Year: 2009

  • Dr Glenn Peoples on Abortion, Morality and Law

    Canterbury student group Prolife UC have organised for Dr Glenn Peoples to deliver some free public lectures at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch on Abortion, Morality and Law.

    Thursday 30th July 7.30 pm
    “Chasing the Justificatory Goalpost: Public Justification and Religious Beliefs”

    There is a broad political tradition that we are a part of that we could call “the liberal democracy.” Some modern thinkers allege that in a liberal democratic society like ours, we should not advocate policies or ideas in the public square that are justified by our religious beliefs (e.g. policies on abortion, marriage, education etc). This is because these people advocate a principle of justification, whereby all policies must be justifiable to our fellow citizen in a certain way, and (as everyone knows, of course!) all policies that are justified by our religious beliefs cannot be justified to our fellow citizens in this way. Dr Peoples will look at exactly what this principle of justification is, whether it is any good (he will argue that it needs improvement), and most importantly, will ask whether or not it is really true that policies that have a religious basis really do fail to be justified in this way.

    Friday 31st July 7.30pm
    “Abortion, Morality and Law”

    Is abortion immoral, and should it be legal? The abortion controversy is a persistent one in New Zealand that has seen revived interest lately. Dr Glenn Peoples will provide reasons for deeming abortion immoral and for its legal restriction. He will also consider some arguments for abortion rights and explains how to address these, demonstrating that they overlook the fundamental moral issues involved.

    Where: A3 lecture theatre, University of Canterbury, Christchurch (map and more info here)

    Cost: free but donation appreciated

    Dr Peoples completed his doctoral research on Religion in Public life through the University of Otago and runs New Zealand’s most popular podcast on philosophy, theology and politics.
  • Sunday Study: Abraham and Isaac – Did God Command the Killing of an Innocent?

    Perhaps the most infamous passage in the Hebrew scriptures occurs in Genesis 22:2,

    Then God said, “Take your son, your only son, Isaac, whom you love, and go to the region of Moriah. Sacrifice him there as a burnt offering on one of the mountains I will tell you about.”

    Of course, as anyone who has read the story knows, God intervened before Abraham carried out the command and prevented him from killing Isaac. It is also true that in the Mosaic laws that follow this passage, the Prophets, the Psalms and the historical books, human sacrifice is condemned. Nevertheless, God still, in this instance, commanded Abraham to kill Isaac. For this reason this story looms large in the criticisms of theological morality. The problem can be expounded succinctly; it seems plausible that Christians are committed to an inconsistent triad;

    [1] If God commands an action A then A is morally required;
    [2] It is wrong to kill innocent human beings;
    [3] God commanded Abraham to attempt to kill an innocent human being.

    It is worth noting here that the problem in [3] arises only if one takes the patriarchal narrative in Genesis as literally true, if one assumes that these narratives accurately and reliably convey the actual historical events. Some commentators evade the dilemma by denying this; according to one line of interpretation, the story of Gen 22 is a sort of parable instructing Israel, in an age where infant sacrifice was common, that God did not require such sacrifices and instead required that such piety be expressed through the sacrifice of goats.

    If this interpretation is correct the problem evaporates. However, I will not pursue this line here because, while I think there are some interesting questions around whether the proto-history of Gen 1-11 should be understood as literal history, I am not convinced that this applies to the patriarchal narratives. Kenneth Kitchen makes a reasonable case that these narratives are historically reliable. Moreover, even if he is mistaken, it seems clear that anyone who raises this objection must assume this (at least for the sake of argument). If not then there would be no basis for asserting [3] and the dilemma would again evaporate. So, in this post I will assume it as a given that the patriarchal narratives are literally true, that what they describe actually occurred.

    As I understand the objection, the objector is offering a reductio ad absurdum. He or she starts by assuming, that the patriarchal narratives are literally true and then derives a contradiction from this assumption. The question then is whether, granting this assumption, such a contradiction actually does arise.

