Year: 2009

  • Auckland Public Meeting: Climategate, NIWA and the ETS

    In the wake of climategate, the NIWA contraversy and public concern over the effect of the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) legislation a public meeting will be held in Auckland on Monday featuring Richard Treadgold, convenor of the Climate Conversation Group, who collated the paper Are we Feeling Warmer Yet? that Matt drew from in NIWA, Climategate and Evasive Fallacious Answers. This data originated from a combined research project undertaken by members of the Climate Conversation Group and the New Zealand Climate Science Coalition.

    Richard will present the findings of the research project and explain why, since New Zealand’s warming comes entirely from the adjustments, they are concerned that the figures have been published without mentioning the adjustments and that they have been used repeatedly to influence national policy, the ETS being case in point. He will also reveal their latest discovery of a contradiction between this official NIWA graph of the past and official predictions for the future.

    The event is free to the public and will also feature member of parliament John Boscawen, ACT Party spokesperson on Climate Change who will speak on the ETS and what he thinks its effects might be on the cost of living for everyday New Zealanders.

    Where: Royal Akarana Yacht Club, 10 Tamaki Drive, Okahu Bay, Auckland
    When: Monday 7 December, 7.30 pm

    For more information
    email karen.bridgman@parliament.govt.nz
    or call 09 531 5531

    Having attended these sorts of meetings organised by John Boscawen’s office previously, I am confident that the organisers would be more than willing to give floor space to a scientist who wishes to speak in defence of NIWA’s graphs, the greater climategate controversy and the theories in support of anthropogenic climate change. I for one would be most interested to hear all sides and as such I will attend the meeting and take this opportunity to encourage any such scientist to contact Karen Bridgman as above.

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI

    In my last posts, beginning Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I,  I set out the doctrine of religious restraint and critiqued some of the key arguments in support of it. I looked at the objection that the argument from respect is too thin, that applied consistently it excludes too much and Audi’s response to this. I examined and critiqued Gerald Gaus’ attempt to salvage the argument from epistemic inaccessibility and his idea of open justification. In this post I will look at the dangers of religion as a justification for its asymmetrical treatment within the DRR and conclude the series.

    B          The Dangers of Religion

    One explanation as to why this asymmetry is applied to religious reasons is offered by Quinn; “Some people fear that religious argument is apt to be dangerously divisive.”[82] Audi concurs, “[religious reasons] are special in relation to liberal democracy even by contrast with [secular reasons] … that are not accessible to any normal adult.” [83] He gives five “salient points” to support his case, all based on the idea that religious reasons are dangerous to society. [84]

    First Audi claims that religious reasons are often “directly or indirectly taken to represent an infallible authority”.[85] The second point is that religious people often “believe that anyone who does not identify with [the ultimate divine source] is forsaken, damned, or in some other way fundamentally deficient.”[86] Third, “religious reasons often dictate practices that are distinctively religious in content (such as prayer) or intent (such as preserving the fetus on the ground that it is a gift from God)”.[87] Fourth, with many religious leaders, especially leaders of cults, there is a risk that they are “cloaking their prejudices with absolute authority.”[88] Finally, Audi contends that religious people tend to be “highly and stubbornly passionate about the importance of everyone’s acting in accordance with religious reasons”.[89]

    Again these features are not unique to religion. As McGrew argues, all these features can be equally present in secular people and movements;[90]

    It is sadly amusing to read this list and to consider how well its negative aspects apply to secular people and movements. Communism, for example, is as fanatical as any conventional religion and demands group-think on an unrivaled scale. Contemporary feminism aspires to control worldview, language, and behavior. The New Atheists are exceedingly passionate about making people behave in accordance with their own beliefs (making sure children are taught Darwinism as unquestioned fact, for example), and Richard Dawkins and P.Z. Myers have an inflated sense of self-importance that would make many a Christian megachurch pastor look modest by comparison. Dawkins is infamous for having repeatedly and insistently called a religious upbringing “child abuse,” and while Dawkins has shied away from the obvious legal implications of this accusation, not everyone who thinks as he does is so cautious. Other secularists, self-styled “comprehensive liberals,” have expressly advocated the use of the power of the state to monitor and limit parents’ ability to transmit their religion to their children (see Hitchcock, 2004). As for the vicious condemnation of children who do not fully conform to their parents’ secular ideology, a good example of this phenomenon is the strange story of Rebecca Walker, daughter of feminist icon Alice Walker. And, on the other hand, there are plenty of religious people who do not display such negative characteristics. It simply does not appear to be true that we reduce fanaticism, self-important leadership, attempts at thought control, and the like in society by reducing the role of religion in public life.

