Tag: Utilitarianism

  • Is Theism Incompatible with the Pauline Principle? Comments on James Sterba’s Argument from Evil

    My paper, “Is Theism Incompatible with the Pauline Principle?” has been published in a special issue of Religions, devoted to the topic Do We Now Have A Logical Argument From Evil? The abstract is as follows:

     

    This paper criticises James Sterba’s use of the Pauline principle to formulate a logical version of the problem of evil. Sterba’s argument contains a crucial premise: If human agents are always prohibited from doing some action, God is also prohibited from doing that action. This implies that the Pauline principle applies to both Divine and human agents. I argue that any Theist who affirms a divine command theory of ethics can consistently and coherently deny this premise and its implication. If a divine command theory is coherent, a theist can affirm that the Pauline principle governs human agents’ actions but not God’s actions. I will also criticise Sterba’s criticisms of a divine command theory and argue that they fail.

     

    Enjoy.

  • What is the Question?: John Gay’s “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”

    In recent posts I have been looking at the rhetorical question: “if there is no God, why be good?” In my last post, I suggested one way to understand this question was in terms of Henry Sidgwick’s famous argument regarding the “dualism of practical reason. As I interpreted Sidgwick, his argument had three steps.

    • First, unless we assume that it is always in our long term self-interest to follow the demands of impartial benevolence, we will not always have decisive reasons to do our duty.
    • Second, secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. They imply that it is not always in our long-term self-interest to follow impartial demands.
    • By contrast, a divine command theory, would if true, vindicate this assumption and provide a coherent account of our fundamental intuitions about the authority and content of moral requirements.

    In my view, Sidgwick’s discussion of these issues is not idiosyncratic. While Sidgwick gives brings a particular level of rigour to the question. My reading of the utilitarian tradition, particularly early religious versions of utilitarianism, suggests that the challenge of a “dualism of practical reason” was a well-known problem when Sidgwick wrote. It had been a standard way 18th-century divine command theorists critiqued secular versions of utilitarianism. In, this post I will explore a different thinker who anticipates many of Sidgwick’s arguments by almost a hundred and fifty years: the philosopher/theologian John Gay.

    Who is John Gay?

    John Gay was a lecturer in Greek and ecclesiastical history at Cambridge from 1724-1732. Gay is not a figure you often hear about in textbooks on the history of philosophy. We know very little about his life or academic career. Today he is known only by a short essay he published in 1731 entitled “The Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality” (Dissertation).  The Dissertation was, within England,[1]  the first systematic presentation and defence of a utilitarian moral theory. Gay’s work marks the beginning of English utilitarianism. 

    Today utilitarianism is assumed to be a paradigmatically secular ethical theory. Gay’s Dissertation proposed an earlier version of the theory known as Theological utilitarianism. Theological utilitarianism is “a doctrine according to which we have a duty to promote the good of humanity because God, our universally benevolent creator, wants us to do so.”[2] As Gay articulated it, moral requirements are divine commands; hence, “the will of God is the immediate criterion of Virtue.”[3] Because God is impartial and benevolent, his purpose, in commanding, is to promote the happiness of his creatures;” Thus the will of God is the immediate criterion of Virtue, and the happiness of mankind the criterion of the wilt of God; and therefore the happiness of mankind may be said to be the criterion of virtue, but once removed.”[4]

    Gay’s theological Utilitarianism became the common position of Cambridge Theologians for the next century.  Cambridge scholars such as  Thomas Rutherford (1744), John Brown(1751),  Some Jeynes (1757), and Edmund Law (1758) repeated  Gay’s essential theory and arguments. Gay’s work also had an evident influence on William Paley. Paley’s “On the Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy” (1785) became one of the most widely read defences of utilitarianism in the nineteenth century. Paley based The Principles on the lectures he delivered while teaching at Cambridge. The Principles was required text in moral philosophy at Cambridge till the 1830s and they were heavily indebted to Gay.  The Cambridge connection is interesting because Sidgwick was a moral philosophy professor at Cambridge from 1883 until his death in 1900. Sidgwick’s book “Method of Ethics” marked the high point in the tradition of English utilitarianism. Gay’s Dissertation marked the beginning of this tradition. Both were authored at the same institution within 143 years of each other.

    What is noteworthy for our purposes is that all elements and basic argument found in Sidgwick’s “dualism of practical reason” can be found in the Dissertation. 

    Why we have to assume harmony between impartial and prudential requirements?

    Let’s look at the first step in Sidgwick’s argument; the claim that unless we assume that it is always in our long-term self-interest to follow the demands of impartial benevolence, we will not always have decisive reasons to do our duty. In my previous post, I suggested Sidgwick’s reasoning could be seen as an inference from three premises:

    [1] We always have decisive reasons to do what is morally required.

    [2] An action is morally required if it is required by rules justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence.[5]

    [3] If there are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with our long-term self-interest, we do not always have decisive reasons to do what is required by impartially justified rules.

    Each of these premises was in Gay’s  Dissertation. Gay articulated virtue as follows:

    Virtue is the conformity to a rule of life, directing the actions to all rational creatures with respect to each other’s happiness; to which conformity everyone in all cases is obliged: and every one that does so conform, is or ought to be approved of, esteemed and loved for so doing. What is here expressed, I believe most men put into their idea of virtue. For virtue generally does imply some relation to others: where self is only concerned, a man is called prudent, (not virtuous)[6]

    Here Gay articulated [1]. Gay contended that it is part of the “common conception” that virtue is a rule of life “to which conformity everyone in all cases is obliged”. In the Dissertation, Gay used the word “obliged” and “obligatory”  term synonymously with the idea of decisive reason to act. Gay is saying that we always have decisive reasons to do what is morally required.

    We also clearly see [2]. Gay understood virtue as conformity to certain rules, rules which direct our conduct, and which we use to evaluate and praise or blame people’s actions. These rules have a particular kind of content. They direct us to promote the good, not just of ourselves, but also the good of others. They promote the happiness of all impartially. Gay, therefore, agreed with Sidgwick that our fundamental moral intuitions have a utilitarian basis. Moral requirements are demands justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence. He differs from Sidgwick only in developing this in a rule utilitarian instead of an act utilitarian way.

