Tag: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

  • Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Secularism and “reasons” to be moral. Part Three: Can Religious theories answer the question, “Why be moral?”

    In a previous post, I observed that Walter Sinnott-Armstrong concedes that secular accounts of moral obligation cannot vindicate the thesis that agents always have decisive (all-things-considered) reasons to avoid wrongdoing. To mitigate this problem, he argues:

    Is this limitation a problem for secular accounts of morality? I doubt that, too. If we demand this extreme kind of reason to be moral, then we are bound to be disappointed. The solution to our disappointment is to give up this demand, not to imagine a higher power that we want to fulfill an illegitimate demand. Besides, this limit on secular theories would be a problem only if the alternative religious account could provide a better reason to be moral. It can’t. That is what I will show in the next section.[1]

    There are three ideas here. First is the claim that the failure to vindicate this assumption is a problem for secular theories only if religious theories can adequately vindicate it. Second is the claim that religious theories cannot vindicate this assumption. Third, he claims that the assumption itself cannot be adequately vindicated.

    I want to focus on the last two of these claims.

    Can religious theories adequately vindicate this assumption?

    Sinnott-Armstrong argues that religious theories cannot adequately vindicate the thesis that agents always have decisive reasons to avoid wrongdoing. His argument involves two steps.

    First, he argues that any adequate theory of moral requirements must not only vindicate the assumption that agents have reasons to do what is right, but that those reasons must be of the right kind—they cannot be arbitrary. He illustrates this point with two examples.

    Imagine that “the King of Curls threatens to kill all of his subjects who do not shave their heads on May 21, though there is nothing special about that date.”[2] Do we have a reason to shave our heads? Yes—the threat of death gives us a reason to comply. However, this reason is arbitrary; it is based on naked force and bears no relation to the content of the command.

    Similarly, a mother is trying to teach her son to stop hitting his sister. She can do this in two ways: she can convince him that harming his sister is wrong, or she can simply threaten him with punishment if he doesn’t comply. The second approach gives the son a reason not to hit his sister, but it is the wrong kind of reason—it is arbitrary, based on force, and doesn’t teach him to care about his sister.[3]

    His second step is to argue that religious theories fail to provide the right kind of reasons for refraining from wrongdoing. They are arbitrary in the same way. His reasoning is as follows:

    Divine threats of Hell or promises of Heaven operate in the same way. If our only reason to be moral is to avoid Hell or get to Heaven, then our motivation is far from ideal. Even a total psychopath, who cares about nobody else but believes in Hell, would have this reason to be moral. But this reason would not give the psychopath any reason for the content of the moral restrictions themselves. The psychopath would still see moral restrictions as just as arbitrary as a law requiring him to shave his head on May 21.[4]

    The key premise here is that if God exists, the only reason we could have for following His commands would be to either get to Heaven or avoid Hell.

    But why think this? Sinnott-Armstrong doesn’t say.

    Earlier in the same chapter, he had rejected the idea that all interests are self-interested. He wrote: “Many reasons are not based on self-interest. That should be common ground between theists and [atheists].”[5] Later, he states:

    The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. The fact that an act causes harm to another person can be a reason for me not to do that act. These facts are reasons, even if the other people are strangers. Crucially, these reasons are not self-interesting. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me.[6]

    So, Sinnott-Armstrong accepts that—even if theism is true—there can be non-selfish reasons for acting. But if that’s correct, why assume that the only reason an agent could have for obeying God is a selfish one? Why couldn’t agents also have non-selfish reasons to obey God?

    Remember the theist whom Sinnott-Armstrong is criticising. This theist understands God to have certain attributes: God is all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially benevolent, and impartial. So what God commands is co-extensive with prescriptions that a benevolent, impartial person would endorse—if that person were fully informed and reasoning correctly. It is quite plausible that agents would have unselfish reasons to follow such prescriptions. In fact, it is hard to see how Armstrong can say that we have unselfish reasons to do acts that benefit others, but no unselfish reasons to obey prescriptions that are justified from a perspective that aims to benefit others.

    Here we need to recall the challenge to secular ethics and how theism is purported to solve it. The challenge is this: Suppose we are not accountable to God. In that case, certain kinds of practical dilemmas will occur. Requirements that are justified from an impartial point of view—ones that promote the interests of others—will sometimes conflict with an agent’s long-term self-interest. Unselfish reasons will point one way, prudential reasons the other. If such dilemmas occur, we face a question: What reason is there to act unselfishly rather than in one’s self-interest? What reason do we have for always giving precedence to impartial demands in such cases?

    It is the inability of secular ethics to address this question that is the alleged problem.

    If we are accountable to God, this problem is avoided because such dilemmas never occur. Rewards and punishments change the balance of reasons for and against the act. However, they do so not by changing or negating the strength of the unselfish reasons against the act—they change the balance of prudential reasons in favour of the act. Because God is impartial and benevolent, we will still have the same kind of unselfish reasons—of the sort Sinnott-Armstrong refers to—to obey God’s commands. However, these reasons will never be matched or overridden by prudential demands to the contrary. Instead, prudential reasons will support and reinforce them.

    Can the assumption be adequately vindicated?

