Tag: Why be Moral?

  • Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Secularism and “reasons” to be moral. Part Three: Can Religious theories answer the question, “Why be moral?”

    In a previous post, I observed that Walter Sinnott-Armstrong concedes that secular accounts of moral obligation cannot vindicate the thesis that agents always have decisive (all-things-considered) reasons to avoid wrongdoing. To mitigate this problem, he argues:

    Is this limitation a problem for secular accounts of morality? I doubt that, too. If we demand this extreme kind of reason to be moral, then we are bound to be disappointed. The solution to our disappointment is to give up this demand, not to imagine a higher power that we want to fulfill an illegitimate demand. Besides, this limit on secular theories would be a problem only if the alternative religious account could provide a better reason to be moral. It can’t. That is what I will show in the next section.[1]

    There are three ideas here. First is the claim that the failure to vindicate this assumption is a problem for secular theories only if religious theories can adequately vindicate it. Second is the claim that religious theories cannot vindicate this assumption. Third, he claims that the assumption itself cannot be adequately vindicated.

    I want to focus on the last two of these claims.

    Can religious theories adequately vindicate this assumption?

    Sinnott-Armstrong argues that religious theories cannot adequately vindicate the thesis that agents always have decisive reasons to avoid wrongdoing. His argument involves two steps.

    First, he argues that any adequate theory of moral requirements must not only vindicate the assumption that agents have reasons to do what is right, but that those reasons must be of the right kind—they cannot be arbitrary. He illustrates this point with two examples.

    Imagine that “the King of Curls threatens to kill all of his subjects who do not shave their heads on May 21, though there is nothing special about that date.”[2] Do we have a reason to shave our heads? Yes—the threat of death gives us a reason to comply. However, this reason is arbitrary; it is based on naked force and bears no relation to the content of the command.

    Similarly, a mother is trying to teach her son to stop hitting his sister. She can do this in two ways: she can convince him that harming his sister is wrong, or she can simply threaten him with punishment if he doesn’t comply. The second approach gives the son a reason not to hit his sister, but it is the wrong kind of reason—it is arbitrary, based on force, and doesn’t teach him to care about his sister.[3]

    His second step is to argue that religious theories fail to provide the right kind of reasons for refraining from wrongdoing. They are arbitrary in the same way. His reasoning is as follows:

    Divine threats of Hell or promises of Heaven operate in the same way. If our only reason to be moral is to avoid Hell or get to Heaven, then our motivation is far from ideal. Even a total psychopath, who cares about nobody else but believes in Hell, would have this reason to be moral. But this reason would not give the psychopath any reason for the content of the moral restrictions themselves. The psychopath would still see moral restrictions as just as arbitrary as a law requiring him to shave his head on May 21.[4]

    The key premise here is that if God exists, the only reason we could have for following His commands would be to either get to Heaven or avoid Hell.

    But why think this? Sinnott-Armstrong doesn’t say.

    Earlier in the same chapter, he had rejected the idea that all interests are self-interested. He wrote: “Many reasons are not based on self-interest. That should be common ground between theists and [atheists].”[5] Later, he states:

    The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. The fact that an act causes harm to another person can be a reason for me not to do that act. These facts are reasons, even if the other people are strangers. Crucially, these reasons are not self-interesting. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me.[6]

    So, Sinnott-Armstrong accepts that—even if theism is true—there can be non-selfish reasons for acting. But if that’s correct, why assume that the only reason an agent could have for obeying God is a selfish one? Why couldn’t agents also have non-selfish reasons to obey God?

    Remember the theist whom Sinnott-Armstrong is criticising. This theist understands God to have certain attributes: God is all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially benevolent, and impartial. So what God commands is co-extensive with prescriptions that a benevolent, impartial person would endorse—if that person were fully informed and reasoning correctly. It is quite plausible that agents would have unselfish reasons to follow such prescriptions. In fact, it is hard to see how Armstrong can say that we have unselfish reasons to do acts that benefit others, but no unselfish reasons to obey prescriptions that are justified from a perspective that aims to benefit others.

    Here we need to recall the challenge to secular ethics and how theism is purported to solve it. The challenge is this: Suppose we are not accountable to God. In that case, certain kinds of practical dilemmas will occur. Requirements that are justified from an impartial point of view—ones that promote the interests of others—will sometimes conflict with an agent’s long-term self-interest. Unselfish reasons will point one way, prudential reasons the other. If such dilemmas occur, we face a question: What reason is there to act unselfishly rather than in one’s self-interest? What reason do we have for always giving precedence to impartial demands in such cases?

    It is the inability of secular ethics to address this question that is the alleged problem.

    If we are accountable to God, this problem is avoided because such dilemmas never occur. Rewards and punishments change the balance of reasons for and against the act. However, they do so not by changing or negating the strength of the unselfish reasons against the act—they change the balance of prudential reasons in favour of the act. Because God is impartial and benevolent, we will still have the same kind of unselfish reasons—of the sort Sinnott-Armstrong refers to—to obey God’s commands. However, these reasons will never be matched or overridden by prudential demands to the contrary. Instead, prudential reasons will support and reinforce them.

    Can the assumption be adequately vindicated?

    Let’s turn to Sinnott-Armstrong’s second claim: that the thesis that agents always have decisive (all-things-considered) reasons to avoid wrongdoing cannot be adequately vindicated. He proposes the following dilemma:

    Different audiences react to this point in different ways. Some people really want a reason to be moral that will motivate psychopaths, even if it is not connected to any reason why certain acts are immoral. They are rightly scared of psychopaths, so they want a reason that will convince psychopaths to be moral. Other people want a reason to be moral that does not leave morality arbitrary, because the reason to be moral shows why those moral acts are moral. They want a moral reason rather than a selfish reason. I share the latter goal, but I can appreciate the former wish. Unfortunately, I doubt that the former wish can be fulfilled. No reason will succeed in convincing everyone to be moral. This is another obvious but hard fact of life that we need to learn to live with.[7]

    The proposed dilemma appears to be this: no meta-ethical theory can both vindicate the assumption that agents always have decisive reasons to refrain from wrongdoing and identify reasons of the correct type. If a meta-ethical theory entails that agents always have decisive reasons to be moral, the reasons it cites will be arbitrary or of the wrong kind. If we are to identify a fact that provides reasons for all people—including egoists and amoral individuals—it will need to appeal to something like self-interest; and self-interested reasons are the wrong kind of reason. By contrast, if a theory provides reasons of the right kind, it will fail to provide a reason strong enough or universal enough to ensure agents always have decisive reasons to be moral. The right kind of reasons are unselfish reasons, but these will not provide everyone—including egoists and psychopaths—with reasons to be moral, nor will they always be strong enough to override prudential or instrumental reasons to the contrary.

    Here, I think Sinnott-Armstrong relies on a false dichotomy. He assumes a meta-ethical theory must either appeal to selfish reasons to be moral or to unselfish reasons. However, his interlocutor’s point is that this is a false choice. If a divine command theory is correct, then what is in our long-term interest and what is justified from an impartial point of view coincide. So we have both types of reason at the same time. They are never in conflict.

    It is always in our interest to obey God and never in our interest to disobey—things such as eternal life are at stake. For this reason, there are strong self-interested reasons to be moral that are never overridden. These reasons provide even an egoist or a psychopath with reasons to comply.

    Because God is impartial and benevolent, we also have very strong unselfish reasons to be moral. What God commands us to do is what a fully informed, rational, impartial, benevolent person would command. The commands He gives are prescriptions justified from a perspective that equally considers the interests of all. These are reasons of the right kind.


    [1] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 118

    [2] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 95 (ebook)

    [3] Ibid, 96

    [4] Ibid

    [5] Ibid, 93

    [6] Ibid, 94

    [7] Ibid, 96

  • Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Secularism and “reasons” to be moral. Part two: Do unselfish reasons answer the question, “Why be moral?”

