Tag: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and the Moral Scepticism Objection to Divine Commands

    In responding to William Lane Craig’s advocacy of a Divine Command Theory (DCT) Walter Sinnott-Armstrong makes the objection that,“The divine command theory makes morality unknowable.”

    He makes the following argument for this:

    To see why, consider whether or not it is immoral to eat pork. If the divine command theory is correct, we cannot answer this question simply by pointing out that eating pork causes harm to pigs or to us, unless we already know that God commanded us to avoid such harm. We also cannot know wether it is immoral to eat pork on the basis of other’s testimony or our own moral intuitions if we have no reason to think their testimony or our intuitions map onto divine commands, and we cannot have any such reason without knowing what God commanded. Thus, on Craig’s theory we cannot know what is morally wrong, if we cannot know what God commanded. Unfortunately, however we have no sound way to determine what God commanded.1

    Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument here is as follows:

    [1] If DCT is correct then we cannot know an action is wrong unless we know God prohibited it.

    [2] We have no sound way to determine what God has commanded or prohibited.

    From these it is concluded that

    [3] If DCT is correct we cannot know an action is wrong.

    In support of [1] he offers two premises,

    [1a] If DCT is correct then we cannot know an action a is wrong because it has property p, unless we know that God prohibits p

    [1b] If DCT is correct, then we cannot know an action a is wrong, on grounds g, unless we know that g “maps on to divine commands”.

    One serious problem with this argument is that [1] is false, as are the supporting premises [1a] and [1b]. According, to the DCT of Adams, Alston, and Evans, which Craig appropriates, the property of being wrong is constituted by the property of being contrary to Gods commands in the same way that the property of being water is constituted by the property of being H20. Sinnott-Armstrong thinks holding that moral duties are constituted by Gods commands, means, one cannot know if an action is wrong unless one knows it was forbidden by God. This seems to presuppose the following inference :

    I1: If A is constituted by B, then one cannot know if something is an A unless one knows it is a B.

    However, I1 is false. Consider the following counter example; water is constituted by H20. Yet people for thousands of years could perceive water, drink it, detect it, and use it etc without knowing anything about atomic theory. This example shows people can know something is an A (water), A can be constituted by something B (H20) and people not know A is a B.

    The same is true for [1a], the DCT claims that wrongness is constituted by God’s prohibition, Armstrong seems to think this means we cannot know if an action is wrong on the basis of some feature of that action unless we know that feature is prohibited by God. This seems to presuppose a similar inference

    I2: If A is constituted by B then we cannot know something is an A on the basis of it possessing p, unless we know that B has p.

    But again there are obvious counter examples to I2. Water is constituted by H20, if I2 is true it would follow one cannot tell that the cup of liquid I am drinking is water because of its taste unless I know that H20 tastes that way. But this is clearly false. Medieval men could recognize by taste a cup of water as well as any modern person despite not knowing anything about H20.

    [1b] faces similar difficulties, here Armstrong thinks, that if our duties are constituted by divine commands, this entails that we cannot know that an action is immoral on the basis of some ground, such as intuition or testimony, unless we have reasons for thinking that ground “maps onto divine commands”. But why think this? The argument seems to rely on the following inference

    I3. If A constitutes B, then one cannot know B exists on ground g, unless one has reason for thinking g reliably tracks A.

    But this is also false. Take the example I mentioned above. There are people do not know about atomic theory and yet know on the basis of perception that the glass in front of them contains water. These people do not need to have reasons for thinking that their eyesight tracts hydrogen and oxygen atoms before they can rationally trust their senses, they know about water quite independently of any knowledge about hydrogen or oxygen.

    So [1], [1a] and [1b] are all false. The error in each instance is the same, Armstrong assumes that the metaphysical claim that our duties are constituted by God’s commands entails that we cannot recognize or know whether an action is wrong unless we know what God commanded. This however is to conflate moral ontology with moral epistemology.

    Similar problems afflict Sinnott-Armstrong’s advocacy of [2] that “we have no sound way to determine what God commanded.” Immediately after making this claim Armstrong defends it by claiming the arguments from natural theology fail, he then states

    Theists often tell us what God commands, as if they knew, and the commands they ascribe to God are often (though not always) plausible. However, what makes us and them accept that God commands those actions rather than others is that we already and independently had a reason to think that certain acts are immoral. Assuming God is good, of course God would command us not to rape. But the only way we know God would issue that command is that we already know rape is wrong. There is no way to know what God does or would command without already knowing what is right or wrong.2

    Here Sinnott-Armstrong seems to contradict [2] when he contends that it’s plausible to claim God commands us not to rape and seems to countenance the conclusion that we can know what God would command on the basis of justified moral beliefs. But if this is true then [2] is false. Of course Sinnott-Armstrong contends such knowledge is dependent on moral beliefs and not revelation or natural theology. But, that is incompatible with [2], [2] does not state that we can’t know through revelation or natural theology it states we can’t gain such knowledge at all.

    Some of what Sinnott-Armstrong states here suggests he may have a different argument in mind. In “Morality: Religious and Secular”, Patrick Nowell-Smith refers to an argument that is “familiar to philosophers but of which the force is not always appreciated” which Smith contends refutes a divine command theory, the argument is:

    [We] must be persuaded independently of his goodness before we admit his right to command. We must judge for ourselves whether the Bible is the inspired word of a kind and benevolent God or a curious amalgam of profound wisdom and gross superstition. To judge this is to make a moral decision, so that in the end, so far from morality being based upon religion, religion is based upon morality.3

    James Cornman and Keith Lehrer have expressed essentially the same line of critique.4 I think this critique is based on a failure to make an important distinction. Take the claim that right and wrong is independent of God’s commands. This claim is ambiguous; it could mean (a), that ones knowledge of right and wrong is independent of ones knowledge of what God commands or (b), that right and wrong exist independently of God’s commands. The first claim states that beliefs about right and wrong are epistemologically independent of beliefs about divine commands. The second is that the existence of moral properties such as right and wrong are ontologically independent of God’s commands.

    Now the DCT denies (b). Divine command theorists claim that wrongness is constituted by the property of being contrary to God’s commands. Hence it postulates an ontological dependence between divine commands and moral properties such as wrongness. The arguments of Nowell-Smith above however do not refute this claim. If they show anything, they show not that (b) is the case but that (a) is the case. Nowell-Smith and Sinnott-Armstrong show that we can know what is right and wrong independently of knowing or believing in the existence of divine commands. Hence they show at most an epistemological independence.

    Showing that beliefs about right and wrong are epistemologically independent of beliefs about God’s commands does not show that right and wrong are ontologically independent of God’s commands unless epistemological independence entails ontological independence. The objector here assumes that if my knowledge of something does not depend upon my knowledge of something else then the two things can exist independently of each other.

    Again this assumption is false. The property of being water is constituted by the property of being H20; as such H20 and water are not ontologically independent. Yet, as noted, for thousands of years people could perceive water, drink it, detect it, and use it etc without knowing anything about atomic theory. Hence, our knowledge of water is independent of our knowledge of H20. Yet this fact does not mean that water is not constituted by H20. Sinnott-Armstrong’s objection therefore fails; it is hard to avoid Craig’s assessment that Sinnott-Armstrong’s critique is “pervaded by the conflation of moral ontology with moral epistemology.”5

    1. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 109.
    2. Ibid 110.
    3. Patrick H. Nowell-Smith, “Morality: Religious and Secular,” in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Ian T. Ramsey (London: SCM Press, 1966) 97.
    4. James W Cornman & Keith Lehrer, Philosophical Problems and Arguments (New York: MacMillan, 1979) 429.
    5. William Lane Craig “This Most Gruesome Guests” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 168.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Morality and Arbitrariness
    Van Inwagen, Divine Duties and the Deontological Argument from Evil
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Infantile Religious Morality
    Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I
    Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II

    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part II
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part II
    On a Common Equivocation

  • Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part I

    Critics of Christianity often claim that the book of Joshua teaches that God commanded genocide. Raymond Bradley for example states,

    In chapters 7 through 12, [the book of Joshua] treats us to a chilling chronicle of the 31 kingdoms, and all the cities therein, that fell victim to Joshua’s, and God’s, genocidal policies. Time and again we read the phrases “he utterly destroyed every person who was in it,” “he left no survivor,” and “there was no one left who breathed.”[1]

    Similarly, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong cites passages in Joshua with the same point in mind.[2]

    The objection that Bradley and Armstrong raise in highlighting these passages is that Christians are committed to an inconsistent set of propositions.