    Gay, also like Sidgwick, thought this was implicit in our common-sense moral beliefs. That morality consists of rules justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence is “what most men put into their idea of Virtue”. Gay argued that the intuitive deontological rules, defended by other ethicists, such as Samuel Clarke, could be derived from the criteria of happiness to mankind as a more fundamental principle.

    Gay also affirms [3], he writes

    Thus those who either or don’t mention the will of God, making the immediate criterion of virtue to be the good of mankind; must either allow that virtue is not in all cases obligatory (contrary to the idea which all or most men have of it) or they must say that the good of mankind is a sufficient obligation. But how can the good of mankind by any obligation to me, when perhaps in particular cases, such as laying down my life, or the like, it is contrary to my happiness?[7]

    Like Sidgwick, Gay here was concerned with a certain kind of dilemma. The possibility of “particular cases” where rules that enjoin “the good of mankind” are “contrary to my happiness”. For example, cases where I am required to  “lay down my life”. If such cases do occur, then the “good of mankind” can’t be a “sufficient obligation”; we must allow that virtue is “not in all cases obligatory”.  If such cases exist,  we do not always have decisive reasons to do what is required by those rules.

    So, Gay agreed with the first step of Sidgwick’s argument. Unless one assumes that impartial and prudential requirements never clash, there will be a dualism of practical reason. This dualism means we cannot coherently claim we always have decisive reasons to do our duty.

    Why Secular accounts undermine this assumption?

    Gay also argued that secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. The dilemma Gay was concerned about arises when people make “the happiness of mankind” the immediate criteria of virtue, without “mentioning the will of God”. Earlier, Gay discussed four “four different manners in which” an obligation [is induced” These are;

    First, that obligation which ariseth from perceiving the natural consequences of things, i. e. the consequences of things acting according to the fix’d laws of nature, maybe call’d natural. Secondly, that arising from merit or demerit, as producing the esteem and favour of our fellow creatures, or the contrary, is usually styled virtuous. Thirdly, that arising from the authority of the civil magistrate, civil. Fourthly, that from the authority of God, religious.[8]

    I noted that Gay used the word “obligation” to mean something like a practical reason or reason for acting. When we see this, it is evident that Gay was discussing what Sidgwick referred to as sanctions.  He was referring to negative or positive consequences annexed impartially justified rules, which provide us with prudential reasons to comply with them.

    Many of these sanctions overlapped those discussed by Sidgwick. When Gay referred to consequences: “arising from merit or demerit, as producing the esteem and favour of our fellow creatures, ” he referred to what Sidgwick called social sanctions. Consequences “arising from the authority of the civil magistrate” was a reference to Sidgwick’s category of legal sanctions.  The reference to religious sanctions was a reference to what Sidgwick meant by the term. Like Sidgwick, Gay thought that when one brackets religious sanctions and relied on secular sanctions alone. These sanctions are insufficient to ensure a “full and complete obligation” that “will extend to all cases”. If secular sanctions are the only sanctions that exist, then the assumption: that it is always in our interests to follow impartial rules is probably false.

    Why a divine command theory vindicates this assumption?

    Gay also argued that a divine command theory would, if true, vindicate the assumption. We noted above what Gay takes to be our conception of “virtue”.

    Virtue is the conformity to a rule of life, directing the actions of all rational creatures with respect to each other’s happiness; to which conformity every one in all cases is obliged: and every one that does so conform, is or ought to be approved of, esteemed and loved for so doing. What is here expressed, I believe most men put into their idea of virtue. For virtue generally does imply some relation to others: where self is only concerned.[9]

    Here Gay, highlighted three features which he thinks are implicit in our intuitive common-sense understanding of morality.  First, moral requirements are requirements imposed by rules, norms or standards. Second, these requirements have a particular content; they direct us to seek the good of others impartially. Third, we always have decisive reasons to comply with them. Fourth, they have sanctions attached to them; people are subject to praise and blame for how well they conform to such rules.  A divine command theory, if true, accounts for all these features.

    Notably, a divine command theory is true, accounts for [1]

    Now it is evident from the nature of God, viz. his being infinitely happy in himself from all eternity, and from his goodness manifested in his works, that he could have no other design in creating mankind than their happiness; and therefore he wills their happiness; therefore the means of their happiness: therefore that my behaviour, as far as it may be a means of the happiness of mankind, should be such. Here then we are got one step farther, or to a new criterion: not to a new criterion of virtue immediately, but to a criterion of the will of God. For it is an answer to the enquiry, How shall I know what the Will of God in this particular is? Thus the will of God is the immediate criterion of virtue, and the happiness of mankind the criterion of the wilt of God; and therefore the happiness of mankind may be said to be the criterion of virtue, but once removed.[10]

    Gay here cites an argument first proposed by Berkeley.  Because God is impartial, benevolent, and rational, his commands would lay down rules that are justified from an impartial benevolent perspective. Consequently, if moral requirements are divine commands, would expect them to express rules which promoted the happiness of all impartially.  Morality has the content one would expect it to have if a divine command theory is true.

    A divine command theory also accounts for [1],

    [I]t is evident that a full and complete obligation which will extend to all cases, can only be that arising from the authority of God; because God only can in all cases make a man happy or miserable: and therefore, since we are always obliged to that conformity called virtue, it is evident that the immediate rule or criterion of it, is the will of God.[11]

    Suppose moral requirements are divine commands, and commands are demands backed by sanctions. In that case, it is always in one’s long-term self-interest to do what we are morally required to do. Hence, a divine command theory entails [1].  The same line of argument also vindicates the assumption that it is always in our interests to do what is impartially required. If a divine command theory is true, the kind of dilemmas that Gay believed undermine [1] cannot occur.

    When we examine John Gay, we find him offering an argument for a theological version of utilitarianism that anticipates Sidgwick’s argument in almost every respect.