    ***

    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong discusses the following objection:

    “Harming others is sometimes in some people’s best interest, even considering probable costs. In those cases, some theists say that only a divine threat of Hell provides a reason to be moral. Since atheists and agnostics do not believe in God, they do not believe in divine retribution for sins, so they have to admit that sometimes some people could get away with immorality and then they have no self-interested reason to be moral. Does that mean that these people have no reason at all to be moral?”[1]

    He responds to this argument as follows:

    No. That conclusion would follow only if every reason had to be self-interested, selfish, or egoistic. There is no basis for that assumption. Many reasons are not based on self-interest. That should be common ground between theists and atheists… The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. The fact that an act causes harm to another person can be a reason for me not to do that act. These facts are reasons, even if the other people are strangers. Crucially, these reasons are not self-interested. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me. These unselfish reasons can answer the question, “Why be moral?”[2]

    Here, Sinnott-Armstrong makes three points. First, the argument in question assumes that “all reasons are selfish.” Second, this assumption is false—“it should be common ground between theists” that there are also “unselfish reasons,” based on the fact that certain acts harm others. Third, these “unselfish reasons” can answer the question: why be moral?

    Do non-selfish reasons answer the question: “Why be moral?”

    I discussed the first point in a previous post. In this post, I will discuss the third: do the non-selfish reasons he appeals to answer the question “Why be moral?”

    In my previous post, I noted that the question “Why be moral?” can be understood in two ways. Armstrong’s interlocutor could be asking:

    (a) whether, in the given circumstances, we have a pro tanto reason to refrain from harm; or
    (b) whether, in those circumstances, we have decisive reasons not to harm.

    I also pointed out that interpreting the question in terms of (a) is idiosyncratic. The way the question is commonly used—and the most plausible understanding of it—is in terms of (b).

    Whether an appeal to unselfish reasons answers the question “Why be moral?” depends on how you interpret the question. If we interpret it in terms of (a), then the fact that an action harms another person would answer the question. Sinnott-Armstrong’s hypothesis is that the property of being morally wrong is constituted by the property of harming another person. Suppose the fact that an action harms another person provides a pro tanto reason not to do that action—in that case, we have a pro tanto reason not to do what is wrong.

    The problem is that this is an extremely weak and idiosyncratic rendition of the skeptical challenge. As Mark Murphy points out:

    It would be helpful if Sinnott-Armstrong had named an opponent here who thought that this was the real challenge for the nontheistic ethicist. The worry is not characteristically expressed by theistic ethicists in terms of whether there is any reason to do what is morally right in the absence of God; the worry is characteristically expressed in terms of whether there could be overriding, or decisive, reason to do what is all-things-considered morally required.[3]

    In my last post, I pointed out that in his writings on moral skepticism, Sinnott-Armstrong himself has noted that the “Why be moral?” question is not normally understood in terms of whether there is “sometimes some kind of reason to be moral.” Instead:

    “A more plausible and common version of practical moral skepticism denies, instead, that there is always an adequate (or non-overridden) reason to do what is morally required.”[4]

    If we interpret the question in terms of (b), Sinnott-Armstrong’s appeal to the fact that an action “harms” another person does not answer the question “Why be moral?” His interlocutor argues that if a secular meta-ethical theory is true, then certain kinds of practical dilemmas will occur. What is prudentially required will be an act that harms others. We will therefore have self-interested or prudential reasons to do the act, and unselfish reasons not to do it. If such dilemmas occur, we face a question: What reason is there to act unselfishly rather than in one’s self-interest? What reason do we have for always giving precedence to impartial demands in such cases?

    Murphy explains:

    “The worry is that there are different kinds of reason that can pull in different directions, and it is not obvious that there is any practical error in choosing against a more impartial point of view by going with the more partial point of view.”[5]

    If I face a dilemma between two options—doing an act that harms others or doing an act that is contrary to my own interest—pointing out that one option involves harming others doesn’t solve the dilemma. What we need is some reason for always treating the impartially based demands as having precedence. Sinnott-Armstrong provides no such reason. In fact, later in the chapter, he is candid that he cannot give any such reason. He writes:

    The fact that an act causes harm to others is a reason not to do that act, and the fact that an act prevents harm to others is a reason to do that act. There is, then, always a reason to be moral on this secular account. And often these reasons are adequate, because they are strong enough to make it rational (or not irrational) to be moral….
    Nonetheless, some people still wish for a reason that is strong enough to motivate everyone to be moral and also to make it always irrational to be immoral. I doubt that secular moral theories can establish that strong kind of reason to be moral. For people who really do not care about others, the solution is found in retraining or restraining rather than in theory. (emphasis mine)[6]

    Note what is being said here: Armstrong is saying that if the best secular accounts of morality are true, agents do not always have all-things-considered reasons to do what is morally right. Sometimes they will, and sometimes they will not. In these latter cases, people will have adequate—and possibly even conclusive—all-things-considered reasons to violate moral norms. The solution to this is an appeal to naked force. What we need to do is force these people to act in ways that they have sufficient or decisive reasons not to act.

    This seems an inadequate answer. Consider the following analogy: critics of monotheistic religions like Christianity, Judaism, or Islam often ask, “What reason do I have to adopt your religion?” This is not a question of belief but of action. Adopting a religion involves living a certain way. Skeptics ask: What reasons do I have to commit to faithfully following what you take to be God’s commands, especially when doing so often goes against my aims or interests?

    Imagine a theist responded to this as follows: “You don’t have compelling reasons to do this. In fact, you have good reason not to do this. The balance of reasons does not support such a commitment and may in fact be against it. However, if you don’t convert, I will persecute you.” Would any religious skeptic think their concerns had been answered?

    In the same way, I suggest that no one who was not already committed to secular morality would find Sinnott-Armstrong’s response here adequate.

    Later, Armstrong offers a different answer:

    Is this limitation a problem for secular accounts of morality? I doubt that, too. If we demand this extreme kind of reason to be moral, then we are bound to be disappointed. The solution to our disappointment is to give up this demand, not to imagine a higher power that we want to fulfill an illegitimate demand. Besides, this limit on secular theories would be a problem only if the alternative religious account could provide a better reason to be moral. It can’t. That is what I will show in the next section.[7]

    Here, Sinnott-Armstrong’s position appears to be twofold:

    First, the fact that a secular theory cannot answer the question “Why be moral?” is only a problem if religious theories can answer that question adequately. If they cannot, then this is a problem for all theories—and hence not a reason to favour one over another.

    Second, he claims that a religious theory cannot answer this question either. In fact, he seems to think no theory can. The appropriate response, he suggests, is to give up the demand.

    In a future post, I will examine Sinnott-Armstrong’s reasons for these two claims. I will argue that they fail.


    [1] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 114

    [2] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 117

    [3] Mark Murphy’s, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [4] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Practical Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/supplement.html accessed 28 August 2025

    [5] Mark Murphy’s, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [6] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 117-118

    [7] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 118

     

  • Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Secularism and “reasons” to be moral. Part One:

    In his book Morality Without God, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that a secular account of the nature of moral properties—namely, that wrongness is constituted by the property of harming others—is preferable to a theistic account, in which wrongness is identified with the property of being contrary to God’s commands

    Chapter 6 is entitled “Why be moral?”
    In this chapter, Sinnott-Armstrong attempts to rebut the idea that secular meta-ethical theories—such as the one he proposes—cannot provide an adequate answer to this question.

    Sinnott-Armstrong begins his discussion by citing an argument that purports to show that secular accounts of morality cannot answer the question: why be moral? He summarises the argument as follows:

    “Harming others is sometimes in some people’s best interest, even considering probable costs. In those cases, some theists say that only a divine threat of Hell provides a reason to be moral. Since atheists and agnostics do not believe in God, they do not believe in divine retribution for sins, so they have to admit that sometimes some people could get away with immorality and then they have no self-interested reason to be moral. Does that mean that these people have no reason at all to be moral?”[1]

    He responds to this argument as follows:

    No. That conclusion would follow only if every reason had to be self-interested, selfish, or egoistic. There is no basis for that assumption. Many reasons are not based on self-interest. That should be common ground between theists and atheists… The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. The fact that an act causes harm to another person can be a reason for me not to do that act. These facts are reasons, even if the other people are strangers. Crucially, these reasons are not self-interesting. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me. These unselfish reasons can answer the question, “Why be moral?”[2]

    There are some infelicities in the way this argument is described and set up. Sinnott-Armstrong’s version of the argument relies solely on the appeal to fear of Hell and divine retribution. He doesn’t, for example, couch the argument in terms of hope of eternal life. Moreover, in the paragraphs leading up to this one, he gives a sarcastic, literalistic reading of the Book of Revelation on the topic of Hell. These all rhetorically prime negative reactions in the reader; they also border on crude caricature.