    [1] Any act that God commands is morally permissible.
    [2] The scriptures are an authoritative revelation of God’s commands.
    [3] It is morally impermissible for anyone to commit genocide.
    [4] According to the book of Joshua, God commanded Israel to commit genocide.

    If we are to rationally affirm both [1] and [2] then we must give up either [3] or [4]. So which one should we reject?

    Philip Quinn has developed a way of addressing clashes such as this. He suggests that we can draw on a principle whereby “whenever two conflicting claims differ in epistemic status, the claim with the lower epistemic status is to be rejected.”

    [3]Given this approach, if a particular interpretation of any passage conflicts with one of our moral intuitions then we should ask whether or not the case for that interpretation is as convincing as the principle that it clashes with. Now, the principle that genocide is wrong is, I think, a highly plausible one. Therefore, if one is to prefer [3] to [4] then the case for a literal reading must at least be this plausible, and preferably even more plausible. In this series of posts I will argue, perhaps surprisingly to some, that [4] is doubtful. While it is true that taken in isolation and interpreted in a strict literal fashion the book of Joshua does appear to state that God commanded Genocide, I contend that when the text is read in its literary and textual context this conclusion is far from evident and is, in fact, rather questionable.

    In the tenth chapter of the book of Joshua we read,

    They [Joshua and his troops] took the city, its king and its villages, and put them to the sword. Everyone in it they totally destroyed. They left no survivors. They did to Debir and its king as they had done to Libnah and its king and to Hebron. So Joshua subdued the whole region, including the hill country, the Negev, the western foothills and the mountain slopes, together with all their kings. He left no survivors. He totally destroyed all who breathed, just as the LORD, the God of Israel, had commanded. Joshua subdued them from Kadesh Barnea to Gaza and from the whole region of Goshen to Gibeon. (Joshua 10:39-41)

    This text summarises Joshua’s campaign in southern Canaan. The northern campaign is summarised in a similar fashion in the following chapter,

    So Joshua took this entire land: the hill country, all the Negev, the whole region of Goshen, the western foothills, the Arabah and the mountains of Israel with their foothills, from Mount Halak, which rises toward Seir, to Baal Gad in the Valley of Lebanon below Mount Hermon. He captured all their kings and struck them down, putting them to death. Joshua waged war against all these kings for a long time. Except for the Hivites living in Gibeon, not one city made a treaty of peace with the Israelites, who took them all in battle. For it was the LORD himself who hardened their hearts to wage war against Israel, so that he might destroy them totally, exterminating them without mercy, as the LORD had commanded Moses. At that time Joshua came and wiped out the Anakim from the hill country, from Hebron, from Debir, from Anab, and from all the hill country of Judah, and from all the hill country of Israel; Joshua utterly destroyed them with their towns. No Anakites were left in Israelite territory; only in Gaza, Gath and Ashdod did any survive. So Joshua took the entire land, just as the LORD had directed Moses, and he gave it as an inheritance to Israel according to their tribal divisions. Then the land had rest from war. (Joshua 11:16-23)

    If these passages are taken in a strict literal fashion and read in isolation from the proceeding narrative they record the divinely authorised commission of genocide. Taken literally these passages state three things.

    Firstly, that Joshua conquered and subdued the entire regions of southern and northern Canaan. Verse 11:23 states that “Joshua took the entire land” and then “gave it as an inheritance to Israel according to their tribal divisions.” This suggests that the region in question is the same land that is later divided between the Israelite tribes, which was the entire land of Canaan.

    Secondly, the passage repeatedly emphasises that Joshua exterminated all the Canaanites in this region. Verse 11:21 states “Joshua came and wiped out the Anakim from the hill country, from Hebron, from Debir, from Anab, and from all the hill country of Judah.” Verse 11:22 states that no Anakites were left living in Israeli territory after this campaign.  Repeatedly it states that Joshua left “no survivors” and “destroyed everything that breathed” in “the entire land.” Alongside these general claims the text goes to identifies several specific places and cities where Joshua exterminated everyone and left no survivors and killed all who breathed. These include Hebron, Debir, the hill country and the Negev.

    Thirdly, the text states that God commanded these actions. Verse 23 identifies the commands with those laid down in the Law of Moses, which refers back to passages like Deut 20:16-19 and Deut 7.1-5.

    The first thing I want to note is that the text should not be read in isolation from the narrative in which this occurs. This hermeneutical point may seem rather obvious but when it is taken seriously immediate and obvious problems occur with a strictly literal reading of the ‘genocide passages’ I mention above. The most glaringly obvious issue relates to the opening of the book of Judges. In the first chapter of Judges we read of events that occurred after the death of Joshua (and, hence, after the campaigns mentioned in Josh 10 and 11). Here it is explicitly stated that Canaanites are living in the land which had been allotted to various Israeli tribes, the land that Joshua is said to have conquered and “left no survivors” in. Note that this was not a small remnant. They existed in such numbers that each of the tribes of Israel needed to fight in order to dislodge them from the land. Several of the tribes were unable to do so and so Israel failed to dislodge them.

    Of particular interest, however, are the several cities and regions mentioned. In the first chapter we are told that the Canaanites lived Gaza (Judg 1:18), the Negev (1:9), in the hill country  (Judg 1:9) in Debir (Judg 1:11), in Hebron (Judg 1:10) and in the the western foothills (Judg 1:9). Moreover, they did so in such numbers and strength that they had to be driven out by force. These are the same cities that Joshua 10 tells us Joshua had annihilated and left no survivors in.  Moreover, the text explicitly states that Anakites are in Hebron, yet Joshua 11:22 tells us that “No Anakites were left in Israelite territory.” This seems rather odd if Joshua had exterminated everyone there and left no survivors. It is also odd given that Joshua is said, in the genocide passages, to have conquered and subdued the entire region.

    Moreover, the account of what God commanded also differs in Judges 2:1. Here no mention of genocide or annihilation is made, instead we hear of how God had promised to drive them out and has commanded the Israelites to not to make treaties with them and to destroy their shrines. Taken in a straight-forward literal manner then, Joshua’s actions are at odds with the first two chapters of Judges.

    It is not just Judges that this problem occurs in. There are numerous places within the book of Joshua itself where the same picture is presented. As noted, Joshua 11 ends by stating that “the entire land, just as the LORD had directed Moses” was given “as an inheritance to Israel according to their tribal divisions.” When the text turns to giving an account of these tribal divisions it is evident that the Israelites do not actually occupy it, but living, breathing, Canaanites do.

    The allotments begin with God telling Joshua, “You are very old, and there are still very large areas of land to be taken over” (Josh 13:1). Moreover, when one examines the allotment given to Judah we see Caleb asking permission to drive the  Anakites (Josh14: 11) from the hill countries and we also hear how Caleb has to defeat Anakites living in Hebron and, after this, marches against the people “living in Debir” (Josh 15:13-19). Similarly it is evident with several of the other allotments that the people have yet to drive Canaanites entrenched in the area and that Israelites were not always successful in doing so.