    Proceeding on this basis, the obvious problem is that [1], [2] and [3] cannot all be true. Kant and Robert Adams have contended Christians should abandon [3] in favour of [2]. While others such as Quinn and Evans have offered defences of the claim that it in certain situations a person (or at least a person in Abraham’s epistemic situation) could rationally deny [2]. While the philosophical questions here are interesting, in this post I will endeavour to solve the dilemma exegetically. I will argue that while [1] is true, a careful examination of the text shows that the events occur in a certain context. I will then argue that when the context is taken into account, [2] is not correct. In essence, while it is true under normal circumstances that killing the innocent is wrong, in certain unusual circumstances it is not wrong. A contextual interpretation of The Torah suggests it affirms that in the case of Abraham unusual circumstances were in play.

    The Command in its Context
    In Gen 12:1-2 God reveals;

    The LORD had said to Abram, “Leave your country, your people and your father’s household and go to the land I will show you. “I will make you into a great nation and I will bless you; I will make your name great, and you will be a blessing.

    Here Abram is told by a God that he will be the father of an entire nation, one that will have its own country. An obvious implication of this is that Abram will have descendants; he will have a son who will live at least as long enough to have children of his own. The text then implicitly teaches that Abram knew on the basis of a reliable source that his son would live to adulthood.

    This point is reiterated in several other encounters between God and Abram. In Gen 15 “the word of the LORD” comes to Abram “in a vision.” Abram’s response is, “You have given me no children; so a servant in my household will be my heir.” God’s answer was emphatic, “This man will not be your heir, but a son coming from your own body will be your heir.” Abram is told, and hence knows, that his heir will be a son from his own body, a biological descendant.” The text continues; “He took him outside and said, ‘Look up at the heavens and count the stars—if indeed you can count them.’ Then he said to him, ‘So shall your offspring be.’”

    In the New Testament Paul utilises this incident as a paradigm example of salvation by faith. Paul notes that Abram, at this stage a Gentile, is considered righteous because of his response in faith to God’s revelation. What’s important in this context is that again Abram knows that he will, both, have a biological son and that this son will live at least long enough to have children. Obviously, if his son dies early in life, before he is able to have children, then Abram will not have biological descendants yet it is clear that Abram knew that he would. Moreover, the passage continues with God promising, as part of a covenant, that these things will be so; again Abram knows that his son will live into adulthood.

    After this incident, Abram makes the mistake of sleeping with Hagar, which results in her giving birth to Ishmael. This leads to various domestic problems including rivalry between Hagar, Ishmael and Abram’s wife Sarah. However, Abram has another encounter with God; in Gen 17:2-14 we read,

    I will confirm my covenant between me and you and will greatly increase your numbers.”

    Abram fell facedown, and God said to him, “As for me, this is my covenant with you: You will be the father of many nations. No longer will you be called Abram; your name will be Abraham, for I have made you a father of many nations. I will make you very fruitful; I will make nations of you, and kings will come from you. I will establish my covenant as an everlasting covenant between me and you and your descendants after you for the generations to come, to be your God and the God of your descendants after you. The whole land of Canaan, where you are now an alien, I will give as an everlasting possession to you and your descendants after you; and I will be their God.”

    Then God said to Abraham, “As for you, you must keep my covenant, you and your descendants after you for the generations to come. This is my covenant with you and your descendants after you, the covenant you are to keep: Every male among you shall be circumcised. You are to undergo circumcision, and it will be the sign of the covenant between me and you. For the generations to come every male among you who is eight days old must be circumcised, including those born in your household or bought with money from a foreigner—those who are not your offspring. Whether born in your household or bought with your money, they must be circumcised. My covenant in your flesh is to be an everlasting covenant. Any uncircumcised male, who has not been circumcised in the flesh, will be cut off from his people; he has broken my covenant.”

    God promises that Abram’s descendants will be numerous, again implying, very clearly, that Abram’s son will live to adulthood. This promise was signified by a covenant marked by circumcision; it was reiterated by God changing his name from Abram (exalted father) to Abraham (father of many).

    The text goes on however to provide us more specifics in verses 15-19,

    God also said to Abraham, “As for Sarai your wife, you are no longer to call her Sarai; her name will be Sarah. I will bless her and will surely give you a son by her. I will bless her so that she will be the mother of nations; kings of peoples will come from her.”

    Abraham fell facedown; he laughed and said to himself, “Will a son be born to a man a hundred years old? Will Sarah bear a child at the age of ninety?” And Abraham said to God, “If only Ishmael might live under your blessing!”

    Then God said, “Yes, but your wife Sarah will bear you a son, and you will call him Isaac. I will establish my covenant with him as an everlasting covenant for his descendants after him.”

