Year: 2009

  • Auckland Bloggers Drinks – This Thursday

    On the first Thursday of every month, Auckland bloggers gather for the B3 (Bloggers Bar Bash).

    What: Auckland Bloggers Drinks
    When:
    Thursday 7 January from 6.30pm
    Where:
    Galbraiths, 2 Mt Eden Road, Mt Eden, Auckland

    The B3, as it coined by regulars, is open to anyone who happens to be in Auckland. Past blogging celebrities in attendance include bloggers and bloupies (blog groupies – those who read blogs) from Annie Fox, Beretta, Cactus Kate, Interest.co.nz, Kiwiblog, Lolly Scramble, MandM, No Minister, Not PC, Roar Prawn, SOLO, State Highway One, The Fairfacts Media Show, Whaleoil and WHOAR.

    Rumours of MacDoctor and Bryan Spondre one day making an appearance regularly abound.

  • A Response to The Dunedin School’s “Thinking in Tatters: Moral Relativism and Hidden Objectivist Assumptions”

    A while ago I did a series of semi-popular posts on moral relativism beginning with Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism I. These posts grew out of a talk I gave in Tauranga in 2008. Later I presented essentially the same talk at Laidlaw College for Thinking Matters Auckland which was posted on You Tube and is available for viewing here. This video drew a response from Dean of The Dunedin School (TDS) blog (a full copy is pasted below as it has disappeared offline then reappeared more than once). In this post I will address Deane’s critique of my discussion of some arguments for moral relativism. In the next I will respond to his criticism of my arguments against relativism.

    Deane’s critique appears to consist of three lines of argument. The first is a string of assertions about my alleged motives combined with pejorative terms to describe my conclusions. Deane insinuates that I am a “frustrated atavistic reactionists who want to take away rights from women, homosexuals, and other minorities and restore power to the patriarchy” and smugly contends that my arguments are “a mish-mash of illogical nonsense and rhetorical scaremongering.”

    Unfortunately one does not refute a person’s arguments by simply asserting that their arguments are illogical. Even if Deane’s assertions about my motives were correct, and he offers no evidence to suggest that that they are, this would show only that I have terrible motives in making the arguments in question, not that the arguments themselves were problematic. Hence, this first line of argument can be dismissed as mere rhetoric.

    The second line of argument is only marginally more substantial. Deane suggests that I spent more than half my talk “presenting obviously unsound arguments for relativism and then (marvelously!) disproving them to [my] captive evangelical audience”. Deane describes this as a “sleight of hand” on my part. Now exactly what this objection amounts to is unclear. Deane clearly dislikes the idea that my audience were evangelicals (which not all were) but the fact that my audience may hold to a particular religion does not show the arguments I presented to this audience were mistaken; in fact, Deane in conceding that the arguments I criticised were “obviously unsound” seems to agree with my conclusions about the merits of these arguments. Given this, it is hard to know what the problem is. Of course Deane describes my criticisms in a sarcastic tone but simply describing something sarcastically does not constitute an argument against it nor does deeming it “sleight of hand” show that it is mistaken.

    What I think Deane is driving at is something more substantial. Some of what he says suggests he is accusing me of attacking a straw-man; he seems to be suggesting that I chose some really bad arguments, which anyone familiar with the discussions on relativism will know are not actually made by proponents of relativism and I criticised these arguments. I got away with it only because my audience are evangelicals, and hence, unaware that a straw-man has been presented.

    Now apart from the suggestion that all evangelicals are ignorant, gullible people with no background in ethics and the assumption that the audience was made up of evangelicals (I suspect that the atheists present probably would not describe themselves as “evangelical”) the obvious problem with this claim is that it is false. The arguments I put forward come from the literature on relativism (as anyone familiar with the discussions on relativism can attest to).

    In the talk I cite two arguments, an argument from tolerance and an argument from diversity. These arguments are often cited in secular ethics text books. Alan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind, for example, notes that the appeal to tolerance is one of the most common reasons proposed for relativism. The arguments I mentioned are also cited by Harry Gensler in his book Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction,  Louis Pojman notes these arguments in Ethics Discovering Right and Wrong and James Rachels raises them in The Elements of Moral Philosophy. Hence, far from being a straw-man that only an ignoramus would cite in the context of relativism, these are arguments for relativism cited in leading mainstream ethics textbooks.

