Tag: Investigate Magazine

  • Contra Mundum: Dawkins and Secular Hypocrisy

    Richard DawkinsWhen I was a non-Christian I was forever hearing about how Christians are hypocrites. When I converted to Christianity at 17, one thing that struck me is how often these charges were often a case of the pot calling the kettle black. While there is undoubtedly some hypocrisy within the church, it is also pervasive outside it. Secular culture often contains absurd ironies and hypocrisy which are conveniently ignored.

    A great example was the media fiasco over William Lane Craig’s visit to the United Kingdom last year. Craig is distinguished philosopher known professionally for his work in philosophy of time and philosophy of religion. Alongside his scholarly work, he has also developed a reputation as a prolific public speaker and debater, debating many of the world’s leading sceptics. His combination of scholarly ability and effective debating skills has earned him a reputation as one of the world’s foremost Christian apologists.

    “Apparently, having two PhD’s, authoring over 100 papers, and writing 30 books on a topic makes you unqualified to speak on it, but being the star of the 80’s TV series “Growing Pains” does.”

    Craig’s visit to the UK attracted media attention when Richard Dawkins, author of the best selling “God Delusion”, publically and resolutely refused to debate him. Dawkins publically stated earlier of his critics that “he did not care” who they were, he would “dialogue” with them and “win the argument”. He also had publically debated numerous critics significantly less qualified than Craig, notably Ted Haggard. These facts, alongside Dawkins implausible and inconsistent reasons lead to accusations of cowardice and hypocrisy from other academics such as Daniel Came a philosophy professor at St Hugh’s College Oxford.

    In the UK newspaper the Guardian Dawkin’s gave two reasons for his refusal. According to Dawkins, Craig “parades himself as a philosopher, but none of the professors of philosophy whom I consulted had heard his name”. Dawkins omitted to mention that this was not the first time he had publicly denigrated Craig’s scholarly credentials. On a previous occasion  Daniel Came,  had e-mailed him stating:

    “Professor Craig has a PhD in philosophy and a PhD in theology. He is Research Professor in Philosophy at Talbot University. He has published more than thirty books and over a hundred papers in reputable peer-reviewed journal. Given your passionate and unconditional commitment to truth, I can only think that you were not aware of Professor Craig’s credentials when you made the above reference.”

    So Dawkins claim that no philosopher he had consulted had ever heard of Craig was less than honest. A less charitable person might describe this as simply slander.

    Dawkins concern about Craig’s alleged lack of scholarly credentials also seems odd seeing that he (Dawkins) had earlier accepted an invitation to debate actor Kirk Cameron.  Apparently, having two PhD’s, authoring over 100 papers, and writing 30 books on a topic makes you unqualified to speak on it but being the star of the 80’s TV series “Growing Pains” does qualify you. It’s also ironic that Dawkins would accuse Craig of lacking scholarly credentials on the matter given that he (Dawkins) is a biologist and not a philosopher of religion.

    Dawkins next excuse was that Craig is “morally unfit” to debate him.  To substantiate this he cites not from any of Craig’s scholarly writings. But two blog posts Craig had written on with the conquest of Canaan. At face value  the early chapters of the book of Joshua portrays God as commanding the killing of every man women and child in Canaan. I say “appears”, here because latter sections of the book of Joshua and its sequel in judges proceed on the assumption this never occurred, and studies into ancient conquest accounts of this genre have noted the widespread use of literary hyperbole whereby victories are described in sweeping rhetoric of killing absolutely everyone when in reality they were (more…)

  • Contra Mundum: After Birth Abortion

    “What we call ‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn baby) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled.” These words, published in the prestigious “Journal of Medical Ethics” by ethicists Dr Francesca Minerva and Dr Alberto Giubilini, sparked outrage around the world.

    After Birth AbortionAfter-birth abortion is, of course, a nonsensical euphemism; the term ‘abortion’ means to ‘terminate a pregnancy’, it cannot, by definition, apply post-pregnancy. The authors are talking about infanticide: the killing of infants; in essence, putting human babies down. People were shocked and perplexed that ethicists were advocating this and that a leading medical ethics journal was taking this idea seriously.