    Here it is made crystal clear; the promise will come through the line of a child called Isaac who will be born through his wife. This seems impossible to Abram due to the fact that his wife is barren. God, however, is emphatic, changing his wife’s name from Sarai (my princess) to Sarah (mother of nations). Abram is again reassured that Isaac will be born and will live at least long enough to have children of his own and will enter into a covenant with God himself. This promise is promised to be confirmed by a seemingly impossible event, a barren woman will bear a child.

    In chapter 18 the promise is again reiterated. Abraham is visited by three men who appear to represent God himself. The text records in verse 10, “Then the LORD said, ‘I will surely return to you about this time next year, and Sarah your wife will have a son.’” Again the point is made in a crystal clear fashion; Sarah will have a child. Again the strong impression from the surrounding text is that this child will live on to adulthood to have children of his own. Abraham is again reassured that Isaac will survive to adulthood.

    If the point has not yet been belaboured enough by the narrative, in Gen 21, when Isaac is born, God again makes it clear to Abraham on the day Isaac is weaned. Abraham is told in verse 12, “Listen to whatever Sarah tells you, because it is through Isaac that your offspring will be reckoned.” Again Abraham is reassured that Isaac will live for at least long enough to have children of his own.

    This then, is the backdrop to the events described in Gen 22. It is worth remembering that this is all one narrative, the division into chapters and verses that occurs in our modern English version were added centuries later. In the original narrative and in the canonically authoritative forms, the division does not occur. Hence by the time we get to Gen 22 both Abraham and the astute reader know that Isaac is not going to die; both the reader and Abraham know that Isaac will live beyond this day to rear children of his own. This is actually pointed out in the text; just before Abraham goes up the mountain to sacrifice Isaac, Abraham states to his servants in verse 5, “Stay here with the donkey while I and the boy go over there. We will worship and then we will come back to you.” Abraham expected Isaac to return alive.

    Just to clinch this point, let me note a final line of evidence; the New Testament teaches that this is the correct way to understand the passage. In Hebrews 11:17-19 it states,

    By faith Abraham, when God tested him, offered Isaac as a sacrifice. He who had received the promises was about to sacrifice his one and only son, even though God had said to him, “It is through Isaac that your offspring will be reckoned.” Abraham reasoned that God could raise the dead, and figuratively speaking, he did receive Isaac back from death.

    Earlier in the same chapter, verses 11-12, the reader is reminded of the promise that Isaac would live to have many descendants. This is significant because Christians do not accept any and all interpretations of the Old Testament, Christians accept as authoritative, the Old Testament as interpreted by the New Testament. One can think whatever they like about Christianity, but this is how Christians are supposed to accept and interpret the story. If one attacks a different interpretation of the passage, one is attacking an interpretation Christians (should) reject, and hence, are not attacking anything Christians (should) believe or are committed to believing. In light of this, I think we can establish the following point, that premise [3] is true provided that a certain context or qualification is understood to apply; namely, God commanded Abraham to attempt to kill his son in a context where Abraham knew that his son would not die but live on after the incident.

    At this stage, no doubt, some will scoff; they will contend that they do not believe these stories could be literally true. They do not think God appeared to Abraham and told him any of this or that he did know these things. However, this complaint is beside the point, whether a person believes the story or not, this is what the story says. If a person is to argue that the text, taken literally, is immoral or portrays God a certain way then he or she needs to accurately portray what the text says. Not believing what a text says is one thing, however, misrepresenting what it says and using that distortion as the basis of an argument to a conclusion is another.

    In the context of this discussion we are asking, if one takes the text to be literally true then what does it teach? Does it teach that God commanded Abraham to kill his son? The answer here, is that God commanded Abraham to kill his son, in a context where Abraham knew his son would not die but live on after the incident. Commanding killing, in this context needs to be shown as immoral for the objection to gain traction.

    Is This Immoral?
    I have argued that [3] is true only if a certain context is assumed. I will now ask if [2] is correct, the claim that “It is wrong to kill innocent human beings.” Here again, I think the answer is yes provided a certain context is assumed. Many people will find this answer a little shocking; I think some reflection, however, will show that it is not.