    We read, for example, that Ephraimites and Manassites “did not dislodge the Canaanites living in Gezer; to this day the Canaanites live among the people of Ephraim” (Josh 16:10). Similarly, in Chapter 17 it states “Yet the Manassites were not able to occupy these towns, for the Canaanites were determined to live in that region. However, when the Israelites grew stronger, they subjected the Canaanites to forced labor but did not drive them out completely” (Joshua 17:12-13). We hear that “Danites had difficulty taking possession of their territory, so they went up and attacked Leshem, took it, put it to the sword and occupied it. They settled in Leshem and named it Dan after their forefather” (Joshua 19:47). Here, we see the same land said to be subdued and conquered by Joshua in battles where he exterminated and left alive nothing that breathed. This land is yet to be occupied by the tribes of Israel and is occupied by Canaanites, often heavily armed and deeply entrenched (17:17-18).

    Brevard Childs notes the apparent contradiction,

    Critical scholars have long since pointed out the tension – usually it is called a contradiction – in the portrayal of the conquest of the land. On the one hand, the conquest is pictured in the main source of Josh. 1-12 as a unified assault against the inhabitants of the land under the leadership of Joshua which succeeded in conquering the entire land. On the other hand, there is a conflicting view of the conquest represented by Judges 1 and its parallels in Joshua which appears to picture the conquest as undertaken by individual tribes, extending over a long period beyond the age of Joshua, and unsuccessful in driving out the Canaanites from much of the land.[4]

    More recently Kenneth Kitchen has taken issue with Childs’ picture of Joshua 1-12. He notes that, apart from the passages cited at the beginning of this post, a careful reading of Joshua 1-12 makes it clear that Israel did not actually occupy or conquer the areas mentioned at all. Kitchen notes that after crossing the Jordan the Israelites set up camp in Gilgal “on the east border of Jericho” (Joshua 4:19). He notes that after every battle in the next six chapters the text explicitly states that they returned to Gilgal,

    The conflict with Canaanite city-state rulers in the southern part of Canaan is worth close examination. After the battle for Gibeon, we see the Hebrews advancing upon six towns in order, attacking and capturing them, killing their local kings and such inhabitants that had not gotten clear, and moving on, not holding on to those places. Twice over (10:15, 43), it is clearly stated that their strike force returned to base camp at Gilgal.  So there was no sweeping take over and occupation of this region at this point. And no total destruction of the towns attacked.[5]

    Kitchen goes on to note,

    What happened in the south was repeated up north. Hazor was both leader and famed center for the north Canaanite kinglets. Thus as in the south the Hebrew strike force defeated the opposition; captured their towns, killed rulers and less mobile inhabitants, symbolically burned Hazor and Hazor only[6] to emphasis its end to its local supremacy. Again Israel did not attempt to immediately hold on to Galilee: they remained based at Gilgal (14:6).[7]

    Kitchen notes that the first “real indication of a move in occupation beyond Gilgal comes in 18:4.” This is after the first allotment of “lands to be occupied are made” and as we saw above the Israelites did not find occupying these allotments easy. He concludes, “these campaigns were essentially disabling raids: they were not territorial conquests with instant Hebrew occupation. The text is very clear about this.”[8]

    So a straight-forward, literal, reading of the passages cited at the beginning of this post does not cohere with the rest of the narrative. The best account I have come across for explaining this apparent contradiction between a literal reading of the “genocide passages” and the rest of Joshua and Judges is one recently defended by Nicholas Wolterstorff.[9] Wolterstorff suggests that the phrases such as, “Everyone in it they totally destroyed,” “They left no survivors,” etc are not intended to be read literally but function as hyperboles. The analogy he gives is of a high school student who, after a baseball game states, “we totally slaughtered the opposition, we annihilated them just as coach told us to.”[10]

    Plantinga suggests a similar line as a possibility. That phrases such as, “put to death men women infants and cattle” are to be understood more like a person who in the context of a boxing match states, “knock his block off, hand him his head” or  in a football or baseball game where it is stated that the team should “kill the opposition” or that “we totally slaughtered them.”[11] Understood in a non-literal sense the phrases probably meant “something like, attack them, defeat them, drive them out; not literally kill every man, woman, child donkey and the like.”[12] Wolterstorff elaborates,

    When a high-school basket ball player says his team slaughtered the other team last night he’s not asserting, literally now, that they slaughter the other team. What is he asserting? Not easy to tell. That they scored a decisive victory? Maybe, but suppose they barely eked out a win? Was he lying? Maybe not. Maybe he was speaking with a wink of the eye hyperbole. High school kids do.[13]

    In the same way,

    To say Joshua struck down all the inhabitants with the edge of the sword is a way of saying something like Israel scored a decisive victory and once you recognise the presence of hyperbole it is not even clear how decisive the victories were. Joshua did not conquer all the cities in the land nor did he slaughter all the inhabitants in the cities he did conquer. The book of Joshua does not say that he did.[14]

    In my next Sunday Study, Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part II,  I will attempt to defend Wolterstorff’s position.


    [1] Raymond Bradley “A moral Argument for Atheism” Presented at the University of Western Washington, May 27, 1999, and–in a revised form–at the University of Auckland, September 29, 1999.
    [2] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 110.
    [3]
    Philip Quinn “Religion and Politics” in ed William Mann The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 316.
    [4]
    Brevard Childs An Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Fortress Press Philadelphia: 1979) 247.
    [5]
    Kenneth Kitchen On the Reliability of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003) 162.
    [6]
    See Joshua 11:13 “But Israel burned none of the towns that stood on mounds except Hazor, which Joshua did burn.”
    [7] Kitchen, above n 5.
    [8]
    Ibid.
    [9] Nicholas Wolterstorff “Reading Joshua” a paper presented to “My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible” Conference at the centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame, Saturday 12 September 2009
    [10] Ibid.
    [11]
    Alvin Plantinga “Comments on Evan Fales’ Satanic Versus: Moral Chaos in Holy Writ” a paper presented to “My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible” Conference at the centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame, Friday 11 September 2009.
    [12]
    Ibid – stated by Plantinga in the Q&A session.
    [13] Nicholas Wolterstorff “Response to Louise Anthony” a paper presented to “My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible” Conference at the centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame. Saturday 12 September 2009.
    [14]
    Wolterstorff, above n 9.





    More recently Kenneth Kitchen has taken issue with Childs’ picture of Joshua 1-12. He notes that, apart from the passages cited at the beginning of this post, a careful reading of  Joshua 1-12 makes it clear that Israel did not actually occupy or conquer the areas mentioned at all. Kitchen notes that after crossing the Jordan the Israelites set up camp in Gilgal “on the east border of Jericho” (Joshua 4:19). He notes that after every battle in the next six chapters the text explicitly states that they returned to Gilgal,

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part II

  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Infantile Religious Morality

    In “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” Walter Sinnott Armstrong criticises William Lane Craig’s contention that theism, if true, provides an adequate foundation for morality. Armstrong contends that Craig’s position is “incredible”[1] and subject to a “cavalcade of devastating objections.”[2] He goes on to conclude that his criticisms do not just call into question Craig’s argument for a theistic based system of ethics, he contends that his arguments are conclusive against any theistic account of ethics that is compatible with Christianity. He states, “Other theists might try to give better arguments for a religious view of morality, I don’t see how they could avoid all the problems in Craig’s account without leaving traditional Christianity far behind.”[3]

    In several posts (see the related posts below) I have criticised some of the arguments Armstrong makes in this article. In this post I want to turn to another. The claim that “divine command theory makes morality childish;” Armstrong states,

    A second objection is that the divine command theory makes morality childish. Compare a small boy who thinks that what makes it morally wrong for him to hit his little sister is only that his parents  told him not to hit her and will punish him if he hits her. As a result, this little boy thinks that, if his parents leave home or die, then there is nothing wrong with hitting his little sister. Maybe some little boys think this way, but surely we adults do not think that morality is anything like this.[4]

    Its worth noting that Armstrong’s sketch is something of a caricature; the picture is of a little boy who thinks hitting is wrong because his parents will punish him if he engages in hitting. This tacitly implies that divine command theorists believe that actions are wrong because God will issue punishments to us if we do them. No divine command theorist to my knowledge holds this view. What we typically hold is that an action is wrong for a person to perform if a perfectly good, omniscient being (identified as God) commands that person to refrain from the action in question. The fear of punishment does not come into it.