    There is an interesting historical narrative here.  Gay taught at Cambridge from 1724 to 1732. He developed a religious version of utilitarianism; whereby moral requirements are divine commands. Gay argued his theory would if, true, coherently explain why we always have decisive reasons to do our duty. He warned that if the theological component of the theory were removed, there would be a problem: a dualism of practical reason. This problem would mean we cannot coherently explain why we always have reasons to do our duty. Gay’s position was adopted and defended by Cambridge theologians, eventually being part of Cambridge’s standard textbooks till 1830.

    Forty years later, Sidgwick, writing in Cambridge, inherits this tradition. However, it is a secular version of utilitarianism mediated through Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Sidgwick ends The Method of Ethics, concluding there is a problematic dualism of practical reason that makes us unable to coherently explain why we always have reasons to do our duty. Sidgwick ended by suggesting that one way to solve this problem coherently is to return to the theological utilitarianism of John Gay.[12]

    Sidgwick then was not formulating a new problem in the Method of Ethics. Instead, he was drawing attention to a problem that divine command theorists had raised for secular utilitarianism from the beginning and highlighted that Bentham and Mill had failed to solve it.



    [1] The first  written exposition of  Utilitarianism is arguably George Berkeley’s  “Passive Obedience”, which was presented in Ireland in 1712

    [2] Matti Häyry “Passive Obedience and Berkeley’s Moral Philosophy” Berkeley Studies 23 (2012) 3

    [3] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

    [4] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

    [5] I have altered premise [2] slightly to reflect Gay’s rule utilitarianism.

    [6] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

    [7] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

    [8] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

    [9] Ibid

    [10] Ibid

    [11] Ibid

    [12] In “Outline of The History of Ethics”, Sidgwick writes:

    “But in fact a simple outline of Paley’s utilitarianism may be found more than a generation earlier in the following passages from Gay’s Dissertation…[Bentham] does not himself use the will of an omnipotent and benevolent being as a means of logically connecting individual and general happiness. He thus undoubtedly simplifies his system, and avoids the disputable inferences from nature and Scripture in which Paley’s position is involved, but this gain is dearly purchased. For the question immediately arises, How then are the sanctions of the moral rules which it will most conduce to the general happiness for men to observe shown to be always adequate in the case of all the individuals whose observance is required?”

     

  • What is the Question?: Henry Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason

    In a previous post, I criticised Richard Dawkins’s discussion of the question: if there is no God, why be good? One criticism I raised was that Dawkins seemed to misunderstand the challenge this rhetorical question presents.  This raises the question as to how we should understand this rhetorical question. What exactly is the problem being alluded to when people ask, “if there is no God, why be good.”? I have been thinking a bit about this of late. In this post, I will begin an attempt to do this by looking at someone who developed an influential version of the problem, Henry Sidgwick.

    Who was Henry Sidgwick?

    Henry Sidgwick was a moral philosopher based at Cambridge University in the late nineteenth century. Outside of the world of Moral Philosophy, Henry Sidgwick is probably not a household name. However, within the world of moral philosophy, Sidgwick’s book “The Method of Ethics” (ME) is widely considered a classic of Moral Philosophy. Sidgwick represents the high point of the classical Utilitarian moral tradition tracing back to John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. His work has widely influenced leading utilitarian philosophers such as Roger Crisp, Peter Singer and Derek Parfit. 

    Interestingly, Sidgwick ended the book with a degree of pessimism about whether a coherent secular utilitarian moral theory was possible.  Sidgwick’s believed that secular versions of utilitarianism could not coherently answer the most fundamental question of ethics: why should I always do my duty? By contrast, Sidgwick thought Theism could coherently answer this question.

    Sidgwick spells out the reasons he came to this conclusion in the final chapter of ME. As I interpret him, his argument contains three steps. 

    • First, he argued that unless we assume there is “harmony” between “rational benevolence” and “prudence”, morality cannot be entirely rational. Instead,  and our “fundamental intuitions” about morality will be “incoherent”. 
    • Second, he argues that secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. They imply that “rational benevolence” and “prudence” are not in harmony. 
    • By contrast, a divine command theory, would if true, vindicate this assumption and provide a coherent account of our fundamental intuitions. 

    The conclusion is those divine command theories can coherently answer the question: “why should I always do my duty?” whereas secular ethical theories cannot.  Because Sidgwick was both an agnostic and a utilitarian, this conclusion caused him considerable anxiety. He wrestled with it for much of his academic life.

    Why do we need to assume harmony between benevolence and Prudence?

    Let’s begin by looking at the first step in Sidgwick’s argument. Sidgwick begins the final chapter by (ME) arguing: “If morality is to be made completely rational, the harmony between the maxim of prudence and the maxim of rational benevolence must be somehow demonstrated.”[1]

    Let me clarify the terminology here:

    First, Sidgwick uses the term “rational benevolence”. In earlier chapters, Sidgwick had argued that analysis and systematisation of our common-sense moral beliefs suggest that moral requirements are requirements justified from a certain point of view. A point of view of impartial benevolence. It is a point of view which the welfare or the good of everyone, which does so impartiality; not considering anyone’s interest or welfare more important than anyone else’s. Sidgwick refers to this as “the point of view of the universe” or the “maxim of rational benevolence”. Because the phrase “moral requirements that are justified from the point of view of impartial benevolence” is unwieldy. I will use the phrase “impartial demands” as shorthand for this.

    Second, Sidgwick says demonstrating the harmony between impartial demands and Prudence is necessary if morality is to be “completely rational”. What he means by “completely rational” is explicated later in the chapter. Failure to “completely” rationalise Morality” means: 

    [P]ractical reason would still impel us decisively to the performance of duty in ordinary cases where what is recognised as duty is in harmony with self-interest properly understood. But in the rarer cases where we find a conflict between self-interest and duty, practical reason, being divided against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side. The conflict would have to be decided by which of two groups of non-rational impulses had more force.[2]

    For morality to be “completely rational” means that we always have decisive reasons to do our duty. Someone has decisive reasons to act in a certain way when the reasons in favour of acting, taken together, are stronger than any set of reasons we may have to act in some other way.  