    The third of Deane’s arguments is more substantive. He suggests that one point I make in my talk is circular. Now the first thing to note is that this claim is, to some extent, fairly irrelevant. In the section in question I noted two arguments commonly put forward in favor of relativism and offered several lines of criticism against them, one of them Deane claims is circular. Now even if Deane were correct, pointing out that one line of criticism is fallacious does nothing to address the overall case I made. If one of several arguments are mistaken it does not follow that the rest are.

    That said, Deane’s attribution of circularity to me is mistaken. In my talk I noted that one argument for relativism implicitly appeals to the following premise:

    [2] All people have a duty to not be intolerant

    At one point I made the following comment about this premise, “And notice too that the second premise is making a what? An objective moral statement. It is saying that all people have a duty to be tolerant. But according to relativism there are no objective moral statements”

    It is here Deane thinks I have argued in a circle. He states,

    Now, indulging Matt for a while, let’s ask this question: if a moral relativist did happen to hold to this premise, what would be the nature of the ‘duty’? Too obvious, you say? Well yes, the answer would seem to be too obvious. The  ’duty’ would clearly be relative for a moral relativist… Matt falsely attributes moral objectivism to a moral relativist, because he just cannot grasp the concept of moral relativism. However, in moral relativism, a duty, even if applicable to everybody in a particular society, would by definition be morally relative. A prevalent problem with moral objectivists such as Matt is that they haven’t ever grasped what a purely subjective morality looks like, how it operates. They keep trying to sneak back in assumptions of moral objectivity – the very thing that moral relativists deny. And so their attempt to raise an argument against it – by assuming the objectivity of morality – is revealed as a piece of illogical and circular nonsense.

    Several things can be said about this. First, even if I did (as Deane contends) assume the objectivity of morality in my criticism here, this would not make my argument circular. A circular argument is one where the conclusion is assumed in the premises. To be circular then I would have to be making an argument for the conclusion that moral relativism is correct. But I was not. At this point in the talk I was criticising one argument for moral relativism. But criticising one argument for moral relativism is not the same thing as offering an argument for objectivism. Hence, even if one grants Deane’s substantive point, my argument is not circular.

    Second, and more importantly, Deane is wrong to claim that I was, at this point, assuming the objectivity of morality and sneaking this assumption into my interpretation of [2]. If Deane had bothered to listen to the passage he cited in its context he would see that I immediately went on to argue that [2] should be interpreted as affirming an objective principle. What I said was:

    if relativism were true [2] would actually be wrong. You would only have a duty to be tolerant if you yourself believed in tolerance. If you were a bigot you’d be perfectly entitled to be intolerant. And if your society was a bigoted society it would be perfectly appropriate for you to be intolerant. So the person who makes this claim actually shows that they believe in objective morality, they believe there is an objective value of tolerance.

    Hence it is simply not the case that I assumed moral objectivism and sneaked this assumption into my reading of [2]. What I did was offer an argument that [2] had to be interpreted this way because unless one interpreted [2] in an objectivist manner, [2] would be false.

    Now if Deane thinks that [2] can be interpreted in a relativist manner then the burden is on him to show that my argument is mistaken. To ignore the argument and simply state that I assumed the position I argued for and then assert that the position is wrong establishes nothing at all (well, it establishes nothing about my argument).

    Ironically, if we accept Deane’s contention that [2] should be interpreted as asserting a relative duty and not an objective duty then, in fact, it is the relativist that is engaging in circular reasoning. Remember, at this point in the talk I was criticising an argument for relativism, [2] was a premise of this particular argument for relativism. If [2], therefore, expresses or presupposes that moral claims are to be interpreted in a relativist fashion then the relativist is presupposing the truth of relativism in the premises of one argument for relativism, and this clearly would be circular.

    For the relativist to offer a non-question begging argument for his position he must appeal to premises that non-relativists are likely to accept and hence the premises of his argument cannot be interpreted in a relativist fashion.