    Let’s turn to Sinnott-Armstrong’s second claim: that the thesis that agents always have decisive (all-things-considered) reasons to avoid wrongdoing cannot be adequately vindicated. He proposes the following dilemma:

    Different audiences react to this point in different ways. Some people really want a reason to be moral that will motivate psychopaths, even if it is not connected to any reason why certain acts are immoral. They are rightly scared of psychopaths, so they want a reason that will convince psychopaths to be moral. Other people want a reason to be moral that does not leave morality arbitrary, because the reason to be moral shows why those moral acts are moral. They want a moral reason rather than a selfish reason. I share the latter goal, but I can appreciate the former wish. Unfortunately, I doubt that the former wish can be fulfilled. No reason will succeed in convincing everyone to be moral. This is another obvious but hard fact of life that we need to learn to live with.[7]

    The proposed dilemma appears to be this: no meta-ethical theory can both vindicate the assumption that agents always have decisive reasons to refrain from wrongdoing and identify reasons of the correct type. If a meta-ethical theory entails that agents always have decisive reasons to be moral, the reasons it cites will be arbitrary or of the wrong kind. If we are to identify a fact that provides reasons for all people—including egoists and amoral individuals—it will need to appeal to something like self-interest; and self-interested reasons are the wrong kind of reason. By contrast, if a theory provides reasons of the right kind, it will fail to provide a reason strong enough or universal enough to ensure agents always have decisive reasons to be moral. The right kind of reasons are unselfish reasons, but these will not provide everyone—including egoists and psychopaths—with reasons to be moral, nor will they always be strong enough to override prudential or instrumental reasons to the contrary.

    Here, I think Sinnott-Armstrong relies on a false dichotomy. He assumes a meta-ethical theory must either appeal to selfish reasons to be moral or to unselfish reasons. However, his interlocutor’s point is that this is a false choice. If a divine command theory is correct, then what is in our long-term interest and what is justified from an impartial point of view coincide. So we have both types of reason at the same time. They are never in conflict.

    It is always in our interest to obey God and never in our interest to disobey—things such as eternal life are at stake. For this reason, there are strong self-interested reasons to be moral that are never overridden. These reasons provide even an egoist or a psychopath with reasons to comply.

    Because God is impartial and benevolent, we also have very strong unselfish reasons to be moral. What God commands us to do is what a fully informed, rational, impartial, benevolent person would command. The commands He gives are prescriptions justified from a perspective that equally considers the interests of all. These are reasons of the right kind.


    [1] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 118

    [2] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 95 (ebook)

    [3] Ibid, 96

    [4] Ibid

    [5] Ibid, 93

    [6] Ibid, 94

    [7] Ibid, 96

  • Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Secularism and “reasons” to be moral. Part two: Do unselfish reasons answer the question, “Why be moral?”

    ***

    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong discusses the following objection:

    “Harming others is sometimes in some people’s best interest, even considering probable costs. In those cases, some theists say that only a divine threat of Hell provides a reason to be moral. Since atheists and agnostics do not believe in God, they do not believe in divine retribution for sins, so they have to admit that sometimes some people could get away with immorality and then they have no self-interested reason to be moral. Does that mean that these people have no reason at all to be moral?”[1]

    He responds to this argument as follows:

    No. That conclusion would follow only if every reason had to be self-interested, selfish, or egoistic. There is no basis for that assumption. Many reasons are not based on self-interest. That should be common ground between theists and atheists… The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. The fact that an act causes harm to another person can be a reason for me not to do that act. These facts are reasons, even if the other people are strangers. Crucially, these reasons are not self-interested. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me. These unselfish reasons can answer the question, “Why be moral?”[2]

    Here, Sinnott-Armstrong makes three points. First, the argument in question assumes that “all reasons are selfish.” Second, this assumption is false—“it should be common ground between theists” that there are also “unselfish reasons,” based on the fact that certain acts harm others. Third, these “unselfish reasons” can answer the question: why be moral?

    Do non-selfish reasons answer the question: “Why be moral?”

    I discussed the first point in a previous post. In this post, I will discuss the third: do the non-selfish reasons he appeals to answer the question “Why be moral?”

    In my previous post, I noted that the question “Why be moral?” can be understood in two ways. Armstrong’s interlocutor could be asking:

    (a) whether, in the given circumstances, we have a pro tanto reason to refrain from harm; or
    (b) whether, in those circumstances, we have decisive reasons not to harm.

    I also pointed out that interpreting the question in terms of (a) is idiosyncratic. The way the question is commonly used—and the most plausible understanding of it—is in terms of (b).

    Whether an appeal to unselfish reasons answers the question “Why be moral?” depends on how you interpret the question. If we interpret it in terms of (a), then the fact that an action harms another person would answer the question. Sinnott-Armstrong’s hypothesis is that the property of being morally wrong is constituted by the property of harming another person. Suppose the fact that an action harms another person provides a pro tanto reason not to do that action—in that case, we have a pro tanto reason not to do what is wrong.

    The problem is that this is an extremely weak and idiosyncratic rendition of the skeptical challenge. As Mark Murphy points out:

    It would be helpful if Sinnott-Armstrong had named an opponent here who thought that this was the real challenge for the nontheistic ethicist. The worry is not characteristically expressed by theistic ethicists in terms of whether there is any reason to do what is morally right in the absence of God; the worry is characteristically expressed in terms of whether there could be overriding, or decisive, reason to do what is all-things-considered morally required.[3]

    In my last post, I pointed out that in his writings on moral skepticism, Sinnott-Armstrong himself has noted that the “Why be moral?” question is not normally understood in terms of whether there is “sometimes some kind of reason to be moral.” Instead:

    “A more plausible and common version of practical moral skepticism denies, instead, that there is always an adequate (or non-overridden) reason to do what is morally required.”[4]

    If we interpret the question in terms of (b), Sinnott-Armstrong’s appeal to the fact that an action “harms” another person does not answer the question “Why be moral?” His interlocutor argues that if a secular meta-ethical theory is true, then certain kinds of practical dilemmas will occur. What is prudentially required will be an act that harms others. We will therefore have self-interested or prudential reasons to do the act, and unselfish reasons not to do it. If such dilemmas occur, we face a question: What reason is there to act unselfishly rather than in one’s self-interest? What reason do we have for always giving precedence to impartial demands in such cases?

