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What is the Question?: John Gay’s “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”

April 3rd, 2021 by Matt

In recent posts I have been looking at the rhetorical question: “if there is no God, why be good?” In my last post, I suggested one way to understand this question was in terms of Henry Sidgwick’s famous argument regarding the “dualism of practical reason. As I interpreted Sidgwick, his argument had three steps.

  • First, unless we assume that it is always in our long term self-interest to follow the demands of impartial benevolence, we will not always have decisive reasons to do our duty.
  • Second, secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. They imply that it is not always in our long-term self-interest to follow impartial demands.
  • By contrast, a divine command theory, would if true, vindicate this assumption and provide a coherent account of our fundamental intuitions about the authority and content of moral requirements.

In my view, Sidgwick’s discussion of these issues is not idiosyncratic. While Sidgwick gives brings a particular level of rigour to the question. My reading of the utilitarian tradition, particularly early religious versions of utilitarianism, suggests that the challenge of a “dualism of practical reason” was a well-known problem when Sidgwick wrote. It had been a standard way 18th-century divine command theorists critiqued secular versions of utilitarianism. In, this post I will explore a different thinker who anticipates many of Sidgwick’s arguments by almost a hundred and fifty years: the philosopher/theologian John Gay.

Who is John Gay?

John Gay was a lecturer in Greek and ecclesiastical history at Cambridge from 1724-1732. Gay is not a figure you often hear about in textbooks on the history of philosophy. We know very little about his life or academic career. Today he is known only by a short essay he published in 1731 entitled “The Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality” (Dissertation).  The Dissertation was, within England,[1]  the first systematic presentation and defence of a utilitarian moral theory. Gay’s work marks the beginning of English utilitarianism. 

Today utilitarianism is assumed to be a paradigmatically secular ethical theory. Gay’s Dissertation proposed an earlier version of the theory known as Theological utilitarianism. Theological utilitarianism is “a doctrine according to which we have a duty to promote the good of humanity because God, our universally benevolent creator, wants us to do so.”[2] As Gay articulated it, moral requirements are divine commands; hence, “the will of God is the immediate criterion of Virtue.”[3] Because God is impartial and benevolent, his purpose, in commanding, is to promote the happiness of his creatures;” Thus the will of God is the immediate criterion of Virtue, and the happiness of mankind the criterion of the wilt of God; and therefore the happiness of mankind may be said to be the criterion of virtue, but once removed.”[4]

Gay’s theological Utilitarianism became the common position of Cambridge Theologians for the next century.  Cambridge scholars such as  Thomas Rutherford (1744), John Brown(1751),  Some Jeynes (1757), and Edmund Law (1758) repeated  Gay’s essential theory and arguments. Gay’s work also had an evident influence on William Paley. Paley’s “On the Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy” (1785) became one of the most widely read defences of utilitarianism in the nineteenth century. Paley based The Principles on the lectures he delivered while teaching at Cambridge. The Principles was required text in moral philosophy at Cambridge till the 1830s and they were heavily indebted to Gay.  The Cambridge connection is interesting because Sidgwick was a moral philosophy professor at Cambridge from 1883 until his death in 1900. Sidgwick’s book “Method of Ethics” marked the high point in the tradition of English utilitarianism. Gay’s Dissertation marked the beginning of this tradition. Both were authored at the same institution within 143 years of each other.

What is noteworthy for our purposes is that all elements and basic argument found in Sidgwick’s “dualism of practical reason” can be found in the Dissertation

Why we have to assume harmony between impartial and prudential requirements?

Let’s look at the first step in Sidgwick’s argument; the claim that unless we assume that it is always in our long-term self-interest to follow the demands of impartial benevolence, we will not always have decisive reasons to do our duty. In my previous post, I suggested Sidgwick’s reasoning could be seen as an inference from three premises:

[1] We always have decisive reasons to do what is morally required.

[2] An action is morally required if it is required by rules justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence.[5]

[3] If there are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with our long-term self-interest, we do not always have decisive reasons to do what is required by impartially justified rules.

Each of these premises was in Gay’s  Dissertation. Gay articulated virtue as follows:

Virtue is the conformity to a rule of life, directing the actions to all rational creatures with respect to each other’s happiness; to which conformity everyone in all cases is obliged: and every one that does so conform, is or ought to be approved of, esteemed and loved for so doing. What is here expressed, I believe most men put into their idea of virtue. For virtue generally does imply some relation to others: where self is only concerned, a man is called prudent, (not virtuous)[6]

Here Gay articulated [1]. Gay contended that it is part of the “common conception” that virtue is a rule of life “to which conformity everyone in all cases is obliged”. In the Dissertation, Gay used the word “obliged” and “obligatory”  term synonymously with the idea of decisive reason to act. Gay is saying that we always have decisive reasons to do what is morally required.