    McGrew suggests there are secular analogues of even Audi’s third reason, that religious reasons often dictate practices that are distinctively religious in content or intent;[91]

    It would certainly be undesirable if people were being coerced to pray to any God, even the true God. But then, secular ideology can and sometimes does demand that we do homage to itself—in the form of changing our language to make it politically correct, for example, or treating two men or two women as “married” in all of our business activities. The problem with forcing people to pray to the true God is that the true God is not truly worshiped in that fashion. The problem with forcing people to pray to false gods and to pledge allegiance to false ideologies is that they are false. You will not avoid the problem of the coercion of conscience by limiting the role of religion in public life. You will only shift that problem so that the unreasonable coercion comes from some quarters rather than others.

    Audi’s first point invites a parallel rejoinder. He defines infallible propositions as those that are “impossible that they be both endorsed or accepted by God and false”.[92] On this definition of infallibility every proposition is infallible. God, as Audi understands him, is omniscient. God only believes true propositions. It follows then that any proposition God accepts cannot be false; this is true whether it is a religious proposition or a secular one.

    Audi’s main concern is that a person who believes an action is commanded by God believes that an omniscient, infallible being has endorsed that action. Appeals to purported divine commands are therefore problematic. However, some secular ethical theories face precisely the same problem.  One of the most influential secular theories, endorsed by ethicists as diverse as David Hume, Adam Smith, Henry Sidgwick, Richard Hare, Roderick Firth, John Stuart Mill, Tom Regan, Richard Brandt, Immanuel Kant and others, is the ideal observer theory. On this theory an action is wrong, if and only if, it would be proscribed by an ideal observer, by a person who is perfectly impartial and perfectly informed on all the relevant facts. A hypothetical ideal observer is no less infallible than religious believers take God to be. It is hard to see how invoking religious reasons is not acceptable but invoking the secular reasons is.[93]

    C         Argument from Religious Wars
    A more forcible danger of religion argument invokes the spectre of religious wars. Audi states “if religious considerations are not appropriately balanced with secular ones in matters of coercion, there is a special problem: a clash of Gods vying for social control. Such uncompromising absolutes easily lead to destruction and death”[94] Wolterstorff articulates the concern;[95]

    One reason which liberals have offered ever since the emergence of liberalism in the seventeenth century is that it’s just too dangerous to let religious people debate political issues outside of their own confessional circles, and to act politically, on the basis of their religious views. The only way to forestall religious wars is to get people to stop invoking God and to stop invoking canonical scriptures when arguing and determining politics.

    The adequacy of this argument can be contested on several grounds. First, Quinn, Greenwald and Wolterstorff note that while it was true of 17th century England, “social peace did depend on getting citizens to stop invoking God, canonical scriptures, and religious authorities when discussing politics in public”,[96] it is not plausible that such a danger exists in 21st century Western countries like New Zealand, Australia and the United States. Quinn notes, “current political debate in the United States exhibits failure to comply with Audi’s principles on a massive scale and yet shows no tendency to reignite the Wars of Religion of the early modern era.”[97]

    Wolterstorff makes two other related points. He notes that “the slaughter, torture, and generalised brutality of our century has mainly been conducted in the name of one or another secular cause–nationalism of many sorts, communism, fascism, patriotisms of various kinds, economic hegemony.”[98] Second, he notes that “many of the social movements in the modern world that have moved societies in the direction of liberal democracy have been deeply and explicitly religious in their orientation”[99] He cites the abolitionist movement, the civil rights movement and movements resisting communism, facism and apartheid as examples. The invocation of religious reasons risks war and civil strife when certain types of religious reasons are invoked in particular socio-political contexts. This is equally true of secular reasons; certain types of secular reasons can be dangerously incendiary in particular socio-political contexts. There seems no basis for an asymmetry between secular and religious reasons on these grounds.