    The outrage the followed has forced the authors to back-pedal; they have since argued that there conclusion was only theoretical, it was only published for Ethicists to read and they were not engaging in political lobbying. This response is odd. The whole point of Ethics is to answer the question of how we ought to do things. If the author’s conclusion is correct then doctors should perform after-birth abortions; they should kill newborn babies on any ground that currently abortions can be performed on, which, in practice, is almost any ground at all. It is precisely this implication that is widely and correctly condemned as outrageous.

    Less widely commented on is the argument the authors gave for this conclusion. Minerva and Giubilini note that “abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the foetus’ health.” Taking this acceptance as given they then advance three key claims. First [1], they argue that an infant, like a foetus, is only a potential person and is not an actual person. Second [2], that potential personhood confers no right to life upon a biological organism. Third [3], that the interests of actual people to not be encumbered with the care or financial burden of raising a child (or even adopting) can be significant enough to justify killing potential persons. These claims are all extremely familiar; in fact, [1], [2] and [3] are simply claims that are already widely accepted in the literature justifying legal abortion, arguments which lead to the legalisation of abortion in the west some forty years ago.

    Take [2]; if merely being a potential person confers a right to life on an organism then foetuses have a right to life because they are at least potential persons. Defenders of abortion deny that feticide is killing an actual person; hence they accept [2].

    Similarly [3] is accepted, at least implicitly, in New Zealand. Current practice allows people to destroy potential persons for a wide variety of reasons, including the burdens of care associated with child rearing and economic grounds. If one accepts this current practice then potential persons can be destroyed for the sake of relieving all manner of unpleasant economic and social burdens. There is minimal outrage over this; those who express it are generally dismissed as extremist nutters, so [2] and [3] appear to be conventionally accepted as mainstream liberal thinking.

    In the same way, whilst it may not be widely known, [1] has been implicitly accepted in pro-abortion literature for the last 40 years. The reason is this: a foetus is clearly and unequivocally a human being. Whilst people sometimes claim that a foetus is merely a clump of cells, this is, at best, only accurate at the earlier embryonic stage of development. By the foetal stage of 6-8 weeks after conception (which is, incidentally, when most pregnancies are confirmed and most abortions occur) one clearly is talking about a living, biological, physiological human animal. To justify abortion defenders of abortion had to argue that whilst a foetus is a human being this fact is insufficient to give it a right to life.

    Two reasons lead to this conclusion. Firstly, a widely held position known as secularism contends that religious reasons must be bracketed from discussions of public policy. Hence, one cannot approach the question of abortion presupposing the standard Christian view that human beings have been made in God’s image and as such have been given a special dignity not given to other animals. One can afford human beings such a dignity only if one identifies a non-theological or natural property that human beings possess and which other animals lack that plausibly grounds such a status.

    Secondly, once religious beliefs are bracketed then it is very difficult to find any such property. The fact that an animal is of a particular species is, of itself, no more relevant than the fact that someone is of a particular race. The only properties that seem remotely relevant are that mature humans typically possess higher psychological functions that other animals lack such as: sentience, self-consciousness, rationality, ability to use language, autonomy and so on. These functions are relevant because an animal with these properties can be aware of its future existence and value it, judge it valuable, and desire its preservation. In the literature, these psychological properties are referred to as ‘personhood’. Even if there is no God to confer value or dignity on human beings, persons can still have lives that are valuable to themselves.

    To defend abortion rights, a distinction was drawn between being a human being and a person. Whilst foetuses are actual human beings they are not actually persons as the psychology of a foetus is extremely primitive. Foetuses do not appear to be conscious at all until around 28 weeks, and even then the consciousness is primitive. Most mature non-human animals are far more developed psychologically than a human foetus, and even though the foetus has some minimal consciousness, it certainly is not yet self-aware or rational or so on. Hence, foetuses are only potential persons, and according to [2], have no right to life.