    This point, however, is largely tangential because the heart of Armstrong’s position appears to be based on three ideas.

    [1] That some children see morality as dependent on the commands of their parents.
    [2] That it is inappropriate, childish or infantile for adults to view morality as being dependent on the commands of a parent.
    [3] That the conception of morality proposed by a divine command theorist is analogous to basing morality on the commands of a parent.

    Hence, divine command morality is infantile or childish.

    In responding to this line of argument, it is worth noting Armstrong’s argument is not new. In fact, it simply summarises an early argument made by Patrick Nowell-Smith in his widely-anthologised essay Morality: Religious and Secular. In this article all three of Armstrong’s premises are defended in more detail than Armstrong provides in the short paragraph above. I think that by critically examining Smith’s argument one can see the problems with Armstrong’s.

    Like Armstrong, Nowell-Smith argued, “religious morality is infantile.”[5] Similarly, like Armstrong, it is clear that Nowell-Smith’s target was a divine command theory.[6] Nowell-Smith’s thesis is that a divine command theorist possesses an ethical consciousness that is frozen or arrested at the pre-critical stage of a child. A mature adult whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly would have outgrown it.

    In arguing for this thesis, Nowell-Smith draws upon the theories of moral development proposed by Piaget.[7] According to Piaget, children start out with a view of morality that Nowell-Smith labels deontological, heteronomous and realist. Children view morality as obedience to certain rules (deontology) which hold because an authority figure, usually the parent, has promulgated them (heteronomous) and wrongdoing is perceived as any external action that violates these rules (realism). This view of ethics is appropriate for small children; however, as they mature and become more rational their consciousness changes. They begin to see the point of certain rules and understand the reasons behind them and the function of such rules. This is the stage where ethics become in Nowell-Smith’s words “autonomous.” Instead of just accepting a parent’s word for it the child learns to figure these things out for him/herself.[8]

    Nowell-Smith goes on to argue that these same features of heteronomy, realism and deontology are present in “religious morality” or more specifically, divine command theory. Consequently, divine command theory reflects a childish way of viewing ethics, one not worthy of a grown-up, educated adult.[9]

    Nowell-Smith’s analogy between divine command theory and childish morality ignores a fundamental disanalogy between the case Piaget describes and that of the divine/human relationship. As Richard Mouw has pointed out, Piaget views the transition from heteronomy to autonomy as corresponding to the time when a child begins to be on an increasingly-equal footing with his or her parents. The infantile stage of morality is appropriate while the child is in infancy because of its limited rationality and knowledge. In this state the child is unable to make decisions as competently as the adult, hence it relies on and defers to the judgement of adults. However, as the child grows equal to the parent in these respects he or she ceases to rely on parental judgement. He or she is now just as competent to answer these questions as his or her parent is and so his or her thinking becomes autonomous.[10]

    Consequently, Piaget’s model of development applies to situations where the subordinate is temporarily in a stage of inferiority to the authority but is undergoing a process of growth towards equality. It is when this equality is reached that the authority relationship is no longer appropriate. However, the relationship between adult humans and God is fundamentally different. Adults are not growing into divinity so that when mature they will equal God in rationality and knowledge. Rather, they are permanently in a state where they are inferior to God in these respects. In this context the failure to reach a moral consciousness that is equal to God’s is not a sign of arrested development and the infantile charge loses its sting. It is inappropriate for adults to behave like children but not inappropriate for them to fail to think like God.[11]

    Nowell-Smith’s argument, therefore, is unsound. I think the same response can be attributed to Armstrong’s argument. Returning to Armstrong’s three premises,

    [1] That some children see morality as dependent on the commands of their parents.
    [2] That it is inappropriate, childish or infantile for adults to view morality as being dependent on the commands of a parent.
    [3] That the conception of morality proposed by a divine command theorist is analogous to basing morality on the commands of a parent.

    There is a subtle equivocation in this argument; turning to premise [2] that it is inappropriate, childish or infantile for adults to view morality as being dependent on the commands of a parent, as we saw, this is because an adult child has grown to a position where he or she is on par in terms of maturity, rationality, insight, knowledge, and so on, to the parent. The problem is once this is clarified [3] is false. The conception of morality proposed by the divine command theorist is not analogous to basing morality on par with the commands of a parent who is an equal as no divine command theorist thinks of adult human beings as being on par with God in terms of maturity, rationality, insight, knowledge, and so on.

    Of course there are other respects whereby the conception of morality proposed by divine command theorists is analogous to a conception that sees morality as dependent on the commands of a parent, so in this sense [3] is true. The problem is that these respects do not include the features of the relationship between an adult child and their parent that makes the conception inappropriate and so if correct then [2] would no longer be true. Either way the argument fails.


    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 106.
    [2]
    Ibid. 108.
    [3]
    Ibid. 114.
    [4]
    Ibid. 109.
    [5]
    Patrick H. Nowell-Smith “Morality: Religious and Secular,” in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy ed. Ian T. Ramsey (London: SCM Press, 1966) 95.
    [6]
    Ibid. 96. Nowell-Smith characterises the view he critiques as follows, “They have simply assumed that just as the legal propriety of an action is established by showing it to emanates from an authoritative source, so also the moral propriety of an action must be established in the same way; the legal rightness has the same form as moral rightness, and may therefore be used to shed light on it. … Morality, on this view, is an affair of being commanded to behave in certain ways by some person who has a right to issue such commands; and once this premise is granted, it is said with some reason that only God has such a right.”
    [7]
    Ibid. 100.
    [8]
    Ibid. 100-103.
    [9]
    Ibid. 103-108.
    [10]
    Richard Mouw The God Who Commands: A Study in Divine Command Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 12.
    [11]
    Ibid. 12-14.

    RELATED POSTS:
    On a Common Equivocation
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Morality and Arbitrariness
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part II
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part II

  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Morality and Arbitrariness

    Is morality independent of religion? One common argument for this position is that denying it makes God’s commands arbitrary.

    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues,

    Let’s assume that God commanded us not to rape. Did God have any reason to command this? If not, his command was arbitrary, and then it can’t make anything morally wrong. On the other hand, if God did have a reason to command us not to rape, then that reason is what makes rape morally wrong. The command itself is superfluous. Either way, morality cannot depend on God’s commands.1

    The conclusion of this argument is that morality cannot “depend” upon God, and that, God’s commands cannot “make” anything morally wrong. It is clear from what Armstrong says earlier in the same paper that he has in mind a relationship of constitution,2 his target is the claim that moral obligations depend on divine commands in a manner analogous to the way the property of being water depends upon the property of being H20. His conclusion is that morality, which in this context refers to deontic properties such as being prohibited, being permitted or being required, is not constituted by divine commands.3

    The premises of the argument can be summarised as follows,

    [1] Either, (i) there is a reason, r, why God prohibits rape; or, (ii) there is no reason, r, why God prohibits rape.

    [2] If there is no reason, r, why God prohibits rape then Gods commands are arbitrary.

    [3] If there is a reason, r, why God prohibits rape then, r, is what constitutes the wrongness of rape.

