Tag: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

  • Richard Carrier and the “Infantile” objection to God’s command’s

    In his article, “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality”, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argued that a “Divine command theory makes morality childish.”[1]

    In my response to Armstrong, “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism?”[2] I made two points. First, I addressed a tangential point: that Armstrong’s argument caricatures divine command theory (“DCT”) by tacitly assuming that divine command theorists believe actions are wrong because God will punish us for doing them. Second, I called into question the analogy Armstrong draws between a child following one’s parents and humans following God.Carrier

    Richard Carrier, in his reply to my article, “On the Facts as we Know them, Ethical Naturalism is all there is”,[3] objects to both these responses.

    The motivation of punishment
    Carrier dismisses my first point as “disingenuous” stating,

    (a) that he is “not aware of any DCT advocate who is actually a universalist”; and

    (b) “Every time a DCT advocate has ever threatened or warned anyone of hell (or even just the loss of heaven) in reference to their behaviour, they expose what they really think the ground of Morality is: the fear of consequences.”[4]

    Neither argument is cogent. Let us look at (a) first. The philosopher most responsible for developing and defending DCT in the last fifty years, Robert Merrithew Adams, is a universalist. Given that Adams’ discussion is definitive, and most of the literature in the last thirty years discusses his arguments, Carrier’s claim that he is “not aware of any DCT advocate who is actually a universalist” speaks only to his lack of reading and knowledge of the subject.

    Premise (b) expresses a non-sequitur. Even if, as is true, many divine command theorists are not universalists and even if some have warned people about divine punishment, then it does not follow that those people believe that fear of punishment is the ground of morality. At most it shows that those people believe in divine judgement and they see it as one reason to avoid wrongdoing.

    An analogy might illustrate the mistaken logic here. All people I know believe that prisons exist and I have known some of them warn others that if they commit a crime they will go to jail. It does not follow from this that that these people believe that jail is the only reason one should not commit crimes.

    Straw manning Armstrong and missing the real target
    Carrier’s response to my second point fares little better. He makes two objections:

    (i): “[Armstrong’s] point about infantilization is not the point Flannagan is responding to. Flannagan thinks he means something to do with children obeying parents (and therefore we can build a comparable analogy to adults obeying God that does not infantilize).”

    (ii) that Armstrong’s real point, that “Adult moral reasoning is based on actually caring about the people affected by our actions and thus wanting to do good, as opposed to actually not wanting to do good but begrudgingly doing it anyway to avoid punishment” remains untouched.[5]

    Once again, both objections fail. In respect of (i), contrary to Carrier’s protestation, Armstrong does speak of children obeying parents and does draw an analogy between adults obeying God and children obeying their parents. Here is what Armstrong says:

    “A second objection is that the divine command theory makes morality childish Compare a small boy who thinks that what makes it Morally wrong for him to hit his little sister is only that his parents told him not to hit her and will punish him if he does. As a result, this little boy thinks that if his parents leave home or die then there is nothing wrong with hitting his little sister. Perhaps some little boys think this way but surely we adults do not think that Morality is anything like this.”[6]

    This section of Armstrong’s work was directly quoted in my article.

    This brings us to (ii), even if Armstrong was making the point Carrier attributed to him in this section of his paper, it is mistaken to conclude that I never addressed this (more…)

  • Published in Philo: Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

    Jeffery Jay Lowder  has informed me that my article “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong”  was  published in the Spring/Summer 2012 issue of Philo. The abstract is below:

    Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong“In many of his addresses and debates, William Lane Craig has defended a Divine Command Theory of moral obligation (DCT). In a recent article and subsequent monograph, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has criticized Craig’s position. Armstrong contended that a DCT is subject to several devastating objections and further contended that even if theism is true a particular form of ethical naturalism is a more plausible account of the nature of moral obligations than a DCT is. This paper critiques Armstrong’s argument. I will argue Armstrong’s objections do not refute a DCT and the ethical naturalism he defends is not more plausible than Craig’s ethical supernaturalism.”

    You can read “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong” here.

  • Mark Murphy Reviews Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.

    Those who have followed my recent discussions of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s writings on God and Morality. Might be interested in this review of Armstrong’s book “Morality without God”  by Mark Murphy in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Mark  is a lecturer in moral philosophy at Georgetown University. He is is one of the leading critics of divine command ethics writing today.

    Interestingly, there is some overlap in his comments and mine, particularly the issues regarding “social obligations” and how moral obligations constitute reasons for action.

    Enjoy

  • Is Ethical Naturalism More Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Part II

    This is the second part of the paper I presented to the Naturalisms in Ethics Conference at Auckland University last year.