    There are several problems with this argument. First, it implies that only those who value their life and desire its preservation have a right to life. This is subject to some obvious counter examples. Consider the (more…)

  • Contra Mundum: When Scientists Make Bad Ethicists

    One thing I find particularly frustrating is reading commentary on theology and philosophy written by scientists. To be fair, some scientists I have read are informed and do offer astute and insightful comments; commonly, however, one finds a person who is undoubtedly brilliant in their own field, writing with confident gusto, articles that fail to understand the most basic theological and philosophical distinctions.

    Jerry CoyneA good example can be seen in a recent USA Today article by influential biologist Jerry Coyne entitled, As atheists know, you can be good without God. Coyne, an outspoken atheist, is disturbed that many Americans, including some prominent scientists, believe that our instinctive sense of right and wrong is “strong evidence for [God’s] existence.” He ventures into moral philosophy to explain why this is clearly mistaken.

    From the get-go Coyne demonstrates he does not understand the issues.

    It is necessary to accurately understand the position Coyne is criticising before we look at the paucity of his critique. The argument that our instinctive sense of right and wrong “is strong evidence for [God’s] existence” found its most important formulation in a 1979 article by Yale Philosopher Robert Adams. In it, Adams noted that we instinctively grasp that certain actions, like torturing children for fun, are wrong; hence, he reasoned, we are intuitively aware of the existence of moral obligations. According to Adams, the best account of the nature of such obligations is that they are commands issued by a loving and just God. Identifying obligations with God’s commands can explain all the features of moral obligation better than any secular alternative. Consequently, the existence of moral obligations provides evidence for God’s existence.

    It is important to note what Adams did not claim. Central to Adams’ argument, and to pretty much every author who follows him, is a vital distinction; this is the distinction between the claim that moral obligations are, in fact, divine commands and the claim that one cannot recognise what our moral obligations are unless one believes in divine commands or some form of divine revelation. Adams illustrates this distinction with the example of H20 and water.

    Contemporary chemistry tells us that the best account of the nature of water is that water is, in fact, H20 molecules. This, of course, means that water cannot exist unless H20 does. However, it does not mean that people who do not know about or believe in the existence of H20 cannot recognise water when they see it. For centuries people recognised, swam in, sailed on and drank water before they knew anything about modern chemistry.

    This distinction has important implications. The claim that moral obligations are, in fact, commands issued by God does not entail that people must believe that God exists and has issued commands in order to be able to recognise right and wrong. These are separate and logically distinct claims.

    Coyne conflates this distinction from the outset. After noting that some people believe that moral obligations provide strong evidence for God’s existence, he claims that this is an oft-heard argument, “‘Evolution,’ many argue, ‘could never have given us feelings of kindness, altruism and morality…’;” to this he rejoins that, “scientists studying our primate relatives, such as chimpanzees, see evolutionary rudiments of morality: behaviours that look for all the world like altruism, sympathy, moral disapproval, sharing — even notions of fairness.”

    This is confused. Apart from the fact that no one who cites morality as evidence for God actually makes the argument about evolution that Coyne sets out, the claim that moral obligations cannot exist independently of God is not the claim that without God people would not have moral feelings. Feeling that one has an obligation to do something and actually having an obligation to do it are clearly different things. People can feel that they have a certain obligation without it actually being the case that they do.

    Coyne makes a similar mistake when he argues that secular European countries like Sweden and Denmark “are full of well-behaved and well-meaning citizens, not criminals and sociopaths running amok.” This  (more…)

  • Contra Mundum: Separating Church and State

    Co-authored by Matthew and Madeleine Flannagan

    The late Philosopher Richard Rorty once described religion as a “conversation stopper”, something that polarises discussion and ends or prevents fruitful dialogue. Rorty was an advocate of,

    “the happy, Jeffersonian compromise that the Enlightenment reached with the religious. This compromise consists in privatizing religion — keeping it out of … “the public square,” making it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy.”