    The point is that either a person must admit that God’s commands are arbitrary or deny that his commands constitute moral obligation.

    I think this argument is problematic; the problem is that the word “reason” is ambiguous. William Wrainwright notes that the word reason can be used in two different senses. The first is a constitutive sense; one affirms that the reason water has certain phenomenological properties is because it is H20. In this sense, the use of the word “reason” denotes a special kind of ontological relationship. The second sense is a motivational reason; as in, when I state that the reason I feed my daughter is because I love her. This sense is more psychological or epistemological.4

    It is important to note that these two senses are not the same as the following illustration demonstrates. Noah fills a glass with water. If we ask what the constitutive reason was for his action, the answer would be that he filled the glass with water because he filled the glass with H20. If we ask what the motivational reason was for his action, the answer would be that he wanted a drink. Yet, his wanting a drink does not constitute water, likewise water being H20 is not the motivational reason he wants the drink.

    When Armstrong states, “Let’s assume that God commanded us not to rape. Did God have any reason to command this?” he could be asking if there is a motivating reason as to why God prohibits rape or he could be asking if there is a constitutive reason as to why God prohibits rape. Either way, however, his argument fails.

    Turning to the first option, if Armstrong means to ask, did God have a motivating reason for prohibiting rape? then r refers to a motivating reason and premise [2] is correct. If God has no motivational reasons for prohibiting rape then God’s commands are arbitrary. To avoid the conclusion that God’s commands are arbitrary one would have to concede that God has motivating reasons for issuing them.

    The problem is that on this sense of “reason,” premise [3] is false. If r refers to a motivating reason then it does not follow that because r exists, r constitutes the wrongness of rape. I noted this in the example I gave above; the fact that Noah has a motivating reason to pour water into a glass does not mean that these motivations constitute him pouring water into the glass. What constitutes water are H20 molecules, not his motivations.

    Armstrong could avoid this by denying that he means r to refer to a motivating reason, that he meant r to refer to some kind of constitutive reason. This might enable him to affirm that [3] is true. The problem is that if this is what is meant by r then [2] is false. Even if God does not have constitutive reasons for prohibiting rape, he could still have motivating reasons and if he does then [2] is false. If God has motivational reasons, such as concern for the welfare of others for issuing the commands he does, then God’s commands are not arbitrary.

    Armstrong’s argument therefore commits the fallacy of equivocation.

    1 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 108.
    2 Ibid 106.
    3 Ibid 105; where he turns to the question of whether Theism is an adequate foundation for objective moral duties.
    4 William Wrainwright Religion and Morality (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2005) 91.

  • Sunday Study: Slavery, John Locke and the Bible

    It is often affirmed, as an incontestable and obvious truth, that the Bible supports slavery. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong cites Leviticus 25:44 as evidence of this charge in “Why Traditional Theism is not an Adequate Foundation for Morality.”[1] Although Armstrong is not the alone in making this claim, I think the charge is mistaken; the Bible does not support slavery.

    This claim was refuted by John Locke in his Second Treatise on Civil Government, one of the founding texts of contemporary liberal political theory. Locke was a famous English philosopher, less known is that Locke was also the author of several commentaries on scripture and the First Treatise of Civil Government was essentially a class argument from scripture against the divine right of kings. In the Second Treatise, Locke argued that the law of nature, which for Locke is the law of God, forbids a person selling themselves or another into slavery.[2]

    In response to the line of argument Armstrong cites, Locke responded with

    I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: for, it is evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleasure, so much as maim him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set him free, Exod. xxi.[3]

    Locke’s argument here is as follows,

    [1] If a person is a slave then that person is “under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases.”[4]
    [2] The institution referred to in scripture that people could sell themselves into, was not one where they were “under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power.”

    The conclusion Locke draws from [1] and [2] is that the institution scripture refers to is not slavery. Locke’s response here is interesting and fundamentally correct. Here I want to simply elaborate on it in more detail so I will address each premise in turn.

    What is Slavery?
    Central to Locke’s argument is his definition of slavery and understanding of what makes slavery wrong. Locke understands the state of slavery as,

    [1] If a person is a slave then that person is “under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases.”

    Rodney Stark utilises a similar definition,

    A slave is a human being who, in the eyes of the law and custom, is the possession, or chattel, of another human being or of a small group of human beings. Ownership of slaves entails absolute control, including the right to punish (often including the right to kill), to direct behaviour, and to transfer ownership.[5]

    The Oxford Dictionary gives a similar definition; a slave is defined as a “person who is the legal property of another or others and is bound to absolute obedience, human chattel.”[6] Timothy Keller notes correctly that the English word ‘slave’ carries connotations of new-world slavery as it was practiced in the British Empire, made infamous in the antebellum southern states of the US.[7] It is this paradigm that critics of scripture tend to allude to. John Loftus, for example, cites an eyewitness description of antebellum practices and then links it slavery in the Bible,

    He took her into the kitchen, and stripped her from neck to waist. He made her get upon the stool, and he tied her hands to a hook in the joist. After rolling up his sleeves, he commenced to lay on the heavy cow skin, and soon the warm, red blood came dripping to the floor … No words, no tears, no prayers, from his gory victim, seemed to move his iron heart from its bloody purpose. The louder she screamed, the harder he whipped; and where the blood ran fastest, there he whipped longest. He would whip her to make her scream, and whip her to make her hush; and not until overcome by fatigue, would he cease to swing the blood clotted cowskin.
    Why didn’t the Christian God ever explicitly and clearly condemn slavery?[8]

    In the British Empire and in many US states, slavery was governed under the Code of Barbados. This code was explicitly racist and described Africans as “heathenish, brutish, and an uncertaine, dangerous kinde of people.”[9] It allowed owners to use, “unlimited force to compel labor without penalty even if this resulted in maiming or death;”[10] It denied slaves due process rights, allowed owners to, in effect, kill their slave for any cause, forbade slaves from marrying and effectively, prevented owners from setting their slaves free.[11] Keller writes that, “The African slave trade was begun and resourced through kidnapping.”[12] Stark notes that “20 to 40 percent of slaves died while being transported to the coast, another 3-10 percent died while waiting on the coast, and about 12 to 16 percent boarded on ships died during the voyage.”[13]

    Does the Old Testament Approve of Slavery?
    Armstrong argues that “the bible contains some horrible passages about slavery;”[14] to substantiate this he cites from the English Standard Version, “as for your male and female slaves whom you may have: you may buy male and female slaves from among the nations around you.” (Lev 25:44) [15]

    The ESV here uses the English word ‘slavery’ to translate the Hebrew word ebed. An important initial observation is that ebed is the noun form of the verb abad which means ‘to work’ or ‘to serve.’ Ebed does not have the same semantic range as the contemporary word ‘slave;’ Freedman notes,

    The word ebed however, denoted not only actual slaves occupied in production or in the household but also persons in subordinate positions (mainly subordinate with regard to the king and his higher officials). Thus the term ebed is sometimes translated as “servant.” Besides, the term was used as a sign of servility in reference to oneself when addressing persons of higher rank.[16]

    Locke suggests that an examination of The Torah’s references to an ebed shows that, in fact, it is not the equivalent of what in English language and culture is referred to with the word ‘slave.’ I noted above that Locke’s second premise was,

    [2] The institution referred to in scripture that people could sell themselves into, was not one where they were “under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power.”

    I will give four examples to demonstrate why I think Locke is correct.

    First, an ebed was not acquired by kidnapping; kidnapping a human being and selling them as a slave was a capital offence in The Torah (Ex 21:16). Moreover, slave trading is implicitly condemned in the book of Revelation (Rev 18:13) and explicitly condemned by Paul as contrary to the law and sound doctrine (1 Tim 1:9-10). An ebed is used in The Torah to refer to a person who offers to work for another, free of charge, in exchange for a debt being cancelled. During service the ebed worked for and served another, lived in that person’s house and probably received free food and board.