    Sidgwick’s, claim then is this: unless it is in our long term self-interest to always comply with impartial demands, we will not always have decisive reasons to do our duty. Sometimes, the strongest reasons will favour doing our duty; on other occasions, they will not. Commitment to always doing what is right will at best be rationally optional and at worst irrational.

    Why does Sidgwick think this? Sidgwick was concerned about a specific sort of practical dilemma which he thought irresolvable. Suppose it is not always in one’s long-term self-interest to act according to impartial demands. This will mean impartial demands sometimes come into conflict with prudential requirements. When they do, we face the question: What reason is there to act impartially, rather than in one’s self-interest. What reason do we have for assuming that impartial demands are always stronger or weightier than prudential requirements when the two clash?

    Sidgwick raises this question repeatedly in the preface to the sixth edition. He asks what the  “rational ground.”[3] is for “subordinating self-interest…to “altruistic” impulses and sentiments” on “what ground?” do we make the “moral choice of the general happiness” or “acquiescence in self-interest.”[4]. What reasons other than “blind habit.”[5] were there in favour is making altruistic sacrifices of one’s self-interest in this way? Sidgwick concluded that no answer is forthcoming. Envisaging someone faced with such a dilemma, Sidgwick states: 

    He might say, “I quite admit that when the painful necessity comes for another man to choose between his own happiness and the general happiness, he must as a reasonable being prefer his own, i.e. it is right for him to do this on my principle….It did not seem to me that this reasoning could be effectively confuted. No doubt it was, from the point of view of the universe, reasonable to prefer the greater good to the lesser, even though the lesser good was the private happiness of the agent. Still, it seemed to me also undeniably reasonable for the individual to prefer his own. The rationality of self-regard seemed to me as undeniable as the rationality of self-sacrifice.

    Suppose Sidgwick is correct and there is no reason for giving impartial demands precedence over prudential requirements in a conflict. If a conflict occurs, the total reasons in favour of doing what is impartially demanded will not be stronger than the reasons against so acting. We can summarise Sidgwick’s conclusion here as an inference from three premises, which he takes to be intuitively plausible: 

    [1] The strongest reasons always favour doing what is morally required.

    [2] An action is morally required if and only if it is demanded from a perspective of impartial benevolence.

    [3] If there are cases where, what is impartially demanded of a person, is an action that is contrary to their long-term self-interest, then the strongest reasons do not always favour doing the action that is demanded from a perspective of impartial benevolence. 

    Suppose [1] [2] and [3] are correct. In that case, we must either embrace the thesis that impartial demands and prudential demands never conflict or embrace a contradiction.  To see this, suppose we assume these demands do conflict:

    [3a] there are cases where an action is demanded from a perspective of impartial benevolence is contrary to one’s own long term self-interest 

    It follows from [3] that, 

    [3b] the strongest reasons do not always favour doing what is demanded from a perspective of impartial benevolence. 

    And [3b] conjoined with [2] entails that;

    [3c] The strongest reasons do not always favour doing what is morally required.

    However, [1] states.

    [1] The strongest reasons always favour doing what is morally required.

    [1] and [3] are obviously in contradiction. Sidgwick concludes that the hypothesis of “harmony of duty and self-interest “is required” to avoid a basic contradiction in one chief part of our thought”. Denying this hypothesis results in “practical reason being divided against itself” and forces us “to abandon the idea of rationalising [morality] it completely.”[6] Sidgwick referred to this problem as “the dualism of practical reason”. “‘self-love’ and ‘Conscience’ claim to rule, and neither will yield to the other.”[7]

    Why do Secular Moral Theories Undermines this assumption?

    This brings me to the second step of Sidgwick’s argument. Sidgwick argues that secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. In ME., Sidgwick examines what sanctions are attached to impartial rules. Sidgwick defines a sanction as “the pleasures that come from conforming to moral rules, and the pains that come from violating them”[8]. Importantly, he initially confines himself to sanctions we might call “secular” or naturalistic. “[T]he coincidence of duty and happiness considered as something that we know about from experience and can expect to show up in our present earthly life.”[9]. Sidgwick identifies several different kinds of secular sanctions which might attach to impartial rules Legal sanctions: “penalties inflicted by the authority of the state”. Social sanctions: “the pleasures to be expected from the approval and goodwill of our fellowmen” and internal sanctions: “the pleasurable emotion, or absence of remorse that accompanies virtuous action”. Linked with internal sanctions is also “sympathy”, where the suffering of others causes us to feel pain and suffering ourselves.

     Sidgwick examines whether the existence of these types of sanctions gives us any reason to think that it is always in our self-interest to comply with impartial demands. His discussion is subtle and detailed, and space prevents me from elaborating it in detail. However, his conclusion is pessimistic.: “when we carefully analyse and estimate the consequences of virtue to the virtuous agent, it appears improbable that this alignment is complete and universal.”[10] He concludes. “the more carefully we examine how the different sanctions—legal, social, and conscientious—operate in the actual conditions of human life, the harder it is to believe that they can always produce this coincidence ·of happiness with social virtue.”[11]. 

    If the only sanctions annexed to impartial rules are secular sanctions, the assumption that it is always in our interests to act according to impartial demands is probably false. 

    Why Divine command theories vindicate this assumption.

    Sidgwick next turns to what he calls religious sanctions.

    This [the failure of secular sanctions] has led other utilitarian writers to prefer to throw the weight of duty on the religious sanction;. From this point of view, the utilitarian code is conceived as the law of God, who is to be regarded as having commanded men to promote general happiness, and announced that he will reward those who obey his commands and punish those who don’t. It’s clear that if we feel convinced that an omnipotent being has somehow signified such commands and announcements, a rational egoist can’t need any further inducement to shape his life on utilitarian principles.[12]

    The other utilitarians” Sidgwick is referring to here are advocates of the theological utilitarianism that was proposed by writers, such as Paley, Berkeley, John Gay, John Brown, John Austin. Theological Utilitarian’s had combined normative rule utilitarianism with a divine command theory of meta-ethics.[13]  These writers had argued that moral requirements are divine commands.  And this assumption enables them to coherently affirm [1] and [2] and [3] without contradiction.