    In my previous post, I noted that Robert Adams has argued that if God exists, then divine commands “best fill the role assigned to wrongness by the concept”.[1] He argues that if moral obligations are divine commands this explains the fact, that (i) “wrongness is an objective property of actions,”[2], (ii) it accounts “for the wrongness of a major portion of the types of action that we have believed to be wrong,”[3]   (iii) it “plays a causal role … in their coming to be regarded as wrong”,[4]  (iv) it explains how moral obligations constitute a “supremely weighty reason” for acting or refraining from an action,   and (v) he contends that DCT explains the intuition that moral duties comprise “a law or standard that has a sanctity greater than that of any merely human will or institution”.[5]

    Moreover, in my last post, I also argued that, for Armstrong to conclude his arguments call into question any theistic account of ethics, he must argue that his harm account of moral obligation provides a better explanation of all these features. Failing that, if his account doesn’t preserve these features of moral obligation, then he must provide us with a reason to suppose that they are not part of the concept of moral obligation. Or he must provide reasons for revising our concepts.

    In his monograph “Morality without God” he attempted to do this. It’s my contention that he has failed in this task.

    1. Social Requirements

    Let’s begin with (v), In “Morality without God”, Armstrong purports to address this line of argument, he claims that “the best line of argument-because it is the only argument is that moral laws require a lawgiver”[6]. He attributes to popular writer Dinesh D’Souza. He then proceeds to make short work of D’Souza’s argument.

    However, this is neither the best, nor the only argument offered in favour of a DCT. In subsequent articles and a monograph, Adam’s has developed (v) in some detail.[7] Adam’s proposes a “social requirement theory” of obligation whereby “being obligated to do something consists in being required (in a certain way under certain situations) by another person or groups of persons not to do it”[8]. Obligations are a kind of social relationship where one person makes a demand on another, failure to comply results ruptures in the relationship expressed in terms of blame, censure, punishment and alienation, which can be expiated by forgiveness. Adam’s offers a sustained argument that the role of guilt, censure, punishment, social inculcation, moral motivation, moral knowledge and forgiveness plays in our concept of obligation, make a social requirement theory plausible.[9] Nowhere in Armstrong “Morality without God” does Armstrong even (more…)

  • Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong Part I

    This is  first half of the paper I presented to the Naturalisms in Ethics Conference at Auckland University last year.

    In many of his addresses and debates William Lane Craig has defended a Divine Command Theory of moral obligation (“DCT”). In a recent article Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has criticized this contention.[1] Armstrong contends that even if theism is true then a particular form of ethical naturalism is a more plausible account of the nature of moral obligations than a DCT is. This paper critiques Armstrong’s argument.

    Craig’s contention
    Craig’s contention is that if theism is true then we can plausibly explain the nature of moral obligation by identifying obligations with God’s commands analogous to the way “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H2O, or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion.”[2] By “God” Craig means a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, loving and just, immaterial person who created the universe.

    This emphasis, both on God as a loving and just being and identifying moral obligations with God’s commands suggests that Craig defends a version of the modified DCT defended by Robert Adams,[3] William Alston[4] and C Stephen Evans[5]. Both Adams and Evans have argued, like Craig, that if God exists then his commands “best fill the role assigned to wrongness by the concept”.[6] Much of Craig’s arguments can be seen as an appropriation and popularisation of Adams.[7]

    Armstrong’s Argument from Harm
    Walter Sinnott-ArmstrongArmstrong contends that such a position is “incredible”[8], he states:

    There is a much more plausible foundation for morality. It seems obvious to me, and to everyone who does not start with peculiarly religious assumptions, that what makes rape morally wrong is the extreme harm that rape causes to rape victims.[9]

    We do not need a “new supernatural level” for morality because a natural property, the property of harming others without an adequate reason, fulfils the role assigned to wrongness by the concept better than divine commands do. Armstrong provides two arguments for this conclusion.

    (a) The harm account makes moral obligations more objective than a DCT does;

    (b) The harm account is more economical than a DCT.

    Armstrong contends that his argument refutes, not just Craig, but any theistic account of ethics, “Other theists might try to give better arguments for a religious view of morality. I don’t see how they could avoid all the problems in Craig’s account without leaving traditional Christianity far behind.”[10]

    I will address arguments (a) and (b) below. However, it is worth noting that, as stated, Armstrong’s conclusion here misses the point. He contends that everyone who does not start with peculiarly religious assumptions will see that the harm-based account is more plausible than a DCT. But Craig’s contention is that if God exists then a DCT is a plausible account of the nature of moral obligations. Neither Craig nor Adams contend that a DCT is the most plausible theory in the absence of religious assumptions. They contend that a DCT is the more “attractive theory, given those [theistic] beliefs, than any other meta-ethical theory is, given non-theistic (more…)

  • Back from San Francisco: A Belated Report

    MandM has been quite of late, this is because Madeleine and I have been very busy.  With moving house in the midst of Christmas and New Years and Madeleine working part-time in a law firm and so on, we’ve had little time to blog. We are now set up, to some extent, and so this post will be a belated comment on my recent trip to San Francisco.

    In November I flew to San Francisco where I attended I attended the  Meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society (ETS), The Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS), The Evangelical Philosophical Society Apologetics Conference and The Annual Meeting of the Society for Biblical Literature (SBL) and American academy of religion.(AAR). While I would love to give detailed commentary on each session, to do so would require several blog posts of inordinate length, instead I will simply summarise what went down.

