Tag: Robert Adams

  • Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part One

    This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters, ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave.

    “If God does not exist, then everything is permissible.” These words from Ivan Karamazov in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers of Karamazov express a widely held intuition that moral requirements depend upon God’s existence. Most contemporary ethicists today would dismiss this intuition. In this talk, I will argue their dismissal is premature. I will defend what philosophers call a divine command theory of ethics. The thesis that moral wrongness is (identical to) the property of being contrary to God’s commands.[1] Where God is understood, in orthodox fashion, as a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially ordered the universe. 

    Note three things about this thesis:

    First, it is a thesis about the nature of moral requirements. It is not a thesis about the nature of goodness. The concept of “good, is ambiguous, as is seen by the following statements “I had a really good dip in the spa pool last night,” Or “going on a low carb diet is good for you.” Or “Carlos the Jakal was a good hitman.” The concept of the morally obligatory, or morally required, is not identical to the concept of what it is good to do. It might be good, even saintly, for me to give a kidney to benefit a stranger, but it is not an act I am obliged to do.[2] 

    Second, my thesis is that the property of being morally required is “identical” to the property of being commanded by God.  I am not saying that people cannot know what is right and wrong unless they believe in God. Nor am I claiming that the word “wrong” means “contrary to God’s command.” These are distinct claims. Consider light; Light is identical to a certain visible range of the electromagnetic spectrum. But obviously, that isn’t the meaning of the word “light.” People knew how to use the word “light” long before discovering its physical nature. And they knew the difference between light and darkness long before they understood the physics of light. Analogously, we can know the meaning of moral terms like “right” and “wrong” and know the difference between right and wrong without being aware that the moral requirements are God’s commands.[3]

    Third, this is a thesis about the relationship between God and morality. It is not a claim about the relationship between the bible and morality. The thesis I laid out does not mention any sacred text such as the Bible, Quran, Hadith, Torah, or Talmud. While many divine command theorists accept that God has revealed his commands in an infallible sacred text, some do not. The claim that God’s commands are contained in some sacred text is not part of or entailed by a divine command theory itself. It is the result of other theological commitments they have. One could consistently be a divine command theorist without holding this. Divine command theories are ecumenical; they have had advocates within the Christian, Islamic, Jewish, and even deist traditions.

    Having clarified my thesis, I will defend three contentions.

    • Secular accounts of morality cannot coherently account for our fundamental intuitions about moral requirements.
    • If God exists, then a divine command theory can coherently account for our fundamental intuitions about moral requirements.
    • Standard objections to divine command theories fail.

    I. Four Assumptions about Moral Requirements

    But first, what do I mean by fundamental assumptions? Moral theories are tested, in part, by how well they account for various assumptions about morality implicit in our moral thought and practice. [4] I will begin by listing four plausible assumptions about the type of requirements morality imposes upon us.

    One is that moral requirements are inescapable: they apply to us irrespective of whether following them contributes to any ends or aims we currently desire.  Consider a criminal who stands in the dock convicted of a crime; he openly admits the crime, is unrepentant and informs us that he wanted to kill and torture. Doing so did not frustrate any of his desires. Does our moral condemnation of him depend on us assuming he does not have statistically abnormal desires so that we withdraw this judgment when we discover he really does desire to kill and maim?  Moral requirements can’t be escaped or begged off by noting they don’t fulfill one’s goals or ends. [5]

    Second moral requirements are requirements that are justified from an impartial point of view. Peter Singer explains:

    The ‘Golden Rule’ attributed to Moses, to be found in the book of Leviticus and subsequently repeated by Jesus, tells us to go beyond our own personal interests and ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’ – in other words, give the same weight to the interests of others as one gives to one’s own interests. The same idea of putting oneself in the position of another is involved in the other Christian formulation of the commandment, that we do to others as we would have them do to us. The Stoics held that ethics derives from a universal natural law. Kant developed this idea into his famous formula: ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.’ Kant’s theory has itself been modified and developed by R. M. Hare, who sees universalisability as a logical feature of moral judgments. The eighteenth -century British philosophers Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith appealed to an imaginary ‘impartial spectator’ as the test of a moral judgment, and this theory has its modem version in the Ideal Observer theory. Utilitarians, from Jeremy Bentham to J. J. C. Smart, take it as axiomatic that in deciding moral issues ‘each counts for one and none for more than one’; while John Rawls, a leading contemporary critic of utilitarianism, incorporates essentially the same axiom into his own theory by deriving basic ethical principles from an imaginary choice in which those choosing do not know whether they will be the ones who gain or lose by the principles they select…. One could argue endlessly about the merits of each of these characterisations of the ethical; but what they have in common is more important than their differences. They agree that an ethical principle cannot be justified in relation to any partial or sectional group. Ethics takes a universal point of view[6]

    Third moral requirements have practical authority: agents always have conclusive reasons to do what is morally required and never have sufficiently good reasons for doing what is morally wrong. Someone has conclusive reasons to act in a certain way when the reasons in favor of acting, taken together, are stronger than any set of reasons we may have to act in some other way.  If we don’t always have conclusive reasons to do what is right, having total allegiance to morality will be arbitrary and, at worst irrational.   We will have no more reason to do what is right than wrong. Or doing the right thing will be doing what we have a most reason not to do.[7]

    Moral requirements are supposed to answer questions about what we are to do. They are considerations that guide our actions.  When we learn something is wrong, that tells us what we are not to do. They cannot do this if we lack conclusive reasons to do what they say.  Suppose you and I are discussing whether it is my duty to donate to the red cross. You convinced me it is my duty to do so. The red cross knocks on my door. I refuse to donate. I suspect this would puzzle you; didn’t I concede that I had a duty to do it? If I responded with “yes, I am persuaded it is my duty to do it, but that doesn’t mean I have reasons to do it,” I suspect you would think I was missing something. I would deny moral requirements have any authority or claim on my behavior and don’t address the question, “what ought I do?”.[8]

    Or suppose you heard that I had resigned from my high-paying job. You think I am nuts. How am I going to provide for my family? Why would I give up the career I always dreamt of? I tell you, I discovered the firm was engaging in unethical business practices, and I had to resign to avoid being complicit. On hearing this, wouldn’t it now make sense that I did this? I was justified in doing so. If you do, you are assuming that the fact an action is wrong justifies my refraining from doing it.[9]

    Fourth, a final assumption is that if something is morally required, we are accountable for doing it in an important sense.  John Stuart Mill famously stated,

    “We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it—if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures, if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. This seems the real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple expediency.”[10]

    There is a conceptual link between something being morally obligatory and something being blameworthy. If we do what is morally wrong without excuse, others can legitimately blame us, and guilt is warranted. Moral requirements conceptually are demands people make upon one each, which we can hold each other accountable through demanding an excuse, practices of blaming, criticizing, and guilt.