We also clearly see [2]. Gay understood virtue as conformity to certain rules, rules which direct our conduct, and which we use to evaluate and praise or blame people’s actions. These rules have a particular kind of content. They direct us to promote the good, not just of ourselves, but also the good of others. They promote the happiness of all impartially. Gay, therefore, agreed with Sidgwick that our fundamental moral intuitions have a utilitarian basis. Moral requirements are demands justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence. He differs from Sidgwick only in developing this in a rule utilitarian instead of an act utilitarian way.

Gay, also like Sidgwick, thought this was implicit in our common-sense moral beliefs. That morality consists of rules justified from a perspective of impartial benevolence is “what most men put into their idea of Virtue”. Gay argued that the intuitive deontological rules, defended by other ethicists, such as Samuel Clarke, could be derived from the criteria of happiness to mankind as a more fundamental principle.

Gay also affirms [3], he writes

Thus those who either or don’t mention the will of God, making the immediate criterion of virtue to be the good of mankind; must either allow that virtue is not in all cases obligatory (contrary to the idea which all or most men have of it) or they must say that the good of mankind is a sufficient obligation. But how can the good of mankind by any obligation to me, when perhaps in particular cases, such as laying down my life, or the like, it is contrary to my happiness?[7]

Like Sidgwick, Gay here was concerned with a certain kind of dilemma. The possibility of “particular cases” where rules that enjoin “the good of mankind” are “contrary to my happiness”. For example, cases where I am required to  “lay down my life”. If such cases do occur, then the “good of mankind” can’t be a “sufficient obligation”; we must allow that virtue is “not in all cases obligatory”.  If such cases exist,  we do not always have decisive reasons to do what is required by those rules.

So, Gay agreed with the first step of Sidgwick’s argument. Unless one assumes that impartial and prudential requirements never clash, there will be a dualism of practical reason. This dualism means we cannot coherently claim we always have decisive reasons to do our duty.

Why Secular accounts undermine this assumption?

Gay also argued that secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. The dilemma Gay was concerned about arises when people make “the happiness of mankind” the immediate criteria of virtue, without “mentioning the will of God”. Earlier, Gay discussed four “four different manners in which” an obligation [is induced” These are;

First, that obligation which ariseth from perceiving the natural consequences of things, i. e. the consequences of things acting according to the fix’d laws of nature, maybe call’d natural. Secondly, that arising from merit or demerit, as producing the esteem and favour of our fellow creatures, or the contrary, is usually styled virtuous. Thirdly, that arising from the authority of the civil magistrate, civil. Fourthly, that from the authority of God, religious.[8]

I noted that Gay used the word “obligation” to mean something like a practical reason or reason for acting. When we see this, it is evident that Gay was discussing what Sidgwick referred to as sanctions.  He was referring to negative or positive consequences annexed impartially justified rules, which provide us with prudential reasons to comply with them.

Many of these sanctions overlapped those discussed by Sidgwick. When Gay referred to consequences: “arising from merit or demerit, as producing the esteem and favour of our fellow creatures, ” he referred to what Sidgwick called social sanctions. Consequences “arising from the authority of the civil magistrate” was a reference to Sidgwick’s category of legal sanctions.  The reference to religious sanctions was a reference to what Sidgwick meant by the term. Like Sidgwick, Gay thought that when one brackets religious sanctions and relied on secular sanctions alone. These sanctions are insufficient to ensure a “full and complete obligation” that “will extend to all cases”. If secular sanctions are the only sanctions that exist, then the assumption: that it is always in our interests to follow impartial rules is probably false.

Why a divine command theory vindicates this assumption?

Gay also argued that a divine command theory would, if true, vindicate the assumption. We noted above what Gay takes to be our conception of “virtue”.

Virtue is the conformity to a rule of life, directing the actions of all rational creatures with respect to each other’s happiness; to which conformity every one in all cases is obliged: and every one that does so conform, is or ought to be approved of, esteemed and loved for so doing. What is here expressed, I believe most men put into their idea of virtue. For virtue generally does imply some relation to others: where self is only concerned.[9]

Here Gay, highlighted three features which he thinks are implicit in our intuitive common-sense understanding of morality.  First, moral requirements are requirements imposed by rules, norms or standards. Second, these requirements have a particular content; they direct us to seek the good of others impartially. Third, we always have decisive reasons to comply with them. Fourth, they have sanctions attached to them; people are subject to praise and blame for how well they conform to such rules.  A divine command theory, if true, accounts for all these features.