    Eberle and Cuneo add that 17th century “confessional conflict … [was] typically rooted in egregious violations of the right to religious freedom, when, for example, people are jailed, tortured, or otherwise abused because of their religious commitments.”[100] Given that few, if any, who appeal to religious reasons advocate such violations or could plausibly bring them about, such appeals are unlikely to have tumultuous effects.

    In terms of protecting freedom of religion from these kinds of abuses it is not obvious that secular reasons fare any better, “secularists have a long history of hostility to the right to religious freedom and, presumably, that hostility isn’t at all grounded in religious considerations”.[101] Moreover when[102]

    religious believers have employed coercive power to violate the right to religious freedom, they themselves rarely have done so in a way that violates the DRR … when such rights have been violated, the justifications offered, even by religious believers, appeal to alleged requirements for social order, such as the need for uniformity of belief on basic normative issues. One theological apologist for religious repression, for example, writes this: ‘The king punishes heretics as enemies, as extremely wicked rebels, who endanger the peace of the kingdom, which cannot be maintained without the unity of the faith. That is why they are burnt in Spain’.

    Similarly, Aquinas, in a Rawlsian vein, famously justified the suppression of heretics by appealing to the accepted political culture of his day which required that counterfeiters be executed.

    Consequently, the religious wars of the 17th century were caused, not by the appeal to religious reasons per se but rather by the violation of religious freedom; this violation has often been defended on secular grounds. It is unlikely that the DRR provides a bulwark against such abuses.

    III        Conclusion

    On examining the DRR it appears that there is no good reason for singling out religious reasons for a particular restraint and limiting discourse to secular reasons. The grounds offered for doing so, the golden rule, the epistemic accessibility of religious premises, the dangers of religion and the potential for religious wars all apply with equal force to secular beliefs. Hence, the restriction appears arbitrary. Moreover, as applied, the DRR is often incoherent and if applied consistently would render most substantive coercive laws unjustified. The current practice of equating secularism with neutrality is flawed.

    As Carter eloquently puts it,[103]

    What is needed is not a requirement that the religiously devout choose a form of dialogue that liberalism accepts, but that liberalism develop a politics that accepts whatever form of dialogue a member of the public offers. Epistemic diversity, like diversity of other kinds, should be cherished, not ignored, and certainly not abolished. What is needed, then, is a willingness to listen, not because the speaker has the right voice but because the speaker has the right to speak. Moreover, the willingness to listen must hold out the possibility that the speaker is saying something worth listening to; to do less is to trivialize the forces that shape the moral convictions of tens of millions of Americans.

    This series was written as a supervised research paper in pursuit of my LLB.


    [82] Phillip Quinn “Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious” (1995) 69:2 Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 35, 143.
    [83]
    Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66, 31.
    [84]
    Ibid 31-32.
    [85]
    Ibid 31.
    [86]
    Ibid.
    [87] Ibid.
    [88]
    Ibid 31-32.
    [89]
    Ibid 32.
    [90]
    Lydia McGrew “The Irrational Faith of the Naked Public Square” (2008) 1 The Christendom Review (at 2 October 2009).
    [91]
    Ibid.
    [92]
    Audi, above n83, 63.
    [93]
    I am grateful to Matthew Flannagan for the development of this point.
    [94]
    Robert Audi Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000) 103.
    [95]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff “Why we should Reject what Liberalism tells us About Speaking and Acting in Public for Religious Reasons” in Paul Weithman (ed) Religion and Contemporary Liberalism (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame IN, 1997) 167.
    [96]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 67-120, 79.
    [97]
    Quinn, above n82, 39.
    [98]
    Wolterstorff, above n96, 80.
    [99]
    Christopher J. Eberle and Terence Cuneo “Religion and Political Theory” (2008) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (at 9 August 2009).
    [100]
    Ibid.
    [101]
    Ibid.
    [102]
    Ibid.
    [103]
    Stephen Carter The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialise Religious Devotion (Basic Books, New York, 1993) 230.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V

  • Philosophers’ Carnival – Call for Submissions

    The current edition of the Philosophers’ Carnival is here; the next Philosophers’ Carnival is heading down under and will be hosted by this blog.