    Murphy explains:

    “The worry is that there are different kinds of reason that can pull in different directions, and it is not obvious that there is any practical error in choosing against a more impartial point of view by going with the more partial point of view.”[5]

    If I face a dilemma between two options—doing an act that harms others or doing an act that is contrary to my own interest—pointing out that one option involves harming others doesn’t solve the dilemma. What we need is some reason for always treating the impartially based demands as having precedence. Sinnott-Armstrong provides no such reason. In fact, later in the chapter, he is candid that he cannot give any such reason. He writes:

    The fact that an act causes harm to others is a reason not to do that act, and the fact that an act prevents harm to others is a reason to do that act. There is, then, always a reason to be moral on this secular account. And often these reasons are adequate, because they are strong enough to make it rational (or not irrational) to be moral….
    Nonetheless, some people still wish for a reason that is strong enough to motivate everyone to be moral and also to make it always irrational to be immoral. I doubt that secular moral theories can establish that strong kind of reason to be moral. For people who really do not care about others, the solution is found in retraining or restraining rather than in theory. (emphasis mine)[6]

    Note what is being said here: Armstrong is saying that if the best secular accounts of morality are true, agents do not always have all-things-considered reasons to do what is morally right. Sometimes they will, and sometimes they will not. In these latter cases, people will have adequate—and possibly even conclusive—all-things-considered reasons to violate moral norms. The solution to this is an appeal to naked force. What we need to do is force these people to act in ways that they have sufficient or decisive reasons not to act.

    This seems an inadequate answer. Consider the following analogy: critics of monotheistic religions like Christianity, Judaism, or Islam often ask, “What reason do I have to adopt your religion?” This is not a question of belief but of action. Adopting a religion involves living a certain way. Skeptics ask: What reasons do I have to commit to faithfully following what you take to be God’s commands, especially when doing so often goes against my aims or interests?

    Imagine a theist responded to this as follows: “You don’t have compelling reasons to do this. In fact, you have good reason not to do this. The balance of reasons does not support such a commitment and may in fact be against it. However, if you don’t convert, I will persecute you.” Would any religious skeptic think their concerns had been answered?

    In the same way, I suggest that no one who was not already committed to secular morality would find Sinnott-Armstrong’s response here adequate.

    Later, Armstrong offers a different answer:

    Is this limitation a problem for secular accounts of morality? I doubt that, too. If we demand this extreme kind of reason to be moral, then we are bound to be disappointed. The solution to our disappointment is to give up this demand, not to imagine a higher power that we want to fulfill an illegitimate demand. Besides, this limit on secular theories would be a problem only if the alternative religious account could provide a better reason to be moral. It can’t. That is what I will show in the next section.[7]

    Here, Sinnott-Armstrong’s position appears to be twofold:

    First, the fact that a secular theory cannot answer the question “Why be moral?” is only a problem if religious theories can answer that question adequately. If they cannot, then this is a problem for all theories—and hence not a reason to favour one over another.

    Second, he claims that a religious theory cannot answer this question either. In fact, he seems to think no theory can. The appropriate response, he suggests, is to give up the demand.

    In a future post, I will examine Sinnott-Armstrong’s reasons for these two claims. I will argue that they fail.


    [1] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 114

    [2] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 117

    [3] Mark Murphy’s, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [4] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Practical Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/supplement.html accessed 28 August 2025

    [5] Mark Murphy’s, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [6] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 117-118

    [7] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 118

     

  • Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Secularism and “reasons” to be moral. Part One:

    In his book Morality Without God, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that a secular account of the nature of moral properties—namely, that wrongness is constituted by the property of harming others—is preferable to a theistic account, in which wrongness is identified with the property of being contrary to God’s commands

    Chapter 6 is entitled “Why be moral?”
    In this chapter, Sinnott-Armstrong attempts to rebut the idea that secular meta-ethical theories—such as the one he proposes—cannot provide an adequate answer to this question.

    Sinnott-Armstrong begins his discussion by citing an argument that purports to show that secular accounts of morality cannot answer the question: why be moral? He summarises the argument as follows:

    “Harming others is sometimes in some people’s best interest, even considering probable costs. In those cases, some theists say that only a divine threat of Hell provides a reason to be moral. Since atheists and agnostics do not believe in God, they do not believe in divine retribution for sins, so they have to admit that sometimes some people could get away with immorality and then they have no self-interested reason to be moral. Does that mean that these people have no reason at all to be moral?”[1]

    He responds to this argument as follows:

    No. That conclusion would follow only if every reason had to be self-interested, selfish, or egoistic. There is no basis for that assumption. Many reasons are not based on self-interest. That should be common ground between theists and atheists… The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. The fact that an act causes harm to another person can be a reason for me not to do that act. These facts are reasons, even if the other people are strangers. Crucially, these reasons are not self-interesting. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me. These unselfish reasons can answer the question, “Why be moral?”[2]

    There are some infelicities in the way this argument is described and set up. Sinnott-Armstrong’s version of the argument relies solely on the appeal to fear of Hell and divine retribution. He doesn’t, for example, couch the argument in terms of hope of eternal life. Moreover, in the paragraphs leading up to this one, he gives a sarcastic, literalistic reading of the Book of Revelation on the topic of Hell. These all rhetorically prime negative reactions in the reader; they also border on crude caricature.