    Robert Adams asks us to imagine a situation in which there are compelling reasons to support you not walking on the lawn. However, these reasons give you no grounds for feeling guilty if you do, and they provide no reasons for other people to make you feel like you must stay off the lawn or to blame and reproach you for doing so. Adams concludes that while there would be a sense in which you ought not to walk on the lawn, you have no obligation not to do so.[11]

    So, whatever property moral wrongness is, it is the property of being prohibited by certain standards: standards that are inescapable and justified from an impartial point of view. The fact these standards prohibit an action means agents have conclusive reasons not to do the action in question. Agents are also accountable for actions doing actions prohibited by these standards. Others can blame and sanction me if I act contrary to them without an adequate excuse. A plausible thesis about the nature of moral wrongness should account for these facts.

    In my next post, I will defend my first contention: that secular accounts of morality struggle to coherently account for these four assumptions.


    [1] Robert M. Adams, “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again,” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979): 76.

    [2] Example from C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 16.

    [3] This illustration comes from William Lane Craig see “Is Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural? The Craig-Harris Debate” available at  https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/debates/is-the-foundation-of-morality-natural-or-supernatural-the-craig-harris-deba/) accessed 19 August  2022.

    [4] The implicit method here is described in Richard Joyce’s “Theistic Ethics and the Euthyphro Dilemma,” Journal of Religious Ethics 30 (2002): 68-69;”

    [5] Richard Joyce, “Mackie’s Arguments for an Error Theory,” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/moral-error-theory.html, accessed 20/4/17).

    [6] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 11

    [7] This argument is adapted from C. Stephen Layman’s “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy, 23 (2006): 306- 307

    [8] This example comes from Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 1994) 6

    [9] This example comes from C Stephen Layman’s “A Moral Argument for The Existence of God” Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 53-54

    [10] John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, chapter 5 available at https://www.utilitarianism.com/mill5.htm accessed 23 August 2022

    [11] Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 238.

  • Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality: Huemer on Observer Independence, part two

    In my last post, I discussed Michael Huemer’s argument that a divine command theory cannot vindicate the objectivity of moral requirements. As I interpret him, the  argument is:

    [1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective.

    [2] Moral requirements are objective just in case there obtain facts about what is right and wrong that do not constitutionally depend upon the attitude of observers towards the objects of evaluation.

    [3] If divine command metaethics is true, facts about right and wrong constitutively depend upon the attitudes of an observer towards the objects of evaluation.

    I think [3] and [1] are questionable.

    Let us begin with [3]. For [3] to be accurate, a divine command theory must entail that facts about right and wrong constitutively depend upon the attitudes of an observer. It is not enough that these facts depend upon God’s attitudes in some way or other. These attitudes must constitute moral facts in part or whole.

    Why think that [3] is true? Presumably, the inference goes like this:  If a divine command theory is true, then facts about right and wrong are identical with facts about what actions have been commanded by God. However, facts about what actions have been commanded and prohibited by God are constituted by facts about God’s attitudes. So, a divine command theory entails that facts about observers attitudes constitute deontic facts.

    However, it is not evident that facts about what actions have been commanded and prohibited by God are constituted by facts about God’s attitudes. In the literature, it is common to distinguish divine command theories from divine will or attitude theories.[1] Divine will theories contend that God’s attitudes towards certain actions constitute deontological facts. By contrast, a divine command theory contends deontological facts are identical with facts about what actions have been commanded by God.  Attitudes and commands are not the same things. Robert Adam’s stresses that “moral obligation is understood in terms of what God requires of us”. But, “requiring is something we do in relationship to each other it essentially involves communicative acts”. It is not logically equivalent to having a positive or negative attitude towards that action.

    The difference between commanding and merely willing is significant. Divine command theorists like Adam’s defend a divine command theory because they believe “the will of a legislature imposes no obligations without being commanded”. To illustrate this, Adam’s provides some examples, where what a person desires or wills and what the command comes apart.

     “Religiously, obedience to God is in large part a matter of respect for God; and interhuman examples suggest that respect would follow commands in preference to unexpressed desires. The wait staff in a restaurant show me benevolence, perhaps, but scant respect, if they bring me what they think I want instead of what I actually ordered.” [2]

    So, when a divine command theorist claims deontological facts are identical with facts about what actions God commanded, it doesnt follow that God’s attitudes constitute these facts. To get that conclusion, we need to assume that commands are constituted by attitudes. Seeing someone can command X without a pro attitude towards it, and someone can have a pro attitude towards x without commanding this is not obvious.

    This brings us to [1], Suppose divine command theories do entail moral facts constitutively depend upon an observer’s (i.e. God’s) attitudes. This is only problematic if our commitment to morality presupposes that moral facts are objective in this sense of the word.  If we define an objective fact as a fact that does not constitutively, as opposed to causally, depend on an observer’s attitudes. It does not seem to me that [1] is true.

    Objectivist metaethical theories’ plausibility consists of their accounting for and vindicating certain presuppositions of our moral thought and practice.  Our moral thought and practice assume that beings like you and I can make mistaken judgements. We have limited information, are prone to biases, and make errors of fact and reason. We reason about morality to discern which evaluations our human compatriots are correct and which are not. We use reasons to support and verify some judgments and criticize others showing they are mistaken.  We defend some of the evaluations of our society against criticisms.[3] We reject others as oppressive, immoral and in need of reform. We think our society made moral progress by rejecting slavery and racial segregation. We believe the Nazi’s evaluation of racism was mistaken, and Martin Luther King Juniors was closer to the truth.  We think some moral reformers who criticized widely endorse policies were correct. They have given us a better understanding of what is right and wrong. We believe certain actions, like the rape and murder of a small child, are wrong even if I or my society endorsed them.

    In Ethical Intuitionism, Huemer himself emphasises several of these assumptions. He notes (i) the judgements of Neo Nazi’s and Nazi society were mistaken.  (ii) That we engage in real disagreement with our compatriots, but individually and collectively contradicting what they say and offering reasons for and against their judgements. (iii) That individuals and societies are not infallible moral judges and (iv) that human judgements can be based on arbitrary reasons.[4]

    These assumptions presuppose moral facts obtain independently of the evaluation of human appraisers: appraisers like you and I who are subject to these cognitive deficiencies. Who are fallible, make mistakes, can be prejudiced and arbitrary, and ignorant of relevant facts.  They do not presuppose that this independence is only constitutive. They do not assume this independence applies to all possible appraisers. Even an infallible omniscient, impartial appraiser upon whose will everything else depends for its existence.

    Two examples will illustrate this.  Take a crude relativist theory: where actions are morally required if and only if, and because, my social group approves of them. This theory is a paradigmatic example of a subjectivist theory. All most everyone rejects it because it contradicts the objectivist presuppositions of moral thought.  Yet, according to Huemer’s view, whether this theory vindicates the objectivity of morality depends solely on whether societies approval causes or constitutes moral facts.