    Many of the ethical prohibitions that hold in the actual world do so because of certain facts about the world. Hitting someone in the head, for example, is wrong because, in the world we actually live in, doing so causes pain and harms people. However, if the physical structure of the world was different, if hitting someone in the head actually advanced their health and improved their quality of life, then it would be permissible and possibly even commendable, to hit someone in the head. Of course, none of this shows us that in the actual world hitting people in this way is not wrong, this is because in the actual world hitting people in the head usually cause harm. However, it does show that the prohibition relies on certain background assumptions about the effects of hitting. If these assumptions were not true then the prohibition would not hold.

    In a critique of deductivist natural law theory, John Hare develops this point showing that slight alterations in the way God set the world up could lead to quite different moral rules applying than in fact do. One example Hare notes, is particularly interesting, “Perhaps (to get more bizarre) God could have willed that we kill each other at the age of 18, at which point God would bring us immediately back to life.” Hare asks us to imagine a world, in which, when people of a certain age are killed they immediately come back to life. He opines, quite plausibly, that if this were to be the case then killing people at this age would not be wrong or at least, not seriously wrong. One of the reasons that killing people is wrong in the world we live in is because people stay dead. If they were only unconscious for a split second and came back to life in full health then arguably killing a person would not be the serious wrong we believe it is.

    Once this is realised, I think it is evident that [1], [2] and [3] are consistent. If one assumes, for the sake of argument, that the Patriarchal Narratives are literally true then it follows that [3] is true only if a certain context is assumed. God commanded Abraham to kill his son in the highly unusual context where Abraham knew that his son would not stay dead but would come down the mountain afterwards and live on to adulthood to father children of his own. Proposition [2] is defensible only in a context where people do not know these sorts of things; the rule to not kill the innocent applies to a world where people do not come back to life after they have been killed. Hence, the story of Abraham and Isaac, if taken literally, does not entail that God commanded something immoral or contradictory.

    1. See for example, Louise Anthony “Atheism as Perfect Piety” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics Eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 77-79.
    2. Kenneth Kitchen On the Reliability of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003) 313-372.
    3. Immanuel Kant The Conflict of the Faculties (Ak. VI1, 63) 115; similar statements can be found in Kant’s
    Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (Ak, VI,87, 186f).
    4. Robert Adams Finite and Infinite Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) Chapter 12.
    5. Philip Quinn Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); also “Obligation, Divine Commands and Abraham’s Dilemma” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(2) 459-466.
    6. C Stephen Evans Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
    7. Ibid.
    8. John E Hare God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands and Human Autonomy (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2001) 68-69.

  • TANSA Faith and Science Conference

    Theology and the Natural Sciences in Aotearoa are holding a one day Faith and Science conference entitled “Faithful Science? – Just How Well Do Science and Faith Get Along?”

    When: Saturday 1 August, 9am-5pm.

    Where: Northcote Baptist Church.

    Speakers:

    Dale Campbell – Science & Faith: Key Issues
    Yael Klangwisan – Reading the book of Genesis
    Dr Nicola Hoggard Creegan – Evolution and Evil
    Dr Myk Habets – A Scientific Theology
    Dr Jeff Tallon – Physics and Faith
    Dr Matthew Flannagan – Does Evolution Make Belief in God Untenable?
    Dr Graeme Finlay – The Glorious Ape
    Prof. Neil Broom – Is there Transcendence in Nature?
    Dr Graham O’Brien – Evolution & Purpose

    Click on the flyer for more:

  • Dr Ben Witherington in Auckland

    Ben Witherington III, is visiting New Zealand to speak at a conference on the Wesleyan Theological Tradition at East City Wesleyan Church Centre, 219 Burswood Drive, Botany, Auckland. The program costs $20 (excluding the Saturday night dinner) and will run as follows:

    Friday 31 July
    7.30 pm The Johnannine Literature: Legacy of the Beloved Disciple: Part 1

    Saturday 1 August
    1.30 pm
    The Johnannine Literature: Legacy of the Beloved Disciple: Part 2

    7.00 pm Personal Observations about the Church around the Globe. (Ticket price for this session is an additional $20 as it includes dinner).


    Sunday Church Services
    10.00 am Morning service at East City Church (219 Burswood Drive, Botany, Auckland)

    5.45 pm cession|community (The Depot, Lloyd Elsmore Park, Pakuranga)

    More info here.