    However, in this post and in future ones, I will focus on what I take to be the main thrust of Sinnott-Armstrong’s response to this argument. Sinnott-Armstrong makes three points. First, he argues that this argument is only sound if one assumes that “every reason” is “self-interested.” Second, he argues that this assumption is false. It should be granted by both theists and non-theists that there are “unselfish reasons” based on the fact that an action will “harm” (or benefit) other people. Third, he contends these unselfish reasons can answer the question of why they are moral.

    Does the argument assume that all reasons are selfish?

    Let’s look at the first point: does this argument assume that all reasons are selfish? That depends on how one interprets the phrase “reasons to be moral” and the rhetorical question “Why be moral?”

    When we talk of “reasons” to act, we can mean one of two things. Sometimes the word “reason” functions as a mass noun, referring to what we have decisive reasons to do—what we have reasons to do all things considered, when we consider everything that counts in favour of an action and against it. Alternatively, the word “reason” can function as a count noun, referring to what we have a pro tanto reason to do—what we have reason to do all else being equal. Here we ask whether there is anything that by itself counts in favour of the action.[3]

    An illustrative example: It is a rainy day, and I have to walk fifteen minutes outside to the bus. The fact I will get wet if I don’t take an umbrella is a pro tanto reason to take an umbrella. The fact that carrying an umbrella is cumbersome is a pro tanto reason against it. When I consider all the relevant factors—the burden of carrying the umbrella and the prospect of getting wet—I conclude that I have decisive, all-things-considered reasons to carry it.[4]

    Sinnott-Armstrong’s interlocutor asks: if we are not accountable to God for our actions, and harming someone promotes our long-term self-interest, what reason do we have to refrain from doing harm? He could mean two things:
    (a) He could be asking whether, in the given circumstances, we have a pro tanto reason to refrain from harm; or
    (b) He could be asking whether, in those circumstances, we have decisive reasons not to harm.

    If he means (a), then Sinnott-Armstrong’s criticism seems on point. The interlocutor is assuming that all reasons are selfish. He is saying that if it is not in our self-interest to avoid harming others, then there is no consideration of any sort at all against harming them. This follows only if all reasons are selfish.

    I suspect that this is how Sinnott-Armstrong interprets the argument in question. The problem is that this is a very idiosyncratic understanding of the question “Why be moral?” Normally, in philosophical discussions, this is not what is meant by the question.[5]

    Consider what  Sinnott-Armstrong himself writes in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on moral skepticism. He writes about a form of skepticism known as “practical skepticism,” which asks the question:

    “Why be moral?” This question is used to raise many different issues. Almost everyone admits that there is sometimes some kind of reason to be moral. However, many philosophers deny various universal claims, including the claims that there is always some reason to be moral, that there is always a distinctively moral reason to be moral, and/or that there is always enough reason to make it irrational not to be moral or at least not irrational to be moral…
    Practical moral skeptics usually deny that there is always enough reason for moral action.[6]

    In a supplementary paper, he explains:

    What such practical moral skeptics deny is that I always have reason to do what is morally required… Practical moral skeptics do not deny that there is sometimes reason not to do what is morally wrong. After all, some wrongdoers are caught and punished. However, practical moral skeptics can still deny that there is always reason to do what is morally required or to avoid what is morally wrong.
    How much reason? Some practical moral skeptics claim that sometimes there is no reason at all to do what is morally required. If all reasons are self-interested, this means that sometimes doing what is morally required does not serve the agent’s interest in any way. That extreme position would be refuted if doing what is morally wrong always creates even a slight risk of some negative repercussion. A more plausible and common version of practical moral skepticism denies, instead, that there is always an adequate (or non-overridden) reason to do what is morally required. To establish this position, practical moral skeptics need only one case where there is overriding reason not to do what is morally required. (emphasis mine)[7]

    So, according to Sinnott-Armstrong himself, if we interpret the rhetorical question “Why be moral?” charitably—in a way that reflects how the question is commonly used—it is not a denial that agents lack any pro tanto reasons to do what they are required to do. Instead, the interlocutor is challenging the idea that agents always have decisive reasons to refrain from harm when doing so is contrary to their self-interest.

    Suppose we interpret Sinnott-Armstrong’s interlocutor in terms of (b). In that case, he is arguing as follows: if there are cases where harming another is in our self-interest, then we will not always have all-things-considered reasons to refrain from harm. This argument does not assume that all reasons are selfish. Even if there are unselfish reasons based on the fact an action harms others, these reasons will not always be stronger or weightier than the selfish reasons we have to the contrary. One can accept that we have a pro tanto reason to do an action and also admit that when one considers everything that is relevant—for and against—the total balance of reasons does not support it.

