Tag: Brad Hooker

  • Published in Sophia “Why the Horrendous deeds objection is still a bad argument”

    My paper, “Why the Horrendous deeds objection is still a bad argument” has now been published by Sophia here.  The abstract is as follows:

    A common objection to divine command meta-ethics (‘DCM’) is the horrendous deeds objection. Critics object that if DCM is true, anything at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent or horrendous. Defenders of DCM have responded by contending that God is essentially good: God has certain character traits essentially, such as being loving and just. A person with these character traits cannot command just anything. In recent discussions of DCM, this ‘essential goodness response’ has come under fire. Critics of DCM have offered various objections to the essential goodness response. This paper responds to these critics. I examine and refute six such objections: (a) the objection from counterpossibles, (b) the objection from omnipotence, (c) the objection from requirements of justice, (d) the objection from God’s moral grounding power, (e) the objection from evil and indifferent deities, and (f) the epistemological objection. I will maintain that despite all that has been said about the horrendous deeds objection in recent analytic philosophy, the horrendous deeds argument is still a bad argument.

    A pre-published copy is available on my academia.edu page. 

  • Brad Hooker and Philip Quinn

    Most versions of Divine command meta-ethics  (DCM) contend that the property of being morally required is informatively identical with the property of being commanded by God.[1] A common objection to divine command meta-ethics is the horrendous deeds objection.  We can formalise this objection as follows:

    [P1] If DCM is true, then if God commands unjust actions unjust actions are morally required

    [P2] It is possible for God to command unjust actions

    [P3] It is not possible for unjust actions to be morally required.

    These three premises, entail a contradiction. [P1] conjoined with [P2] entails that it is possible for unjust actions to be morally required. However, this conclusion explicitly contradicts [P3]. Moreover, [P1] is clearly true. If I contend that  A and B are really the same property, then if any action that has A will also have B. So it follows that if an unjust action has the property of being commanded by God. It will also have the property of being morally required.

    Philip Quinn responds to the abhorrent commands objection, by rejecting [P2].[2] Quinn notes that on standard conceptions of God has certain character traits essentially. God is omniscient, omnipotent, but he is also loving and just. It is impossible however for a loving and just person to knowingly and deliberately command something incompatible with love and justice. If someone did this, they couldn’t coherently be called just or loving. The upshot is that [P2] is false. Affirming that a loving and just being commands injustice is to affirm something logically impossible.

    Hooker’s Critique

    Brad Hooker offers a response to Quinn.[3]  Hooker notes that DCM has the implication that “Before God made any commands, there were no moral requirements.”  However, Quinn suggests that God has the property of being just essentially, this means that requirements of justice must exist antecedent to any commands God issues.  But that means there are requirements of justice antecedent to requirements of morality.

    Hooker then offers the following argument:

    [P1]    If DCM is correct all moral requirements depend on Gods commands.

    [P2]:  If all moral requirements derive from God’s commands, then the require­ments cannot exist until the commands exist.

    [P3]: Even before God made any commands, there were requirements of justice constraining His commands.

    [C1]     Before God made any commands, there were no moral requirements (from premises 1 and 2)

    [C2] Requirements of justice were not moral requirements. (from P3 an C1)

    However, Hooker argues that [C2] is false.  He concludes:

    Since the logic of the above argument is valid, then if the argument’s conclusion is false, at least one of the argument’s premisses must be false. Premiss 2 cannot plausibly be denied. To reject Premiss 1 is to abandon the Divine Command Theory. So is Premiss 3 the one to reject? According to Quinn, even before God makes His first command, His inherent justice would keep Him from making unjust commands. To reject Premiss 3 is to abandon Quinn’s defence of the Divine Command Theory … [4]


    Response to Hooker

    I agree with Hooker that, if the conclusion of the argument is false, then at least one of its premises must be false. I also agree that a divine command theorist cannot abandon P1 or P2 and abandoning P3 commits him to abandoning Quinn’s defence of DCM.  The critical question is whether [C2] is false. Why is [C2] implausible? Hooker’s argument against [C2] is brief. He writes:

    However, requirements of justice are moral requirements. If they are moral requirements, then presumably they also were moral requirements (and will continue to be). Conclusion 2, therefore, seems false… the Divine Command Theory commits us to the implausible view that requirements of justice are not moral requirements.