    Second, the institution was not based on racist notions that ebed were of an inferior race. In fact, the opposite is affirmed. In the book of Job we read,

    If I have rejected the cause of my male or female slaves [Hebrew: ebed amah] when they brought a complaint against me; what then shall I do when God rises up? When he makes inquiry, what shall I answer him? Did not he who made me in the womb make them? And did not one fashion us in the womb? (Job 31:13-15

    Here Job refers to an ebed as having a right to go to court and sue their “owner” in pursuit of their rights. Job bases this on the idea that both he and his ebed are equal; both are created by God.

    Third, as Locke notes, an ebed was not the property of another so that they could dispose of them as they saw fit. To deliberately kill an ebed is a capital offence (Ex 21:20-21). Similarly, it was illegal to strike an ebed (Ex 21:26-27). This latter point is often denied on the basis of Exodus 21:20-21,

    If a man beats his male or female slave with a rod and the slave dies as a direct result, he must be punished, but he is not to be punished if the slave gets up after a day or two, since the slave is his property.

    Some interpret this passage to mean that because a slave is the property of another they can severely beat the slave and providing the beating is not fatal, there is no punishment. This fails to deal adequately with the context and the Hebrew text; the word translated as ‘property’ here is actually ‘silver’ (a reference to money) and the word translated ‘punishment’ here is not the usual word for punishment. Christopher Wright notes that the word implies “the shedding of the blood of the master of the slave”[17] and so refers to capital punishment. It is used in direct contrast with the same word in the previous verse where it is stated that deliberately killing an ebed is to be avenged. Therefore it does not say the person will not be punished for beating a slave, it says he will not be executed for it unless he kills the slave. For further evidence that the passage is not a licence to beat, a couple of verses later even causing a minor injury on an ebed, such as a bruise, is explicitly condemned.

    The same contrast occurs in the passage immediately preceding where a free man who struck and killed another was to be “held responsible” but not if the person survives. It is clear from v 19, however, that the person was in fact to be punished; hence, again, the ‘held responsible’ is referring only to being held responsible for murder and is not speaking to the lesser charges. What Ex 21:20-21 says then, is that if a person deliberately kills their ebed then they are to be held responsible for murder and executed. If the slave if the slave “gets up after a day or two,” they are not to be held responsible for murder because the ebed is their “silver.”

    This makes sense when a few verses later, in Ex 21:26-27, striking a slave is explicitly prohibited and the legal punishment is for the ebed to go free. In The Torah, the penalty for assault was for the assailant to provide monetary compensation to the victim.[18] This would create a quandary in this case as an ebed is in a position of servitude because he or she is in debt to the person they work for. In such a case the assailant would owe money to a person who owes him money. The Torah resolves the issue by declaring that even a trivial strike (such as the causing a bruise 21:25) resulted in an immediate cancelation of the ebed’s entire debt, which would often result in a financial loss to the assailant.

    Third, unlike new world slavery which was life long and where, under the Barbados code, emancipation was effectively prohibited, an ebed could not be held in service for more than six years (Exodus 21:2).[19] Upon release, their employer was morally required to give them sufficient resources for them to be set up on their own feet (Deut 15:12-18) and the community left resources for them to live on for a year (Ex 23:10-11, Lev 25:2-7). In fact, The Torah encouraged people to prevent family members from becoming an ebed by paying their debts for them (Lev 25:48). Paul, after writing to the Corinthians and encouraging them to “retain the place in life that the Lord assigned,” encourages slaves to purchase their freedom and not to remain in this position (1 Cor 7:21-22).

    Finally, if an ebed fled from an oppressive employer it was illegal to return him or her to “his master,” instead he or she was to live, “wherever he likes and in whatever town he chooses” (Deut 23:15-16). It was forbidden to send him or her back to his owner. This law stood in stark contrast the Ancient Near Eastern legal customs of the day.[20] The code of Hammurabi, for example, proscribed the death penalty for receiving a runaway slave.[21] In the antebellum south, the Fugitive Slave Act 1850 required the return of run-away slaves at penalty of law.

    It seems then that Locke’s response is fundamentally correct. While it is true that many English translations of the bible use the word slavery to translate the word ebed it is mistaken to see the two institutions as the same. Slavery refers to the state of being the property or chattel of another; regardless of what connotations various words in English translations have, the institution referred to in scripture did not permit, condone or allow this.

    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 101-116.
    [2] John Locke Second Treatise on Civil Government Ch IV.
    [3] Ibid, sec 24.
    [4] Ibid, sec 23.
    [5] Rodney Stark For the Glory of God: How Monotheism led to Reformations, Science, Witch-hunts and the end of Slavery (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) 292.
    [6] The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon University Press, 1974 ) 5th Edition, 1199.
    [7] Timothy Keller Reasons for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism (New York: Dutton books) 110.
    [8] John Loftus Why I Became an Atheist: A Former Preacher Rejects Christianity (New York: Prometheus Books, 2008) 231. Many thanks to Dean Mischewski for gifting us a copy of Loftus’s book.
    [9] Stark For the Glory of God: 312-313.
    [10] Ibid, 313.
    [11] Ibid.
    [12] Keller Reasons for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism 111.
    [13] Stark For the Glory of God: 303.
    [14] Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” 110.
    [15] Armstrong omits to mention the previous passage which forbids any Israelite taking another Israelite as a ‘slave’ on the grounds that they are a “slave of God” whom God has redeemed. Paul applies the same teaching to Christians in 1 Corinthians 7:23 prohibiting Christians from being sold as ‘slaves.’ This teaching led many early and medieval theologians to forbid the enslavement of Christians resulting in slavery all but disappearing from Christian Europe in the early Middle Ages; Stark documents this in For the Glory of God: 329-330.
    [16] D N Freedman Anchor Bible Dictionary (New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group,1992).
    [17] Christopher Wright God’s People in Gods Land: Family, Land and Property in the Old Testament (Grand Rapids Mi: Paternoster Press, 1990) 242.
    [18] See Exodus 21:19.
    [19] There is an apparent discrepancy between Exodus 21:1-6 and the release laws of Leviticus 25:39-43; Christopher Wright in God’s People in Gods Land: 253, noted that the law in Exodus 21:6 refers to Hebrew slaves. Wright notes that in its original context the word ibri designated a social class, not an ethnic group. This was the class of people who did not own land, who survived by hiring themselves out to land owners. Lev 25, on the other hand, deals with an Israelite landowner who has been forced into poverty by mortgaging his land and then selling himself and his family into the service of another land owner.
    [20] Wright God’s People in Gods Land: 249.
    [21] Code of Hammurabi 16.

    LINKS TO THIS POST:
    John W. Loftus Nitpickers Have Started to Attack
    Glenn Peoples Skeptics and the annoyance of the little things…. like facts.
    John W. Loftus Madeleine Flannagan is Happy to be Treated as Women Were in the Bible!
    Wintery Knight Does the Bible condone slavery?


  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part II

    In my last post, I discussed Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument from harm. I concluded by suggesting that his conclusion missed the point and failed to address the conditional, defended by William Lane Craig that, if theism is true then there exists a sound foundation for moral duties. In this post I will argue that the same problem afflicts Armstrong’s two major arguments for his harm-based account of wrongness.

    Armstrong’s Arguments for the Superiority of the Harm-Account
    The same failure to actually address the contention at hand is evident in the two main arguments Armstrong musters in favour of the harm-based foundation. These arguments are

    (a) The harm account is more economical than a divine command theory;
    (b) The harm account makes moral obligations more objective than a divine command theory does.