    We can conclude our discussion as follows: Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim—that his interlocutor’s argument rests on a false assumption, namely that all reasons are selfish—is true if one interprets the question “Why be moral?” in an idiosyncratic and uncharitable way, contrary to how the question is typically used. However, if the question is interpreted charitably, in line with its usual philosophical usage, then  Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim is false.


    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 114

    [2] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Morality Without God 117

    [3] See Stephen Darwall, “What Are Moral Reasons?” The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 12 (2017): 2. Available at https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/What%20Are%20moral%20reasons.pdf accessed 28 August 2025

    [4] See Stephen Darwall, “What Are Moral Reasons?” 2-3

    [5] This point is made by Mark Murphy’s review, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [6] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/index.html accessed 28 August 2025

    [7] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Practical Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/supplement.html accessed 28 August 2025

  • Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part Two:

    This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave.

    I outlined four assumptions about the kind of requirements morality imposes upon us. These were

    1. Inescapability: moral requirements apply to us irrespective of whether following them contributes to any ends or aims we currently desire.
    2. Impartiality: moral requirements are justified from an impartial perspective.
    3. Authority: agents always have conclusive reasons to do what is morally required and never have sufficiently good reasons for doing what is morally wrong.
    4. Accountability: if something is morally required, we are guilty and liable to blame if we fail to do it and lack an adequate excuse.  

    We can now turn to my first contention: secular accounts of morality cannot coherently account for these assumptions. I will make two points in support of this.

    The first is that unless prudential and impartial requirements never conflict, we won’t be able to account for these assumptions coherently.[1] Why think this? Suppose it is not always in one’s long-term self-interest to comply with impartial demands. Sometimes a particular type of practical dilemma will occur. Impartial demands will conflict with prudential requirements. When they do, we face the question: What reason is there to act impartially rather than in one’s self-interest? What reason do we have for always giving precedence to impartial demands in such cases? [2]

    One cannot answer this question by pointing out that we have impartial reasons to follow such rules based on the fact that other people will benefit or be harmed by our actions. The question, after all, is why I should give impartial reasons precedence in such cases. Nor can it be answered by appealing to my interests or because the case is one where morality and such things conflict. Many philosophers have argued that no answer is forthcoming. Three examples will illustrate the problem:

    Example #1. Ms. Poore has lived many years in grinding poverty. She is not starving but has only the bare necessities. She has tried very hard to get ahead by hard work, but nothing has come of her efforts. An opportunity to steal a large sum of money arises. If Ms. Poore steals the money and invests it wisely, she can obtain many desirable things her poverty has denied her: a well-balanced diet, decent housing, adequate heat in the winter, health insurance, new career opportunities through education, and so on. Moreover, if she steals the money, her chances of being caught are very low, and she knows this. She is also aware that the person who owns the money is well off and will not be greatly harmed by the theft. Let us add that Ms. Poore rationally believes that if she fails to steal the money, she will likely live in poverty for the remainder of her life. In short, Ms. Poore faces the choice of stealing the money or living in grinding poverty the rest of her life.[3]

    Example 2: A young woman has her heart set on getting into medical school. If she gets in, through hard work and dedication she will graduate and become a good physician. However, even after much study she has been unable to score high enough on the MCATs to be admitted to any medical school. She finds herself with an opportunity to cheat that will ensure her an MCAT score that is high enough to gain admittance to some medical school and so to eventually fulfill her lifelong dream. Her patients will not be harmed by being treated by an incompetent physician because she will not be an incompetent physician once she receives the necessary training. At most the only person who will be harmed is the person denied admittance to medical school because this young woman will take one of the available places and so leave one less slot to be filled. Assume that this person will only be slightly harmed and that somehow the young woman knows all this. It would be wrong for this young woman to cheat to get into medical school, but why isn’t it true that if she does not care about cheating, then what she has most reason to do is to cheat if she knows she can get away with it?[4]

    Example: 3 Suppose your son has robbed a rich man of his jewels, the police are after him, and he asks you to help him escape to Brazil. You know you can arrange things so that neither of you will get caught. You also know that if he is caught he will be sent to prison and his life will be ruined, but if he escapes, he will have a good life in Brazil. It would be wrong of you to help him escape, but why isn’t it true that what you have most reason to do is to help your son escape justice?[5]

    Cases like this suggest that, if impartial and prudential requirements conflict, agents don’t always have reasons to give precedence to the former. However, this means the total reasons in favor of doing what is impartially demanded will not always be stronger than the reasons against acting. Consequently, agents will not have conclusive reasons to do what they are morally required to do.

    We can summarize the conclusion here as an inference from three intuitively plausible premises:

    [1] Moral requirements are inescapable demands justified from an impartial perspective

    [2] agents always have conclusive reasons to do what is morally required

    [3] If there are cases where impartial and prudential requirements clash, then either (a) agents have reasons to always give precedence to impartial demands in such cases or (b) agents do not always have conclusive reasons to follow impartial demands.

    [4] agents do not always have reasons to give precedence to impartial demands in such cases.

    If these premises are all correct, we must either embrace the assumption that impartial and prudential demands never conflict or embrace a contradiction. We cannot claim both those moral requirements are inescapable and impartial and claim that agents have conclusive reasons to follow them. 