    Because God is both benevolent and impartial, omniscient and rational, he issues those commands that are justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence in light of all relevant facts.  Hence, a divine command theory, if true, entails the truth of [2].

    Similarly, because commands were understood as prescriptions or rules, which God holds people accountable, one always had decisive reasons to comply with impartial demands. So, it is always in one’s long-term self-interest to act in accord with impartial demands. 

    Consequently, If moral requirements are divine commands, then the assumption of harmony between impartial demands and prudential requirements is vindicated.  Note the issue here is not just that the coincidence is consistent with divine command meta-ethics. The claim is that would if true, entail or predict this coincidence.

    Sidgwick then argues three things; (a) unless we assume that it is in our long-term self-interest always to follow impartial demands, we don’t have decisive reasons to do what is right;  (b) Secular accounts of morality, if true, undermine this assumption, and; (c) divine command theories, if true, vindicate it. 

    Of course, I have not in a short post defended these claims. Advocates of secular forms of utilitarianism will contest each of these steps. But the point is there is a serious line of thought here that needs to be addressed. Just as a divine command theorist cannot just assert that God provides the best account of morality and has to address sceptical challenges to their position, such as the Euthyphro dilemma. Opponents of religious morality have to address concerns raised by Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason. It is not enough to caricature it as the crude claim that “the only motive I have to be good is fear” and dismissing this claim as obviously ridiculous.

     


    [1] Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, 242 available at https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/sidgwick1874.pdf accessed 20/3/21

    [2] Ibid 284

    [3] Preface to the Sixth Edition” Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick available at https://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/sidgwick/me/me.preface.s06.html accessed 20/30/21

    [4] Ibid

    [5] Ibid

    [6] Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, 248 available at https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/sidgwick1874.pdf accessed 20/3/21.

    [7] This quote is from Barton Schultz “Henry Sidgwick” in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sidgwick/ accessed 26/3/21.

    [8] Ibid 76

    [9] Ibid, 75

    [10] Ibid, 82

    [11] Ibid 243

    [12] Ibid 246

    [13] See my posts  http://www.mandm.org.nz/2018/01/divine-command-theory-and-utilitarianism-forgotten-bedfellows-paleys-principles-of-moral-and-political-philosophy-part-one.html and http://www.mandm.org.nz/2018/01/divine-command-theory-and-utilitarianism-forgotten-bedfellows-paleys-principles-of-moral-and-political-philosophy-part-two.html accessed 26/3/21

  • Divine Command Theory and Utilitarianism forgotten bedfellows? Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (part two)

    In my last post, I explained the position of Theological Utilitarianism as expounded in William Paley’s The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. I pointed out The Principles was first published in 1785, four years before Jeremy Bentham published An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In this post, I want to look at the influence Theological Utilitarianism had in the 18th and 19th centuries. Was Paley expounding some novel idiosyncratic position? Or was he simply repeating a fairly mainstream position on the relationship between Gods law and happiness which had been around for decades?

    1. The influence of Theological Utilitarianism in the 18thand 19th centuries

    Theological Utilitarianism sounds novel to contemporary ears. But it wasn’t an innovative position in the late eighteenth century. Paley notes in the preface that he is a “compiler” of earlier writers of moral theory. Schneewind, states that the theory he proposed was in fact “an assemblage of ideas developed by others and is presented to be learned by students rather than debated by colleagues. “[1] Some trace theological utilitarianism back to the divine command theory of John Locke[2]  However, the earliest clear exponent of this position appears to be George Berkeley’s sermons in 1712.[3]

    It is worth looking at Berkeley in some detail.  According to Berkeley, things are “denominated good or evil” as “they are fitted to augment or impair our own Happiness” Good or Evil. On the other hand, “Moral Goodness” consists in a “Conformity to the Laws of God.” Berkley articulates the relationship between moral and non-moral goodness as follows:

    For Laws being Rules directive of our Actions to the end intended by the Legislator, in order to attain the paleyKnowledge of God’s Laws, we ought first to enquire what that end is, which he designs should be carried on by human Actions. God is a Being of Infinite Goodness. it is plain the end he proposes is Good. But God enjoying in himself all possible Perfection, it follows that it is not his own Good, but that of his Creatures. Again, the Moral Actions of Men are entirely terminated within themselves, so as to have no influence on the other orders of Intelligences or reasonable Creatures: The end therefore to be procured by them, can be no other than the good of Men. But as nothing in a natural State can entitle one Man more than another to the favour of God, except only Moral Goodness, which consisting in a Conformity to the Laws of God, doth presuppose the being of such Laws, and Law ever supposing an end, to which it guides our Actions, it follows that Antecedent to the end proposed by God, no distinction can be conceived between Men; that end therefore itself or general design of Providence is not determined or limited by any Respect of Persons: It is not therefore the private Good of this or that Man, Nation or Age, but the general well-being of all Men, of all Nations, of all Ages of the World, which God designs should be procured by the concurring Actions of each individual. Having thus discover’d the great end, to which all Moral Obligations are Subordinate; it remains, that we enquire what Methods are necessary for the obtaining that End.[4]

    When Berkeley says God is  infinitely good, he like Samuel Clarke seems to mean that God  has “an unalterable disposition to do and to communicate good or happiness.”[5] [6] God’s goal in issuing the commands he does is the happiness, impartially considered of all human beings.

    Berkeley proceeds to note two ways that God could promote this happiness. One would be “without the injunction of any certain universal Rules of Morality, to to oblige “every one upon each particular Occasion, to consult the publick Good, and always to do that, which to him shall seem in the present time and circumstances, most to conduce to it.”  The second is  “by enjoining the Observation of some determinate, established Laws, which, if Universally practised, have from the Nature of things an Essential fitness to procure the well-being of Mankind” Berkeley argues that “”there lie several strong Objections.” Berkeley then anticipates the “self-effacing” objection to act utilitarianism arguing that anyone committed to promoting the happiness of others wouldn’t promulgate act utilitarianism as a decision procedure. Public endorsement and acceptance of the rule “do whatever maximises utility” would probably not maximise utility. Consequently, Berkeley concludes that God has followed the second method.