    Dr Witherington is the Amos Professor of New Testament for Doctoral Studies at Asbury Theological Seminary and is on the doctoral faculty at St. Andrews University in Scotland. He has authored over thirty books, including The Jesus Quest and The Paul Quest, both of which were selected as top biblical studies by Christianity Today. Dr Witherington was one of the NT experts consulted by Lee Strobel for The Case for Christ and is an elected member of the prestigious SNTS, a society dedicated to New Testament studies.

    I’d love to attend the entire thing, however, I am giving my conference paper, “Does Evolution Make Belief in God Untenable?” at The Theology and Natural Sciences Conference on the Saturday and then I’ll be joining Madeleine on Waiheke Island for her Grandfather’s memorial gathering.

    Hat Tip: Thinking Matters Talk

  • Hear Dr Matthew Flannagan speak on “In Defence of Divine Commands”

    You’re invited to a Thinking Matters Auckland, God, Morality and Society, event:

    What: Dr Matthew Flannagan speaking on “In Defence of Divine Commands”
    When: Tuesday 4th August – 7:00pm
    Where: Lecture Room 2, Laidlaw College, 80 Central Park Drive, Henderson, West Auckland
    Format: Talk followed by questions, answers and discussion.
    Cost: Free but donations are appreciated

    Are God’s commands irrelevant when we discuss moral and ethical questions? Many claim that this is the case and offer the following as an argument against Divine Commands: either an action is right because God commands it or God commands it because it is right; the latter renders God’s commands superfluous, if they are right independently of God then God is unnecessary; however, the former renders God’s commands arbitrary, if God commanding an action makes that action right then any action could conceivably be right. Given this, they conclude that God and the commands he issues, should be kept out of consideration of our ethical and moral questions.

    In this talk Matt will challenge this line of thought and will demonstrate that this attempt to dismiss God’s commands from our consideration of ethical and moral issues is flawed and will explain, in layman’s terms, why a Christian should not be intimidated by this argument.

    Matt holds a PhD in Theology, a Masters degree in Philosophy. His area of expertise is Philosophy of Religion, Theology and Applied Ethics. He is an adjunct lecturer in Philosophy for Laidlaw College and Bethlehem Tertiary Institute and is currently re-training to be a high school Religious Studies/Philosophy teacher. He has formally debated the Abortion Law Reform Association of New Zealand’s Dr Zoe During and the New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanist’s Dr Bill Cooke and his publications appear in international journals of philosophy and ethics. He writes for MandM and has nearly 15 years experience teaching, engaging and challenging secular culture both in New Zealand and internationally.

  • In Defence of the Partial Defence of Provocation

    The case we have all watched in horror playing out in the news is over. Clayton Weatherston has been found guilty of murdering Sophie Elliot and his attempt at the partial defence of provocation was rightly shown the contempt it deserved by the court. At MandM we maintained our standard policy of refusing to comment while a trial is in progress but now the verdict is in we will add our voices to the debate raging in New Zealand over the partial defence of provocation.

    Like everyone, we found it sickening to watch the narcissistic Weatherston trying to paint his victim as evil in an attempt to have his brutal stabbing and mutilation of her rendered manslaughter instead of murder. Watching her brave mother, who not only testified but who tried to stop him stabbing her daughter, suffer through the ordeal of the trial, made all the worse by Weatherston’s desperate attempt to save himself from the consequences of his actions, was awful. As a mother I cried with her. No mother should have to bury her daughter much less witness her daughter’s murder and then sit in the same room with her killer as he spent days in the court room trying to spin his actions into something understandable.

    However, likewise, no accused should lose their right to due process, to a fair trial, just because this accused was so obviously guilty and so obviously wrong and utterly reprehensible in his attempts to suggest that his culpability should be reduced. The Weatherston case was open and shut murder. However, not all cases are this clear and some people are falsely accused and some accuseds should succeed with a partial defence of provocation. If we remove the partial defence of provocation because of our disgust at Weatherston and what he tried to argue in the courtroom and how deeply we feel for Mrs Elliot, we would do a far greater wrong.

    Accuseds will often try to raise defences for which, if they are being honest with themselves they should not be trying to raise; however, if we remove a defence because we do not like witnessing these attempts, we will be removing it for those whose actions did amount to provocation, who do deserve the lesser charge of manslaughter.