    So... you've got a couple of weeks to submit an entry.

    The lowdown on the carnival and the criteria for submissions is explained in full here. The short version is that you should  use the BlogCarnival submissions form to submit your link to the blog post you'd like to have featured.  It doesn't have to be something new, feel free to use something you might have written a while back but that perhaps deserves more exposure. Also keep in mind that Philosophers' Carnival founder Richard Chappell points out that "your post doesn't need to be anything earth-shattering - it just needs to be something that other philosophically-minded people might enjoy reading."

    It would be great to see some more kiwi contributions amongst the international ones especially now that Richard is an honorary yank - I'm not sure we can claim him anymore 😉

  • Goodbye Anna

    Peter Cresswell posted this afternoon that blogger Anna Woolf who blogged at Annie Fox lost her battle with Non-Hodgkins Lymphoma today.

    We first met Anna at bloggers drinks back in April this year and then we began to read her blog. Over the few short months I knew her I saw someone who bravely looked death in the face, who managed to laugh and enjoy life despite the pain she lived with and the short time she had left. Her courage was and strength amazed me.

    Goodbye Anna – bloggers drinks and blogosphere will not be the same without you.

  • NIWA, Climategate and Evasive Fallacious Answers

    Climategate has been all the rage on the blogosphere of late and judging by the emails we’ve received in the past few days from our international readers, New Zealand’s own climategate has gone global. The fuel providing the heat is a recent criticism of New Zealand’s National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) by the New Zealand Climate Science Coalition (NZCSC).

    The coalition released an 8-page report that compares the figures on NIWA’s website with the official graph NIWA has constructed that purports to show that New Zealand’s temperatures have steadily risen since 1909.

    Official New Zealand Average Temperature According to NIWA

    The problem is that the two sets of figures do not match. When one graphs NIWA’s own websites figures the graph shows a constant steady rate of temperature.

    Unadjusted New Zealand Average Temperature According to NIWA

    The climb in temperature in the official graph is due to the fact that NIWA adjusted the raw data, in almost all cases, upwards. It is these adjustments, and not the raw data itself, which leads to the incline on the official graph. NZCSC have cried foul, Ian Wishart, author of best seller Air Con: The Seriously Inconvenient Truth About Global Warming, got hold of it, the blogosphere followed suit.

    In response NIWA have argued that they had good reasons for adjusting the raw data in this fashion. They maintain that over a hundred years the sites where measurements have been taken have changed and so they have needed to adjust their figures upwards to correct for the distortions these changes would have made.

    I am aware that not being a climatologist or someone that familiar with the relevant data to any great extent makes it difficult to arrive at an informed position in this debate. However, it seems to this lay person that two things are evident.

    From what I have seen from NIWA’s response, the raw data does not support their conclusions and the method of collecting the raw data was flawed and inaccurate to begin with.

    The issue then is whether one is justified in adjusting the data to fit what one thinks it would have been if these inaccuracies did not exist, and, if we are, how confident we can be of the results based on counter-factual speculations of this sort. I myself have no idea of the answer but certainly I think that it is fair for people to ask questions of this sort. Especially with the backdrop of the international climategate emails and memos and when serious political policies such as the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which restricts people’s life, liberty and property, are being passed on the basis of the legitimacy of climate change science.

    Scientific debates aside, it seems that as a point of justice the burden of proof must fall on those who wish to impose severe restrictions on other people’s lives, liberty and property; those advocating restrictive policies, like the ETS and those under discussion at Copenhagen, must be able to show that their polices are defensible. This is simply an implication of the idea that people have a prima facie right to liberty and property. A prima facie right is one that holds as a default position in the absence of sufficient reason to the contrary. It seems to me fairly self-evident that if one is going to restrict people’s freedom or property one needs good reasons for doing so. A principle that suggests we could enslave, coerce and confiscate people’s property for no reason, trivial reasons or simply when we unsure there were any reasons would clearly be wrong – much more so when the question hangs over the reason as to whether or not the justification has been faked.