    Suppose there are two versions of this theory. (a) One claims the property of being morally required is identical to the property of being socially approved.  (b), Another claims my society can directly and immediately bring it about that I am required to do something by approving of it. Neither of these theories will vindicate the objectivists presuppositions of our moral thought. Both will entail that correct evaluation are co-extensive with the attitudes of my society. So, both will have implications that contradict the relevant presuppositions mentioned above. Nevertheless, in Huemer’s view, (b) entails that moral facts are objective and (a) does not.  Consequently,  a theory can vindicate the objectivity of morality, in Huemer’s sense of the word, yet fail to vindicate any objectivist presuppositions of our moral thought and practice.

    A second example, consider a form of naturalistic moral realism whereby moral facts are facts about the causal properties of certain actions. Rightness just is the property an action has when it tends to increase or enhance our happiness. Wrongness just is the property an action has when it tends to diminish our happiness. This is a paradigmatic objectivist theory. It makes wrongness depend on facts about causal physical properties of actions. It vindicates the objectivist presuppositions of our moral thought and practice. The judgements human appraisers make about causal properties can fail to correspond to causal reality.   Yet on Huemer’s view, whether this theory vindicates the objectivity of morality depends solely on what its advocates believe about the ontology of laws of nature.

    Suppose John and Mary jointly develop and defend a theory of this sort. Although they agree on the ontology of moral facts, John and Mary have different views on the ontology of laws of nature. Mary is an atheist who accepts David Armstrong’s thesis that laws of nature are a form of natural necessity[5]. By contrast, John is a Theist who accepts the view of early modern scientists that laws of nature are just the laws by which God governs the natural world. He accepts Alvin Plantinga’s[6] and John Foster’s[7] defence of the thesis that Laws of nature are divine decrees. 

    John and Mary advocate the same meta-ethical theory. But, Huemer’s definition entails that Mary’s theory vindicates the objectivity of morality and John’s theory does not. Their thesis is that certain causal properties of actions constitute the wrongness of actions. John believes that causal laws are constituted by God’s willing certain regularities occur. So, John is committed to claiming that wrongness constitutively depends on God’s will.  Mary has no such commitments.

    However, this difference between Mary and John makes no difference whatsoever for how well their joint theory vindicates the objectivist assumptions of our moral discourse. Consequently, a theory can fail to vindicate the objectivity of morality in Huemer’s sense and yet vindicate all the objectivist features of our moral discourse.

    If I am correct about this, the kind of objectivity presupposed by our moral commitments has nothing to do with whether moral facts are “constitutional” independent of any observer or appraiser.


    [1] Examples of divine will theories include those of; Matthew Carey Jordan (2012),“Divine Attitudes, Divine Commands, and the Modal Status of Moral Truths,” Religious Studies 48: 45–60; Mark Murphy (1998), “Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation,” Faith and Philosophy 15: 3–27; Christian Miller (2009), “Divine Desire Theory and Obligation,” in Yujin Nagasawa and Erik Wielenberg (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Religion (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); and Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (2004), Divine Motivation Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    [2] Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 260

    [3] Think of the perennial moral debate between conservatives and progressives, which is over what social norms to preserve and defend and what to reform.

    [4] Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 49-53.

    [5] David Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)

    [6] Alvin Plantinga, “Law, Cause, and Occasionalism” Reason and Faith: Themes from Richard Swinburne, (Eds.) Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey E. Brower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 126-143.

    [7] John Foster, The Divine Lawmaker: Lectures on Induction, Laws of Nature, and the Existence of God, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 

  • The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (Part three)

    In Part One, I expounded the Psychopath objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM) that has recently been defended by Erik Wielenberg. Wielenberg argues as follows:

    R1) If God commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.

    [1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) 

    [2] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued no divine commands. (from 1 and R)

    [3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). 

    [4] But there are no psychopaths who have no moral obligations. 

    [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)

    In my last post, I contended this argument is crucially ambiguous; the word “obligation” occurs in both R1 and [3] and [4]. However, one can use the word “obligation” in an objective and a subjective sense. Objective obligatoriness (or rightness or wrongness) is the deontic status that an action has in virtue of its actual circumstances and consequences” By contrast, “Subjective obligatoriness (or rightness or wrongness) is the deontic status an action has in virtue of the agent’s beliefs about its morally relevant circumstances and consequences” (Smith (2010), 4)

    I contend that the distinction between objective and subjective obligation makes trouble for the Psychopath Objection. For the argument to be logically valid, and avoid committing the fallacy of equivocation, the word “obligation must be used the same way in both premise [R] and premise [4]. When one examines Wielenberg’s argument; however, we find this is not the case. If we interpret the word obligation in the “subjective sense” premise [4] is not justified by the evidence Wielenberg offers. By contrast, if we interpret obligation in the objective sense, then [R] is unjustified.

     The Subjectivist Interpretation

    Let us begin first by interpreting [R] and [4] in the subjective sense:

     (R1 Subjective) If God’s commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes a subjective obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.

     

    [1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) 

    [2*] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued commands that generate no subjective obligations. (from 1 and R) .

     [3*] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). 

    [4S] But there are no psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. 

    [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)

    If we interpret [4] in terms of [4S], then Wielenberg must contend not just that Psychopaths have objective obligations’ but also that they are subjectively obligated to refrain from immoral activity. He must hold that Psychopath’s act contrary to their own non-culpable recognition of what morality requires. The data he cites, however, does not support this. Consider the following examples, which Wielenberg cites to support premise [1] 

    The mainstream view of psychopaths in contemporary psychology and philosophy has it that they have significant neurological deficits that leave them with an absent or significantly diminished capacity for love, compassion, and guilt. They are often described as lacking conscience and are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands…(emphasis added) (Wielenberg (2018), 5)

    ‘Since their dysfunctional conscience does not stimulate moral feelings, psychopaths do not become aware of the constraints required to understand that they have obligations. Their conscience does not make them responsive to the constraining power of morality’..(Emphasis added) (Ibid., 6)

    About one in twenty-five individuals are sociopathic, meaning, essentially, that they do not have a conscience … The intellectual difference between right and wrong does not bring on the emotional sirens and flashing blue lights, or the fear of God, that it does for the rest of us. … ‘[Psychopaths] do not appear… to be aware of the need to justify actions which infringe moral rules … [and] do not really understand the concept of morality’… ‘Psychopaths do not merely behave contrary to moral standards . . . but seem in some sense not even to understand the notion of a moral standard in any “serious” sense. (Emphasis added) (Ibid., 5-6)

     

     Even more, telling is the conclusion Wielenberg draws from this data.

