Tag: Infanticide

  • Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy Thesis: Part Three Standard Objections to the Autonomy Thesis, Human Rights and Dignity without God

    In my last post I looked at Erik Wielenberg’s response to the objection that, in the absence of God, people lack compelling reasons to comply with morality’s demands.  A second objection Wielenberg briefly addresses is that without certain theological doctrines, one cannot provide a plausible basis for human rights and dignity.  Wielenberg, here again, takes Craig as paradigmatic.

    defaul1If there is no God, then what’s so special about human beings? They’re just accidental by-products of nature that have evolved relatively recently on an infinitesimal speck of dust lost somewhere in a hostile and mindless universe and that are doomed to perish individually and collectively in a relatively short time[1]

    Craig’s rhetorical question alludes to a serious point, made in more detail by Peter Singer, Louis Pojman, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, this is that it is hard to plausibly accommodate the thesis that all human beings have equal dignity and rights outside a theistic framework. Wielenberg’s response is that human rights are grounded in “non-moral intrinsic properties of human beings” He notes: “Human beings can, reason, suffer, fall in love, set goals for themselves and so on. God or no God, human beings obviously differ when it comes to intrinsic properties than dogs or mere lumps of clay[2]”

    Wielenberg here appeals to certain higher cognitive capacities human beings possess that other animals lack.

    This brief response to Craig is central to his Wielenberg’s rebuttal of evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism latter in the book. Sharon Street and others have raised epistemological challenges to moral realism by noting that many of our basic evaluative capacities, our disposition to judge certain types of behaviour as morally wrong, has been shaped by naturalistic evolution.  Naturalistic evolution, however, isn’t guided by considerations of truth, in selecting such dispositions, but by adaptability, these basic evaluative judgements exist, because making such judgements enabled our ancestors to reproduce effectively in the environment in which they lived. Street notes “the striking coincide between independent moral truths posited by the realist and the normative views evolution has pushed us towards” and “challenges the realist to explain this coincidence.”[3]

    Wielenberg proposes that “our cognitive capacities” explain the coincidence. Moral rights D supervene upon any creature that possesses certain cognitive capacities.  Seeing these are the same cognitive capacities which produce moral beliefs. It follows that any being which believes it has moral rights will necessarily have them.[4]

    Wielenberg specifies that the supervenience relationship here involves both modal covariation, and a form of “robust causation” analogous to the way theist understand God’s relationship to the created universe, just as Theists believe that God immediately sustains the universe in existence moment by moment simply by willing its existence. So, natural those properties which constitute our higher cognitive faculties, robustly cause the existence of moral rights, without any intermediatory agency or laws of nature.

    This answer both to the grounding of human rights and evolutionary debunking arguments has a cost.  As Wolterstorff [5] and Singer [6].  have both pointed out, while it is true that normal adult humans have the cognitive capacities in question, many important categories of human beings do not. Infants and small children cannot reason, or fall in love, set goals for themselves, nor do they have the developed moral cognition Wielenberg refers to. In fact, David Boonin has noted: “by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows, and pigs, chickens and ducks are more intellectually developed than a new born infant.”[7].

    So, Wielenberg’s answer gives us no reason for thinking a child or infant has a rights or dignity, over and above any other animal. In fact, seeing moral rights modally covary with possession of the relevant cognitive faculties, such capacities are necessary and sufficient for the possession of moral rights.  Consequently, His position seems to entail that infant’s small children, and mentally impaired human adults have no moral rights.


    [1] Wielenberg, Robust Ethics 51, the citation is from William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong God: A Debate Between a Christian and an Atheist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 18

    [2] Ibid 51

    [3] Ibid 155

    [4] Ibid 134-175

    [5] Nicholas Wolterstorff Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008) 325-341.

    [6] Peter Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2001) 186-187

    [7] David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 121, the neurological data is summarised in Michael Tooley’s Abortion and Infanticide (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) Ch. 11.5.

  • Peter Singer on Human Dignity and Infanticide: Part Two

    This is the second half of the paper I presented to the the Evangelical Philosophical Society Annual Meeting in Milwaukee three weeks ago. It is part of a two-part post series; make sure you have read part one Peter Singer on Human Dignity and Infanticide.

    II. Marquis’ Critique
    In my previous post I sketched Singer’s desire account of killing and how it relates to Singer’s preference utilitarianism and position on vegetarianism. Don Marquis has offered two kinds of counter examples to the desire account of killing:[1] take depressed people who are either suicidal or simply don’t care about life, but whom we know will with medication or counselling overcome this. Such people have no desire to live, yet it seems they have a right to life. Killing them is not in their interests and we would wrong them, not just their relatives or society, if we killed them.