    One thing that did interest me in this whole debate, however, is how some scientists have defended NIWA against its critics. What I have observed does not inspire confidence.  A good example occurs over at MacDoctor. MacDoctor had raised questions about NIWA’s data, the response from Gareth Renowden, author of Hot Topic.

    I think you are giving far too much weight to the CRU email hack. Here’s a few reasons why:

    1: The emails were stolen. Those released amount to under 2% (pers comm) of the total stolen, and have clearly been selected to support the storylines being run by the “right wing blogs” you mention. The editorial selection has been made by a bunch of crooks.

    2: Many of the mails being talked about have perfectly innocent explanations (see RealClimate). They are the private conversations of a bunch of working scientists, not the science itself. We see that they can be rude about each other and their rivals — that only proves that scientists are human. However, the climate sceptic network is making all sorts of outrageous claims about what they say. Sadly you seem to have bought those interpretations, rather than the somewhat more mundane truth.

    3: Our body of scientific knowledge is found in the peer-reviewed literature, not in a careful selection of emails. Not one peer-reviewed paper is called into question by these emails.

    4: Timing is everything. These emails were “released” a couple of weeks before the Copenhagen conference, and while a major emissions reduction bill is before the US legislature. They were immediately trumpeted from the rooftops by the usual suspects – those campaigning against action on climate change. Coincidence, or part of a campaign?

    If I was a climatologist, I would be very angry at this point, not because I have to go back and redo any work, but because those seeking to delay or prevent action on climate change are resorting to vicious personal attacks against my colleagues. After all, if you can only make a case by stealing and lying, what sort of case have you got?

    There are some things about this response that deserve comment. Consider the points raised in 1: here Gareth’s response is to attack the character of those who took the emails. He notes that they are crooks, that the data has been used to support a particular line of interpretation put forward by “right wing blogs.” Similarly, in 4: he suggests that the timing of the information was politically motivated.

    These arguments commit the ad hominem fallacy; whether or not the material put forward by climate change sceptics is true or false depends on the empirical evidence for it and not on the motives of those who put it forward. One can see the point better by simply reversing it, suppose a body of scientific data is appropriated by left-wing bloggers and is released just before an important political meeting. Does it follow that the studies themselves are worthless? Gareth seems to be suggesting that because the people had particular political leanings or particular political motivations that one should reject their research without actually examining the evidence. Far from showing that the sceptics claims are unfounded, this very line of argument suggests that the scientists are letting political commitments dictate the lines of inquiry they will consider from the outset.

    Gareth’s points 2: and 3: have more merit. He suggests correctly that the nasty rude character of individual scientists does not mean their research is flawed. This is correct; it makes the valid point that whether an individual scientist has a good character is in fact a different question as to whether his arguments are sound. Of course this observation actually rebuts most of what he has said in 1: and 4:.

    Moreover, Gareth suggests that what matters is what the peer reviewed studies show and these are not called into question by anything in the leaked (stolen) emails and memos at the centre of climategate and goes on to suggest that there are innocent explanations of the conversations in question. These latter claims, if correct, do provide a valid response to the questions people raised.

    MacDoctor responds to this as follows:

    Those released amount to under 2% (pers comm) of the total stolen

    No. You can access all the emails. The ones being discussed in blogs and the media amount to about 2%.

    Many of the mails being talked about have perfectly innocent explanations

    I’m sure you are right. However, many of the e-mails have meanings that cannot be interpreted in any way except that they reveal severe selection bias. Even Monbiot thinks that they show more politics than science.

    Our body of scientific knowledge is found in the peer-reviewed literature

    Apparently not, according to the emails. There appears to have been a concerted effort made to keep certain articles out of the peer reviewed literature. The smothering of dissenting views makes for a flawed, truncated science that is all but worthless.

    Timing is everything

    Indeed. CRU timed plenty of scary statistics to be brought forth just before the Copenhagen conference – now all suspect. The timing works both ways.

    Here MacDoctor addresses both the valid and invalid arguments. In response to the issue of peer review, MacDoctor notes that the climategate emails and memos provide evidence that the process of peer review has been corrupted. He also notes that not all of the emails and memos can be plausibly explained away in the fashion Gareth suggests.