    There is a final point to make here, Deane makes heavy weather out of the contention that I cannot conceive of what a relativist morality would look like. He states,

    Matt’s criticism reveals that he has failed to appreciate what a thoroughgoing moral relativism would look like. He just doesn’t get it. He cannot conceive of moral duties that are not objective. I suspect that this is an all-too-frequent barrier for moral objectivists. Their commitment to moral objectivism is such that they fail to properly conceive of a world in which every moral duty is simply the result of cultural norms.

    It is evident that an unjustified leap is being made here. Suppose, contrary to fact, I did err in one criticism I made of one argument for relativism. It hardly follows from this that I cannot conceive of what a thorough-going relativism would look like. All it would show is that on one point I made a mistake. But more importantly, even if it did establish what Deane claims, that I failed to appreciate what a thoroughgoing moral relativism would look like, it is not clear how this would constitute a criticism of my position. After all there are many things which I cannot conceive of that are perfectly rational for me to reject. I cannot conceive of what a square triangle would look like, it does not follow from this that I cannot defensibly claim that anyone who affirms that square triangles exist is mistaken and is uttering a nonsense. So once again Deane’s criticism amounts to nothing at all.

    Of course Deane makes his points in a rhetorical, sarcastic, snarky manner and I am sure that for those who dislike evangelical Christianity, such writing is highly entertaining. Entertaining rhetoric, however, is never a substitute for substantive content; notwithstanding the entertaining rhetoric in this instance, the arguments Deane offers fail.

    RELATED POSTS:
    A Response to The Dunedin School’s “Thinking in Tatters: Moral Relativism and So-Called ‘Counter-Examples’”
    Video of Matthew Flannagan Speaking on Moral Relativism
    Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism I
    Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism II
    Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism III

    The original blog post, “Thinking in Tatters: Moral Relativism and Hidden Objectivist Assumptions”, by Deane Galbraith of The Dunedin School is below (more…)

  • Top 10 NZ Christian Blogs – October 09

    The Top 10 New Zealand Christian Blogs for October 09 are as follows:

    1. [1.] MandM 14.5 (3 – 26)
    2. [2.] NZ Conservative 17 (5 – 29)
    3. [3.] MacDoctor Moments 17.5 (18 – 17)
    4. [4.] Something Should Go Here, Maybe Later (HalfDone) 19 (10 – 28)
    5. [5.] Say Hello to my Little Friend (Beretta Blog) 21.5 (8 – 35)
    6. [6.] Being Frank 34.5 (36 – 33)
    7. [7.] Liturgy Worship Spirituality* 37 (34 – 40)
    8. [8.] Brad Heap 44.5 (46 – 43)
    9. [N.] Manawatu Christian Apologetics Society 46 (43 – 49)
    10. [N.] The Briefing Room 51 (81 – 21)

    Rank. [previous top 10 rank] Blog MandM (Half Done – Tumeke)

    To obtain our stats we ran searches on Half Done’s October 09 NZ stats and Tumeke’s October 09 NZ stats for openly Christian blogs, which demonstrate adherence to the historic Christian tradition in their blog content, then we average those blogs scores to obtain their overall scores.

    If you think your blog should make our rankings, make sure you are listed on both Tumeke and HalfDone’s rankings as an identifiably Christian blog and we’ll check you out.

    * For blogs that only feature on one set of stats a score for the other set is estimated by factoring in the discrepancy between the two sets of stats given their different ranking methods; any blogs this effects are marked with an asterisk. We suggest that any blog not featuring on both should submit their blog to the ranking they are not currently on as it is not always possible for us to simply calculate the score that blog would have obtained.

  • Merry Christmas: Mary’s Magnificat

    Given that it is Christmas day we thought we would post Mary’s Magnificat,  Mary’s response to  learning she would bear a child, Jesus. The passage is so called because in the Latin Bible in verse 47 of Luke 1 (Luke 1:46-55) it begins with the words magnificat animum mea dominum, which means, “My soul magnifies the Lord.”