    Second, secular accounts of the kind of accountability we have to morality would, if true, undermine this assumption. They entail that impartial and prudential requirements do sometimes conflict. I noted earlier that if something is morally required, we are accountable for doing it. Historically, many understood this in terms of accountability to God. However, God cannot play that role in a secular theory. What does? Atheist philosopher Walter Sinnott Armstrong answers: “human beings” do. “We each have the authority to hold people responsible for violating moral duties. If my neighbor steals jewelry from his grandmother, then surely, I have the authority to criticize him and his action…You do, too.” [6] “Morality is enforced verbally by public condemnation or socially by ostracizing violators.” [7]. In addition, “we all have the authority to vote for representatives who enforce moral norms through formal institutions, such as by legal punishments…. We collectively have the authority to impose such sanctions.” [8]

    These kinds of sanctions might account for our being accountable to moral requirements. However, they are insufficient to ensure that it is always in everyone’s self-interest to comply with impartial requirements. The” norms enforced through legal punishments,” “public condemnation,” or “social ostracization” are often not justified from an impartial point of view. Laws often endorse or permit unjust practices that fail to take the interests of a segment of society into account. The accepted mores of the groups people belong to, such as nations, and gangs, often are designed to advance the interests of the group over and above those of others. The mores we legally and socially enforce are often unjustified by facts and sound reasoning. The laws of a society can and often do persecute people who act impartially. There are familiar cases where a person becomes a member of a social group where acting immoral enhances their social status, whereas doing what is right results in social ostracization.

    Even if these norms were co-extensive, agents would not be held to account in cases where a person can violate these norms secretly without being detected. There also will be cases where whatever sanctions are incurred will be more than offset by the benefits gained by non-compliance. There will be many cases where a person knows that it is extremely unlikely they will be caught, and the risk of punishment or sanction is more than outweighed by the benefits one receives from disobeying.[9]

    In summary, unless we assume that prudential and impartial commands never conflict, we cannot account for our fundamental intuitions about morality. Second, secular accounts of the kind of accountability we have to morality undermine this assumption. This means that secular accounts of morality cannot coherently account for our fundamental assumptions about morality.


    [1] The argument from this section is influenced by the argument proposed by Henry Sidgwick (1900) The Methods of Ethics Book IV, chapter VI available at https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46743/46743-h/46743-h.htm#Page_496 and also John Gay (1731) The Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022  I adapt their ideas in my own way. David Brink develops a similar line of argument; see David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Morality” and also “Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority, and Supremacy” in In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. (Oxford University Press, 1997). 255–291 

    [2] See, for example, David Brink, “Self-Love and Altruism” Social Philosophy & Policy 14 (1997) 123.

    [3] This example comes from C. Stephen Layman’s “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy, 23 (2006): 307

    [4]  This example comes from Bruce Russell’s “Two Forms of Ethical Skepticism,” in Louis Pojman, Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings (New York: Wadsworth, 1998), p. 595.

    [5] Ibid 595,

    [6] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 98.

    [7] Ibid, 98.

    [8] Ibid,

    [9] These last two paragraphs summarize the argument of Henry Sidgwick in “The Method of Ethics” see Book II, chapter V.  available at https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46743/46743-h/46743-h.htm#Page_162 accessed 25/8/22

  • Does the Dualism of Practical Reason assume Egoism?

    Recently, I have been examining the question, “If there is no God, why be good?” As I interpret it, this expresses an argument about the “dualism of practical reason” made by Henry Sidgwick and John Gay. This argument had three steps.

    • First, unless we assume that it is always in our long-term self-interest to follow the demands of impartial altruism, we will not always have decisive reasons to do our duty.
    • Second, secular accounts of sanctions and moral and accountability would, if true, undermine this assumption. They imply that it is not always in our long-term self-interest to follow impartial demands.
    • By contrast, if true, a divine command theory would vindicate this assumption and provide a coherent account of our fundamental intuitions about the authority and content of moral requirements.

    The conclusion is that those divine command theories can coherently answer the question: “why should I always do my duty?” whereas secular ethical theories cannot.

    The first step of this argument was motivated by concerns about “the dualism of practical reasoning”. A contradiction that results from three intuitively plausible premises:

    [1] We always have decisive reasons to do what is morally required.

    [2] An action is morally required if it is required by rules justified from a perspective of impartial altruism.[1]

    [3] If there are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with our long-term self-interest, we do not always have decisive reasons to do what is required by impartially justified rules.

    These three premises entail that we must either: (a) embrace the thesis that impartial demands and prudential demands never conflict or (b) embrace a contradiction. Affirming both that we do and do not always have decisive reasons to do morality requires.

    Some object that [3] assumes the truth of rational Egoism: the thesis that I have a reason to perform some action if and only if, and because performing that action maximises my self-interest. Walter Sinnott Armstrong, states.

    Harming others is sometimes in some people’s best interest, even considering probable costs. In those cases, some theists say that only a divine threat of Hell provides a reason to be moral. Since atheists and agnostics do not believe in God, they do not believe in divine retribution for sins, so they have to admit that sometimes some people could get away with immorality and then they have no self-interested reason to be moral. Does that mean that these people have no reason at all to be moral? No. That conclusion would follow only if every reason had to be self-interested, selfish, or egoistic. There is no basis for that assumption. Many reasons are not based on self-interest…[2]

    Armstrong provides cases where the fact an act would benefit other people provides us with reasons to do it. He concludes:

    “The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. These reasons are not self-interested. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me. These unselfish reasons can answer the question, “Why be moral?”[3]

    I think this dismisses the problem far too quickly. In this post, I will explain why I think this.