    However, in this post and in future ones, I will focus on what I take to be the main thrust of Sinnott-Armstrong’s response to this argument. Sinnott-Armstrong makes three points. First, he argues that this argument is only sound if one assumes that “every reason” is “self-interested.” Second, he argues that this assumption is false. It should be granted by both theists and non-theists that there are “unselfish reasons” based on the fact that an action will “harm” (or benefit) other people. Third, he contends these unselfish reasons can answer the question of why they are moral.

    Does the argument assume that all reasons are selfish?

    Let’s look at the first point: does this argument assume that all reasons are selfish? That depends on how one interprets the phrase “reasons to be moral” and the rhetorical question “Why be moral?”

    When we talk of “reasons” to act, we can mean one of two things. Sometimes the word “reason” functions as a mass noun, referring to what we have decisive reasons to do—what we have reasons to do all things considered, when we consider everything that counts in favour of an action and against it. Alternatively, the word “reason” can function as a count noun, referring to what we have a pro tanto reason to do—what we have reason to do all else being equal. Here we ask whether there is anything that by itself counts in favour of the action.[3]

    An illustrative example: It is a rainy day, and I have to walk fifteen minutes outside to the bus. The fact I will get wet if I don’t take an umbrella is a pro tanto reason to take an umbrella. The fact that carrying an umbrella is cumbersome is a pro tanto reason against it. When I consider all the relevant factors—the burden of carrying the umbrella and the prospect of getting wet—I conclude that I have decisive, all-things-considered reasons to carry it.[4]

    Sinnott-Armstrong’s interlocutor asks: if we are not accountable to God for our actions, and harming someone promotes our long-term self-interest, what reason do we have to refrain from doing harm? He could mean two things:
    (a) He could be asking whether, in the given circumstances, we have a pro tanto reason to refrain from harm; or
    (b) He could be asking whether, in those circumstances, we have decisive reasons not to harm.

    If he means (a), then Sinnott-Armstrong’s criticism seems on point. The interlocutor is assuming that all reasons are selfish. He is saying that if it is not in our self-interest to avoid harming others, then there is no consideration of any sort at all against harming them. This follows only if all reasons are selfish.

    I suspect that this is how Sinnott-Armstrong interprets the argument in question. The problem is that this is a very idiosyncratic understanding of the question “Why be moral?” Normally, in philosophical discussions, this is not what is meant by the question.[5]

    Consider what  Sinnott-Armstrong himself writes in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on moral skepticism. He writes about a form of skepticism known as “practical skepticism,” which asks the question:

    “Why be moral?” This question is used to raise many different issues. Almost everyone admits that there is sometimes some kind of reason to be moral. However, many philosophers deny various universal claims, including the claims that there is always some reason to be moral, that there is always a distinctively moral reason to be moral, and/or that there is always enough reason to make it irrational not to be moral or at least not irrational to be moral…
    Practical moral skeptics usually deny that there is always enough reason for moral action.[6]

    In a supplementary paper, he explains:

    What such practical moral skeptics deny is that I always have reason to do what is morally required… Practical moral skeptics do not deny that there is sometimes reason not to do what is morally wrong. After all, some wrongdoers are caught and punished. However, practical moral skeptics can still deny that there is always reason to do what is morally required or to avoid what is morally wrong.
    How much reason? Some practical moral skeptics claim that sometimes there is no reason at all to do what is morally required. If all reasons are self-interested, this means that sometimes doing what is morally required does not serve the agent’s interest in any way. That extreme position would be refuted if doing what is morally wrong always creates even a slight risk of some negative repercussion. A more plausible and common version of practical moral skepticism denies, instead, that there is always an adequate (or non-overridden) reason to do what is morally required. To establish this position, practical moral skeptics need only one case where there is overriding reason not to do what is morally required. (emphasis mine)[7]

    So, according to Sinnott-Armstrong himself, if we interpret the rhetorical question “Why be moral?” charitably—in a way that reflects how the question is commonly used—it is not a denial that agents lack any pro tanto reasons to do what they are required to do. Instead, the interlocutor is challenging the idea that agents always have decisive reasons to refrain from harm when doing so is contrary to their self-interest.

    Suppose we interpret Sinnott-Armstrong’s interlocutor in terms of (b). In that case, he is arguing as follows: if there are cases where harming another is in our self-interest, then we will not always have all-things-considered reasons to refrain from harm. This argument does not assume that all reasons are selfish. Even if there are unselfish reasons based on the fact an action harms others, these reasons will not always be stronger or weightier than the selfish reasons we have to the contrary. One can accept that we have a pro tanto reason to do an action and also admit that when one considers everything that is relevant—for and against—the total balance of reasons does not support it.

    We can conclude our discussion as follows: Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim—that his interlocutor’s argument rests on a false assumption, namely that all reasons are selfish—is true if one interprets the question “Why be moral?” in an idiosyncratic and uncharitable way, contrary to how the question is typically used. However, if the question is interpreted charitably, in line with its usual philosophical usage, then  Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim is false.


    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 114

    [2] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Morality Without God 117

    [3] See Stephen Darwall, “What Are Moral Reasons?” The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 12 (2017): 2. Available at https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/What%20Are%20moral%20reasons.pdf accessed 28 August 2025

    [4] See Stephen Darwall, “What Are Moral Reasons?” 2-3

    [5] This point is made by Mark Murphy’s review, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [6] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/index.html accessed 28 August 2025

    [7] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Practical Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/supplement.html accessed 28 August 2025

  • Does the Dualism of Practical Reason assume Egoism?

    Recently, I have been examining the question, “If there is no God, why be good?” As I interpret it, this expresses an argument about the “dualism of practical reason” made by Henry Sidgwick and John Gay. This argument had three steps.

    • First, unless we assume that it is always in our long-term self-interest to follow the demands of impartial altruism, we will not always have decisive reasons to do our duty.
    • Second, secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. They imply that it is not always in our long-term self-interest to follow impartial demands.
    • By contrast, if true, a divine command theory would vindicate this assumption and provide a coherent account of our fundamental intuitions about the authority and content of moral requirements.

    The conclusion is that those divine command theories can coherently answer the question: “why should I always do my duty?” whereas secular ethical theories cannot.

    The first step of this argument was motivated by concerns about “the dualism of practical reasoning”. A contradiction that results from three intuitively plausible premises:

    [1] We always have decisive reasons to do what is morally required.

    [2] An action is morally required if it is required by rules justified from a perspective of impartial altruism.[1]

    [3] If there are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with our long-term self-interest, we do not always have decisive reasons to do what is required by impartially justified rules.

    These three premises entail that we must either: (a) embrace the thesis that impartial demands and prudential demands never conflict or (b) embrace a contradiction. Affirming both that we do and do not always have decisive reasons to do morality requires.

    Some object that [3] assumes the truth of rational Egoism: the thesis that I have a reason to perform some action if and only if, and because performing that action maximises my self-interest. Walter Sinnott Armstrong, states.

    Harming others is sometimes in some people’s best interest, even considering probable costs. In those cases, some theists say that only a divine threat of Hell provides a reason to be moral. Since atheists and agnostics do not believe in God, they do not believe in divine retribution for sins, so they have to admit that sometimes some people could get away with immorality and then they have no self-interested reason to be moral. Does that mean that these people have no reason at all to be moral? No. That conclusion would follow only if every reason had to be self-interested, selfish, or egoistic. There is no basis for that assumption. Many reasons are not based on self-interest…[2]

    Armstrong provides cases where the fact an act would benefit other people provides us with reasons to do it. He concludes:

    “The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. These reasons are not self-interested. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me. These unselfish reasons can answer the question, “Why be moral?”[3]

    I think this dismisses the problem far too quickly. In this post, I will explain why I think this.

    At the outset, one must concede that some important defenders of [3] have appealed rational Egoism. Consider, John Gay; Gay argued that:

    Thus those who either or don’t mention the will of God, making the immediate criterion of virtue to be the good of mankind; must either allow that virtue is not in all cases obligatory (contrary to the idea which all or most men have of it) or they must say that the good of mankind is a sufficient obligation. But how can the good of mankind by any obligation to me, when perhaps, However, its clear in particular cases, such as laying down my life, or the like, it is contrary to my happiness?[4]

    Gay uses the word “obligatory” to refer to what agents have decisive reasons to do. However, he bases his conclusion on an egoist understanding of practical reasons. Earlier, he wrote, “Obligation is the necessity of doing or omitting any action in order to be happy” we are obliged to do or omit an action…” when there is such a relation between an Agent and an action that the agent cannot be happy without doing or omitting that action.”[5]

    On some interpretations, Sidgwick held a similar view. According to David Brink: “Sidgwick wants to represent the dualism of practical reason as a conflict between a utilitarian account of duty and an egoistic or prudential account of rationality.”[6]

    If rational Egoism is true, we have a powerful argument favouring [3]. Suppose we grant rational Egoism and affirm the antecedent of [3] we get.