    Stephen Darwall suggests that the best way to interpret Berkeley is to distinguish between his meta-ethical theory and normative theory. His meta-ethical theory attempts “to answer metaphysical questions of what goodness and rightness themselves, respectively, are.” On the other hand, his normative theory “concerns what actions or things are good and right.” Meta-ethically Berkeley is a divine command theorist “moral goodness consists” consists in a “Conformity to the Laws of God”. However, Berkeley’s normative theory was rule-utilitarian, God commands “Laws, which, if Universally practised, have from the Nature of things an Essential fitness to procure the well-being of Mankind”.[7]

    A position very similar to Berkeley is hinted at in Butler’s writings[8] but is expounded more clearly in the writings of, John Gay [9] John Brown, and Abraham Tucker.   It’s clear that Paley clearly draws upon this earlier tradition.  In the preface to The Principles Paley acknowledges that he is attempting to compile and articulate the positions of John Gay, and Abraham Tucker. Book II chapter 1 of The Principles proposes a line of argument that closely resembles the argument of John Gay “Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”.

    Similarly, Paley’s emphasis on rules is, as we saw, found in Berkeley’s Passive obedience and performs the same function. Berkeley’s initial advancement of this distinction and advocacy of rule utilitarianism was part of a broader argument to argue against violent resistance to the state during the Jacobite agitation in Ireland. He was concerned that people were advocating the violation of certain negative rules of the law of nature such as: “do not commit adultery”, “do not steal”, “don’t rebel against the government”, whenever they perceived doing so would further the public good. Paley uses the distinction for similar purposes, to respond to the objection that utilitarianism allows people to break with impunity moral rules against theft and murder whenever they perceive it will make people happy.

    In fact, the proximate source for Paley’s stress on rules appears to be Abraham Tucker. Tucker. Wrote

      As we cannot upon every occasion see to the end of our proceedings, he [the moralist] will establish certain rules to serve as landmarks for guiding us on the way.  These rules, when he has leisure and opportunity for mature consideration, he will build on one another, erecting the whole fabric upon the basis of the summum bonum before described.  (Original emphasis)[10]

    Similarly, Paley’s argument that God wills the happiness of his creatures and so the commands God issues must be coextensive with promoting the happiness is ubiquitous in the tradition that preceded him. This argument is s found in Berkeley, Gay, and Brown Louden also documents the same argument occurs in Adam Smith and Joseph Butler [11]

    Finally, Paley’s exposition of this tradition was very influential. The principles became required text at Cambridge university Schneewind points out “utilitarianism first became widely known in England through the work of William Paley.[12] Paley, not Bentham being its most well-known exponent.  Similarly, Smith points out that Paley’s writings were once as well known in American colleges as were the readers and spellers of William McGuffey and Noah Webster in the elementary schools.[13]

    In fact, Paley’s influence is still seen clearly in John Austin’s work on Jurisprudence, in the early and late nineteenth century.  Mill himself appeals to the tradition:

    We not uncommonly hear the doctrine of utility inveighed against as a godless doctrine. If it be necessary to say anything at all against so mere an assumption, we may say that the question depends upon what idea we have formed of the moral character of the Deity. If it be a true belief that God desires, above all things, the happiness of his creatures, and that this was his purpose in their creation, utility is not only not a godless doctrine, but more profoundly religious than any other. If it be meant that utilitarianism does not recognise the revealed will of God as the supreme law of morals, I answer, that a utilitarian who believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of God, necessarily believes that whatever God has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals, must fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree. …Whether this opinion is correct or not, it is superfluous here to discuss; since whatever aid religion, either natural or revealed, can afford to ethical investigation, is as open to the utilitarian moralist as to any other. He can use it as the testimony of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given course of action.[14]

    Mill here explicitly rejects the idea that Utilitarianism does not recognize the revealed will as the supreme law of morals, and uses a line of argument very similar to Paley, whose writings Mill was aware of, to argue the contrary.

    Consequently, Utilitarianism then wasn’t a new or novel theory of ethics proposed by secular thinkers such as Hume and Bentham in the late 18th century. Nor did it develop in response to or in opposition to a conception of morality based divine commands or divine laws. Divine command theorists, in fact, had been advocating Theological Utilitarianism for decades before Bentham, and the popularity of utilitarianism in Anglo-American thought had a good deal to do with the popularity of theological utilitarianism.


    [1]J B Schneewind Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002) 446.  Paley was, therefore, summarising an already existing, popular, school of thought.

    [2] See for example A. P. Brogan “John Locke and Utilitarianism” Ethics 69: 2 (1959), 79-93.

    [3] See Berkeley’s A Discourse on Passive Obedience (1712) and dialogues I-III of the   Alciphron (1732). Berkeley had included a systematic treatise on moral theory in the draft of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), but the manuscript was lost, leaving historians to piece together his theories from his occasional writings.

    [4] Passive obedience: or, the Christian doctrine of not resisting the supreme power, proved and vindicated … In a discourse deliver’d at the College-chapel. By George Berkeley, M.A. Fellow of Trinity-College, Dublin. Available at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ecco/004899015.0001.000/1:3?rgn=div1;view=fulltext

    [5] Clarke, Demonstration, Prop. XII; in Works, vol. II, p. 572.

    [6] Robert Louden notes this conception of God’s goodness was common in the 18th century and similar arguments can be seen in Smith and Butler see Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280

    [7] See Stephen Darwall “Berkeley’s Moral and Political Philosophy,” in, The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, Kenneth Winkler, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

    [8] Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280

    [9] John Gay “Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality” in Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, being Selections from Writers principally of the Eighteenth Century, vol. 2 [1897] available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/bigge-british-moralists-vol-2 accessed 26 Aug 2016

    [11] Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280.