    And Mary said: “My soul glorifies the Lord and my spirit rejoices in God my Savior, for he has been mindful of the humble state of his servant. From now on all generations will call me blessed, for the Mighty One has done great things for me–holy is his name. His mercy extends to those who fear him, from generation to generation. He has performed mighty deeds with his arm; he has scattered those who are proud in their inmost thoughts. He has brought down rulers from their thrones but has lifted up the humble. He has filled the hungry with good things but has sent the rich away empty. He has helped his servant Israel, remembering to be merciful to Abraham and his descendants for ever, even as he said to our fathers.”

    Madeleine and I wish you all a Merry Christmas and thank you for your readership, comments and links over the past year.

  • Does Abortion Benefit the Fetus? A Critique of Himma Part 2

    In my previous post, Does Abortion Benefit the Fetus? A Critique of Himma Part 1, I discussed Kenneth Einar Himma’s argument that even if a fetus is a human being, laws permitting feticide are compatible with the harm principle.I elaborated an important objection to Himma’s argument, an objection articulated by Mark Murphy, which appeals to the common law doctrine of novus actus interveniens. In this post I will address three objections that Himma has made to this line of criticism to his argument.

    Objection 1: Inevitability

    One objection Himma makes to Murphy’s line of critique is to point out that there is an important disanalogy between Murphy’s illustration of the Good Samaritan and a person who aborts an innocent fetus. If a person aborts a fetus, it is logically inevitable that God will confer eternal life upon the fetus,

    If God has resolved to confer eternal life upon moral innocents who die, eternal bliss is the inevitable outcome… Indeed there is no logically possible world in which a perfect God has made such a decision and acted contrary to that decision on any single instance.[1]

    On the other hand,

    Even if we knew that (1) the Samaritan would appear at the crime scene and (2) the traveller would have a transformative response to being rescued, we have no reason to think it inevitable, in any meaningful sense, that the Samaritan will rescue the traveller. Though it might be very unlikely that the Samaritan would do so, it is none the less possible.[2]

    Himma’s point is that in the case of the Good Samaritan the benefits conferred upon the traveller were not logically inevitable; it was possible that the Samaritan would not rescue the traveller. This is why in this case we do not claim that the robbers benefited the traveller. In the case of abortion, however, salvation is inevitable.

    This seems mistaken. First, it is not true that it is logically inevitable that abortion will result in the fetus receiving eternal life. If we are talking in terms of logical possibilities, as Himma is, then it is possible for the fetus to be aborted and yet not gain eternal life. It is possible for the abortion to be botched and for the fetus to survive; it is possible for the fetus to miraculously survive or to be risen from the dead post-abortion. These outcomes are very unlikely but they are, nonetheless, possible.

    Secondly, the fact that it is possible that no rescue will be enacted by the Samaritan seems to have no bearing on whether the robbers are said to have harmed or benefited the traveller. Consider an analogous case that Himma himself mentions, the case where doctors perform a preventive mastectomy to prevent the development of breast cancer. Himma take this as an obvious case where a doctor benefits his patient. However, in this case the result is not logically inevitable. It is possible for the doctor to botch the operation and even if he did not it is possible that the patient would not have contracted cancer anyway. Moreover, if the patient had contracted cancer, it is possible that the cancer would miraculously disappear even if it was contracted. However, none of these possibilities led us to suggest that a doctor who performs such surgery does not benefit the patient. So it is hard to see why our judgement, that the robbers do not benefit the traveller but rather harm him or her, depends upon the mere possibility that the Samaritan will fail to carry out a rescue.

    Objection 2: Equivocation between Harm and Blame

    Himma’s second objection is to contend that the doctrine of novus actus interveniens “conflates two questions:

    (1) The conceptual question as to whether A should properly be characterised as harmful; and,

    (2) The normative question of whether the agent should be praised or blamed for A.[3]

    Himma notes that these two questions are not the same thing; a person can, in certain circumstances, be punished for benefiting a person, such as when he performs life saving surgery on another person without their consent. Similarly, a person can be non-culpable for certain harms they accidentally inflict. Himma goes on to assert,

    as far as our conceptual and moral practises are concerned it is uncontroversial only that the intervening act of a free agent insulates the performer of some proceeding act from moral responsibility of the consequences; it is not uncontroversial that the intervening act of a free agent necessarily figures into whether a proceeding should be characterised as beneficial or harmful.[4]

    This response again seems irrelevant. First the fact that it is “not uncontroversial that the intervening act of a free agent necessarily figures into whether a proceeding should be characterised as beneficial or harmful” [emphasis added] is hardly an argument against this claim. Himma’s own argument is, after all, not uncontroversial but that fact alone does not suffice to refute it.