    [3a] We have a reason to perform some action if and only if, and because performing that action maximises my self-interest.

    [3b] There are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with our long-term self-interest

    The conclusion that follows is

    [3c] There are cases where we have no reasons to do what is demanded by impartially justified rules.

    So, it is true that many people who have argued for [3] have appealed to Egoism. It is also true that rational Egoism would, if true, provide grounds affirming [3]. However, these facts do not show that [3] assumes rational Egoism. All they show is that some arguments for [3] depend on rational Egoism.

    There are other arguments for [3] which, do not appeal to rational Egoism, which have the same result. Consider, for example, David Brink, whom I mentioned above. Brink is a leading secular meta-ethicist representing a position known as “Cornell realism“: a research project that attempts to vindicate objective moral facts within a scientific-naturalist view of the world. In doing so, Brink appeals to the thesis that all reasons for action are agent-relative: “Reasons for action are dependent on the aims or interests of the agent who has them.”[7] According to this thesis, what an agent has reasons to do, is a function of or derived from his desires and interests. Facts about reasons are simply facts about what humans desire are interested in or aim at under certain conditions.  This thesis is popular in contemporary philosophy. Brink summarises some of the reasons for its popularity:

    Agent-relative assumptions seem to underlie many formal and informal discussions of individual rationality in philosophy, economics, and politics. Moreover, an agent-relative theory provides a reliable link between reasons for action and motivation, we expect one who recognises reasons for action to be motivated to act on them, and an agent seems more likely to be motivated by facts about his own interest or desires than by facts about the interest or desires of others. Also, when we explain an agent’s behaviour as an attempt to satisfy certain desires, given her beliefs, we are said to “rationalise” her behaviour. This suggests that genuinely rational behavior is that which would promote the agent’s desires or at least those desires that she would have if she met certain epistemic conditions.[8]

    This thesis does not entail that all reasons are self-interested. Even if benefiting another does not promote my interests, it can still fulfil my desires or aims. What the thesis rules out is the existence of “impartial reasons”. Reasons to promote the good of others that don’t derive from the interests or aims of the agent in question.[9] Moreover, if the thesis is true, there is a sound argument for something like [3].

    [3a]* An agent has a reason to perform some action if and only if, and because, that performing that achieves ّthe agents aims or promotes the agents’ interests

    [3b]* there are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with the agents’ aims and is not in the agents’ interest

    Therefore

    [3c] There are cases where we have no reasons to do what is demanded by impartially justified rules. [10]

    Because this thesis entails that we have no reason to comply with morality in cases where doing so is not in our interests and contrary to our aims, other philosophers reject it. They contend there are also impartial reasons: reasons to promote the welfare of others that don’t derive from our interests and aims. However, even if one grants the existence of impartial reasons, worries about the dualism of practical reason still arise. Brink explains:

    [W]e do not need to think of rationality in exclusively prudential terms to raise this worry. The worry can arise even if there are impartial reasons-that is, nonderivative reasons to promote the welfare of others. For as long as there are prudential reasons, a conflict between impartial reason and prudential reason appears possible. Without some reason to treat impartial reasons as superior, the supremacy of other-regarding morality must remain doubtful.[11]

    Suppose impartial rules demand something contrary to our self-interests. If such cases occur, impartial reasons will point in one direction, and our interests and aims will point in another. This situation generates the sceptical question, “Why be Moral?” What reason do I have, in such cases, to follow impartial rules, not my self-interest? One cannot answer this question by pointing out we have impartial reasons to follow such rules. The question, after all, is why I should give impartial reasons precedence? Nor can it be answered by appealing to my interests or aims because the case is one where morality and such things conflict. 

    Stephen Layman provides a vivid example of the problem:

    Ms Poore has lived many years in grinding poverty. She is not starving but has only the bare necessities. She has tried very hard to get ahead by hard work, but nothing has come of her efforts. An opportunity to steal a large sum of money arises. If Ms. Poore steals the money and invests it wisely, she can obtain many desirable things her poverty has denied her: cure for a painful (but nonfatal) medical condition, a well-balanced diet, decent housing, adequate heat in the winter, health insurance, new career opportunities through education, etc. Moreover, if she steals the money, her chances of being caught are very low, and she knows this. She is also aware that the person who owns the money is very wealthy and will not  be greatly harmed by the theft …Ms. Poore faces the choice of stealing the money or living in grinding poverty the rest of her life. In such a case, I think it would be morally wrong for Ms. Poore to steal the money; and yet, assuming there is no God and no life after death, failing to steal the money will likely deny her a large measure of personal fulfilment, i.e. a large measure of what is in her long-term best interests.[12] 

    Layman accepts that Ms Poore has impartial reasons not to steal.[13] However, these reasons conflict with powerful prudential reasons to steal. Plausibly, there are stronger reasons to break in cases like this than complying with impartial rules. Compliance will be “irrational—in the sense that it involves acting on inferior or weaker reasons.”[14] 

    Let’s recap the dialectic: if rational egoism is true, we lack reason to obey impartial rules if doing so is contrary to our self-interest. If all reasons are agent-relative: we will lack reason to obey if doing so is not in our interests nor promotes our aims. By contrast, if there are impartial reasons, if compliance is not in our interest, prudential and impartial reasons will conflict. There is no reason always to treat impartial rules as having precedence in such conflicts. Even if rational egoism is false, a problematic dualism of practical reason looms.


    [1] To avoid wordiness, I will use the phrase “impartially justified rules” to refer to rules which are justified from a perspective of impartial altruism.

    [2] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 114

    [3] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 117

    [4] John Gay on Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 29/7/21

    [5] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 29/7/21

    [6] David Brink, “Sidgwick’s dualism of Practical Reason” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 66:3, 1998. 303. Brink’s interpretation of Sidgwick is controversial.

    [7] David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Ethics”, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 6, Ethics, (1992) 1

    [8] David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Ethics”, 2

    [9] David Brink “Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy” in In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press (1997) 257

    [10] See David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Morality” and also “Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy” in In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. (Oxford University Press, 1997). 255–291 for the articulation of an agent-relative version of what is essentially the same problem.

    [11] David Brink, “Self-Love and Altruism” Social Philosophy & Policy 14 (1997) 123

    [12] C. Stephen Layman “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy, 23 (2006): 307

    [13] Layman “God and the Moral Order” 305:

    [14] Stephen Layman Letters to Doubting Thomas: A Case for the Existence of God, (Oxford University Press, 2006) 242

     

     

  • What is the Question?: John Gay’s “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”

    In recent posts I have been looking at the rhetorical question: “if there is no God, why be good?” In my last post, I suggested one way to understand this question was in terms of Henry Sidgwick’s famous argument regarding the “dualism of practical reason. As I interpreted Sidgwick, his argument had three steps.

    • First, unless we assume that it is always in our long term self-interest to follow the demands of impartial benevolence, we will not always have decisive reasons to do our duty.
    • Second, secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. They imply that it is not always in our long-term self-interest to follow impartial demands.
    • By contrast, a divine command theory, would if true, vindicate this assumption and provide a coherent account of our fundamental intuitions about the authority and content of moral requirements.

    In my view, Sidgwick’s discussion of these issues is not idiosyncratic. While Sidgwick gives brings a particular level of rigour to the question. My reading of the utilitarian tradition, particularly early religious versions of utilitarianism, suggests that the challenge of a “dualism of practical reason” was a well-known problem when Sidgwick wrote. It had been a standard way 18th-century divine command theorists critiqued secular versions of utilitarianism. In, this post I will explore a different thinker who anticipates many of Sidgwick’s arguments by almost a hundred and fifty years: the philosopher/theologian John Gay.

    Who is John Gay?

    John Gay was a lecturer in Greek and ecclesiastical history at Cambridge from 1724-1732. Gay is not a figure you often hear about in textbooks on the history of philosophy. We know very little about his life or academic career. Today he is known only by a short essay he published in 1731 entitled “The Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality” (Dissertation).  The Dissertation was, within England,[1]  the first systematic presentation and defence of a utilitarian moral theory. Gay’s work marks the beginning of English utilitarianism. 