    Or consider people brainwashed in a religious cult to commit suicide, or people who, believing they will be rewarded in the afterlife, offer themselves as voluntary human sacrifices. These people lack a desire to live yet they still have a right to life. Morality requires we try and save them from the cult rather than that we kill them. The desire account thus appears false, and given that preference utilitarianism entails the desire account, preference utilitarianism is problematic.

    These counter examples are part of a more general problem. Singer’s position infers a right to continue to exist from a desire to continue existing. However, the inference that “X has a prima facie right to Z” from “X desires Z”, is problematic. Children have rights to medical care, nutritious food, and education, but often children have little or no desire for these things. Often in cases of complicated medical procedures the child lacks a conception of the operation itself, yet it still has a right to such things. This claim is based on it being in their interests to have these things, and they will be harmed by not having them, it’s not plausible to ground these rights in the fact the parents or society want the child to have them.

    III. Singer’s reply
    Peter SingerIn A Reply to Don Marquis,[2] Singer acknowledges the cogency of Marquis’s counter examples and offers a revision to the desire account of killing. He cites the example of a tennis player who desires to drink a bottle he believes is full of water, but in reality contains poison. Singer concludes from this case “if a person’s desire to die is based on a false belief, it does not justify assisting him in satisfying the preference”[3], also ruling out the example of the fanatical religious believer. Similarly, “for a preference to be one we should act upon it should be based not only on accurate information …” but also a “calm and rational assessment of the situation”; this rules out the example of the depressed individual.[4]

    Singer’s revision means the issue is not the actual desires an individual has but rather their ideal desires, i.e. desires the individual would have had if they were reasoning correctly and had correct information. Marquis’s counter-examples therefore fail.

    IV. Critique of Singer’s Reply
    I will offer three lines of response to Singer’s reply.

    Motivation and Arbitrariness
    The first problem is that Singer’s position appears unmotivated. Anticipating Singer’s response, Marquis noted that while infants lack actual desires to continue to exist, it’s not clear they totally lack a rational desire to live because “if a fetus were fully informed and rational, it would desire to live” [5]. Singer’s modification then would appear to undercut his advocacy of infanticide.

    To avoid this, Singer adopts a particular conception of ideal desires. Ideal desires are a being’s actual desires corrected for false information and errors of reasoning. Seeing infants lack any desire to continue existing they cannot in this sense have an idealised desire to exist in the future. Consequently, Singer suggests that preference utilitarianism should be modified so as to involve the maximisation of idealised preferences so defined. The problem is that apart from the fact it enables him to both support abortion and infanticide and avoid the counter examples, Singer offers no reason why one should adopt this particular conception of ideal desires. Various different conceptions of ideal desires have been proposed which will get around the counter examples aforementioned and not all of them involve the modification of actual desires. Consequently, Singer’s position appears unmotivated.

    Singer’s response to this rejoinder is to state,

    “Adjusting a person’s actual desires for errors is one thing; attributing a wholly new desire to a being that is not capable of having any desires  at all, or any desires of the relevant kind is something else altogether, and something for which there is no obvious motivation” [6]

    This is inadequate; Singer asserts that his account is different from one other account and that this other accounts is unmotivated. But the fact other accounts are unmotivated does not entail that Singer’s own account is motivated.

    The Hamlet problem
    A second problem is that even if Singer’s account escapes Marquis’s counter example it seems vulnerable to a new one. Consider the following lines from Hamlet (more…)

  • Peter Singer on Human Dignity and Infanticide: Part One

    This is the first section of the paper I presented to the the Evangelical Philosophical Society Annual Meeting in Milwaukee two weeks ago. Several people have asked me to post it on MandM. It will appear as a two-part post series.

    Christian theism has traditionally taught that human beings have equal dignity and worth, a moral status that separates them from non-human animals. Peter Singer has famously rejected this teaching, holding that human beings are not any more special than animals and doctrines of human dignity are indefensible.  He contends that killing a new-born infant is, in and of itself, no more problematic than killing a non-human animal such as a cow or a pig and defends the permissibly of infanticide under certain conditions.

    Peter SingerThis paper will critically assess one important part of Singer’s position: his understanding of why it is wrong to kill.  In I I will sketch Singer’s “desire account” of killing and its relationship to his own preference utilitarianism and project of animal equality. Following Don Marquis, I will argue in II, that this “desire account” is subject to important counter examples. In III I note Singer’s attempts to modify his position so as to avoid these counter examples and suggest that these modifications are problematic. In IV, I will suggest that, despite this, there is an important truth in Singer’s critique, one that Christian thinkers can appropriate in developing moral arguments for Christian theism.