    Secondly, I think the examples I cited previously do suggest that the intervening act of a free agent do factor into whether an action is characterised as harmful. Consider the example I cited from Augustine; it is not, in this case, that we think the person who refused to commit adultery actually killed the suicide victim in an innocent, non-culpable fashion; rather, our intuition is that the person did not kill the suicide victim at all.

    Thirdly, in the context of the harm principle, it is unclear that the distinction Himma draws here carries much relevance. The harm principle, after all, is a principle about what actions the criminal law should punish by law and it requires that one should only punish harmful actions. In this context it seems the question then of what harms we can justly be punished for is the relevant question.

    Objection Three: The Argument from Sharm

    This brings us to Himma’s last objection. This involves granting Murphy’s point that the fetus is not benefited by the abortion but instead reformulating the harm principle in terms of what he calls “the sharm principle.”

    I could respond simply by defining a new concept and reformulating the harm principle to include that concept in the following way. First, define sharm as follows: act a is sharmful to another person P if and only if a harms P and a does not make logically inevitable some benefit that would, from the standpoint of P’s self interest, infinitely out-weigh the harm to P from a. Second define the sharm principle as follows: the state may legitimately criminalise those acts that are sharmful to others.[5]

    I will say two things in response to this fairly creative move. The first is that as Himma has defined his terms it does not entail that abortion should be permitted. For abortion to be permitted it would have to be the case that it does not sharm the fetus and this would be the case only if abortion makes it “logically inevitable” that the fetus will gain eternal life. But it does not. Even if the woman has an abortion it is logically possible for the fetus to not die. It is logically possible for the surgery to be botched or for the fetus to miraculously live or for God to raise the fetus from the dead post-abortion. Of course none of these things are terribly likely but they are logically possible and hence the outcome of fetal salvation is not logically inevitable.

    Secondly, Himma’s move here seems to me merely an ad hoc manoeuvre. He has stipulated that the harm principle be reformulated a certain way precisely to ensure it gives him the result of justifying abortion rights. Apart from this, there seem no independent reasons for accepting the reformulated principle. If this is so then his argument is circular. He adopts a principle because it fits a given moral conclusion and then he uses the principle to justify that conclusion. Moreover, not only is there no independent reason for accepting the sharm principle, I contend that there are good reasons for not accepting it. This is because the sharm principle entails that infanticide should be permitted.

    Himma himself anticipates and tries to circumvent this; he notes that his argument “ would justify a law permitting infanticide,” he notes, “since infants are no more capable of sin than fetuses, it follows, according to this line of analysis that, that premature death is also infinitely benefits an infant by providing her with a free pass to heaven.”[6] The sharm principle would then entail that women have a right to commit infanticide. Himma grants that this implication would constitute a reductio ad absurdum of his position but argues that he can avoid endorsing laws in favour of infanticide by focusing “on the harmful effects of allowing infanticide.” He contends,

    On this line of reasoning, societal tolerance for killing of even new born infants would diminish the respect we have for human life in general and hence would be likely to increase the rates of violent crime. Thus, allowing infanticide, even in limited circumstances would have psychological effects that are likely to result in an increase in violent crime against people who are morally culpable and hence are at risk of damnation.[7]

    Himma thinks this is likely because of the “physical similarities between infants and older adults.”[8] He maintains that “our ethical judgements about and behaviour towards non-infants are shaped in part by our ethical judgements about infants because of the physical similarities between the two.”[9] The basic idea here is that because infants look like adults (that is, they are physically similar to mature adult human beings) a development of an ethic justifying the killing of infants will, as a matter of human psychology, lead to increased killing of older human beings. For this reason infanticide is harmful and so should not be permitted.