     [12] Schneewind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant 446.

    [13] Wilson Smith “William Paley’s Theological Utilitarianism in America” The William and Mary Quarterly Third Series, 11:3 (1954) 402–424

    [14] John Stuart Mill “What is Utilitarianism” available at https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645u/chapter2.htm

  • Divine Command Theory and Utilitarianism forgotten bedfellows? Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (part one)

    This post is adapted from a short essay I wrote on William Paley’s Ethics

    In a widely used textbook, James Rachels refers to “revolution in ethics” which occurred in the 18-19th centuries.  Referring to upheavals such as the American Revolution, French Revolution, Rachel’s contends that people began to think differently about Ethics. There arose “A new conception of ethics” a conception we today call “utilitarianism”. Rachels states that this was a theory of ethics “proposed by David Hume (1711-1776) but given definitive formulation by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill ( 1806-1873)”  Rachel’s continues:paley

    Bentham’s argument for a new conception of ethics had a powerful influence. Morality, he [Bentham] urged is not a matter of pleasing God, nor is it about following abstract rules; Rather, morality is nothing more than the attempt to bring about as much happiness as possible into the world[1]

    This picture of the history of moral thought seems to be widely held. Stephen Nathanson, for example, writes that utilitarians:

    [R]eject moral codes or systems that consist of commands or taboos that are based on customs, traditions, or orders given by leaders or supernatural beings. Instead, utilitarians think that what makes a morality be true or justifiable is its positive contribution to human (and perhaps non-human) beings.[2]

    The story draws a contrast between moral theories which based morality on divine commands or divine laws and those based on human happiness. The claim is that Utilitarianism was a new or novel theory of ethics proposed by secular thinkers such as Hume and Bentham in the late 18th century. This new happiness based conception was in contrast to and replaced the divine command conception. Utilitarianism is associated with social and political radicalism and the upheavals that followed the American revolution and French revolutions and so is seen not just as secular, but radical.

    I maintain this story is untrue, manifestly untrue when one examines 18th-century moral thought. I can’t spell all the ins and outs here, so will focus on one book that this narrative fails to come to grips with. This is William Paley’s The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (henceforth The Principles) which was first published in 1785, four years before Jeremy Bentham published An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.

    Paley book is significant for three reasons: First, it is a clear presentation of the position known as Theological Utilitarianism: “a doctrine according to which we have a duty to promote the good of humanity because God, our universally benevolent creator, wants us to do so.” [3]   Second, theological utilitarianism was highly influential in the eighteenth century and represented a common way people thought about morality and politics which had dominated English moral thought for several decades. Third, given the rise of classical utilitarianism under Bentham and Mill and its dominance in contemporary moral thought today, utilitarianism is often viewed as a thoroughly secular, liberal and radical moral philosophy at odds with conservative religious and moral viewpoints. Paley’s book provides insight into an alternative conservative religious tradition of utilitarian thought which predates Bentham by several decades.

    1. Paley’s Theological Utilitarianism

     In The Principles Paley summarizes theological utilitarianism succinctly: “Virtue is ‘the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness.’[4]If we were to, anachronistically, expound Paley’s position in today’s philosophical categories, his summary offers an answer to three meta-ethical questions.

    The first is the question of moral ontology: if moral requirements exist, what are they what is there nature? Paley proposes a divine command theory of meta-ethics whereby “the property of ethical wrongness is (identical) with the property of being contrary to God’ s command. ” [5]

    The second, is the question “why be moral”? Sometimes doing my duty conflicts with my self-interest, or with goals I really want to achieve in such cases why should I follow duty and not prudence? Paley’s answer is to distinguish between “what we shall gain or lose in the present world”, and what “what we shall gain or lose in the world to come.” Because God is just and awards good behaviour with eternal life, it is never in our long-term best interests to disobey [6]

    The third, question is:“what is the content of morality?” what types of actions do moral requirements supervene upon. Paley’s answer is that:

    God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures. And this conclusion being once established, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely, “that the method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness.  [7]

    An interesting feature of Paley’s answer is his appeal to rules. Contemporary moral philosophers distinguish between act and rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarians hold that “we should perform the action that will create the greatest net utility.” [8]  The principle of utility is “applied on a case by case basis. The right action in any situation is the one that yields more utility (i.e. creates more well-being) than other available actions.” [9] By contrast rule utilitarians adopt a “two-part view… a) a specific action is morally justified if it conforms to a justified moral rule, and b) a moral rule is justified if its inclusion into our moral code would create more utility than other possible rules (or no rule at all).” [10]  In contemporary moral philosophy, this distinction “was not sharply drawn until the late 1950s when Richard Brandt and introduced this terminology”. [11].

    The move from act to rule utilitarianism appears to have been motivated by problems which emerged in act utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism seemed to imply that a doctor who could save five people from death by killing one healthy person and using that person’s organs for life-saving transplants, should do so. Rule utilitarianism avoids this: while more good would be done by killing the healthy patient in a specific individual case. Having a publically acknowledged and accepted general rule which permits doctors to kill patients whenever they perceive there is the need for organs arguably would have bad consequences.

    Interestingly, Paley draws this distinction in 1785 he contrasts the particular and general consequences of performing an action. The particular consequences are the total consequences of performing an action itself. The general consequences, however, are those that would occur “if the same sort of actions were generally permitted.” Paley identifies himself in what today we would call the rule utilitarian position. Interesting he does so, in anticipation of the problems act utilitarianism would face. Paley forsees that act utilitarianism would have the kind of implications that critics would later press and stresses that utility attaches to the rule to avoid the problem.

    In my next post in this series, I will look at the important influence theological utilitarianism had in the 18th century.


    [1] James Rachels The Elements of Moral Philosophy, (Random House: New York, 1993) 80

    [2]  Stephen Nathanson “Act and Rule Utilitarianism” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/util-a-r/

    [3] Matti Häyry “Passive Obedience and Berkeley’s Moral Philosophy” Berkeley Studies 23 (2012) 3

    [4] William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy [1785] Book I chapter 7, available online at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/paley-the-principles-of-moral-and-political-philosophy accessed 25/8/2016

    [5] This technical definition comes from Robert Adams “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979) 76.  Paley of course does not use this level of precision; I am attempting rather to interpret Paley’s answers in light of more recent technical discussions of the issues.