    Notice that the problem here is not that DCT implies that psychopaths are not responsible for their immoral actions. There are robust philosophical debates about the extent to which psychopaths are legally or morally responsible for their actions (see, e.g. Malatesti & McMillan (2010) ). ….However, as far as I can tell, all parties to these debates would accept the claim about psychopaths upon which the argument of this article depends: psychopaths cannot grasp the authority and force of moral demands. As Erick Ramirez puts it, ‘psychopaths are said to suffer from moral blindness. Philosophers disagree on whether this moral blindness exempts them from responsibility for their bad behavior’ (Ramirez (2013), 244). As this remark suggests, the moral blindness of psychopaths is widely taken for granted – and that moral blindness of psychopaths is the foundation of the central argument of this article. Accordingly, the problem for DCT that I have advanced here is not that it implies that psychopaths violate moral obligations but are not (legally or morally) responsible for doing so; rather, the problem is that DCT implies that psychopaths have no moral obligations to violate in the first place. (Wielenberg (2018), 8)

    This data, if accurate, undermines the claim that Psychopaths have subjective obligations. The evidence does not-unequivocally support the idea that they do what is wrong, given what they non-culpably believe about the situation. Wielenberg concedes Psychopaths are “morally blind” may “lack a conscience” “do not understand the concept of morality” and “lack the constraints necessary constraints required to understand that they have obligations.” His claim they have obligations carries no implications that they are culpable of their actions or culpably act contrary to what they discern to be obligatory. Consequently, [4S] is unjustified. [4] is only justified if Wielenberg is using obligation in the objective sense. 

    Objectivist Interpretation

    This leads us to consider next an “objectivist” interpretation of the argument.

      (R1 Objective) If God’s commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an objective obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force. 

     

    [1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) 

    [2**] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued commands that generate no objective obligations. (from 1 and R) .

     [3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no objective moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). 

    [4O] But there are no psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. 

    [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)

     

    If [4] is interpreted in terms of [4O], then [4] is plausible. Even if Pscyopath’s suffer from “a moral blindness” which prevents them from recognising their objective obligations, it is implausible to think Psychopaths lack objective moral requirements. 

    The problem is that now (R1 Objective) is no longer plausible. We saw above that Wielenberg argues for R by contending that standard responses to the promulgation objection rely on it. Wielenberg argued:

    A distinctive feature of DCT is that a given human being has moral obligations only if a divine command is somehow communicated to that human being. This aspect of the theory is emphasised by many proponents of the theory. For example, Adams writes: ‘A command does not exist or have any force unless it is issued – that is, unless, it is in some way communicated’ (R. Adams (1999), 263). In defence of this position, Adams memorably remarks that ‘[g]ames in which one party incurs guilt for failing to guess the unexpressed wishes of the other party are not nice games. They are no nicer if God is thought of as a party to them’ (ibid., 261) (Wielenberg (2018), 2)

    He immediately continues:

    Stephen Evans similarly emphasises the importance of divine communication in this passage:

    A law that was passed in secret and never revealed to anyone would hardly be binding on the citizens of a state. It is true that it is often said that ignorance of the law is not a valid excuse for not obeying the law, but this principle surely assumes that the law in question is a matter of public record and that the individual who should obey the law could have known about it. Something similar must hold for moral laws as well. (Evans (2013), 37) 

    In accordance with Adams’s view that ‘[i]n order to exist, a command… .must be communicated to those who are subject to it’ (R. Adams (1999), 263), I shall henceforth use ‘command’ to mean obligation-bestowing command. On this usage, no divine command is issued unless it imposes some moral obligation on those to whom it is issued (Ibid.)

    This argument does not, however, seem plausible if by R we mean (R1 objective). On the face of it, Adam’s and Evan’s are using the word “obligation” in the subjective sense in these paragraphs. 

    Consider Adam’s first, Adam’s repudiates a “picture of divine-human relations, one in which the wish of God’s heart imposes binding obligations without even being communicated, much less issuing in a command.” This is because “Games in which one party incurs guilt for failing to guess the unexpressed wishes of the other party are not nice games. They are no nicer if God is thought of as a party to them.” In this passage, the phrase “binding obligation” is being used synonymously with “incurring guilt”. The problem he is addressing is that that one cannot incur guilt unless one non-culpably knows what is required. This best fits the concept of a subjective obligation. 

    We can say similar things about Evan’s. Evans states that a law “passed in secret” would not be “is binding” on citizens. However, he explains what he means next sentence; it is about whether someone has a valid excuse due to non-culpable ignorance. Evans is talking about an obligation of which one is not culpably ignorant and so incurs guilt for violating. So, Evan’s is plausibly talking about a subjective obligation. 

    Conclusion

    My conclusion, therefore, is that Wielenberg’s latest round in the dialectic on divine command meta-ethics is unsuccessful. His new Psychopathy objection commits the fallacy of equivocation. When he claims that God’s commands, do not impose an obligation unless the commandee is capable of recognising the requirement as both authoritative and as having imperative force he uses the word objective either in a subjective or objective sense. If he has in mind the former, then the very data he cites does not support his claim that Psychopaths have moral obligations. If he uses the word in an objective sense, then divine command theorists are not committed to denying Psychopaths have moral obligations.


    Adams Robert Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999.

    Evans C Stephen God and Moral Obligation [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.


    Smith Holly
    The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs [Book Section] // Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics / book auth. Timmons Mark. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2010. – Vol. 1.

    Wielenberg Erik Divine command theory and psychopathy [Journal] // Religious Studies. – 2018. – pp. 1-16.

  • The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (part one)

    Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM). DCM “has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible” (Wielenberg (2008), 1). Wielenberg develops this argument in response to some criticisms of his earlier work. One of the critics he addresses is me. In some forthcoming posts, I will respond to Wielenberg’s arguments. In this post, I will set the scene by explaining the argument and the context in which it occurs. Subsequent posts will offer criticism of the argument

    1. Wielenberg’s New Argument from Psychopathy.

    Wielenberg calls his new argument the Psychopathy objection. The Psychopathy objection is the latest move in the contemporary debate between Wielenberg and his critics over the defensibility of divine command meta-ethics. By divine command theory, Wielenberg has in mind the divine command meta-ethics (DCM) defended by Robert Adams (1999) (1979), William Lane Craig (2009), William Alston (1990), Peter Forrest (1989) and C. Stephen Evans (2013). This version of DCM holds that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God.

    In previous writings, Wielenberg has pioneered the promulgation objection to divine command meta-ethics. (see Wielenberg (2005), 60–65; Morriston (2009); Wielenberg (2014), 75–80). According to this objection, a divine command theory is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers.

    In making this argument, Wielenberg takes for granted the existence of “reasonable non-believers” people whom “—have been brought up in nontheistic religious communities, and quite naturally operate in terms of the assumptions of their own traditions.” Similarly, “many western philosophers, have explicitly considered what is to be said in favor of God’s existence, but have not found it sufficiently persuasive.” Wielenberg assumes many people in these groups are “reasonable non-believers, at least in the sense that their lack of belief cannot be attributed to the violation of any epistemic duty on their part.” (Wielenberg (2018), 77)

    Wielenberg argues that if the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God, then these people would have no moral obligations. Seeing reasonable non-believers clearly, do have moral obligations it follows that, DCM is false. 

    Why do reasonable non-believers lack moral obligations, given DCM? Wielenberg cites the following exposition of the problem from Wes Morriston:

    Even if he is aware of a “sign” that he somehow manages to interpret as a “command” not to steal, how can he [a reasonable non-believer] be subject to that command if he does not know who issued it, or that it was issued by a competent authority? To appreciate the force of this question, imagine that you have received a note saying, “Let me borrow your car. Leave it unlocked with the key in the ignition, and I will pick it up soon.” If you know that the note is from your spouse, or that it is from a friend to whom you owe a favor, you may perhaps have an obligation to obey this instruction. But if the note is unsigned, the handwriting is unfamiliar, and you have no idea who the author might be, then it is as clear as day that you have no such obligation.