    The view that the public square – the legal system, economy, public education system, politics and so on – should be secular is now standard in contemporary political theory. When making decisions about their private conduct religious believers can utilise religious reasons in but in public they are morally bound to bracket their beliefs about God and appeal only to secular considerations.

    In an earlier column, “Secularism and Public life”, Matthew criticised this position. He pointed out that a growing number of scholars working in philosophy, political science and law are calling the defensibility of this position into question. We will not repeat those points here instead we will address one interesting feature of Rorty’s comment above; Rorty referred to his position as “the … Jeffersonian compromise.”

    In doing this he reflected a trend that began in the US the mid to late 20th Century and has spread around the Western World. The First Amendment of the United States (US) Constitution asserts that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; …”. In a letter to the Danbury Baptists in 1802, US Founding Father Thomas Jefferson stated that this amendment established a “wall of separation” between church of state. In the mid 20th century the US Supreme court argued that on the basis of Jefferson’s comments the US Constitution required the “separation of church and state”. This was then interpreted to mean that the US Constitution demanded a secular public square, religious ideals and beliefs were not to be allowed in public life.

    It won’t be news to anyone who has watched any US television shows to hear that the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to mean that religious instruction, prayer, references to God, displays of the 10 Commandments, nativity scenes — even where participation is voluntary — are banned from public institutions.

    Separation of Church and StateWhen Rorty referred to his position as “the Jeffersonian compromise” he was alluding to this line of argument. It is an argument we have heard over and over: because our society has a separation of church and state, we are committed to having a secular public square. If one opposes a secular public square and believes, as we do, that religious beliefs should influence public life then one gets accused of denying the separation of church and state.

    We think this inference is wrong-headed. It confuses the separation of two institutions, the church and state, with the separation of religion and public life. These are not the same things.

    To understand separation of church and state some history is necessary.

    Prominent legal scholar, Steven D Smith, observed that the church-state relationship, which would have been familiar to an eighteenth century American, was one where “governments controlled or directly intervened in the internal affairs of churches, and churches claimed and were formally endowed with governmental powers.” He elaborated that,

    “Since the middle ages, scholars and polemicists of all stripes had argued-on both religious and political grounds-that the church should exercise control over the state or-again on both religious and political grounds-that the state should control the church. The common view for centuries had been that an established church was essential to political and social stability. …

    In medieval Europe, for example, kings had claimed, and had exercised, the power to appoint bishops and popes. After the Reformation, the British monarch became the official head of the Church of England, and British government assumed control over both the selection of ecclesiastical officials and the formulation of religious doctrine.

    Medieval popes regularly crowned earthly emperors and kings, and they claimed (and frequently purported to exercise) the authority not merely to excommunicate but actually to depose those kings. Popes sometimes asserted jurisdiction to adjudicate what were essentially political or property disputes. In England, the Church enjoyed-and still enjoys-official representation in Parliament. Immigrants later imported established churches in some form into most of the American colonies.”

    Separation of church and state is the idea that the church should not be formally endowed with governmental powers and that the state should not try to intervene in or control the church. Now many people (including we, the writers) accept this. We do not believe that the government should set up an official state church or have any say in the liturgy, theology, choice of ministers and so on in established churches. Nor do we think that churches should be granted state powers, the right to hold seats in parliament, the ability to pass legislation, prosecute or tax people and so on. We wholeheartedly accept the separation of church and state.

    However, separation of church and state is not separation of religious beliefs from public life – perhaps this confusion arises because both concepts have the word “separation” in them. Church and state are formal institutions; public life is not an institution nor is a religious belief an institution. To assert, as so many commentators do, that separation of church and state commits us to a secular public square is to offer a non-sequitur.

    Some examples will illustrate this point. Suppose New Zealand were to allow the establishment of a completely private university; this university would not be an official state university, it would not be endowed with any political status nor would it does it hold any judicial, legislative or executive powers. The government would not choose its employees or its curriculum and the scholars within it would have total academic freedom. If this were to occur we would say there was an institutional separation between the state and this university.