    For example, imagine if Mrs Elliot, on breaking down the door to Sophie’s bedroom and witnessing Weatherston stabbing her daughter’s dead body, had, after calling the police and having a minute to think it through, gone back upstairs with an axe, smashed the door in and hacked Weatherston to pieces. She would have faced murder charges and she would not have available to her a defence of self-defence, her daughter was already dead so she was not defending her, Weatherston wasn’t cornering her and threatening her and the force she used was arguable disproportionate. Neither, would she necessarily be guaranteed a defence of temporary insanity. Her best option would be to argue for the partial defence of provocation.


    Would you want her to not have that option, to be stuck with murderer as her label? Surely, even though we can all appreciate hacking Weatherston to death with an axe at that moment would have been wrong, we can at least see that the level of blame we as a society should attach to the likes of Weatherston, should not apply to the hypothetical, axe-wielding, Mrs Elliot in my scenario.

    Not all killing is equal. We can tell the difference between an accidental death and a pre-meditated killing. We recognise that there are degrees between these two extremes. We also recognise that sometimes murder is understandable, even if not completely excusable; this is precisely why we have the partial defence of provocation.

    The person who reacts to discovering an intruder in their child’s bedroom by repeatedly bashing them over the head with a cast-iron frying pan is not on par with a serial killer. These degrees are recognised in both the sentences the courts hand down and the convictions placed against the actors names and it is important for justice that the police, the courts and accuseds have this range of options to measure a person’s actions and intentions against when they grapple with the evidence and the events and circumstances surrounding a homicide.

    People accused of criminal acts, who are not prepared to face up to what they have done and accept the consequences, will always try to run any kind of far-fetched defence they can dream up in a desperate bid to get off. Had Weatherston not had provocation as an option he might have tried self-defence or a complete denial of guilt and you would have seem very similar attempts to smear the victims playing out on the news as he tried to run with these options; likewise if consideration of provocation is moved to sentencing. The only way you can get rid of attempts to smear the victim and the pain the family of the victim goes through in a trial is to completely get rid of trials and summarily convict all accuseds. What Mrs Elliot and Sophie’s family, friends and memory went through, terrible as it was, is nevertheless, the lesser evil.

    The system worked. Weatherston’s attempt at provocation rightly failed and in making that attempt he made himself look worse and his victim gained more sympathy, distasteful as the process was. Further, we all understand as a community that the court was right to deem this man a murderer. John Stuart Mill was right, truth becomes more evident and thus, more valuable, when it has been permitted to grapple with falsehood.

  • Religion and Science: A Response to Ken Perrott’s “Other Ways of Knowing”

    Ken Perrott, at Open Parachute, took issue with some comments I made in my recent defence of Plantinga’s stance on Evolution being taught in state schools. To gain focus let’s look at one thing I said to Ken in the comments section on that post,

    If the relevant evidence points towards a theory it does not follow that all the evidence points towards it. That’s because there might be evidence which science does not consider, such as theological claims, that are relevant.”

    I went on to say

    …on many issues the relevant scientific evidence is the only evidence, but on questions of origins that is not the case. The question of our origins is both a scientific and theological question so a correct examination of the issue will take into account both the theological and scientific evidence that is relevant to the question. To teach evolution is the true theory of origins one would have to show it is probable on all relevant evidence, and seeing science excludes relevant theological evidence from the discussion it cannot claim to have shown it’s true on all relevant evidence.

    Central to this argument is a distinction between all the relevant scientific evidence and all the relevant total evidence. The argument assumes that science, while a reliable method of gaining truth in many areas, is not the only source of reliable information we have about the world, that on certain topics we can also discover truths about the world through faith and revelation; hence, on these topics an accurate view of the world must utilise both sources of information.

    Ken was clearly displeased with this statement and labeled it the “other ways of knowing argument.” On his own site he asked me to respond to his criticisms; I will do so below.

    1. Much of Ken’s response to this appears to be based on a failure to grasp what I actually said. In the above citation I did not say that evolution was not true nor did I say evolution was not probable on all the relevant evidence. Everything I have said is entirely compatible with theistic evolution, where a person comes to a position based both on the scientific evidence and the theological reflection. I did not say, as Ken repeatedly attributes to me, that “theology trumps science” or that theological reflection is more reliable than science. What I said was that a theory which is probable on all the evidence, that is all the theological and all the scientific evidence, taken together, should be believed over a theory which is only probable on the scientific evidence alone. I also maintain the opposite is true; a theory which is probable on all relevant evidence, drawn from both theology and science should be believed over a theory which is supported by theological considerations alone.