    In the same way, it seems that even if our reasonable non-believer gets as far as to interpret one of Adams’ “signs” as conveying the message, “Do not steal”, he will be under no obligation to comply with this instruction unless and until he discovers the divine source of the message. (Morriston (2009), 5-6)

    I have responded to Wielenberg both in my book and in a recent article. I argued that Morriston’s argument contains a subtle equivocation. In the first line above, he expresses a disjunction. A person is not subject to a command if he does not know (a) who issued it, or (b) that it has an authoritative source. The example he cites, the case of an anonymous note to borrow one’s car, is a case where neither of these disjuncts holds. The owner of the car knows neither who the author is, nor whether its author has authority. We can illustrate this mistake, by reflecting on examples where, a person does not know who the author of the command is, but does recognize that it has an authoritative source.

    Consider two counter-examples I offered, first:

    Suppose I am walking down what I take to be a public right of way to Orewa Beach, New Zealand. I come across a locked gate with a sign that says: “private property, do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted.” In such a situation, I recognize that the owner of the property has written the sign, though I have no idea who the owner is. Does it follow I am not subject to the command? That seems false. To be subject to the command, a person does not need to know who the author of the command is. All they need to know is that the command is authoritative over their conduct. (Flannagan (2017), 348)

    A second counter-example I provided was; 

    Suppose, for example, that an owner of one of the beachfront properties in Orewa puts up a sign that states “private property do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted” and that John sees the sign and clearly understands what it says. He understands the sign as issuing an imperative to “not enter the property.” John recognizes this imperative is categorical and is telling him to not trespass; he also recognizes this imperative as having authority over his conduct, he also recognizes that he will be blameworthy if he does not comply with this imperative. However, because of a strange metaphysical theory, he does not believe any person issued this imperative and so it is not strictly speaking a command. He thinks it is just a brute fact that this imperative exists. Does this metaphysical idiosyncrasy mean that the command does not apply to him and that he has not heard or received the command the owner issued? That seems to be false. While John does not realize who the source of the command is, he knows enough to know that the imperative the command expresses applies authoritatively to him and that he is accountable to it. (Flannagan (2017), 351)

    In the first example, I am aware of the command but do not know who issued it. Despite my ignorance of the source of the command, I know it is authoritative over my conduct, and hence can be said to be subject to it. In the second example, John does not believe he is being commanded. However, he discerns the imperative expressed by the command and is aware both that it authoritatively applies to him and that he is accountable for performing it. A person who doesn’t believe in God can be subject to his commands if he discerns the imperative the command expresses and percieves its authority. 

    Craig, (2018) Evan’s (2013) and Adams (1999) have raised similar counter-examples. In a dialogue at the University of Purdue between with Wielenberg Craig responded by citing my second example and discussed is subsequently on his podcast. Evan’s gives a similar counter-example. He imagines a person walking on the border between Iraq and Iran, who perceives a sign warning him to stay on the path. Because he is on the border, he does not know whether the Iranian or the Iraqi governments posted the command, yet he knows some government has issued it. (Evans (2013), 113-114) Adam’s argues: “We can suppose it is enough for God’s commanding if God intends the addressee to recognize a requirement as extremely authoritative and as having imperative force. And that recognition can be present in non-theists as well as theists.” (Adams (1999), 268) These examples all suggest that reasonable believers can be “subject to God’s commands” without believing or knowing that God exists.

    In his most recent work, Wielenberg (2018) appears to concede the problem. He concludes that a reasonable unbeliever does not need to recognize moral obligations as God’s commands to be subject to them. However, he suggests this response to the promulgation objection raises a deeper worry. Wielenberg suggests that, behind the responses of Evan’s, Adam’s, Craig and myself is a “plausible principle” which he labels R.

    (R) God commands person S to do act A only if S is capable of recognizing the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force. 

    R enables the divine command theorist to claim consistently that a reasonable non-believer has moral obligations. However, Wielenberg contends this comes at a cost; this is because when conjoined with DCM, R implies that Psychopath’s lack of moral obligations. 

    According to Wielenberg “the mainstream view of psychopaths in contemporary psychology and philosophy” which is that lack “conscience and are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands”. Wielenberg states, “According to principle (R) above, since psychopaths cannot grasp morality’s authority and force, God has not issued any commands to them, and so DCT implies that they have no moral obligations” (Wielenberg (2018), 8) 

    Wielenberg summarises his argument as follows:

    The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory

    [1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) 

    [2] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued no divine commands. (from 1 and R) .

    [3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). 

    [4] But there are no psychopaths who have no moral obligations. 

    [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)

    In the next few posts, I will criticise this argument. In my next post, I will argue that the argument is crucially ambiguous in some of its key terms. In a subsequent post, I will argue that these ambiguities undermine the argument.


    Adams Robert Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again [Journal] // The Journal of Religious Ethics. – Spring 1979. – 1 : Vol. 7. – pp. 6-79,.

    Adams Robert Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999.

    Alston William Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists [Book Section] // Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy / ed. Beaty Michael. – Notre Dame  : Notre Dame University Press, 1990.

    Craig William Lane Debate: God & Morality: William Lane Craig vs Erik Wielenberg [Online] // Reasonablefaith.org. – February 23, 2018. – 8 10, 2019. – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6iVyVJAMiOY.

    Craig William Lane This most Gruesome of Guests [Book Section] // Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics / ed. King Robert K Garcia and Nathan L. – Lanthan: : Rowan and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2009.

    Evans C Stephen God and Moral Obligation [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.

    Flannagan Matthew Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis [Journal] // Philosophia Christi. – 2017. – 2 : Vol. 17. – pp. 345-362.

    Forrest Peter An argument for the Divine Command Theory of Right Action [Journal] // Sophia. – 1989. – 1 : Vol. 28. – pp. 2–19.

    Morriston Wes The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command meta-ethics [Journal] // International Journal of Philosophy of Religion. – 2009 . – Vol. 65.

    Wielenberg Erik Divine command theory and psychopathy [Journal] // Religious Studies. – 2018. – pp. 1-16.

    Wielenberg Erik Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless [Book]. – New York : Oxford University Press, 2014.