    Economy and Simplicity
    Of his first argument, Armstrong writes,

    The secular view is also preferable on grounds of simplicity. Like the secular view, the divine command theory must recognise harm and its relevance to morality. Then the divine command view adds a new supernatural level to its theory of morality. That added complication brings no benefits for the objectivity of morality, as I have just argued. We should prefer simpler views when we have no reason to complicate matters. Hence, we should prefer the secular view.[1]

    Armstrong appeals to Ockham’s razor, multipicandum sunt praetor necessitatem, entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. The idea is that if two theories can explain the phenomena equally well then the one that postulates the least entities is the preferred one.

    This principle is the basis of Armstrong’s critique. He notes that both his own secular view and the divine command theory both explain the objectivity of moral obligation equally well. The divine command theory, however, does so by adding “a new supernatural level [God]” and so the harm based account is preferable.

    “there are cases where rape is gravely wrong and yet no one is harmed or if they are, the harm is minimal and yet the action remains gravely and seriously wrong”In response to this argument I will make two points. First, even if the divine command theorist does add “a new supernatural level” his theory does not follow that Ockham’s razor automatically means it is a less preferable theory. Ockham’s razor tells us that if two theories can explain the phenomena equally well then the one that postulates the least entities is the preferred one. For Armstrong’s objection to be cogent, he needs to argue that his own harm based account explains the existence and nature of moral obligations better than a divine command theory. Armstrong does not do this; all he does s show that both theories explain the objectivity of moral properties equally well. However, objectivity is only one feature of moral obligations that a viable ontological foundation must explain. Showing your theory explains one feature as well as a rival theory does is a long way from showing it explains all features as well.

    This is important, because one of the arguments made by defenders of divine command theory, such as Robert Adams, is that it can explains all the features of moral obligation better than its rivals. Adams maintains divine commands “best fill the role assigned to wrongness by the concept”.[2] He notes that divine commands explain, not just the fact, that “wrongness is an objective property of actions,”[3] they also account “for the wrongness of a major portion of the types of action that we have believed to be wrong,”[4] and “play a causal role … in their coming to be regarded as wrong.”[5] In addition, Adams argues that they account for the intuition that our moral duties comprise, “a standard that has a sanctity greater than that of any merely human will or institution”.[6]

    In other articles Adams has noted that divine commands capture the intuition that moral properties such as rightness and wrongness are “non-natural in the sense that they cannot be stated entirely in the language of physics, chemistry, biology, and animal or human psychology,”[7] and also, the idea that “having an obligation to do something consists of being required (in a certain way, under certain circumstances), by another person or group of persons, to do it”.[8]

    Stephen Layman has argued that theism explains the overriding nature of moral obligations, that to have a duty to do something entails that one has decisive reasons for doing it; reasons that override any non-moral reasons to the contrary. Moreover, Layman argues that secular views do not explain this feature of moral obligation anywhere near as well as theism does.[9] Now these arguments may not be successful but given that theists have made them, Armstrong owes us an argument showing they are not; especially if he is going to conclude that his arguments call into question, not just Craig’s arguments, but the “arguments for a religious view of morality” of “other theists” and that these other theists cannot “avoid all the problems in Craig’s account without leaving traditional Christianity far behind.”

    There is a second, more important problem, with Armstrong’s appeal to Ockham’s razor. This is that when one takes into account the dialectical context of Armstrong’s argument it is not clear that the divine command theory does violate Ockham’s razor. Plantinga articulates this point in a recent paper he presented before the American Philosophical association; he argued

    Suppose we land on a planet we know is inhabited by intelligent creatures. We come across something that looks exactly like an arrow-head complete with grooves and indentations apparently caused by the process of shaping and sharpening it. Two possibilities suggest themselves, that it acquired these features by erosion or that it was intentionally fashioned by the inhabitants. Someone with a couple of courses in philosophy might suggest that the former hypothesis is to be preferred because it posits fewer entities than the latter. He’d be wrong of course, since we already know that the planet is inhabited by intelligent creatures, there is no additional Ockhamistic cost in assuming these structures were designed.[10]

    Plantinga’s insight is correct. He goes on to note that if we did not know the planet was inhabited by intelligent beings and the erosion hypothesis was not significantly less probable then an appeal to Ockham’s razor, in favour of the erosion hypothesis, would have “teeth”. However, if one already knows that the planet is inhabited by intelligent beings then we do not violate Ockham’s razor by appealing to the existence of these beings to explain the existence of grooves and indentations on what appears to be an arrow-head.

    Something analogous occurs here. Craig is arguing that if theism is true then there is a plausible ontological foundation for moral obligation in divine commands. He is not, then, proposing the theory in a context where people do not know whether God exists, nor is he proposing it in a context where people do not know that divine commands exist that are co-extensive with moral duties. Rather, he is proposing it in a context where one assumes, for the sake of argument, that theism is true and asks what theory best explains the nature of moral obligation given these assumptions.

    Once this is realised, however, it is far from clear that the theist is adding “a new supernatural level.” Rather, the existence of a supernatural element is already granted. The question, then, is how best to understand this element’s relationship to morality.

    Armstrong’s appeal to Ockham’s razor seems to presuppose a dialectical context whereby both theist and non-theist start from an agnostic perspective and try to work out the best foundation for the nature of moral obligation given the shared information available to both of them. The problem is that Craig was not arguing for his theory in that context. His argument is that if theism is true then a sound foundation exists. To rebut the contention that Craig actually defends, Armstrong needs to show that if God exists such a foundation does not exist. This, however, is precisely what he does not do.

    Objectivity
    The same problems afflict Armstrong’s appeal to objectivity. Armstrong states,

    This secular foundation makes morality objective. If what makes rape morally wrong is the harm to rape victims, then whether rape is wrong does not depend on whether I or rapists believe that rape is wrong. It also does not depend on whether any one wants to rape. Regardless of any-one’s desires and moral beliefs, rape causes harm to the victim, and that harm makes rape wrong. This secular foundation, thus, makes morality every bit as objective as the divine command theory.[11]

    Armstrong here shows that with regard to the objectivity of duties the harm-based account and the divine command theory are on par. However, he then argues that, in fact, the divine command theory fails to explain the objectivity of moral duties.

    If God did not think that rape was morally wrong, then God would not command us not to rape, and then rape would not be morally wrong, according to this theory. … In contrast, the secular harm-based view makes morality independent even of what God thinks. If God somehow thought that rape was not morally wrong, and if God forgot to command us not to rape, or even if God commanded us to rape, none of that would make any difference. Rape would still be morally wrong, because it would still harm rape victims.[12]

    I think Armstrong is mistaken here. Theism, as Craig defines it, includes the claim that God is omniscient; hence, even if rape is wrong in virtue of the harm it causes and not because of any divine commands, it still would be impossible for rape to be wrong independently of God thinking it is wrong. An omniscient being only believes true propositions and never believes false propositions; hence, it is impossible for rape to be wrong and God to not believe that it is wrong.

    Once this is realised, it is clear that Armstrong’s examples assume that theism is false. He puts forward situations where God forgets to issue commands or where God mistakenly believes rape is not wrong. This can only occur if God is not omniscient and, hence, theism is false. However, Craig is not arguing that a divine command theory is plausible if theism is false. His claim is that if God exists then there is a sound ontological basis for moral duties.

    Does Harm Explain the Wrongness of Rape?
    My final criticism directly challenge the harm account. Throughout his critique, Armstrong, contends that rape is wrong because of the extreme harm it causes rape victims. Despite its initial plausibility, I am inclined to think this account of the wrongness of rape fails. This is because there are cases where rape is gravely wrong and yet no one is harmed or if they are, the harm is minimal and yet the action remain gravely and seriously wrong.