    I arrived in San Francisco at around 4pm  on the 15th. I presented my first paper at 8:30am the next morning. My paper was a critique of Walter Sinnott Armstrong’s arguments against divine command theory meta-ethics. Armstrong contends that the nature of moral obligation is best explained by identifying moral obligations with the natural property of harming others without justification, and, focusing largely on Craig’s work, argues this is superior to divine command ethics. I argued: (a) his argument fails to note the conditional nature of Craig’s (his main target’s) contention that if theism is true moral obligations are best explained as divinecommands (b) Armstrong’s does not provide a better account of moral objectivity (c) Armstrong’s account is not more economical than a divine command theory. (d) Even if it were an economical account, it does not explain various features of obligation such as (i) the social nature of moral obligations (ii) the fact that moral obligations constitute a decisive reason for acting and (iii) the specific moral content of obligations; as well as a divine command theory. All in around 30 minutes!!! The paper was very well received, with several people asking me to forward them a copy. I plan to get it published later this year.

    The rest of the morning was filled with me hearing various papers on moral theory and philosophy of religion all of which were interesting and stimulating. These panellists all shared similar perspectives yet were astutely critical of each other’s arguments. Particularly interesting was the dialogue between Baggett and Craig. Some of the issues here were technical and deserve further discussion so I plan to blog on this dialogue in more detail in the future. But in sum: Craig has defended a counterfactual: if God did not exist then moral obligations would not exist. Baggett  argued for various reasons that this is too strong; if God, the creator and sustainer of the universe, did not exist, the universe would not exist. To make sense, Craig’s claim needs to envisage a compossible world, which is like the actual world in all respects except that God does not exist, if it’s like the world in all other respects however, then it has all the features of the world God has created – and hence the resources for something like moral obligations to exist. Instead, Baggett contended, one should argue that a world with God provides a better explanation of the nature and existence of moral obligations than a world without God does. This means the theist does not have to argue, with Craig, that there is no adequate secular account of the existence of moral obligations, only that a divine command theory is more plausible than such accounts. Both Craig and Baggett made telling points which I will have to elaborate on some other time. highlight of Wednesday was the afternoon session. A panel discussion of David Baggett and Jerry Wall’s new book “Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality”. This book is the latest defence of divine command theory ethics, recently published by Oxford University Press. Baggett and Walls sketched briefly the content of the book and Paul Copan and William Lane Craig offered critical commentary, to which Baggett and Walls responded.

    Thursday started with an excellent critique of evolutionary (more…)

  • Friday Fallacy: Equivocation

    In my post on Assessing Arguments I noted that a valid argument is one where it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. I gave the following example:

    Premise: All men are under 10 feet tall;
    Premise: John is a man;
    Conclusion: John is under 10 feet tall.

    This argument is valid because it is impossible for both premises to be true and the conclusion false. If it is true that all men are under 10 feet tall and if it is true that John is a man then John cannot be over 10 feet tall. If it were possible for John to be over 10 feet tall then the first premise would mean he could not be a man, which, of course, would contradict the second premise.

    In this post I want to note an important feature of this type of argument. There is an obvious link between the first and the second premises. The first premise makes a claim about all men; it identifies a class of beings, those we call men, and it attributes a property to members of this class. The second premise identified John as a man – a member of the class mentioned in premise one. The fact that both premises refer to the same class of beings is important to the validity of the argument because John is a member of the same class that is stated to be under 10 feet tall; the conclusion, that John is under 10 feet tall, cannot be logically avoided. This argument is valid because the word ‘man’ refers to the same thing in both premises. If the word ‘men’ in the first premise did not refer to the same class John is said to be a member of in the second premise then the argument would not follow.

    This brings me to this weeks fallacy: the fallacy of equivocation. Sometimes the same word has more than one meaning. The fallacy of equivocation occurs when a person uses the same word in different premises but not the same meaning. Because the same word is used the argument appears valid but when one looks at what the word actually refers to in each premise, the argument is not valid.  A obvious example is as follows:

    1. Money put in a bank will earn interest;
    2. A bank is the body of land at the side of a river;

    Therefore:

    3. If you want to earn interest on your money you should put it in the body of land at the side of a river.

    This silly example shows quite nicely how the fallacy works. Both premise 1. and premise 2. make reference to a bank; at a superficial glance the argument might appear valid if what the first premise says of a bank is true and if what the second premise says of a bank is true. The problem is (and in this example it is fairly obvious) the word ‘bank’ in each premise has a different meaning. In the first premise it refers to a financial institution, in the second it refers to a body of land at the side of a river. When one looks at what the terms actually refer to, as opposed to their verbal form, the argument is invalid.

    In this example the fallacy is obvious; the conclusion is so outrageously silly and the premises so uncontroversial that the mistake is obvious. However, in other cases the fallacy can be more subtle.

    The Fallacy of Equivocation

    Here is an example I recently spotted on Common Sense Atheism’s (more…)