    Now, imagine that the science department (more…)

  • Contra Mundum: Consenting Adults and Harm

    In debates over abortion, homosexual conduct, euthanasia, prostitution, drugs, those who call themselves liberals often mount the same basic argument; a socially or morally permissive stance is necessitated towards such practices because people have a right to choose do what ever they like with their own bodies. As John Stuart Mill put it in his book On Liberty:

    “The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.” [Emphasis added]

    John Stuart Mill

    Here Mill articulates the harm principle. He makes a distinction between other-regarding actions, actions that harm other people, and self-regarding actions, those that harm oneself. He argues that society, either by law or by social pressure, cannot justly regulate any action a person performs unless it is other-regarding; that is, it harms people other than the agent him/herself.

    As Mill’s position is typically interpreted, harm is understood to be governed by the principle volenti non fit injuria (where there is consent there is no injury); it refers to things done to other people without their consent. Mill states that a self-regarding action is one “which affects only himself, or affects others with their free and voluntary, and undeceived consent”.

    Mill intended his principle to be criteria as to what should and should not be made a criminal offence; he did not consider it criteria for determining what is right and wrong. Yet many contemporary liberals appear to use it in this latter way. They contend that as long as the action involves only consenting adults it is morally permissible. It is often asserted in our society, as though it were self-evident, that people have a moral right to do whatever they like with their own bodies.

    I think this claim is far from self-evident. Irving Kristol famously proposed this counter-example in a 1971 article in New York Times Magazine:

    “[T]he plain fact is that none of us is a complete civil libertarian. We all believe that there is some point at which the public authorities ought to step in to limit the “self-expression” of an individual or group even where this might be seriously intended as a form of artistic expression, and even where the artistic transaction is between consenting adults. A playwright or theatrical director might, in this crazy world of ours, find someone willing to commit suicide on stage, as called for by the script. We would not allow that-any more than we would permit scenes of real physical torture on the stage, even if the victim were a willing masochist. And I know of no one, no matter how free in spirit, who argues that we ought to permit gladiatorial contests in Yankee stadium, similar to those once performed in the Coliseum of Rome-even if only consenting adults were involved.”

    The examples Kristol gives are all cases where any person of common sense would condemn the act but where all the victims consent to be harmed.

    In his book Harmless Wrong Doing: Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Liberal Political Philosopher Joel Feinberg considers Kristol’s objection as the most important and potentially-devastating counter-example to the harm principle and he spends considerable energy attempting to circumvent it. He offers four responses. Here I will argue that these responses fail.

    First, Feinberg questions whether such cases are really cases of consensual homicide. He suggests (more…)

  • Macsyna King, Representative of the Coming Race

    We are simple souls, and so find ourselves “conflicted” (to use pop psych jargon) over the public vituperate venting about one Macsyna King.  How we love a mob.  All heat and no light.  A dirty bomb.

    Macsyna King Breaking Silence: The Kahui CaseMacsyna is coming out of the closet via a book, Breaking Silence: The Kahui Case, written by Ian Wishart.  The mob has called for the book to be banned, via boycott, successfully pressuring booksellers not to carry it.  She was the mother of murdered (or manslaughtered) infant twins, Chris and Cru Kahui.  The court acquitted her then current boyfriend (and father of the twins) of responsibility for their deaths.  No-one else has been charged.  The defence argued that Macsyna herself was their killer.

    If the court evidence is to be believed, King has been both wretched and depraved.

    Asked by Crown lawyer Richard Marchant who was the dominant person in the relationship, Ms King replied “I thought I was”. “I would yell the loudest, I would swear at him (“husband”, Chris) and I just wouldn’t stop till I got my way,” she said. “I’ve kicked him in the shin, I’ve slapped his face before.” Kahui, eight years her junior, was a quiet, softly spoken person who would bottle things up. . . .