    Wielenberg Erik  Virtue and Value in a Godless Universe [Book]. – Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2005

     

  • Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy thesis: part four Intrinsic goodness

    In my last two posts, I argued that  Erik Wielenberg fails to show that Godless Normative Robust Realism (GRNR) avoids some of the standard objections to the autonomy thesis. This brings me to Wielenberg’s third claim III, Wielenberg suggests that GRNR is prima facie preferable to various theistic accounts of axiological properties. Several authors have defended accounts of the nature of moral goodness which identify goodness with certain types of relationships to God. Robert Adam’s has defended a platonic conception of goodness, where God is the paradigmatic good, and all finite things are good or bad depending on how they resemble Gods nature. Mark Murphy has defended an Aristotelian position whereby goodness consists in “being like God in ways that belong to the kind to be like God”[1]. Linda Zagzebski, by contrast, has appealed to Gods motives[2] and, and Thomas Carson has defended an account of Goodness whereby goodness is what God prefers[3]. defaul1

    Wielenberg refers to all these positions under the umbrella term “theological stateism” (TS). Wielenberg argues that prima facie GRNR is preferable to TS because, unlike TS, GRNR is consistent with the intuition that certain things have intrinsic value:

    “I suggest that among our common-sense moral beliefs are the belief that some things distinct from God are intrinsically good: for example, the pleasure of an innocent back rub, or the love between parent and child,” …“[B]ecause non-theistic robust normative realism allows for the intrinsic goodness of things distinct from God, that theory fares better in this respect than its theistic alternatives.”[4]

    By “the intrinsic value of a given thing” Wielenberg means the “value it has, if any, in virtue of its intrinsic properties.” Something’s extrinsic value by contrast “is the value it has in virtue of how it is related to things apart from itself.”[5]

    Can Theological Stateism accommodate Intrinsic Value?

    Wielenberg’s argument relies, crucially, on the claim that TS entails that nothing distinct from God is intrinsically good. His argument for this claim is as follows:

    A second noteworthy aspect of Adams’s view is its implication that no finite thing is intrinsically good (or evil) since the goodness (and badness of things) of all finite things is dependent upon their relationship to God. Craig follows Adam’s in holding that finite goodness=resemblance to the necessarily existing divine nature. (emphasis mine)[6]

    Later he cites Mark Murphy’s view as an example;

    Back in section 2.2, I noted that Adam’s theory implies no finite thing is intrinsically good (or evil) since, on Adam’s view, the goodness (and badness) of all finite things is partly determined by how they are related to God. Consequently, Adam’s view holds that nothing distinct from God is intrinsically good. Murphy holds also holds that the goodness of things distinct from God consists in their standing in certain relationships to God: their goodness is extrinsic rather than intrinsic because it is explained not merely by intrinsic properties but also by certain properties of God.[7]

    According to Wielenberg then reason TS  entails that “the value of all finite things is dependent upon their relationship to God” (emphasis mine)[8].  However, if a finite thing has intrinsic value, it is valuable “in virtue of its intrinsic properties” and not “in virtue of how it is related to things apart from itself.” Consequently, TS entails that that “nothing distinct from God is intrinsically good.”

    For this argument to be valid, the kind of dependence that  TS postulates to hold between God and the goodness of finite things must be the same kind of dependence that Wielenberg’s definition of intrinsic value rules out. Consequently, the phrase “in virtue” in Wielenberg’s definition, must refer to the same kind of dependence relationship which TS entails exists between God and the value of finite things. However, a careful examination of Wielenberg’s definition, however, shows this is not the case.

    Earlier in Robust Ethics  Wielenberg spends some time elaborating what he means when he defines intrinsic value something has in virtue of its intrinsic properties. On pages 9-15 he distinguishes between two[9] different types of supervenience relationship which can hold between finite things and their evaluative properties. The first is what Wielenberg calls “reductive supervenience” (or R supervenience) this is where a moral property M supervenes upon a base property B because the moral property is identical with the base property. The second is what Wielenberg refers to as “De-Paul supervenience” (D- supervenience). If a moral property M D supervenes upon a base property B then “M is not identical with, reducible to or entirely constituted by B” instead “B’s instantiation makes M be instantiated”.

    D supervenience and R supervenience are distinct types of relationship.  M can R supervene upon B without D supervening upon B and  M can D supervene upon B without R supervening upon it.  GRNR is itself an example of this distinction. According to GRNR moral properties are sui generis irreducible non-natural properties that  D supervene upon natural properties. Consequently, GRNR presupposes that moral properties can D supervene upon natural properties without R supervening upon them.

    Not only do are D and R supervenience distinct relationships. It appears they are mutually exclusive.  If B is reducible to or identical to M, it B cannot be a distinct property from M, which M causes to exist. That would involve self-causation. Similarly, if B is distinct from M and B makes M be instantiated, B is not reducible to or identical with M.

    When Wielenberg defines a finite thing’s intrinsic value as the value, it has in virtue of its intrinsic properties,  he uses the phrase “in virtue” to refer to a relationship of D supervenience.

    If there are entities distinct from God that possess intrinsic value, then Craig is mistaken. I think there are such entities. As I suggested in chapter 1, some finite things pass the isolation and annihilation tests which, which suggests such things are intrinsically valuable. The intrinsic value of such entities D supervenes upon some set of their intrinsic properties and not on how they are related to other things.[10]

    Earlier he writes:

    In my view, the most plausible way of understanding the “in virtue” relationship which I earlier claimed holds between the intrinsic properties of certain things and their intrinsic value is making. To claim that a given thing is intrinsically valuable is to claim that some of that thing’s intrinsic properties make it valuable… More generally, I think that moral properties indeed all moral properties D supervene upon non-moral properties.(emphasis mine)[11]

    The problem is that proponents of TS are not committed to denying that moral properties D supervene on the intrinsic properties of finite objects.  When people like Mark Murphy or Robert Adam’s or William Lane Craig contend that the goodness of all finite things is dependent upon their relationship to God, they are not claiming that goodness D supervenes upon this relationship. They are claiming it R supervenes upon this relationship. Consider how Wielenberg himself describes Adams’s position.

     A noteworthy feature of Adams’s view is its implication that no finite thing is intrinsically good (or evil) since the goodness (and badness of things) of all finite things is dependent upon their relationship to God. Craig follows Adam’s in holding that finite goodness=resemblance to the necessarily existing divine nature...  Murphy holds also holds that the goodness of things distinct from God consists in their standing in certain relationships to God: their goodness is extrinsic rather than intrinsic because it is explained not merely by intrinsic properties but also by certain properties of God. (emphasis mine)[12]

    It is true that according to Adams the goodness of finite things is “dependent” upon their relationship to God. However, but in the highlighted sentence, Wielenberg spells out the kind of dependence Adam’s has in mind. The dependence Adams refers to is one where “finite goodness=resemblance to the necessarily existing divine nature”.  Adam’s is, therefore, saying that the goodness of finite objects R supervenes upon the divine nature. Wielenberg notes this when a few paragraphs earlier he describes Adam’s (and Craig) as holding that:

    [S]ince the Good just is God, the existence of God cannot explain or ground the existence of the good. In the context of Adams’s view, the claim God serves as the foundation of the Good is no more sensible than the claim that H20 serves as the foundation of water. Indeed, once we see that on Adams’s view the good = God, we see that Adams’s  theory entails that the Good has no external foundation, since God has no external foundation.[13]

    Similarly, when Wielenberg discusses Murphy he notes that according to Murphy the goodness of things distinct from God “is explained”, not merely by intrinsic properties, but also by certain properties of God. However, he clarifies that, by this, Murphy means the goodness of finite things “consist in” their relationship to God So again, Murphy is talking about R Supervenience, not D Supervenience.