    The issue then, is not that one discipline “trumps another,” it is that a theory is not worthy of consent unless it takes into account all the relevant information from both disciplines. I think that theological and scientific reflections are both reliable methods and our interpretation of both the theological and empirical data can be fallible.

    These clarifications address an awful lot of Ken’s argument such as his statement, “To assert today that we should revert to a pre-scientific era, that theology or philosophy should trump scientific knowledge, is to claim that mythology/logic/reason is more reliable than evidence.” Given that I never said that theology should trump science, this statement is irrelevant.

    Similarly, Ken’s claim that my position “is consistent with the Wedge strategy” is misleading. While it is true that my position is consistent with creationism, as I note above, it is also consistent with evolutionary theory. Contrary to what Ken thinks, the mere fact that two views are consistent provides no basis for linking the views together in a kind of guilt by association argument. Creationism is, after all, consistent with the view that Wellington is the capital of New Zealand; however, this does not mean that everyone who claims that Wellington is the capital believes that the world was created in six 24-hour days. Consider a less palatable example; Hitler’s belief in the superiority of the Aryan race is consistent with the claim that there is a city called Cairo this does not mean that anyone who remembers visiting Cairo is a Nazi.

    2. Ken’s response also appears marred by a failure to adequately understand the meaning of some philosophical terms I use. In the above citation I use the word “true,” Ken says, in response to my use of it, that “the word [truth] means different things to theologians, scientists and people on the street.” In fact, in the above citation I am using the standard Aristotelian concept of truth which is common to both disciplines. Aristotle stated, “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.” By this definition the claim that the earth is round is true if the earth is, in fact, actually round, and it is false if the earth is, in fact, not round. Similarly in theology, the claim that God created the world ex nihilo is true if there is, in fact, a God and he did, in fact, create the physical universe out of nothing a finite period of time ago.

    Ken seems similarly confused about the meaning of the word “logic” and goes to great lengths to assert that “logic must follow evidence.” However, this simply shows he does not understand logic; logic is the study of rules of inference, that is, logic tells one how to deduce conclusions from evidence. Once this is realised, the claim that logic should follow evidence makes no sense. One cannot deduce or infer anything from evidence without logic in the first place.

    Similarly Ken’s suggestion that science is more reliable than logic is questionable. Science utilises logic to infer its conclusions from the empirical data; logic, therefore, is a presupposition of science that science needs if science is to conclude anything. Moreover, some axioms of logic clearly are more certain and reliable than many empirical claims, the claim, for example, that Both A and Not A cannot both be true, in the same sense, at the same time is more certain that speculations about how first life arose. Similarly with the rule modus tollens, something of which we can be relatively certain, which states: if A, then B, not B, therefore, not A.

    3. Putting aside these misinterpretations and philosophical mistakes, Ken’s main objection is,

    Implicit in the “different ways of knowing” argument, and hinted at by Matt in his comments, is the desire to change the science process to include theological “evidence” and claims that are not based on, or tested by, evidence. To give theology a “free pass.”

    Elsewhere he claims,

    It’s claiming a logic or justification for the theist belief without allowing the normal checking that should go with knowledge claims.”

    Here Ken raises a fairly standard argument:

    [1] that scientific claims differ from theological claims in that the former are empirically testable and the latter are not; [2] lack of testability disqualifies theological claims from being taken into account in theorising about the world.

    This argument is problematic and has been refuted numerous times in the literature; here I can be brief. Turning to [1] Larry Laudan notes “It is now widely acknowledged that many scientific claims are not testable in isolation, but only when embedded in part of a larger system of statements, some of whose consequences can be submitted to test.”[1] Take the claim that there is at least one electron in the universe. To test the truth of this claim we would need a theory about how electrons act under various conditions, what their predicted effects upon things would be and theories about how one could detect these effects if they occur and so on. Only with this kind of background information can we can use the relevant tools to test the predictions; however, in isolation, the claim that there is at least one electron is untestable.[2]

    Second, many theological claims are testable in precisely the same way. Take the claim made by Archbishop Usher that the world was created 6000 years ago. This claim is testable; we can muster empirical evidence to assess the age of the earth. The same is true for other theological claims; take the claim, for example, that the cosmos had a beginning in time, an implication of the theological views of St Augustine or that the universe is governed by laws that can only be discovered by empirical means, an implication of the voluntarist theology of the late middle ages or the claim made by 14th-15th century theologians that, contrary to some interpretations of Aristotlian physics, God did make the universe such that the earth orbited the sun or Augustine’s claim that God created the world with seed principles, via which, the whole creation of the universe could unfound over time or Bonaventure’s theologically based contention that the cosmology of his day was mistaken in claiming that the universe was infinitely old.