    Today utilitarianism is assumed to be a paradigmatically secular ethical theory. Gay’s Dissertation proposed an earlier version of the theory known as Theological utilitarianism. Theological utilitarianism is “a doctrine according to which we have a duty to promote the good of humanity because God, our universally benevolent creator, wants us to do so.”[2] As Gay articulated it, moral requirements are divine commands; hence, “the will of God is the immediate criterion of Virtue.”[3] Because God is impartial and benevolent, his purpose, in commanding, is to promote the happiness of his creatures;” Thus the will of God is the immediate criterion of Virtue, and the happiness of mankind the criterion of the wilt of God; and therefore the happiness of mankind may be said to be the criterion of virtue, but once removed.”[4]

    Gay’s theological Utilitarianism became the common position of Cambridge Theologians for the next century.  Cambridge scholars such as  Thomas Rutherford (1744), John Brown(1751),  Some Jeynes (1757), and Edmund Law (1758) repeated  Gay’s essential theory and arguments. Gay’s work also had an evident influence on William Paley. Paley’s “On the Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy” (1785) became one of the most widely read defences of utilitarianism in the nineteenth century. Paley based The Principles on the lectures he delivered while teaching at Cambridge. The Principles was required text in moral philosophy at Cambridge till the 1830s and they were heavily indebted to Gay.  The Cambridge connection is interesting because Sidgwick was a moral philosophy professor at Cambridge from 1883 until his death in 1900. Sidgwick’s book “Method of Ethics” marked the high point in the tradition of English utilitarianism. Gay’s Dissertation marked the beginning of this tradition. Both were authored at the same institution within 143 years of each other.

    What is noteworthy for our purposes is that all elements and basic argument found in Sidgwick’s “dualism of practical reason” can be found in the Dissertation. 

    Why we have to assume harmony between impartial and prudential requirements?

    Let’s look at the first step in Sidgwick’s argument; the claim that unless we assume that it is always in our long-term self-interest to follow the demands of impartial benevolence, we will not always have decisive reasons to do our duty. In my previous post, I suggested Sidgwick’s reasoning could be seen as an inference from three premises:

    [1] We always have decisive reasons to do what is morally required.

    [2] An action is morally required if it is required by rules justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence.[5]

    [3] If there are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with our long-term self-interest, we do not always have decisive reasons to do what is required by impartially justified rules.

    Each of these premises was in Gay’s  Dissertation. Gay articulated virtue as follows:

    Virtue is the conformity to a rule of life, directing the actions to all rational creatures with respect to each other’s happiness; to which conformity everyone in all cases is obliged: and every one that does so conform, is or ought to be approved of, esteemed and loved for so doing. What is here expressed, I believe most men put into their idea of virtue. For virtue generally does imply some relation to others: where self is only concerned, a man is called prudent, (not virtuous)[6]

    Here Gay articulated [1]. Gay contended that it is part of the “common conception” that virtue is a rule of life “to which conformity everyone in all cases is obliged”. In the Dissertation, Gay used the word “obliged” and “obligatory”  term synonymously with the idea of decisive reason to act. Gay is saying that we always have decisive reasons to do what is morally required.

    We also clearly see [2]. Gay understood virtue as conformity to certain rules, rules which direct our conduct, and which we use to evaluate and praise or blame people’s actions. These rules have a particular kind of content. They direct us to promote the good, not just of ourselves, but also the good of others. They promote the happiness of all impartially. Gay, therefore, agreed with Sidgwick that our fundamental moral intuitions have a utilitarian basis. Moral requirements are demands justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence. He differs from Sidgwick only in developing this in a rule utilitarian instead of an act utilitarian way.

    Gay, also like Sidgwick, thought this was implicit in our common-sense moral beliefs. That morality consists of rules justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence is “what most men put into their idea of Virtue”. Gay argued that the intuitive deontological rules, defended by other ethicists, such as Samuel Clarke, could be derived from the criteria of happiness to mankind as a more fundamental principle.

    Gay also affirms [3], he writes

    Thus those who either or don’t mention the will of God, making the immediate criterion of virtue to be the good of mankind; must either allow that virtue is not in all cases obligatory (contrary to the idea which all or most men have of it) or they must say that the good of mankind is a sufficient obligation. But how can the good of mankind by any obligation to me, when perhaps in particular cases, such as laying down my life, or the like, it is contrary to my happiness?[7]

    Like Sidgwick, Gay here was concerned with a certain kind of dilemma. The possibility of “particular cases” where rules that enjoin “the good of mankind” are “contrary to my happiness”. For example, cases where I am required to  “lay down my life”. If such cases do occur, then the “good of mankind” can’t be a “sufficient obligation”; we must allow that virtue is “not in all cases obligatory”.  If such cases exist,  we do not always have decisive reasons to do what is required by those rules.

    So, Gay agreed with the first step of Sidgwick’s argument. Unless one assumes that impartial and prudential requirements never clash, there will be a dualism of practical reason. This dualism means we cannot coherently claim we always have decisive reasons to do our duty.

    Why Secular accounts undermine this assumption?

    Gay also argued that secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. The dilemma Gay was concerned about arises when people make “the happiness of mankind” the immediate criteria of virtue, without “mentioning the will of God”. Earlier, Gay discussed four “four different manners in which” an obligation [is induced” These are;

    First, that obligation which ariseth from perceiving the natural consequences of things, i. e. the consequences of things acting according to the fix’d laws of nature, maybe call’d natural. Secondly, that arising from merit or demerit, as producing the esteem and favour of our fellow creatures, or the contrary, is usually styled virtuous. Thirdly, that arising from the authority of the civil magistrate, civil. Fourthly, that from the authority of God, religious.[8]

    I noted that Gay used the word “obligation” to mean something like a practical reason or reason for acting. When we see this, it is evident that Gay was discussing what Sidgwick referred to as sanctions.  He was referring to negative or positive consequences annexed impartially justified rules, which provide us with prudential reasons to comply with them.

    Many of these sanctions overlapped those discussed by Sidgwick. When Gay referred to consequences: “arising from merit or demerit, as producing the esteem and favour of our fellow creatures, ” he referred to what Sidgwick called social sanctions. Consequences “arising from the authority of the civil magistrate” was a reference to Sidgwick’s category of legal sanctions.  The reference to religious sanctions was a reference to what Sidgwick meant by the term. Like Sidgwick, Gay thought that when one brackets religious sanctions and relied on secular sanctions alone. These sanctions are insufficient to ensure a “full and complete obligation” that “will extend to all cases”. If secular sanctions are the only sanctions that exist, then the assumption: that it is always in our interests to follow impartial rules is probably false.

    Why a divine command theory vindicates this assumption?

    Gay also argued that a divine command theory would, if true, vindicate the assumption. We noted above what Gay takes to be our conception of “virtue”.

    Virtue is the conformity to a rule of life, directing the actions of all rational creatures with respect to each other’s happiness; to which conformity every one in all cases is obliged: and every one that does so conform, is or ought to be approved of, esteemed and loved for so doing. What is here expressed, I believe most men put into their idea of virtue. For virtue generally does imply some relation to others: where self is only concerned.[9]

    Here Gay, highlighted three features which he thinks are implicit in our intuitive common-sense understanding of morality.  First, moral requirements are requirements imposed by rules, norms or standards. Second, these requirements have a particular content; they direct us to seek the good of others impartially. Third, we always have decisive reasons to comply with them. Fourth, they have sanctions attached to them; people are subject to praise and blame for how well they conform to such rules.  A divine command theory, if true, accounts for all these features.

    Notably, a divine command theory is true, accounts for [1]

    Now it is evident from the nature of God, viz. his being infinitely happy in himself from all eternity, and from his goodness manifested in his works, that he could have no other design in creating mankind than their happiness; and therefore he wills their happiness; therefore the means of their happiness: therefore that my behaviour, as far as it may be a means of the happiness of mankind, should be such. Here then we are got one step farther, or to a new criterion: not to a new criterion of virtue immediately, but to a criterion of the will of God. For it is an answer to the enquiry, How shall I know what the Will of God in this particular is? Thus the will of God is the immediate criterion of virtue, and the happiness of mankind the criterion of the wilt of God; and therefore the happiness of mankind may be said to be the criterion of virtue, but once removed.[10]

    Gay here cites an argument first proposed by Berkeley.  Because God is impartial, benevolent, and rational, his commands would lay down rules that are justified from an impartial benevolent perspective. Consequently, if moral requirements are divine commands, would expect them to express rules which promoted the happiness of all impartially.  Morality has the content one would expect it to have if a divine command theory is true.