    I find this rejoinder implausible for two reasons. First, if it is sound then an analogous line of reasoning can be made with regard to fetuses. Fetuses, after all, from fairly early on in the pregnancy, physically resemble human being. Boonin notes that there is “a general consensus that the fetus is recognisably human after six weeks, and certainly after eight.”[10] If, as Himma claims, rules against killing adults require us to prohibit the killing of beings which look like and physically resemble human beings, despite the fact that they lack a grasp of moral concepts, then it follows that there should be prohibitions on killing fetuses from at least eight weeks gestation (most abortions are performed 8-12 weeks gestation).

    The second and more serious problem, however, is that the argument relies on a questionable premise. Himma thinks that because infants physically resemble adult human beings, human psychology means that the allowing of killing one will inevitably lead to the killing of another. Unfortunately he provides no empirical evidence for this claim; he simply asserts it as being true. It is unclear however that it is true. Sociological studies show that historically most cultures widely practiced and endorsed infanticide throughout history.[11] It was the rise of Judeo-Christian and Islamic beliefs about homicide that led to Westerners having a divergent attitude. However, there does not appear to be any evidence that these pre-Christian cultures were any more violent towards adults than Christian societies were. Moreover, one can think of plenty of examples where people have been able to deprive rights of a class of human beings and seek passionately the welfare of another class of human beings despite the fact that the class “resemble people physically.” For centuries people enslaved Africans and did not enslave Caucasians, despite the fact that the Africans and Caucasians physically resemble each other. People have treated women in ways they would never have treated men, despite the fact that men and women physically resemble each other in numerous respects. Jews were put in gas chambers and fellow Germans were not. Human societies appear quite capable of depriving one class of people of their rights and exalting the status of another class, despite the fact that the two are physically similar. Prima facie, Himma’s psychological claim appears dubious.

    Himma then cannot, it seems, consistently permit abortion and rule out infanticide on the grounds he gives. In fact, I am inclined to think that the implications of his position go even further than merely permitting infanticide. If the sharm principle is correct, it would follow not just that infanticide is permissible but that the killing of any human being who lacks moral culpability is permissible. However, it is not just infants and fetuses that lack moral culpability, as Himma himself notes, mentally retarded adults lack moral culpability for their actions. Similarly, the laws of most countries recognise that even up to their early teens, children are not moral agents who can be held culpable for their actions. Hence, it is difficult to see why Himma’s argument does not commit one to permitting the killing of not just fetuses but also infants, children and mentally retarded people. If a moral principle clashes so violently with our pre-theoretical intuitions as this one does, and there is no independent reason for accepting it, then I submit we have good reasons for rejecting it.


    [1] Kenneth Einar Himma “Harm , Sharm and One Extremely Creepy Argument: A Reply to Mark Murphy” 21:2 Faith and Philosophy (2004) 251.
    [2] Ibid.
    [3] Ibid, 252.
    [4] Ibid.
    [5]
    Ibid.
    [6] Kenneth Einar Himma “No Harm, No Foul: Abortion and the Implication of Fetal Innocence” 19:2 Faith and Philosophy (2002) 186.
    [7] Ibid, 187.
    [8]
    Ibid.
    [9] Ibid, 187-188.
    [10] David Boonin A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 95.
    [11] See Lalia Williamson “Infanticide: An Anthropological Analysis” in Infanticide and the Value of Life ed M Kohl (New York: Prometheus Books, 1978) 61-73.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Does Abortion Benefit the Fetus? A Critique of Himma Part 1

  • Name Suppression and the Balancing of Rights and Freedoms

    God, via the consent of the governed, gives authority to the state to administer justice against those who violate the rights and freedoms of others. Given this, it is important that the citizens can see that justice is being done. My fellow blogger WhaleOil’s very public battle with New Zealand’s name suppression laws and the wide support he’s received (if not for his actions at least for the sentiment behind them) highlights a concern that name suppression law, as practiced in New Zealand – especially with regard to celebrities – offends this notion.

    Suppression orders offend important liberal concepts; the principle of openness, transparent and public trials, is grounded in the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom of expression, for each citizen to be able to seek, receive and impart information, are both contained the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Suppression orders meant that we, the public, are unable to receive information about matters of justice and thus we cannot fully witness justice being done; the balance of power becomes too weighted in favour of the state.