    At the outset, one must concede that some important defenders of [3] have appealed rational Egoism. Consider, John Gay; Gay argued that:

    Thus those who either or don’t mention the will of God, making the immediate criterion of virtue to be the good of mankind; must either allow that virtue is not in all cases obligatory (contrary to the idea which all or most men have of it) or they must say that the good of mankind is a sufficient obligation. But how can the good of mankind by any obligation to me, when perhaps, However, its clear in particular cases, such as laying down my life, or the like, it is contrary to my happiness?[4]

    Gay uses the word “obligatory” to refer to what agents have decisive reasons to do. However, he bases his conclusion on an egoist understanding of practical reasons. Earlier, he wrote, “Obligation is the necessity of doing or omitting any action in order to be happy” we are obliged to do or omit an action…” when there is such a relation between an Agent and an action that the agent cannot be happy without doing or omitting that action.”[5]

    On some interpretations, Sidgwick held a similar view. According to David Brink: “Sidgwick wants to represent the dualism of practical reason as a conflict between a utilitarian account of duty and an egoistic or prudential account of rationality.”[6]

    If rational Egoism is true, we have a powerful argument favouring [3]. Suppose we grant rational Egoism and affirm the antecedent of [3] we get.

    [3a] We have a reason to perform some action if and only if, and because performing that action maximises my self-interest.

    [3b] There are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with our long-term self-interest

    The conclusion that follows is

    [3c] There are cases where we have no reasons to do what is demanded by impartially justified rules.

    So, it is true that many people who have argued for [3] have appealed to Egoism. It is also true that rational Egoism would, if true, provide grounds affirming [3]. However, these facts do not show that [3] assumes rational Egoism. All they show is that some arguments for [3] depend on rational Egoism.

    There are other arguments for [3] which, do not appeal to rational Egoism, which have the same result. Consider, for example, David Brink, whom I mentioned above. Brink is a leading secular meta-ethicist representing a position known as “Cornell realism“: a research project that attempts to vindicate objective moral facts within a scientific-naturalist view of the world. In doing so, Brink appeals to the thesis that all reasons for action are agent-relative: “Reasons for action are dependent on the aims or interests of the agent who has them.”[7] According to this thesis, what an agent has reasons to do, is a function of or derived from his desires and interests. Facts about reasons are simply facts about what humans desire are interested in or aim at under certain conditions.  This thesis is popular in contemporary philosophy. Brink summarises some of the reasons for its popularity:

    Agent-relative assumptions seem to underlie many formal and informal discussions of individual rationality in philosophy, economics, and politics. Moreover, an agent-relative theory provides a reliable link between reasons for action and motivation, we expect one who recognises reasons for action to be motivated to act on them, and an agent seems more likely to be motivated by facts about his own interest or desires than by facts about the interest or desires of others. Also, when we explain an agent’s behaviour as an attempt to satisfy certain desires, given her beliefs, we are said to “rationalise” her behaviour. This suggests that genuinely rational behavior is that which would promote the agent’s desires or at least those desires that she would have if she met certain epistemic conditions.[8]

    This thesis does not entail that all reasons are self-interested. Even if benefiting another does not promote my interests, it can still fulfil my desires or aims. What the thesis rules out is the existence of “impartial reasons”. Reasons to promote the good of others that don’t derive from the interests or aims of the agent in question.[9] Moreover, if the thesis is true, there is a sound argument for something like [3].

    [3a]* An agent has a reason to perform some action if and only if, and because, that performing that achieves ّthe agents aims or promotes the agents’ interests

    [3b]* there are cases where what is demanded by impartially justified rules conflicts with the agents’ aims and is not in the agents’ interest

    Therefore

    [3c] There are cases where we have no reasons to do what is demanded by impartially justified rules. [10]

    Because this thesis entails that we have no reason to comply with morality in cases where doing so is not in our interests and contrary to our aims, other philosophers reject it. They contend there are also impartial reasons: reasons to promote the welfare of others that don’t derive from our interests and aims. However, even if one grants the existence of impartial reasons, worries about the dualism of practical reason still arise. Brink explains:

    [W]e do not need to think of rationality in exclusively prudential terms to raise this worry. The worry can arise even if there are impartial reasons-that is, nonderivative reasons to promote the welfare of others. For as long as there are prudential reasons, a conflict between impartial reason and prudential reason appears possible. Without some reason to treat impartial reasons as superior, the supremacy of other-regarding morality must remain doubtful.[11]

    Suppose impartial rules demand something contrary to our self-interests. If such cases occur, impartial reasons will point in one direction, and our interests and aims will point in another. This situation generates the sceptical question, “Why be Moral?” What reason do I have, in such cases, to follow impartial rules, not my self-interest? One cannot answer this question by pointing out we have impartial reasons to follow such rules. The question, after all, is why I should give impartial reasons precedence? Nor can it be answered by appealing to my interests or aims because the case is one where morality and such things conflict. 

