that Madeleine, therefore, does not know what a right is.

    Now even if Madeleine believed that there was a right to not be offended, this would not show she does not know what rights are, merely that she mistakenly believes in one that does not exist.

    Moreover, even if Madeleine did not know what a right is that would not make her a moron. There is vigorous debate about the nature of rights and what exactly they are, if they exist, in contemporary philosophical literature. Many intelligent people disagree on this issue. Hence we have two clear non-sequiturs in this argument.

    It is worth noting that this non-sequitur attacks a straw man, because nowhere did Madeleine claim that there is a right to not be offended. If one turns to the quote (to which godlesszone actually links). You will see what Madeleine actually said is in its entirety:

    No one has the right to tell me how to educate my kids. Not the state, family planning and not the local pizza company. I am not catholic, I am speaking as a parent. Hell Pizza will never again see a cent of my family’s money for their utter disregard of parental rights. We used to buy their pizza, we never will again. I encourage every person who believes in parental rights to boycott Hell Pizza. We have a big enough Nanny State in New Zealand without them adding to it. My kids reckon Pizza Hut tastes better than Hell Pizza anyway.

    Nowhere in this citation does Madeleine claim that there is a right to not be offended. What Madeleine claims is that there is a parental right to educate ones children. Hell Pizza had attempted to educate people’s children’s about sex and contraception without parental consent. That was the basis of her complaint, a simple reading of what she actually wrote makes this clear. Now of course Madeleine was not claiming here that the state can never step in. In cases where there is clear evidence of abuse the state has a right and a duty to step in but nothing like that was involved in this situation being discussed.

    Two things are worth noting here, first godlesszone is a Libertarian and hence actually believes in a parental right to educate ones children, in fact he probably holds to a stronger conception of parental right to educate one’s children than Madeleine does. Hence nothing she actually said about the existence of such a right would be objectionable to him.

    Second, by linking to this quote and citing it godlesszone shows he had in fact read this quote and hence knew what Madeleine actually said. And by snipping out the first few sentences, and asserting she was referring a parental right to not be offended, godlesszone deliberately attributes to Madeleine a thesis that he knows she did not assert.

    So here the blogger at no god zone sees a person appeal to a principle he actually agrees with. However, because he dislikes the persons religion he lies about what they said, makes up something else and then ridicules them for making this made up claim, and finally make fallacious jumps to accuse them of ignorance of basic concepts in ethics.

    I suspect that no god zone is not actually interested in rational critique. All we have is hatred of Christians, a hatred that burns to such an extent that simple basic prima facie moral obligations such as don’t lie about other people and don’t insult other people are considered not to apply when dealing with them.

    There is an irony here the author of no god zone was until fairly recently a writer for a respected internet news outlet which claims to stand for tolerance. He also is a contributor to a liberal institute which proposes tolerance as one of its core values. Unfortunately this sort of thing is becoming far too common. We see the banner of tolerance and reason used as a vehicle by which to promote irrational intolerance of Christianity. Orwell parodied a world which stated “War is Peace” today, perhaps, the parody should be “irrational bigotry is tolerance”.