    Take the following case, a doctor is performing surgery on a woman. He puts her under general anaesthetic and she falls unconscious. Then, prior to performing surgery, he has intercourse with her. He does so using a condom. He takes care to be gentle. The physical harm to his patient is minimal. The patient is unconscious; she is unlikely to ever be aware of what has occurred; the risk of psychological trauma is not present. Hence, it is implausible to suggest that the doctor has caused extreme harm to the patient, yet his actions are clearly rape and it is also clear that what he has done is gravely and seriously wrong. Hence, what makes the action wrong cannot be the extreme harm done to the rape victim.

    This example can be strengthened when we compare it to another proposed by Robert Adams.[13] Adams asks us to imagine the case of a person whose doctoral dissertation is destroyed by a computer hacker. We would consider the sabotage of the computer a reprehensible act but nowhere near as serious a crime as the rape committed by the doctor in the previous example. Despite this, it is not implausible to suggest that the person who has had their doctoral research destroyed suffers more “discernible harm” than the person who awakes from surgery never knowing she has been raped and continues on with life oblivious to it.

    What this shows is that the grave wrongness of rape does not depend on the extreme harm it causes, because even when there is no extreme harm present the act remains gravely wrong. Rape remains a very serious wrong, relative to other wrongs, even when the harms of these other wrongs outweigh it. For this reason, I am inclined to think that far from being “obviously correct” Armstrong’s harm-account of moral obligations is implausible.

    [1] Ibid, 107.
    [2] Robert Adams “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1(1979) 74.
    [3] Ibid, 74.
    [4] Ibid, 74.
    [5] Ibid, 75.
    [6] Ibid, 75.
    [7] Robert Adams “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief” 117-18.
    [8] Robert Adams “Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation” 262-63.
    [9] C. Stephen Layman “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002) 304-16; “God and the moral order: replies to objections” Faith and Philosophy 23 (2006) 209-12; “A Moral Argument for The Existence of God” Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 49-66.
    [10] I transcribed this from Plantinga’s paper to the American Philosophical Association, “Science and Religion: Where the Conflict Really Lies” http://www.mandm.org.nz/2009/04/alvin-plantinga-v-daniel-dennett.html.
    [11] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” 106.
    [12] Ibid, 107.
    [13] Robert Adams Finite and Infinite Goods 107.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part II
    Maverick Philosopher on the Historical Atrocities Argument

  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I

    This is the first of a two-part series where I examine a recent argument criticising religious ethics by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.

    In many of his publications and debates William Lane Craig has defended the contention that if theism is true then there exists a sound foundation for moral duties. In a recent article, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has criticised this contention. Armstrong has claimed that his criticisms do not just call into question Craig’s argument for a theistic based system of ethics, he contends that his arguments are conclusive against any theistic account of ethics which is compatible with Christianity. He states, “Other theists might try to give better arguments for a religious view of morality. I don’t see how they could avoid all the problems in Craig’s account without leaving traditional Christianity far behind.”[1]

    Before discussing Armstrong’s critique it is important to define a few key terms; this will become important later on. First, by theism, Craig means, belief in a necessarily existent, all powerful, all knowing, perfectly virtuous, immaterial person who created the universe. By foundation, he means, an ontological or meta-physical foundation. The ontological grounding he has in mind is that of “informative identification;”[2] an example of this is the way “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H20 or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion.”[3] Craig argues that if theism is true then one can informatively identify moral obligations with divine commands; hence, providing a plausible and defensible foundation for moral obligations.

    “his arguments display a conflation of epistemic and ontological questions”Armstrong’s critique begins by noting that Craig defends “traditional divine command theory.” Armstrong contends that such a position is “incredible”[4] and subject to a “cavalcade of devastating objections.”[5]

    Two initial points are worth making. First, the position Craig defends is not a “traditional divine command theory” but rather a version of the modified divine command theory defended by Robert Adams,[6] more recently by William Alston[7] and Stephen Evans[8], also I have defended it here.

    This theory affirms that the property of being wrong is identical with the property of being contrary to God’s commands in much the same way that water is identical with H20. Second, many of the “devastating objections” consist simply of a repetition of the tired old lines always used against divine command theories; most of these objections have been subjected to rigorous criticism in the literature on divine commands over the last 30 years by people such as Philip Quinn,[9] Edward Weirenga,[10] Robert Adams,[11] William Wrainwright[12] and again by me[13]. Armstrong does not address any of these criticisms; he merely repeats the standard arguments without even mentioning, much less, addressing the problems noted by these authors. In fact, in several places, his arguments display a conflation of epistemic and ontological questions which is a common error as I have argued here.

    Armstrong’s Argument from Harm
    Putting these niggles to one side, however, Armstrong’s main line of argument is fairly novel.[14] He states,

    There is a much more plausible foundation for morality. It seems obvious to me, and to everyone who does not start with peculiarly religious assumptions, that what makes rape morally wrong is the extreme harm that rape causes to rape victims.[15]

    Armstrong suggests that Craig’s conditional, if theism is true then there exists a sound foundation for moral duties, is mistaken because a more plausible foundation exists for our duties, one that is independent of God’s commands. The wrongness of actions can be founded in the harm caused by immoral actions such as rape. Armstrong provides two arguments as to why this harm-based or secular account of the nature of wrongness is superior to a divine command theory.

    (a) The harm account is more economical than a divine command theory;
    (b) The harm account makes moral obligations more objective than a divine command theory does.

    In my next post I will address arguments (a) and (b). I will leave you with the thought that it is worth noting that Armstrong’s conclusion misses the point. He contends that everyone who does not start with peculiarly religious assumptions will see that the harm-based foundation is more plausible than a divine command theory. Nothing in Craig’s contention contradicts this. Craig’s contention is that if God exists then there is a sound basis for moral obligations. The sound basis he identifies is divine commands. Craig, then, was not arguing that a divine command theory was the most plausible theory in the absence of religious assumptions, Craig argues that in the absence of religious assumptions it is Nihilism, not divine command theory, which is the most plausible account of moral obligation. Craig’s contention is that a divine command theory is plausible if one grants such assumptions. Armstrong’s conclusion actually has no bearing on the contention he is attempting to refute.

    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 114.
    [2] Mark C Murphy “Theism, Atheism and the Explanation of Moral Value” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 127.
    [3] Ibid.
    [4] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” 106.
    [5]Ibid, 108.
    [6] Robert Adams Finite and Infinite Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979) 66-79; “Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation” Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987) 262-275. [7] William Alston “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed. Michael Beaty ( Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 303-26.
    [8] C. Stephen Evans Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
    [9] Philip L Quinn Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1978); “Divine Command Theory” in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory ed Hugh LaFollette (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing Co, 1999) 53-73; “Theological Voluntarism” in The Oxford Handbook to Ethical Theory Ed David Copp (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 63-90.
    [10] Edward Weirenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into the Divine Attributes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989) 215-27. See also, “Utilitarianism and the Divine Command Theory,” American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984) 311-318; and “A Defensible Divine Command Theory” Nous 17 (1983) 387-408.
    [11] Robert Adams “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness” in Divine Commands and Morality ed Paul Helm (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981) 83-108; “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979) 66-79; Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief” in Rationality and Religious Belief ed C F Delaney (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979) 116-140.
    [12] William Wrainwright Religion and Morality (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2005).
    [13] Matthew Flannagan “The Premature Dismissal of Voluntarism” in Colloquium: The Australasian Theological Review (forthcoming).
    [14] I say “fairly novel” because a very similar objection was raised in Don Marquis’s seminal essay, “Why Abortion is Immoral” The Abortion Controversy: 25 Years after Roe v Wade, A Reader eds Louis Pojman and Francis Beckwith (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998) 345.
    [15] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” 106.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part II
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part II
    Maverick Philosopher on the Historical Atrocities Argument