    [6] William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy Bk II Chapter 3

    [7] Ibid Book II Chapter 5

    [8] Stephen Nathanson “Act and Rule Utilitarianism” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/util-a-r/

    [9] Ibid

    [10] Ibid

    [11] Ibid

  • Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Religious Studies: Part one

    This is a talk I gave to the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers annual conference at St Cutherberts College in September this year. Several people have asked me to make this talk available.

    I have broken my talk up into four parts. Part One introduces what philosophy of religion. In part two I will outline two movements within analytic philosophy during the early to mid-century which I think resulted in religious beliefs not being taken very seriously within philosophy and philosophy of religion taking a fairly minor role. Part three will look at some responses to these movements offered in the late 20th century and how they changed the philosophical landscape. Part four will look at the question of “how to do philosophy of religion” comparing the methods used by two different atheist’s J L Mackie and Graham Oppy, and how this relates the National Certificate of Educational Achievement Standards. This post will contain part one.

    First, I want to thank the association for asking me to speak, seeing I have been teaching in the secondary sector full time for only a  couple of years so I am not sure I have a lot to share with you and feel very much like I have more to learn from you.

    I have been asked to talk about the contemporary philosophy of religion.  In my talk this morning I will focus on three things. First, I will talk about what philosophy of religion is. Second, I will talk a little bit about its history but focus on recent developments in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Finally, I will link some of these things with the current National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA) Standards in Religious Studies. I hope what I say is helpful to you.

    What is Philosophy of Religion
    What is the philosophy of religion? Charles Taliaferro at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as “thephilosophy-of-religion philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions.” He adds “Philosophy of religion also includes an investigation into the religious significance of historical events (e.g., the Holocaust) and general features of the cosmos (e.g., laws of nature, the emergence of conscious life, widespread testimony of religious significance, and so on)”[1] Chad Meister at The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as “ the philosophical study of the meaning and nature of religion. It includes the analyses of religious concepts, beliefs, terms, arguments, and practices of religious adherents.”[2]

    The History of Philosophy of Religion

    Now, Philosophy of religion has a very long history, going back to the Pre-Socratics. And it was an integral part of medieval philosophy, Augustine, Aquinas, Anselm, Abelard, Scotus, Ockham and so forth worked in the tradition of “faith seeking understanding”. They used philosophy as a conceptual tool to reflect upon, analyse, refine, the religious faith that they held and develop philosophically informed models of core religious doctrines, they also used it to respond to objections and critique rival views and develop arguments for the own for theological models they supported. Some of these reflections proved very fruitful.  The Islamic-Christian dialogue over Aristotle’s understanding of causation and how it related to miracles, and Gods causal activity in the world, for example, is profoundly influential on latter accounts of causation by people like David Hume and the concepts of laws of nature used by early modern scientists.

    Perhaps lesser appreciated is the role of philosophy of religion during the enlightenment.  There is an unfortunate tendency in the history of philosophy not to appreciate the religious context in which important key thinkers of the enlightenment operated. Descartes cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am), for example, comes from Augustine’s response to sceptics about religious knowledge in the city of God Book 11: 26. Descartes immediately follows this up of course with an appeal to his own version of the ontological argument, proposed famously by Anselm of Canterbury.

    Or consider John Locke, according to Locke’s associate James Tyrell, the impetus for Locke’s “Essay on human understanding” was a conversation  he, Locke and four others had on the topic of “the principles of morality and revealed religion.” Locke’s attempt to develop a comprehensive empiricist understanding of knowledge was an attempt to answer the question of faith and reason, a topic he explicitly addresses in the last section of the book. (Incidentally, it’s a section often skipped in contemporary courses on Locke.)

    Or consider what a widely used textbook refers to as the “revolution in ethics” which occurred in the 18-19th centuries. Which the author, James Rachels, contends is due to Hume, Bentham and Mill. Rachel’s refers to as “A new conception of ethics”… “Morality, he [Bentham] urged is not a matter of pleasing God,  nor is it about following abstract rules, Rather, morality is nothing more than the attempt to bring about as much happiness as possible into the world”.[3]

    Rachel’s is, of course, talking about utilitarianism. However, his characterisation of the history is quite selective. In 1715, some 74 years before Bentham, George Berkley had defended a rule utilitarian conception of ethics[4]Berkeley was a divine command theorist hat moral rightness, and wrongness consists in agreement and disagreement, respectively, with the will of God.  Because  God’s purposes were benevolent a God’s aim was to maximize the happiness of his creatures, so one could assume that whatever rules maximized happiness were those enjoined by God. Berkley used this theoretical account of God and morality to attempt to reconcile his Irish Anglican commitment to passive obedience with loyalty to the Glorious revolution during Jacobite uprisings in Ireland. Berkley’s “theological utilitarianism” was adopted by people like John Gay, Abraham Tucker and compiled by William Paley. Paley’s textbook defending this way of looking at ethics was the standard text at Cambridge and widely influential several years before Bentham published his defence of utilitarianism.

    I could go on; my point is that Philosophy of religion has a long and prestigious history, even during the enlightenment and an important part of educating students about our history and the history of concepts that undergird much of the modern world involves acknowledging these connections rather than ignoring them.

    [1] Charles Taliaferro “Philosophy of Religion”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philosophy-religion/

    [2] Chad Meister, “Philosophy of Religion” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://www.iep.utm.edu/religion/

    [3] James Rachels The Elements of Moral Philosophy, (Random House: New York, 1993) 80

    [4] For explication see Stephen Darwall, “Berkeley’s Moral and Political Philosophy” Kenneth Winkler (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley. Cambridge University Press. (2005) see also C. D. Broad, “Berkeley’s Theory of Morals” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 23-24 (1953):  72-86.