    Ms King told the court she had three children to two different fathers prior to meeting Kahui in 2004. All three children were now cared for by their respective fathers and she did not have contact with them. She started living with Kahui shortly after meeting him and quickly fell pregnant, giving birth to a boy, Shayne, in 2005. In September that year, she split with Kahui for several months and went to live with her sister Emily. During that time she got into a relationship with another man but then returned to Kahui. She fell pregnant with the twins soon after her return. . . .

    During her conversation with Ms Ingham, Ms King said she sometimes hit Kahui – but not around the head or face – and occasionally smacked their one-year-old son Shayne with an open hand. She also said she was attending an anger management course. She also said she like to go out with her friends and get drunk but would get the babies “out of her hair” first. . . .

    But, why pick on her? Why the loathing and disgust?  She is hardly atypical.  In fact she accurately and fairly represents the NZ underclass–which is large and growing.  She is a poster girl for the intergenerational welfare dependant.  Maybe that’s why the populist mob is so energized.  It is deeply offended that thousands of people like King, not only exist, not only are the products of New Zealand society, but are funded and paid for by state welfare payments which become more generous according to the number of children one produces.  Their depravity is paid for by the ever generous state.

    Maybe this cuts so bone deep that the mob is having an “I don’t want to know” moment of denial. Disembowelling the messenger is its defensive visceral reaction.

    For our part, the more folk like King get their story out there, the better.  We rely upon Wishart to get the text as close to the truth as possible–but he is rather experienced at it. We would argue for the stories of a hundred of King’s underclass colleagues to be told.

    Most people in New Zealand ardently support state welfare.  We are bored to death by repeated assertions from the Commentariate that the Macsyna King’s of this world simply do not exist.  They are only imaginary febrile figments on the part of beneficiary bashers.  State welfare helps (more…)

  • Contra Mundum: Pacifism and Just Wars

    Comedian Bill Maher recently berated Christians for being hypocrites for supporting military action against terrorists in his “New Rules” segment on the U.S. TV show Real Time (transcript here). Jesus, Maher contended, was a pacifist; “Jesus lays on that hippie stuff pretty thick. He has lines like, “do not repay evil with evil,” and “do not take revenge on someone who wrongs you.” Here Maher was citing from Romans 12, where Paul formulated Christ’s teaching about loving one’s enemies. In this passage Paul commanded people to “bless those who persecute them,” they are forbidden to “repay evil for evil” and are commanded to “not take revenge” but to “leave room for God’s wrath. For it is written, ‘Vengeance belongs to me. I will pay them back’.”

    Maher scathingly contended that this support contradicted Christ’s clear teaching; he said, “nonviolence was kind of Jesus’ trademark. Kind of his big thing. To not follow that part of it is like joining Greenpeace and hating whales.”

    After saying this Maher quipped, “the next line isn’t ‘and if that doesn’t work, send a titanium fanged dog to rip his nuts off.’” The irony is that it Maher clearly had not bothered to actually read the next line; Romans 13 states that the “governing authorities” are “established by God”; one is morally bound to submit to rulers because “rulers do not bear the sword for no reason. They are God’s servants, agents of wrath to execute vengeance upon evil doers”.

    The Greek words for evil, wrath, and vengeance are the same in both Romans 12 and 13. Paul is stating that the very things Christians are forbidden to do with regard to not repaying evil for evil, are precisely what the State has been given the legitimate authority and right to do.

    Paul here elaborates the basic premise that moral theologians appeal to to reject pacifism and to support the claim that war can be just under certain circumstances. The premise is that a government has the right and duty to use force to uphold within the geographical area over which it has jurisdiction. A just war is simply an extension of a government’s power to pass laws and create police powers.

    If a criminal attempts to rape or kill people within the geographical realm over which a government has authority then the government can justifiably use force to prevent this. And it can also use force to try and punish anyone who does these things; hence, the existence of a legislature, police force, courts and prisons. Just War theorists simply note that there seems no reason why this would not extend to when the person committing the offence is a soldier from another country as opposed to a domestic criminal.

    These theorists argue that for a war to be just it must (more…)