    A divine command theory also accounts for [1],

    [I]t is evident that a full and complete obligation which will extend to all cases, can only be that arising from the authority of God; because God only can in all cases make a man happy or miserable: and therefore, since we are always obliged to that conformity called virtue, it is evident that the immediate rule or criterion of it, is the will of God.[11]

    Suppose moral requirements are divine commands, and commands are demands backed by sanctions. In that case, it is always in one’s long-term self-interest to do what we are morally required to do. Hence, a divine command theory entails [1].  The same line of argument also vindicates the assumption that it is always in our interests to do what is impartially required. If a divine command theory is true, the kind of dilemmas that Gay believed undermine [1] cannot occur.

    When we examine John Gay, we find him offering an argument for a theological version of utilitarianism that anticipates Sidgwick’s argument in almost every respect.

    There is an interesting historical narrative here.  Gay taught at Cambridge from 1724 to 1732. He developed a religious version of utilitarianism; whereby moral requirements are divine commands. Gay argued his theory would if, true, coherently explain why we always have decisive reasons to do our duty. He warned that if the theological component of the theory were removed, there would be a problem: a dualism of practical reason. This problem would mean we cannot coherently explain why we always have reasons to do our duty. Gay’s position was adopted and defended by Cambridge theologians, eventually being part of Cambridge’s standard textbooks till 1830.

    Forty years later, Sidgwick, writing in Cambridge, inherits this tradition. However, it is a secular version of utilitarianism mediated through Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Sidgwick ends The Method of Ethics, concluding there is a problematic dualism of practical reason that makes us unable to coherently explain why we always have reasons to do our duty. Sidgwick ended by suggesting that one way to solve this problem coherently is to return to the theological utilitarianism of John Gay.[12]

    Sidgwick then was not formulating a new problem in the Method of Ethics. Instead, he was drawing attention to a problem that divine command theorists had raised for secular utilitarianism from the beginning and highlighted that Bentham and Mill had failed to solve it.



    [1] The first  written exposition of  Utilitarianism is arguably George Berkeley’s  “Passive Obedience”, which was presented in Ireland in 1712

    [2] Matti Häyry “Passive Obedience and Berkeley’s Moral Philosophy” Berkeley Studies 23 (2012) 3

    [3] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

    [4] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

    [5] I have altered premise [2] slightly to reflect Gay’s rule utilitarianism.

    [6] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

    [7] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

    [8] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

    [9] Ibid

    [10] Ibid

    [11] Ibid

    [12] In “Outline of The History of Ethics”, Sidgwick writes:

    “But in fact a simple outline of Paley’s utilitarianism may be found more than a generation earlier in the following passages from Gay’s Dissertation…[Bentham] does not himself use the will of an omnipotent and benevolent being as a means of logically connecting individual and general happiness. He thus undoubtedly simplifies his system, and avoids the disputable inferences from nature and Scripture in which Paley’s position is involved, but this gain is dearly purchased. For the question immediately arises, How then are the sanctions of the moral rules which it will most conduce to the general happiness for men to observe shown to be always adequate in the case of all the individuals whose observance is required?”

     

  • What is the Question?: Henry Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason

    In a previous post, I criticised Richard Dawkins’s discussion of the question: if there is no God, why be good? One criticism I raised was that Dawkins seemed to misunderstand the challenge this rhetorical question presents.  This raises the question as to how we should understand this rhetorical question. What exactly is the problem being alluded to when people ask, “if there is no God, why be good.”? I have been thinking a bit about this of late. In this post, I will begin an attempt to do this by looking at someone who developed an influential version of the problem, Henry Sidgwick.

    Who was Henry Sidgwick?

    Henry Sidgwick was a moral philosopher based at Cambridge University in the late nineteenth century. Outside of the world of Moral Philosophy, Henry Sidgwick is probably not a household name. However, within the world of moral philosophy, Sidgwick’s book “The Method of Ethics” (ME) is widely considered a classic of Moral Philosophy. Sidgwick represents the high point of the classical Utilitarian moral tradition tracing back to John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. His work has widely influenced leading utilitarian philosophers such as Roger Crisp, Peter Singer and Derek Parfit. 

    Interestingly, Sidgwick ended the book with a degree of pessimism about whether a coherent secular utilitarian moral theory was possible.  Sidgwick’s believed that secular versions of utilitarianism could not coherently answer the most fundamental question of ethics: why should I always do my duty? By contrast, Sidgwick thought Theism could coherently answer this question.

    Sidgwick spells out the reasons he came to this conclusion in the final chapter of ME. As I interpret him, his argument contains three steps. 

    • First, he argued that unless we assume there is “harmony” between “rational benevolence” and “prudence”, morality cannot be entirely rational. Instead,  and our “fundamental intuitions” about morality will be “incoherent”. 
    • Second, he argues that secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. They imply that “rational benevolence” and “prudence” are not in harmony. 
    • By contrast, a divine command theory, would if true, vindicate this assumption and provide a coherent account of our fundamental intuitions. 

    The conclusion is those divine command theories can coherently answer the question: “why should I always do my duty?” whereas secular ethical theories cannot.  Because Sidgwick was both an agnostic and a utilitarian, this conclusion caused him considerable anxiety. He wrestled with it for much of his academic life.

    Why do we need to assume harmony between benevolence and Prudence?

    Let’s begin by looking at the first step in Sidgwick’s argument. Sidgwick begins the final chapter by (ME) arguing: “If morality is to be made completely rational, the harmony between the maxim of prudence and the maxim of rational benevolence must be somehow demonstrated.”[1]

    Let me clarify the terminology here:

    First, Sidgwick uses the term “rational benevolence”. In earlier chapters, Sidgwick had argued that analysis and systematisation of our common-sense moral beliefs suggest that moral requirements are requirements justified from a certain point of view. A point of view of impartial benevolence. It is a point of view which the welfare or the good of everyone, which does so impartiality; not considering anyone’s interest or welfare more important than anyone else’s. Sidgwick refers to this as “the point of view of the universe” or the “maxim of rational benevolence”. Because the phrase “moral requirements that are justified from the point of view of impartial benevolence” is unwieldy. I will use the phrase “impartial demands” as shorthand for this.

    Second, Sidgwick says demonstrating the harmony between impartial demands and Prudence is necessary if morality is to be “completely rational”. What he means by “completely rational” is explicated later in the chapter. Failure to “completely” rationalise Morality” means: 

    [P]ractical reason would still impel us decisively to the performance of duty in ordinary cases where what is recognised as duty is in harmony with self-interest properly understood. But in the rarer cases where we find a conflict between self-interest and duty, practical reason, being divided against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side. The conflict would have to be decided by which of two groups of non-rational impulses had more force.[2]

    For morality to be “completely rational” means that we always have decisive reasons to do our duty. Someone has decisive reasons to act in a certain way when the reasons in favour of acting, taken together, are stronger than any set of reasons we may have to act in some other way.  

    Sidgwick’s, claim then is this: unless it is in our long term self-interest to always comply with impartial demands, we will not always have decisive reasons to do our duty. Sometimes, the strongest reasons will favour doing our duty; on other occasions, they will not. Commitment to always doing what is right will at best be rationally optional and at worst irrational.

    Why does Sidgwick think this? Sidgwick was concerned about a specific sort of practical dilemma which he thought irresolvable. Suppose it is not always in one’s long-term self-interest to act according to impartial demands. This will mean impartial demands sometimes come into conflict with prudential requirements. When they do, we face the question: What reason is there to act impartially, rather than in one’s self-interest. What reason do we have for assuming that impartial demands are always stronger or weightier than prudential requirements when the two clash?

    Sidgwick raises this question repeatedly in the preface to the sixth edition. He asks what the  “rational ground.”[3] is for “subordinating self-interest…to “altruistic” impulses and sentiments” on “what ground?” do we make the “moral choice of the general happiness” or “acquiescence in self-interest.”[4]. What reasons other than “blind habit.”[5] were there in favour is making altruistic sacrifices of one’s self-interest in this way? Sidgwick concluded that no answer is forthcoming. Envisaging someone faced with such a dilemma, Sidgwick states: 

    He might say, “I quite admit that when the painful necessity comes for another man to choose between his own happiness and the general happiness, he must as a reasonable being prefer his own, i.e. it is right for him to do this on my principle….It did not seem to me that this reasoning could be effectively confuted. No doubt it was, from the point of view of the universe, reasonable to prefer the greater good to the lesser, even though the lesser good was the private happiness of the agent. Still, it seemed to me also undeniably reasonable for the individual to prefer his own. The rationality of self-regard seemed to me as undeniable as the rationality of self-sacrifice.