    So, contrary to Wielenberg TS does not entail that things distinct from God cannot have value in virtue of, their intrinsic properties. TS entails that the value of something distinct from God  R supervenes upon its relationship with God. However, that does not entail its value D supervenes upon this relationship. So TS is not incompatible with the common sense intuition that finite objects can have intrinsic value.

    On the other hand, If the objection is that TS  entails that the value of finite things cannot R supervene upon their intrinsic properties, then GRNR fares no better. According to Wielenberg, the proponent of GRNR holds that moral properties are “real and sui generis; they are non-natural and not reducible to any other sort of property” (emphasis mine). If moral properties are not reducible to other properties, then they do not R supervene on the intrinsic properties of finite things. In fact, on GRNR and the goodness of every distinct and finite thing will R supervene, not upon its intrinsic properties but on its relationship to distinct irreducible non-natural properties and so finite things will have only extrinsic value. This objection, therefore, is a non-starter.


    [1] Mark Murphy God and The Moral Law: A Theistic Explanation of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 155

    [2] Linda Zagzebski Divine Motivation Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

    [3] Thomas Carson Value and the Good Life (Notre Dame Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000)

    [4] Erik Wielenberg Robust Ethics 84

    [5] Ibid. 2

    [6] Ibid. 44

    [7] Ibid.

    [8] Ibid.

    [9] Wielenberg actually spells out three relationships, but mentioning the third would only complicate this discussion unnecessarily. The proceeding argument applies equally well when the third type of supervenience is taken into account.

    [10] Ibid. 44

    [11] Ibid. 13

    [12] Ibid. 44

    [13] Ibid. 43

  • Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy Thesis: Part Two Standard Objections to the Autonomy Thesis, Reasons to be Moral Without God

    defaul1The autonomy thesis contends that there can be moral requirements to φ regardless of whether God commands, desires, or wills that people φ. In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism,[1] Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defences of the autonomy thesis to date.

    Wielenberg argues three things. First, I the most plausible alternative to the autonomy thesis, the divine command theory, is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers. Second, II  robust realism, the thesis that moral requirements are sui generis non-natural properties which supervene upon natural properties, can be formulated in a way that avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis. Third, III robust realism provides a better account of intrinsic value than any meta-ethical theory that identifies moral goodness with states of God.

    In a previous post I discussed I, I argued Wielenberg’s critique of divine command meta-ethics fails. This post will begin looking at his second major claim II. As an alternative to DCM, Wielenberg proposes a position he labels Robust Realism, the thesis that moral requirements are sui generis non-natural properties which supervene upon natural properties. By itself, robust realism is compatible with both theism and atheism. Wielenberg refers to the conjunction of robust realism and atheism as Godless Robust Normative Realism (GRNR) Wielenberg contends that his formulation of GRNR avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis.  Here I’ll look at one such objection.

    Reasons for being Moral without God.

    One objection Wielenberg discusses is the perennial concern that, in the absence of God, people lack compelling reasons to comply with morality’s demands. Wielenberg takes the following comments by Craig as representative of this objection.

    Even if there were objective moral values and duties under naturalism, they are irrelevant because there is no moral accountability. If life ends at the grave, it makes no difference whether one lives as a Stalin or as a saint…Why should you sacrifice your self-interest and especially your life for the sake of someone else? There can be no good reason for adopting such a self-negating course of action on the naturalistic worldview… Life is too short to jeopardize it by acting out of anything but pure self-interest. [2]

     Wielenberg initially suggests that Craig is arguing that “if people had moral obligations, but God did not exist, then people would have no normative reasons to carry out their obligations”.[3] He re-joins, plausibly, that people often do have normative reasons to refrain from wrongdoing. “the fact rape harms its victims is a compelling reason for me not to rape, regardless of whether refraining from rape benefits me” (emphasis mine).[4]

    Wielenberg then suggests that Craig might be offering a different argument. He might be contending that “if God does not exist then people lack self-interested normative reasons to perform their obligations” Wielenberg suggests taken this way, there are two problems with the argument. First, even if it were true, it wouldn’t follow that people lack any normative reasons to perform their obligations.  Second, this claim isn’t true “people often do in fact do have powerful self-interested reason’s for caring about fulfilling their obligations”[5] Wielenberg cites various empirical studies which show that immorality tends to disrupt, and damage people’s social relationships and harm meaningful connections.[6]

    However, it seems implausible to me that Craig is maintaining either of these positions. Elsewhere.  Craig clarifies his position as follows:

    [I]f God does not exist, then prudential reason and moral reason can and often do come into conflict, in which case there is no reason to act morally rather than in one’s self-interest. That’s consistent with saying that in other cases it is, indeed, prudent to act morally.[7]

    Here Craig affirms that if atheism is true, people often can have both moral and prudential normative reasons to carry out their moral obligations. So he doesn’t affirm, either of the positions, Wielenberg attributes to him.  He isn’t saying that no one ever has reasons to refrain from wrongdoing, nor is he claiming that no one ever has prudential reasons to refrain from wrongdoing.  Craig’s objection is rather that, if atheism is true, moral and prudential reasons can and do come into conflict. When they do people lack any reason to comply with what morality demands. “One has moral value pulling in one direction and prudential value tugging in the opposite, and no way to decide rationally which choice to make”[8].

    Latter Wielenberg suggests a different way of formulating the argument:

    [1] If GRNR is true then morality and self-interest sometimes diverge in the long run.

    [2] But, morality and self-interest never diverge in the long run.

    [3] Therefore, GRNR is false[9]

    Wielenberg grants the truth of [1], the empirical studies he earlier cited show only that people “often” have powerful prudential reasons to do what is right, not that they always or necessarily do. Wielenberg states that “an important different between a theistic universe and a godless universe” is that “without God, there is always the possibility that we will face a deep conflict between what is in our self-interest and what morality requires of us”. On the other hand, if God exists “there is a perfect correlation between morality and self-interest”[10]

    Wielenberg’s rebuttal, therefore, focuses on denying [2], his treatment of [2] consists of a single paragraph:

    It is hard to imagine a convincing non-question begging rationale for (2) that wouldn’t at the same time tell against (1). One might appeal to the existence of God to support (2) but this obviously begs the question. Alternatively, one might find a secular ground for (2)-but to the extent that such a ground is convincing it undermines the first premise…Craig often proceeds as if (2) were a datum for which any plausible moral theory must account. But such an approach has nothing to commend it. It is no more plausible than the falsity of (2) as a datum and arguing against Craig’s view. Such arguments get us nowhere.[11]

    Wielenberg provides two reasons for rejecting [2]. These are (a) that there is no non-question-begging reason for affirming [2] which does not undermine [1], and (b) that [2] is not a datum to be explained by a moral theory.  Neither is compelling.

    Regarding first (a), the problem is that several people, including Craig, have offered reasons for affirming [2] which neither assume theism or tell against [1].