    Turning to [2] the suggestion that only testable claims can be utilised in answering a question about the world is also questionable. Ethical statements, such as, “it is wrong to cause pain just for entertainment” cannot be, by themselves, empirically tested yet in answering many questions about what we ought to do it is impossible to get an answer without appealing to them. Moreover, one cannot empirically test anything without presupposing some truths that themselves cannot be empirically established. Hume showed for example that it is impossible to non- circularly justify the reliability of inductive reasoning. William Alston has argued persuasively that one cannot empirically verify the reliability of one’s senses (the reason for this is quite obvious, to empirically demonstrate anything one needs to use one’s senses, and hence, one needs to presuppose the reliability of the source one is trying to prove the reliability of). It is hard to even conceive of a situation where basic axioms of logic, such as the law of non-contradiction, could be observably false. Yet science proceeds by presupposing the reliability of the senses, the reliability of inductive reasoning and the rules of logic.

    Ken’s central argument then is mistaken. His other arguments fair no better, such as his attempt to try to link my position with Stalinism;

    So what would the trumping of science by theology/philosophy be like? We have seen some disastrous examples. Such as Stalin’s promotion of Lysenko, trumping of science by Stalinist interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. This put Soviet genetic science back many years and led to the death and persecution of many scientists. In many ways the current theological/creationist/wedge attack on science is of a similar ilk to Stalinism.

    Apart from the fact that I did not espouse creationism or claim that theology trumps science, Ken here seems to think that telling state schools that they can teach a theory is true , as opposed to merely saying that it is the best scientific theory, is akin to arresting scientists, censoring their research, persecuting and executing them!

    Unfortunately, this logic can be turned on its head as the same logic would entail that refusal to teach Christian theology as the truth in state schools is akin to persecuting Christian theologians, censoring their research, persecuting them and executing them; hence, any atheist who objects to their children being taught religion at a state school is advocating some kind of quasi-Stalinist policy.

    Somewhat ironically, however, Ken makes some claims that if taken seriously suggest he is not adverse to religious persecution. Ken states that,

    He [Matt] argues that teaching evolution is actually teaching “fundamentalist children that their religious beliefs are false.” Well, of course that is a problem for fundamentalism, not science. We cannot ignore reality because some silly people are offended by it.

    Ken here implies that state schools should teach that a particular religious perspective is false if “that’s reality.” In other words, if a person’s religious beliefs really are false then it is not unjust for the state to teach this.

    Now as I stated in my original post and as I have repeated several times in correspondence with Ken, this argument is problematic. Both Ken and I agree that Islam is false, that Mohammad is not a prophet. If Ken’s claims were correct then, justice would require that the government run re-education programs for Muslim students telling them that Mohammad is not a prophet. After all, as Ken grants, “this is reality” and the religious sensibilities of other people cannot justify not teaching reality.

    Ken’s second argument is that to fail to tell children that evolution is true is “child abuse.” As I pointed out, however, if this were true then the many Muslim, Christian and Jewish parents who home school their kids with creationist texts or send their kids to private schools where creationism is taught should be arrested, charged with child abuse and punished at law on par with child abusers; further, their children should be placed in state care and sent to state re-education centres. The logical implication of both Ken’s arguments is religious persecution.

    Now I pointed both these points out to Ken when he raised them in previous discussions. Ken’s response was to apparently ignore the response and just repeat the argument. This, however, is not a rational response at all; simply repeating the same mantra over and over does not make it true.

    [1] Larry Laudan “Science at the Bar — Causes for Concern” Science, Technology and Human Values 7: 16-19.
    [2] For example see, Alvin Plantinga “Religion and Science” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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    Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part I
    Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part II