    Suppose Sidgwick is correct and there is no reason for giving impartial demands precedence over prudential requirements in a conflict. If a conflict occurs, the total reasons in favour of doing what is impartially demanded will not be stronger than the reasons against so acting. We can summarise Sidgwick’s conclusion here as an inference from three premises, which he takes to be intuitively plausible: 

    [1] The strongest reasons always favour doing what is morally required.

    [2] An action is morally required if and only if it is demanded from a perspective of impartial benevolence.

    [3] If there are cases where, what is impartially demanded of a person, is an action that is contrary to their long-term self-interest, then the strongest reasons do not always favour doing the action that is demanded from a perspective of impartial benevolence. 

    Suppose [1] [2] and [3] are correct. In that case, we must either embrace the thesis that impartial demands and prudential demands never conflict or embrace a contradiction.  To see this, suppose we assume these demands do conflict:

    [3a] there are cases where an action is demanded from a perspective of impartial benevolence is contrary to one’s own long term self-interest 

    It follows from [3] that, 

    [3b] the strongest reasons do not always favour doing what is demanded from a perspective of impartial benevolence. 

    And [3b] conjoined with [2] entails that;

    [3c] The strongest reasons do not always favour doing what is morally required.

    However, [1] states.

    [1] The strongest reasons always favour doing what is morally required.

    [1] and [3] are obviously in contradiction. Sidgwick concludes that the hypothesis of “harmony of duty and self-interest “is required” to avoid a basic contradiction in one chief part of our thought”. Denying this hypothesis results in “practical reason being divided against itself” and forces us “to abandon the idea of rationalising [morality] it completely.”[6] Sidgwick referred to this problem as “the dualism of practical reason”. “‘self-love’ and ‘Conscience’ claim to rule, and neither will yield to the other.”[7]

    Why do Secular Moral Theories Undermines this assumption?

    This brings me to the second step of Sidgwick’s argument. Sidgwick argues that secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. In ME., Sidgwick examines what sanctions are attached to impartial rules. Sidgwick defines a sanction as “the pleasures that come from conforming to moral rules, and the pains that come from violating them”[8]. Importantly, he initially confines himself to sanctions we might call “secular” or naturalistic. “[T]he coincidence of duty and happiness considered as something that we know about from experience and can expect to show up in our present earthly life.”[9]. Sidgwick identifies several different kinds of secular sanctions which might attach to impartial rules Legal sanctions: “penalties inflicted by the authority of the state”. Social sanctions: “the pleasures to be expected from the approval and goodwill of our fellowmen” and internal sanctions: “the pleasurable emotion, or absence of remorse that accompanies virtuous action”. Linked with internal sanctions is also “sympathy”, where the suffering of others causes us to feel pain and suffering ourselves.

     Sidgwick examines whether the existence of these types of sanctions gives us any reason to think that it is always in our self-interest to comply with impartial demands. His discussion is subtle and detailed, and space prevents me from elaborating it in detail. However, his conclusion is pessimistic.: “when we carefully analyse and estimate the consequences of virtue to the virtuous agent, it appears improbable that this alignment is complete and universal.”[10] He concludes. “the more carefully we examine how the different sanctions—legal, social, and conscientious—operate in the actual conditions of human life, the harder it is to believe that they can always produce this coincidence ·of happiness with social virtue.”[11]. 

    If the only sanctions annexed to impartial rules are secular sanctions, the assumption that it is always in our interests to act according to impartial demands is probably false. 

    Why Divine command theories vindicate this assumption.

    Sidgwick next turns to what he calls religious sanctions.

    This [the failure of secular sanctions] has led other utilitarian writers to prefer to throw the weight of duty on the religious sanction;. From this point of view, the utilitarian code is conceived as the law of God, who is to be regarded as having commanded men to promote general happiness, and announced that he will reward those who obey his commands and punish those who don’t. It’s clear that if we feel convinced that an omnipotent being has somehow signified such commands and announcements, a rational egoist can’t need any further inducement to shape his life on utilitarian principles.[12]

    The other utilitarians” Sidgwick is referring to here are advocates of the theological utilitarianism that was proposed by writers, such as Paley, Berkeley, John Gay, John Brown, John Austin. Theological Utilitarian’s had combined normative rule utilitarianism with a divine command theory of meta-ethics.[13]  These writers had argued that moral requirements are divine commands.  And this assumption enables them to coherently affirm [1] and [2] and [3] without contradiction.

    Because God is both benevolent and impartial, omniscient and rational, he issues those commands that are justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence in light of all relevant facts.  Hence, a divine command theory, if true, entails the truth of [2].

    Similarly, because commands were understood as prescriptions or rules, which God holds people accountable, one always had decisive reasons to comply with impartial demands. So, it is always in one’s long-term self-interest to act in accord with impartial demands. 

    Consequently, If moral requirements are divine commands, then the assumption of harmony between impartial demands and prudential requirements is vindicated.  Note the issue here is not just that the coincidence is consistent with divine command meta-ethics. The claim is that would if true, entail or predict this coincidence.

    Sidgwick then argues three things; (a) unless we assume that it is in our long-term self-interest always to follow impartial demands, we don’t have decisive reasons to do what is right;  (b) Secular accounts of morality, if true, undermine this assumption, and; (c) divine command theories, if true, vindicate it. 

    Of course, I have not in a short post defended these claims. Advocates of secular forms of utilitarianism will contest each of these steps. But the point is there is a serious line of thought here that needs to be addressed. Just as a divine command theorist cannot just assert that God provides the best account of morality and has to address sceptical challenges to their position, such as the Euthyphro dilemma. Opponents of religious morality have to address concerns raised by Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason. It is not enough to caricature it as the crude claim that “the only motive I have to be good is fear” and dismissing this claim as obviously ridiculous.

     


    [1] Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, 242 available at https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/sidgwick1874.pdf accessed 20/3/21

    [2] Ibid 284

    [3] Preface to the Sixth Edition” Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick available at https://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/sidgwick/me/me.preface.s06.html accessed 20/30/21

    [4] Ibid

    [5] Ibid

    [6] Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, 248 available at https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/sidgwick1874.pdf accessed 20/3/21.

    [7] This quote is from Barton Schultz “Henry Sidgwick” in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sidgwick/ accessed 26/3/21.

    [8] Ibid 76

    [9] Ibid, 75

    [10] Ibid, 82

    [11] Ibid 243

    [12] Ibid 246

    [13] See my posts  http://www.mandm.org.nz/2018/01/divine-command-theory-and-utilitarianism-forgotten-bedfellows-paleys-principles-of-moral-and-political-philosophy-part-one.html and http://www.mandm.org.nz/2018/01/divine-command-theory-and-utilitarianism-forgotten-bedfellows-paleys-principles-of-moral-and-political-philosophy-part-two.html accessed 26/3/21

  • Dawkin’s dilemma: How not to answer the question “Why Be Moral?”

    In his bestselling book, the God Delusion, Richard Dawkin’s responds to the question: “If there is no God, Why be good?”Richard Dawkins

    Posed like that, the question sounds positively ignoble. When a religious person puts it to me in this way (and many of them do), my immediate temptation is to issue the following challenge: ‘Do you really mean to tell me the only reason you try to be good is to gain God’s approval and reward or to avoid his disapproval and punishment? …If you agree that, in the absence of God, you would ‘commit robbery, rape, and murder’, you reveal yourself as an immoral person, ‘and we would be well advised to steer a wide course around you’. If, on the other hand, you admit that you would continue to be a good person even when not under divine surveillance, you have fatally undermined your claim that God is necessary for us to be good.[1]

    Dawkin’s thinks someone who asks “if there is no God, why be moral?” is assuming that the Gods approval is the only reason they to do good. He attacks this assumption with a dilemma. Either this assumption is true, or it is not true. If it is true, the questioner reveals themself to be an immoral person. He is someone who refrains from theft, murder and rape only because God will punish him. We should shun and avoid someone like this. If the questioner’s assumption is not true, then the claim that there is no reason to do good without God is undermined. The fact he would continue to do what is right, even if God did not exist shows that he does have reason to do good even if God does not exist. 