    I. Preference Utilitarianism and the desire account of the wrongness of killing
    Classical Utilitarianism conjoins three theses. First, the maximisation thesis; an action is right if and only if it maximises overall net benefit:  net benefit being the total amount of  benefit accruing to individuals as a consequence of the action, minus any harms resulting. An action maximises net benefit when the consequences of performing it constitute a higher net benefit than that associated with any alternative action.

    Second, , the thesis of equal consideration: a benefit or harm to any one individual is counted as having equal weight to a similar sized benefit or harm to any other individual.

    Third, the thesis of hedonism: on this account, benefits and harms are understood in terms of pleasure and pain. Something benefits an individual or is good if it causes him pleasure and harms him if it causes pain.

    Peter Singer is a preference utilitarian. Preference utilitarians accept both the maximisation and equal consideration theses however reject hedonism in favour of a desire fulfillment or preference satisfaction view of the good. Something is good for an individual if he desires or prefers it, and it is bad if contrary to his preferences or desires.

    Singer uses preference utilitarianism to reject the doctrine that human beings have equal dignity and worth, a moral status that separates them from non-human animals.  Sentient animals clearly have desires; they can suffer and feel pain and desire not to. The equal considerations thesis entails that in so far as these desires are similar to those of human beings the suffering of an animal must be considered equal with that of a human being.

    However, in terms of actual as opposed to potential psychological capacities, some human beings have a comparable mental life to that of animals.   A new born human infant’s psychology is primitive. David Boonin notes “by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows and pigs, chickens and ducks are more intellectually developed than a new born infant.” [1]  This means that the desires of a new born infant are similar to those of other animals.

    Singer illustrates this point in a discussion of animal experimentation. (more…)

  • Singer on Matthew Flannagan in “Peter Singer Under Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Faces His Critics”

    Yesterday Matt went the library and did a little reading for his upcoming Evangelical Philosophical Society paper “Peter Singer, Human Dignity, and Infanticide“ and he discovered that email exchange he’d had with Peter Singer in 2006 had resulted in a few paragraphs in Singer’s book Peter Singer Under Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Faces His Critics.

    Here is a screen shot of what one sees when one uses the “search inside this book” function:

    Peter Singer Under Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Faces His Critics

    Matt does not feel that Singer accurately portrayed his counter example but the substance Singer presents of it is correct. Singer’s response to Matt seems to be that Matt is right in principle but in practice it would never be an issue.

  • Matt to speak on Singer and Infanticide at 2012 Evangelical Philosophical Society Meeting in Milwaukee

    Every November there is about a two week period in America where a number of professional academic conferences are held where the best of the best in the field gather. For the last two years Matt has been either accepted or invited to speak at them (I was accepted to speak at them last year too but had a visa problem at the last minute so Matt went without me). Anyway, this year they are all being held in Milwaukee and I am happy to announce that Matt received this email last week:

    Evangelical Philosophical SocietyCongratulations!  Your paper proposal for the 2012 Evangelical Philosophical Society meeting in Milwaukee (14-16 November) has been accepted for presentation.

    …

    Since there were nearly twice as many proposals as spaces, many fine papers had to be rejected.  If for any reason you will not be able to present your paper after all, please inform the EPS program committee as soon as possible so that we can allow one of the alternates to fill the vacated slot.

    Again, congratulations, and we look forward to hearing your paper in Milwaukee!

    Sincerely in Christ,

    The EPS program committee

    Yay – so proud of him! The abstract he submitted for blind review was as follows:

    Peter Singer, Human Dignity, and Infanticide

    Christian theism has traditionally taught that human beings have equal dignity and worth, a moral status that separates them from other non-human animals. Peter Singer has famously argued that this teaching is problematic; human beings are not any more special than animals and doctrines of human dignity are indefensible.  He contend that killing a new-born infant is, in and of itself, no more problematic than killing a non-human animal such as a cow or a pig, and he defends the permissibility of infanticide.

    This paper will critically assess one important part of Singer’s position: his understanding of why it is wrong to kill.  In part 1 I will sketch Singer’s “desire account” of killing and its relationship to his own preference utilitarianism and project of animal equality. Following Don Marquis, I will argue that this “desire account” is subject to important counter examples. In part 2, I will note Singer’s attempts to modify his position so as to avoid these counter examples and suggest that these modifications undercut his arguments for animal equality. In part 3, I will suggest that, despite this, there is an important truth in Singer’s critique, one that Christian thinkers can appropriate in developing moral arguments for Christian theism.