    Noticing a subtle shift in this argument is important. In Hooker’s argument, C2 is the claim that “moral requirements of justice were not moral requirements. (emphasis mine). The “were” refers to the time before God issued any commands. P1 P2 and P3 do not entail that moral requirements are not moral requirements posterior to such commands. The divine command theorist could affirm, and I suspect probably will affirm, that antecedent to any commands by God, there were requirements of justice. But no one was under any moral requirement to act justly. Posterior to Gods commands, however, there is such a requirement. Hence while the requirements of justice are moral requirements now, they were not prior to God issuing any commands.

    A distinction made by John Mackie is illustrative here. Mackie famously argued for moral nihilism. According to Mackie, our moral discourse presupposes that objective moral requirements exist. He then argued that no such requirements do exist and so our moral discourse is systematically mistaken. Claims such as “Bill is morally required to act justly are false.

    Mackie’s thesis is jarring, to soften the blow he but that in denying moral requirements exist he points out he is “not denying that there can be objective evaluations relative to standards,” taking, as an example, the standard of justice:

    In one important sense of the word, it is a paradigm case of injustice if a court declares someone to be guilty of an offence of which it knows him to be innocent. More generally, a finding is unjust if it is at variance with what the relevant law and the facts together require, and particularly if it is known by the court to be so. More generally still, any award of marks, prizes, or the like is unjust if it is at variance with the agreed standards for the contest in question: if one diver’s performance, in fact, measures up better to the accepted standards for diving than another’s, it will be unjust if the latter is awarded higher marks or the prize …”[5]

    What follows from nihilism is instead that:

    The statement that a certain decision is thus just or unjust will not be objectively prescriptive: in so far as it can be simply true it leaves open the question whether there is any objective requirement to do what is just and to refrain from what is unjust, and equally leaves open the practical decision to act in either way.[6]

    On this Mackie is surely correct, a person who embraces nihilism and thinks nothing is really right or wrong can still understand the concept of what is loving and just. Such a person could know that this idea of justice entailed certain standards and paradigmatic examples and he or she could in many cases tell whether certain behaviour was loving or was in accord with the standards of justice. She or he also could choose to live in accord with these standards if he or she wanted to and she or he could choose not to live in accord with them. He or she could simply reject that there was any objective moral obligation to behave in accord with such standards.   The question of whether an action is just and loving and whether it is obligatory are, in principle, separate questions.

    This distinction is subtle but important, and it has application here. DCM entails that, prior to God’s commands, no action is morally wrong. This, however, does not mean that actions cannot be loving and just prior to God’s commands. Prior to God’s act of commanding, certain actions will be loving and just without it being the case that they are obligatory. Because God is loving and just he commands people to behave in loving and just ways so that actions which are just antecedent to his commands become morally required or obligatory posterior to such commands.

    It seems then that Hooker then is mistaken when he states “Divine Command Theory commits us to the implausible view that requirements of justice are not moral requirements.” Hooker here has moved from C1 which claims moral requirements were not moral requirements antecedent to God’s commands to the claim they are not moral requirements posterior to God’s commands.

    The only reason Hooker gives for this leap is to assert “If they [requirements of justice] are moral requirements, then presumably they also were moral requirements (and will continue to be).”  But apart from Hooker’s presumption, there is no reason to think that, and certainly no reason for a divine command theorist to believe this. As far as I can tell its coherent to claim that actions could be unjust but not obligatory prior to God’s commands.


    [1] I say most here, William Lane Craig, Robert Adams, C Stephen Evans, William Alston, and Peter Forrest all contend the property of being commanded by God and the property of being morally required are informatively identical. By contrast, Philip Quinn holds that Gods commands directly and immediately cause the existence of moral requirements. This difference though important will not affect the subsequent discussion of Philip Quinn.

    [2] Philip Quinn, “Divine Command Theory” In The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. H. LaFollette, (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 70-71

    [3] Brad Hooker “Cudworth and Quinn” Analysis 61: 4 (2001); 333-335

    [4] Brad Hooker “Cudworth and Quinn” Analysis 61: 4 (2001); 335

    [5] John Mackie “The Subjectivity of Values” in Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory ed George Sher (Routledge, 2012) 184.

    [6] Ibid.