    I think each step of this response is mistaken. 

    First, is it true that this question presupposes that threat of divine punishment is the only reason anyone has to refrain from immoral behaviour? I think the answer is clearly no.

    The question “why be good?” or “why be moral?” This question has a long history in western thought question going back at least as far as Plato’s republic. John Tilly explains that according to the standard interpretation of the question, it involves: 

    A request for a justification for giving precedence to moral reasons for action when such reasons conflict with other reasons (e.g., those of self-interest). Whenever moral reasons recommend one course of action and nonmoral reasons recommend another, why should I favor the first set of reasons? What argument could persuade me to do[2]

    This simple question has proved difficult to answer. So much so that, the 19th-century Philosopher Henry Sidgwick declared it to be “The profoundest problem in ethics”. During the 17th-19th[3] centuries, several philosophers argued this recalcitrant problem posed difficultly for any purely secular understanding of morality. Thomas Reid’s (1710–1796) summary is typical.

    What about cases where concern for our happiness on the whole conflicts with a concern for duty? This is a merely imaginary conflict; there can’t actually be any such opposition between the two leading principles. While the world is under a wise and benevolent administration, it’s impossible that any man should be a loser by doing his duty. So every man who believes in God, while he is careful to do his duty, can safely leave the care of his happiness to his Maker. He realizes that his most effective way of attending to his long-run happiness is by attending to his duty. But consider the case of an atheist who wrongly thinks his virtue is contrary to his happiness on the whole. … this man’s dilemma is without remedy. It will be impossible for him to act so as not to ·seem to himself to· contradict a leading principle of his nature. He must either sacrifice his happiness to virtue, or his virtue to happiness, and he has to decide whether it is better to be a fool or to be a knave! [4]

    Reid points out that the “why be moral?” challenge presupposes the existence of a dilemma: what duty requires contradicts what my long-term happiness requires. Because the “the world is under a wise and benevolent administration” Reid thinks such dilemmas are “imaginary”. They never, in fact, occur. However, they would occur if, contrary to fact, God did not exist. So, if atheism is true, some answer to this dilemma is needed if morality’s rational authority is to be vindicated.

    Nothing in this line of argument assumes that the only reason Reid has to do good is divine reward or punishment. Reid speaks of a dilemma between “two rational governing principles in the constitution of man.” [5]. A dilemma occurs when one has two options, both of which are problematic. We do have powerful moral reasons independent of our self-interest demanding us to do what is right. But we also have powerful prudential reasons pointing the other way. For Reid, Divine sanctions mean that prudential reasons never really point the other way. But they are not the only reasons in the equation. Reid is not atypical in this. Someone who asks, “if there is no God, why be good?” need not assume the only reason he or anyone else has for doing good is divine reward or punishment.

    However, let’s suppose for the sake of argument they did assume this. Dawkin’s attempted rebuttal of this assumption fails. Consider Dawkin’s discussion of the dilemmas first horn.

    “If you agree that, in the absence of God, you would ‘commit robbery, rape, and murder’, you reveal yourself as an immoral person, ‘and we would be well advised to steer a wide course around you’.[6]

    Dawkin objects that anyone who answers “yes” reveals themselves to be an immoral person. That may be true. But it is also irrelevant in this context. Remember what the question is: Dawkin’s interlocutor asks the question “Why we should always do what is morally right when it contradicts our self-interest?”. To answer, “because if you don’t, you are acting immorality” misses the point. Dawkin’s interlocutor knows it is immoral to act contrary to immorality. He is instead asking why he should side with morality and not self-interest in the first place.

    An illustration might help here. Imagine that a religious sceptic was asking “If God exists, why should I do what he says”? I doubt Dawkin’s would consider the response “because God tells you to and if you don’t, you aren’t following God” to be a satisfactory answer. The question is “why to obey God?”, answering “because God tells you to”  begs the very question at issue.

    The same thing is true when the question is “if there is no God, why be good”. Dawkin’s interlocutor is asking “if God does not exist, why always do what is required by morality”? The response “if you don’t you are immoral” begs the question in the same way. Just as the theist cannot cite God’s commands as a reason for obeying God’s commands, the atheist cannot cite moral requirements as a reason for obeying moral requirements.

    So Dawkin’s treatment of the first horn misses the point. What about the second horn? Dawkin’s writes.

    If, on the other hand, you admit that you would continue to be a good person even when not under divine surveillance, you have fatally undermined your claim that God is necessary for us to be good.[7]

    This confuses two separate questions. The original question was “why should you be good, without God”. The questioner doubts we always have reasons to do always what is right. However, this doubt is compatible with admitting that one would continue to do what is right without God. What you should do and what you would do are not the same thing. Dawkin’s argument here was anticipated and responded to by Henry Sidgwick :

    It was no use to say that if I was a moral hero, I should have formed a habit of willing actions beneficial to others which would remain in force, even with my own pleasure in the other scale. I knew that at any rate, I was not the kind of moral hero who does this without reason; from blind habit. Nor did I ever wish to be that kind of hero: for it seemed to me that that kind of hero, however admirable, was certainly not a philosopher. I must somehow see that it was right for me to sacrifice my happiness for the good of the whole of which I am a part.[8]

    Sidgwick accepts that if I am a highly moral person, I will have formed a habit of doing good actions. These habits will mean I will have a strong disposition to continue doing good when I believe it is not in my self-interest. But, this does not show that I really do have a reason for doing this. I could be just acting out of blind habit and prior commitment to morality. One possible response to the question, “why be good?” is to admit there is no reason and affirm we “must simply decide between the moral life and its alternatives.” [9] People can sometimes make arbitrary non-rational leaps of faith where they commit to some form of life without reason or rational grounds. If people never did this, the whole raison d’être for writing The God Delusion is undermined. The fact that morally upright people admit that they would always do what is right in the absence of God. Doesn’t show they have reasons to do so.

    Lets recap: Someone asks a serious sceptical question about Dawkin’s beliefs. His response is first to express outrage at an “ignoble.” [10] question and claim it is a “conversation stopper.” [11]. Then he paints a very uncharitable and inaccurate picture of the person who dares ask this ignoble question. Suggesting that religious believers who raise this sceptical challenge reveal themselves to be selfish egoists, amoral people we should consider shunning. When the believer objects that he isnt, in fact, an amoralist, Dawkin’s takes that as evidence the believer doesn’t really accept the sceptical challenge. The subtext is that anyone who really harboured this doubt about secular morality is a dangerous psychopath we are well-advised to keep away from. 

    For the reasons spelt out above, none of this count as a good answer to the question: why be moral without God” There may, or may not, be a good answer to this question. But if there is Dawkin’s doesn’t provide it. This seems to be more a case of passive-aggressive rhetorical bullying than substance. He responds to a sceptical question, not by answering it. But with sarcastic outrage, an insinuation the questioner is dangerous, evil, and should be shunned for asking the question. These are the kind of tactics one expects from cult leaders or so-called religious fundamentalists. One doesn’t expect it from someone who is supposed to be a proponent of rational scientific free inquiry. 


    [1] Richard Dawkin’s, The God Delusion (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2006) 226-227

    [2] John Tilley, “Two (Faulty) Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism” available at https://www.pdcnet.org/wcp20-paideia/content/wcp20-paideia_1998_0044_0248_0253 accessed 26/1/21 

    [3] Examples include Rene Descartes, John Locke, George Berkeley, John Gay, John Brown, Edmund Law William Paley, Thomas Reid, and Immanuel Kant, perhaps most famous for pressing this difficulty is Henry’s Sidgwick.

    [4] Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, III iii. viii, 4 see http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/reid1788essay3part3.pdf accessed 12 January 2020

    [5] See, Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, III iii. viii, 4 seehttp://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/reid1788essay3part3.pdf accessed 12 January 2020

    [6] Dawkins, God Delusion, 227

    [7] Dawkins, God Delusion, 227

    [8] See, Henry Sidgwick “Method of Ethics” Preface to the sixth edition.

    [9] See Tilley, Two (Faulty) Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism” available at https://www.pdcnet.org/wcp20-paideia/content/wcp20-paideia_1998_0044_0248_0253 accessed 26/1/21

    [10] Dawkins, God Delusion, 226

    [11] Dawkins, God Delusion, he has no answer to the question and hence nothing to say.