    Robert Adam’s, for example, has appealed to the intuition that moral judgments “have an action- and preference-guiding force that they could not have unless everyone had reason to follow them in his actions and preferences.”[12]  Adam’s argues that “if happiness will, in the long run, be strictly proportioned to moral goodness, that explains how virtually everyone does have an important reason to want to be good.”[13] However, if this is not the case, it’s hard to justify the conclusion that “everyone does have reason always to be moral.”[14]

    Adam’s here focuses on the idea that everyone has a reason to be moral.  That if an action φ is morally wrong for a person P to perform, then P has a reason to not φ. Stephen Layman has offered a similar line of argument, focusing instead on the idea that people always have decisive reasons to do what morality demands.  Layman refers to what he calls the “The Reasons Thesis: The strongest reasons always favor doing what is morally required.” The idea that if something is obligatory, we not only have a reason to do it but that this reason is always decisive. Other reasons we may have for not complying such as reasons of self-interest or economics do not override it. Layman provides several examples which suggest that “If there is no God and no life after death, then there are cases in which morality requires that one make a great sacrifice that confers relatively modest benefits (or prevents relatively modest harms).” Layman argues that if such cases obtain,  reasons of prudence will override moral reasons we have doing the action in question.[15]

    Neither of these arguments begs the question by assuming God exists. They appeal not to God’s existence, but theses about the authority of moral requirements, that they provide virtually everyone with decisive reasons for acting.  Nor do these arguments give us reason for questioning [1]. Both, of them, in fact, concede and incorporate [1] in their thinking. So, Wielenberg’s claim, that it’s hard to imagine a non-questioning begging rationale for [2] that doesn’t undermine [1], is false. Several such rationales have been offered in the literature which he does not even mention let alone address.

    Moreover, Craig himself provided a similar rationale.   Craig claimed that:“[I]f God does not exist, then prudential reason and moral reason can and often do come into conflict, in which case there is no reason to act morally rather than in one’s self-interest”[16]. Elsewhere, Craig has stated:

    “I agree with Layman that on atheism, what he calls the overriding thesis ( namely that moral value always trumps prudential value) is not true, for one can have extremely strong prudential reasons for not acting morally, and there seems to be no common scale in which to weigh moral against prudential considerations”[17]

    This brings us to  (b), Wielenberg’s objection that [2] is not a datum to be explained by a moral theory. While he is correct that [2] itself is not a datum of moral theory, the claim that moral demands are authoritative so that everyone always as a decisive reason to be moral is something that, at least prima facie, a meta-ethical theory should explain.[18]  Wielenberg himself seems to accept this. He states “as I suggested in Chapter 1, to have an obligation just is to have decisive reasons to perform a certain action.” Therefore, according to Wielenberg, it is a necessary truth that we always have decisive reasons to do what we are moral required to do, and it is impossible, for people to not have such reasons or them to be overridden by other reasons such as self-interest”. Adam’s, Layman and Craig, therefore, appeal to something that is, on his view, a datum a meta-ethical theory should explain.


    [1] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)

    [2] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics, 56-57, the citation is from William Lane Craig “The Indispensability of Meta-Ethical Theological Foundations for Morality” available at http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/meta-eth.html

    [3] Ibid, 57

    [4] Ibid

    [5] Ibid

    [6] Wielenberg’s examples all deal with Hume’s idea of the sensible knave, the individual who has a reputation for morality but engages in undetected wrongdoing when it’s in his self-interest. They don’t, however, address Kai Neilsen’s example of a “classist amoralist” who forms deep and genuine relationships with others within his class but ruthlessly exploits members of other classes to his advantage. See Kai Nielsen Why be Moral (Buffalo, N.Y: Prometheus Books, 1989) 295-296

    [7] William Lane Craig  “Q&A 230 Is Life Absurd without God?” available at http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-life-absurd-without-god. Accessed 6/2/2017

    [8] William Lane Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 182-183

    [9] Wielenberg, Robust Ethics 59

    [10] Ibid, 59

    [11] Ibid, 59

    [12] Robert Adams “Moral Argument for Theistic Belief” in The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 158

    [13] Ibid

    [14] Ibid.

    [15] See C Stephen Layman “God and the moral order”, Faith and Philosophy, 19: 3 (2002) 304-16.

    [16] William Lane Craig “Q&A 230 Is Life Absurd without God?” available at http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-life-absurd-without-god. Accessed 6/2/2017

    [17] William Lane Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” 183

    [18] Terence Cuneo makes this point, see  Terence Cuneo “Erik J Wielenberg Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2015.03.24 available at http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/56511-robust-ethics-the-metaphysics-and-epistemology-of-godless-normative-realism/ accessed 7/2/17

  • Is Ethical Naturalism More Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Part II

    This is the second part of the paper I presented to the Naturalisms in Ethics Conference at Auckland University last year.

    In my previous post, I noted that Robert Adams has argued that if God exists, then divine commands “best fill the role assigned to wrongness by the concept”.[1] He argues that if moral obligations are divine commands this explains the fact, that (i) “wrongness is an objective property of actions,”[2], (ii) it accounts “for the wrongness of a major portion of the types of action that we have believed to be wrong,”[3]   (iii) it “plays a causal role … in their coming to be regarded as wrong”,[4]  (iv) it explains how moral obligations constitute a “supremely weighty reason” for acting or refraining from an action,   and (v) he contends that DCT explains the intuition that moral duties comprise “a law or standard that has a sanctity greater than that of any merely human will or institution”.[5]

    Moreover, in my last post, I also argued that, for Armstrong to conclude his arguments call into question any theistic account of ethics, he must argue that his harm account of moral obligation provides a better explanation of all these features. Failing that, if his account doesn’t preserve these features of moral obligation, then he must provide us with a reason to suppose that they are not part of the concept of moral obligation. Or he must provide reasons for revising our concepts.

    In his monograph “Morality without God” he attempted to do this. It’s my contention that he has failed in this task.

    1. Social Requirements

    Let’s begin with (v), In “Morality without God”, Armstrong purports to address this line of argument, he claims that “the best line of argument-because it is the only argument is that moral laws require a lawgiver”[6]. He attributes to popular writer Dinesh D’Souza. He then proceeds to make short work of D’Souza’s argument.

    However, this is neither the best, nor the only argument offered in favour of a DCT. In subsequent articles and a monograph, Adam’s has developed (v) in some detail.[7] Adam’s proposes a “social requirement theory” of obligation whereby “being obligated to do something consists in being required (in a certain way under certain situations) by another person or groups of persons not to do it”[8]. Obligations are a kind of social relationship where one person makes a demand on another, failure to comply results ruptures in the relationship expressed in terms of blame, censure, punishment and alienation, which can be expiated by forgiveness. Adam’s offers a sustained argument that the role of guilt, censure, punishment, social inculcation, moral motivation, moral knowledge and forgiveness plays in our concept of obligation, make a social requirement theory plausible.[9] Nowhere in Armstrong “Morality without God” does Armstrong even (more…)