    This is not to say there is no place for suppression orders, I believe there clearly is, but in granting one the interests of justice must be properly weighed against the right to expression “and only where the Court’s capacity to ensure justice is significantly imperilled will the right of citizens and the media to seek, receive and impart information be curtailed.” (Thomas J in Police v O’Connor [1992] 1 NZLR 87, 99) The court must take into consideration the effect of doing so on freedom of expression, alongside its affronts to the principle of openness, and engage in the weighing and balancing that Thomas J referred to.

    Now given the presumption of innocence, innocent until proven guilty in a court of law, one wonders why someone simply being accused of something causes the court to tip the balance in favour of the right to privacy, a right not typically contained in Bills of Rights or listed by jurists when considering the key elements of a just and liberal society? If the reason is that once accused everyone thinks you did it then why doesn’t everyone get name suppression? Do non-celebrities not also have very real risks to their careers and relationships when they are tainted by accusations?

  • Philosophers’ Carnival XCXI

    Welcome to MandM,  a New Zealand based philosophy of religion, ethics, theology, jurisprudence and social commentary blog and hosts of the XCXI edition of the Philosophers’ Carnival. We have a good selection of philosophy readings for your holiday perusal, so take a look around and enjoy.

    Epistemology
    Glenn Peoples brings us Hume on Induction and Miracles: Having a Bob Each Way? posted at Say Hello to my Little Friend. Glenn draws attention to a conflict between Hume’s stance on induction on the one hand, and the kind of argument that he uses against miracles on the other.

    History of Philosophy
    Jim S.
    brings us Thus Spoke Cratylus posted at Agent Intellect.  Jim provides critical commentary on Nietzsche’s essay “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.”

    Logic and Language
    Bryan brings us Where the Material Conditional gets its Truth Conditions posted at Soul Physics. Bryan discusses how to explain, in simple terms, the truth table for the material conditional, in particular, why conditionals with a false antecedant are true.

    Mind
    Gualtiero Piccinini brings us Two Kinds of Concept: Implicit and Explicit posted at Brains. Gualtiero links to a paper he has written explicating the distinction between implicit and explicit concepts.

    Jonathan Phillips brings us  Could Paris Hilton Ever Be Happy? posted at Experimental Philosophy. Jonathan sets out the results of some research on attributions of evaluative and non-evaluative mental state concepts. The discussion already begun in the comments section is also worth reading.

    Moral Philosophy
    Richard Chappell brings us Analyzing Act, Rule, and Global Consequentialism posted at PEA Soup. As the title suggests, Richard discusses the difference between act, rule and global consequentialism and offers critical comments on all three.

    Philosophy of Law
    Madeleine Flannagan
    brings us Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V & Part VI posted at MandM. Madeleine provides a long and comprehensive discussion of the doctrine of religious restraint, the claim that in public policy debate support for a given policy is morally unjustified unless one has secular reasons for that policy. She argues that the doctrine entails an arbitrary and unjustified asymmetrical treatment of religious and secular beliefs.

    Philosophy of Religion
    Dominic Bnonn Tennant brings us Determinism and the Authorship of Sin in Calvinism and Arminianism posted at Dominic Bnonn Tennant. Bnonn discusses issues around theological determinism and God’s culpability for sin.

    Jeremy Pierce brings us Satisficing Without Supererogation posted at Parableman. Jeremy attempts to reconcile the claim that there is no best possible world with the view that there is no supererogation. He argues that for a perfect being there is no supererogation and also that a perfect being is not required to create the best possible world as no best possible world exists.

    Matthew Flannagan brings us Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I and Part II posted at MandM. Matt gives a critical discussion of Michael Tooley’s version of the Euthyphro dilemma and some attempts to defend it.

    Political Philosophy
    Aaron Powell brings us A Marble Temple Shining on a Hill: Reality and Michael Walzer posted at Aaron Ross Powell. This is a criticism of Michael Walzer’s defence of communitarianism.

    That concludes Philosophers’ Carnival XCXI. You can submit your blog article to the next edition using the Philosophers’ Carnival submission form. Past posts and future hosts can be found on the blog carnival index page.