Notably, a divine command theory is true, accounts for [1]

Now it is evident from the nature of God, viz. his being infinitely happy in himself from all eternity, and from his goodness manifested in his works, that he could have no other design in creating mankind than their happiness; and therefore he wills their happiness; therefore the means of their happiness: therefore that my behaviour, as far as it may be a means of the happiness of mankind, should be such. Here then we are got one step farther, or to a new criterion: not to a new criterion of virtue immediately, but to a criterion of the will of God. For it is an answer to the enquiry, How shall I know what the Will of God in this particular is? Thus the will of God is the immediate criterion of virtue, and the happiness of mankind the criterion of the wilt of God; and therefore the happiness of mankind may be said to be the criterion of virtue, but once removed.[10]

Gay here cites an argument first proposed by Berkeley.  Because God is impartial, benevolent, and rational, his commands would lay down rules that are justified from an impartial benevolent perspective. Consequently, if moral requirements are divine commands, would expect them to express rules which promoted the happiness of all impartially.  Morality has the content one would expect it to have if a divine command theory is true.

A divine command theory also accounts for [1],

[I]t is evident that a full and complete obligation which will extend to all cases, can only be that arising from the authority of God; because God only can in all cases make a man happy or miserable: and therefore, since we are always obliged to that conformity called virtue, it is evident that the immediate rule or criterion of it, is the will of God.[11]

Suppose moral requirements are divine commands, and commands are demands backed by sanctions. In that case, it is always in one’s long-term self-interest to do what we are morally required to do. Hence, a divine command theory entails [1].  The same line of argument also vindicates the assumption that it is always in our interests to do what is impartially required. If a divine command theory is true, the kind of dilemmas that Gay believed undermine [1] cannot occur.

When we examine John Gay, we find him offering an argument for a theological version of utilitarianism that anticipates Sidgwick’s argument in almost every respect.

There is an interesting historical narrative here.  Gay taught at Cambridge from 1724 to 1732. He developed a religious version of utilitarianism; whereby moral requirements are divine commands. Gay argued his theory would if, true, coherently explain why we always have decisive reasons to do our duty. He warned that if the theological component of the theory were removed, there would be a problem: a dualism of practical reason. This problem would mean we cannot coherently explain why we always have reasons to do our duty. Gay’s position was adopted and defended by Cambridge theologians, eventually being part of Cambridge’s standard textbooks till 1830.

Forty years later, Sidgwick, writing in Cambridge, inherits this tradition. However, it is a secular version of utilitarianism mediated through Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Sidgwick ends The Method of Ethics, concluding there is a problematic dualism of practical reason that makes us unable to coherently explain why we always have reasons to do our duty. Sidgwick ended by suggesting that one way to solve this problem coherently is to return to the theological utilitarianism of John Gay.[12]

Sidgwick then was not formulating a new problem in the Method of Ethics. Instead, he was drawing attention to a problem that divine command theorists had raised for secular utilitarianism from the beginning and highlighted that Bentham and Mill had failed to solve it.



[1] The first  written exposition of  Utilitarianism is arguably George Berkeley’s  “Passive Obedience”, which was presented in Ireland in 1712

[2] Matti Häyry “Passive Obedience and Berkeley’s Moral Philosophy” Berkeley Studies 23 (2012) 3

[3] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

[4] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

[5] I have altered premise [2] slightly to reflect Gay’s rule utilitarianism.

[6] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

[7] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

[8] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 2/4/21

[9] Ibid

[10] Ibid

[11] Ibid

[12] In “Outline of The History of Ethics”, Sidgwick writes:

“But in fact a simple outline of Paley’s utilitarianism may be found more than a generation earlier in the following passages from Gay’s Dissertation…[Bentham] does not himself use the will of an omnipotent and benevolent being as a means of logically connecting individual and general happiness. He thus undoubtedly simplifies his system, and avoids the disputable inferences from nature and Scripture in which Paley’s position is involved, but this gain is dearly purchased. For the question immediately arises, How then are the sanctions of the moral rules which it will most conduce to the general happiness for men to observe shown to be always adequate in the case of all the individuals whose observance is required?”

 

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