    Stephen Layman provides a vivid example of the problem:

    Ms Poore has lived many years in grinding poverty. She is not starving but has only the bare necessities. She has tried very hard to get ahead by hard work, but nothing has come of her efforts. An opportunity to steal a large sum of money arises. If Ms. Poore steals the money and invests it wisely, she can obtain many desirable things her poverty has denied her: cure for a painful (but nonfatal) medical condition, a well-balanced diet, decent housing, adequate heat in the winter, health insurance, new career opportunities through education, etc. Moreover, if she steals the money, her chances of being caught are very low, and she knows this. She is also aware that the person who owns the money is very wealthy and will not  be greatly harmed by the theft …Ms. Poore faces the choice of stealing the money or living in grinding poverty the rest of her life. In such a case, I think it would be morally wrong for Ms. Poore to steal the money; and yet, assuming there is no God and no life after death, failing to steal the money will likely deny her a large measure of personal fulfilment, i.e. a large measure of what is in her long-term best interests.[12] 

    Layman accepts that Ms Poore has impartial reasons not to steal.[13] However, these reasons conflict with powerful prudential reasons to steal. Plausibly, there are stronger reasons to break in cases like this than complying with impartial rules. Compliance will be “irrational—in the sense that it involves acting on inferior or weaker reasons.”[14] 

    Let’s recap the dialectic: if rational egoism is true, we lack reason to obey impartial rules if doing so is contrary to our self-interest. If all reasons are agent-relative: we will lack reason to obey if doing so is not in our interests nor promotes our aims. By contrast, if there are impartial reasons, if compliance is not in our interest, prudential and impartial reasons will conflict. There is no reason always to treat impartial rules as having precedence in such conflicts. Even if rational egoism is false, a problematic dualism of practical reason looms.


    [1] To avoid wordiness, I will use the phrase “impartially justified rules” to refer to rules which are justified from a perspective of impartial altruism.

    [2] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 114

    [3] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 117

    [4] John Gay on Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 29/7/21

    [5] John Gay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”, available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022 accessed 29/7/21

    [6] David Brink, “Sidgwick’s dualism of Practical Reason” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 66:3, 1998. 303. Brink’s interpretation of Sidgwick is controversial.

    [7] David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Ethics”, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 6, Ethics, (1992) 1

    [8] David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Ethics”, 2

    [9] David Brink “Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy” in In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press (1997) 257

    [10] See David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Morality” and also “Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy” in In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. (Oxford University Press, 1997). 255–291 for the articulation of an agent-relative version of what is essentially the same problem.

    [11] David Brink, “Self-Love and Altruism” Social Philosophy & Policy 14 (1997) 123

    [12] C. Stephen Layman “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy, 23 (2006): 307

    [13] Layman “God and the Moral Order” 305:

    [14] Stephen Layman Letters to Doubting Thomas: A Case for the Existence of God, (Oxford University Press, 2006) 242

     

     

  • Published in Sophia “Why the Horrendous deeds objection is still a bad argument”

    My paper, “Why the Horrendous deeds objection is still a bad argument” has now been published by Sophia here.  The abstract is as follows:

    A common objection to divine command meta-ethics (‘DCM’) is the horrendous deeds objection. Critics object that if DCM is true, anything at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent or horrendous. Defenders of DCM have responded by contending that God is essentially good: God has certain character traits essentially, such as being loving and just. A person with these character traits cannot command just anything. In recent discussions of DCM, this ‘essential goodness response’ has come under fire. Critics of DCM have offered various objections to the essential goodness response. This paper responds to these critics. I examine and refute six such objections: (a) the objection from counterpossibles, (b) the objection from omnipotence, (c) the objection from requirements of justice, (d) the objection from God’s moral grounding power, (e) the objection from evil and indifferent deities, and (f) the epistemological objection. I will maintain that despite all that has been said about the horrendous deeds objection in recent analytic philosophy, the horrendous deeds argument is still a bad argument.

    A pre-published copy is available on my academia.edu page. 

  • Divine Command Theory and The Masked Man Fallacy

    In almost every talk I give on divine command theory someone in the audience inevitably will interpret me as saying that atheists can’t believe in moral requirements and will cite the fact unbelievers can know what’s right and wrong as a reason to reject the theory. This happens even when I have spent some time pointing out that this isn’t the case. I am not alone in this experience. In the book “Is Goodness without God is good enough” this objection is raised by Paul Kurtz to Craig and is pressed by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, amongst others. I recently addressed a paper by Richard Carrier where he defends this kind of claim.

    Outside of philosophy departments, probably the most well-known response to this objection is that given by Willaim Lane Craig. Craig responds to this objection in his debates by noting it confuses moral ontology with moral epistemology. This is correct I think, however many sceptics outside philosophy departments don’t really grasp these terms or distinctions and think it’s a kind of philosophical triviality.

    Perhaps a more straightforward response is to point out that this argument seems to commit the “Masked Man” fallacy ( a fallacy you can find mentioned interestingly on some sceptic websites on critical thinking)zorro1

    Consider the paradigmatic example of the fallacy:

    1.I know who my father is

    2. I don’t know who the masked man is

    Therefore

    3. The masked man is not my father.

    Or another less used example:

    1. Lois Lane knows that Superman can fly

    2. Lois Lane doesn’t know Clark Kent can fly

    Therefore:

    3. Superman is not Clark Kent

    The mistake in each case is assuming that because A and B are identical and I know something about A, it follows I also know it about B.

    Now compare these fallacious inferences with the following one:

    1 Atheists know that right and wrong exist

    2. Atheists don’t know that Gods commands and prohibitions exist

    Therefore

    3. Moral rightness and wrongness are not Gods commands and prohibitions.

    It seems to me this is an analogous inference, with the same form as the fallacious ones. If I am correct this provides a simpler way of providing a response to the objection that moral requirements can’t be divine commands because atheists have moral knowledge than attempting to explain the difference between ontology and epistemology. One doesn’t need to do this, one needs only to point out it commits a well-known fallacy.