    Matt did not apply for any other of the conferences this year, although he was invited to give a paper at the Society for Biblical Literature but the session got cancelled. He and I are contemplating applying to Notre Dame’s annual conference on the week before, it’s theme this year is Justice so both of us could, and I still have enough time on my US Visa to go, but I am not sure if I have time to write a paper as my case-load is insane, so it might be just Matt. Anyway – yay Matt!

    Update
    Wow, already in receipt of donation offers to help get him there! We love you guys 🙂 We have just over $1.5k left over from blog donations and fundraising last time which constitutes the refunds from my aborted-lack-of-visa trip. I will price Auckland to Milwaukee and put up a fundraising widget in the sidebar soon – as with previous years accommodation options will be needed so Milwaukee readers if you have a couch talk to me 🙂

  • Contra Mundum: After Birth Abortion

    “What we call ‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn baby) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled.” These words, published in the prestigious “Journal of Medical Ethics” by ethicists Dr Francesca Minerva and Dr Alberto Giubilini, sparked outrage around the world.

    After Birth AbortionAfter-birth abortion is, of course, a nonsensical euphemism; the term ‘abortion’ means to ‘terminate a pregnancy’, it cannot, by definition, apply post-pregnancy. The authors are talking about infanticide: the killing of infants; in essence, putting human babies down. People were shocked and perplexed that ethicists were advocating this and that a leading medical ethics journal was taking this idea seriously.

    The outrage the followed has forced the authors to back-pedal; they have since argued that there conclusion was only theoretical, it was only published for Ethicists to read and they were not engaging in political lobbying. This response is odd. The whole point of Ethics is to answer the question of how we ought to do things. If the author’s conclusion is correct then doctors should perform after-birth abortions; they should kill newborn babies on any ground that currently abortions can be performed on, which, in practice, is almost any ground at all. It is precisely this implication that is widely and correctly condemned as outrageous.

    Less widely commented on is the argument the authors gave for this conclusion. Minerva and Giubilini note that “abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the foetus’ health.” Taking this acceptance as given they then advance three key claims. First [1], they argue that an infant, like a foetus, is only a potential person and is not an actual person. Second [2], that potential personhood confers no right to life upon a biological organism. Third [3], that the interests of actual people to not be encumbered with the care or financial burden of raising a child (or even adopting) can be significant enough to justify killing potential persons. These claims are all extremely familiar; in fact, [1], [2] and [3] are simply claims that are already widely accepted in the literature justifying legal abortion, arguments which lead to the legalisation of abortion in the west some forty years ago.

    Take [2]; if merely being a potential person confers a right to life on an organism then foetuses have a right to life because they are at least potential persons. Defenders of abortion deny that feticide is killing an actual person; hence they accept [2].

    Similarly [3] is accepted, at least implicitly, in New Zealand. Current practice allows people to destroy potential persons for a wide variety of reasons, including the burdens of care associated with child rearing and economic grounds. If one accepts this current practice then potential persons can be destroyed for the sake of relieving all manner of unpleasant economic and social burdens. There is minimal outrage over this; those who express it are generally dismissed as extremist nutters, so [2] and [3] appear to be conventionally accepted as mainstream liberal thinking.

    In the same way, whilst it may not be widely known, [1] has been implicitly accepted in pro-abortion literature for the last 40 years. The reason is this: a foetus is clearly and unequivocally a human being. Whilst people sometimes claim that a foetus is merely a clump of cells, this is, at best, only accurate at the earlier embryonic stage of development. By the foetal stage of 6-8 weeks after conception (which is, incidentally, when most pregnancies are confirmed and most abortions occur) one clearly is talking about a living, biological, physiological human animal. To justify abortion defenders of abortion had to argue that whilst a foetus is a human being this fact is insufficient to give it a right to life.

    Two reasons lead to this conclusion. Firstly, a widely held position known as secularism contends that religious reasons must be bracketed from discussions of public policy. Hence, one cannot approach the question of abortion presupposing the standard Christian view that human beings have been made in God’s image and as such have been given a special dignity not given to other animals. One can afford human beings such a dignity only if one identifies a non-theological or natural property that human beings possess and which other animals lack that plausibly grounds such a status.

    Secondly, once religious beliefs are bracketed then it is very difficult to find any such property. The fact that an animal is of a particular species is, of itself, no more relevant than the fact that someone is of a particular race. The only properties that seem remotely relevant are that mature humans typically possess higher psychological functions that other animals lack such as: sentience, self-consciousness, rationality, ability to use language, autonomy and so on. These functions are relevant because an animal with these properties can be aware of its future existence and value it, judge it valuable, and desire its preservation. In the literature, these psychological properties are referred to as ‘personhood’. Even if there is no God to confer value or dignity on human beings, persons can still have lives that are valuable to themselves.

    To defend abortion rights, a distinction was drawn between being a human being and a person. Whilst foetuses are actual human beings they are not actually persons as the psychology of a foetus is extremely primitive. Foetuses do not appear to be conscious at all until around 28 weeks, and even then the consciousness is primitive. Most mature non-human animals are far more developed psychologically than a human foetus, and even though the foetus has some minimal consciousness, it certainly is not yet self-aware or rational or so on. Hence, foetuses are only potential persons, and according to [2], have no right to life.

    There are several problems with this argument. First, it implies that only those who value their life and desire its preservation have a right to life. This is subject to some obvious counter examples. Consider the (more…)

  • Francesca Minerva and Matthew Flannagan on “After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?” on Radio

    Francesca Minerva and Alberto Giubilini‘s article “After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?” published in the Journal of Law, Ethics and Medicine is creating waves the world over. In a few hours, on the morning of Thursday 1 March, around 10:00am New Zealand time, Dr Minerva will be interviewed on this article on Radio Rhema’s Pat Brittenden Mornings. Shortly after Dr Matthew Flannagan, of this blog, arguably New Zealand’s most eminent Abortion Ethicist, will be interviewed in response.

    The Abstract of “After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?” is as follows:

    After Birth AbortionAbortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the fetus’ health. By showing that (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have the same moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact that both are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3) adoption is not always in the best interest of actual people, the authors argue that what we call ‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled.

    Matt’s articles on abortion rebutting most of the arguments used in “After-birth abortion” (they are very similar to arguments offered by Michael Tooley and Peter Singer) can be found by using the tags below – particularly see his:

    Boonin and Sentience Criteria: A Critique Part I
    Boonin and Sentience Criteria: A Critique Part II
    (published in Ethics and Medicine: An International Journal of Bioethics vol 25, issue 2, 2009, 95-106)
    Sentience Part 1
    Sentience Part 2 

    UPDATE:
    Dr Francesca Minerva’s interview on her and Alberto Giubilini’s article “After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?” is now available to download it as an MP3.

    Dr Matthew Flannagan’s interview on Francesca Minerva and Alberto Giubilini’s article “After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?” is now available to download it as an MP3.

    FURTHER UPDATE
    In response to Dr Minerva’s comments in her interview where she states that parents of disabled children do not read academic articles and later, academics who are capable of understanding the debate would not be offended by the position she was arguing for:

    I am an academic, I am married to Matt who is also an academic.

    Matt and I are the parents of four children, two of whom have disabilities, one whose diagnosis is Severe Autistic Spectrum Disorder. The severity of this diagnosis cannot be overstated. Our son cannot go to school, cannot be cared for by most people; and when his condition is not managed, regularly does actions that endanger himself and others that are the source of considerable stress – he gets into rages where he cannot value or appreciate the risks he is taking to his own life. We shape our lives around managing his care. It is hard. His condition causes significant impact to our financial, social and professional endeavours as well as our stress levels; just on Saturday he caused four Police Patrol cars and their respective officers to leave active duty to deal with him.

    So we present a conundrum to Dr Minerva’s claims. We are academics, we are both capable of following and understanding the argument and contributing to it in a non-emotive way – in fact, both of us have contributed to this particular debate in this way. Further, we often read academic articles – most recently we have each read hers; we author them too. Contemporaneously, we are also parents of disabled children, one fairly seriously disabled child. So are we offended by her argument? Yes. The suggestion that our son, because he is a burden, could understandably and justifiably be killed provided he is of a biological state where he does not value or appreciate his life – or that had we known what we were in for we could just had killed him at birth, is offensive. An implication of this argument is that he is not as valuable as other human beings and I reject that.

    As Matt pointed out in his interview, when your reasoning brings you to a conclusion of that magnitude you need to check your premises, not bite the bullet and shoot the baby.

    Oh and by the way, abortion means termination of pregnancy it cannot, by definition, apply post-pregnancy. It is up there with talking about post-death homicide.

    HERALD UPDATE:
    The New Zealand Herald has run an article on the subject featuring Matt (only they wrongly imply he is on faculty at Auckland University): “Killing newborns: Paper stirs debate, death threats”