    At this point I was interested in seeing if Gareth had an adequate response to these points. I was disappointed. Gareth’s response is as follows,

    Selection bias! In the cherry-picking of stuff to feed into right wing attack lines, yes.

    The “concerted effort” was to deal with crap – papers that should never have got through peer review. Note that the perversion of peer review was actually being conducted by sceptics – notably Chris de Freitas, who as an editor at Climate Research was responsible for passing several papers from his sceptic mates for publication without proper peer review. Six editors resigned in protest. Full story here from one of the editors who resigned.

    CRU “timed” no scary statistics for release, and none of their normal products are now suspect.

    I must say I’m astonished that someone who (presumably) relies on evidence-based should be so partial when it comes to work in another field. Your choice. Your loss.

    What we see here is not a valid response to MacDoctor’s concerns but rather a series of tu quoques. He responds by noting that right wingers have selection bias. That may or may not be true but that was not the question. The question was whether the scientists at the heart of climategate had selection bias. You do not show that one person is not biased by pointing out that someone else is or might be. In the same way, pointing out, as Gareth does, that some sceptics of anthropogenic global warming (AGW) have tried to manipulate peer review does not actually tell us anything about whether defenders of AGW have also manipulated peer review.

    If anything, Gareth’s remaining comments tend to suggest that they did try to do this but were justified because the work of sceptics is “crap.” This shows us that, at the crucial point, his defence degenerates to denigration and name-calling. The rest of the response is to insinuate that those who do not disagree with these obviously fallacious arguments do not follow “evidence based research.” Strange, I though evidence based research involves actually providing evidence for your claims, not raising red herrings and making evasions.

    After reading the exchange I am left wondering; here scientists are defending their position by using clear-cut obvious examples of fallacious reasoning but surely scientists of all people know not to do this don’t they?

    For those like myself who are lay people the questions remain. Governments advocate using the force of law, with policies such as the ETS, to restrict peoples freedom, confiscate their property and raise the price of food, petrol and power. We are told this is because a “consensus” of scientists thinks certain facts about climate change and AGW are the case and that these facts justify certain action. Apart from the obvious is ought fallacy employed in such reasoning (empirical research by itself cannot answer moral questions about what we ought to do) and putting aside the question of whether scientific consensus are always reliable guides to truth, it is disconcerting, in such a politically charged context as we find ourselves in amidst climategate, that when people discover that data has been adjusted on the basis not of what it actually showed but what they think it should have shown under non-existent ideal conditions and they ask questions about this that at least some defenders of science respond with evasions. People who are trained in scientific thinking must know that such responses are fallacious and inadequate. When  I witness this, especially when some of it seems premised on the idea that views can be dismissed out of hand if the conclusions are “right wing,” it makes one, at the very least, a bit suspicious that we are dealing with politics and agendas as much as science.

  • Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth

    A while back I made a passing comment on my blog criticising an advertisement which claimed that, prior to Columbus, the Church taught that the world was flat. In response I received the following email from a high-school student in the US,

    I’ve been studying Christopher Columbus in my history class and my history books say that prior to Columbus everyone did think the world was flat……..I don’t know if it was a mistake in the history book or your mistake…..but anyway….I guess I have some things to learn! God bless ~ Katie

    We have all heard the story behind this. Prior to Columbus, the Church and its theological scholars taught that the world was flat. For this reason they opposed Columbus’ proposed voyage in 1492 as they believed he would sail off the edge of the earth (or that he would prove them wrong and they would lose standing in society). Despite this Columbus sailed anyway and his rejection of the Church’s position was vindicated, he scored a victory for science and reason.

    My correspondent is correct. They do teach this in high school text books. I was taught it at both primary and high-school. In fact, not too long ago Prentice Hall published claims to this effect in their middle school textbook Prentice Hall Earth Science.

    At a philosophy conference at Otago University, shortly after I graduated, I recall one speaker using the example of “medieval flat-earthers” in his paper as an example of an irrational belief. Almost everyone in attendance nodded their heads in agreement; no one contested the historical assumptions implicit in the example. More recently Victoria University ran a slick television campaign stating that in the 14th century most people believed the world was flat. The ad showed a picture of a boat sailing across the sea only to fall over the side of the earth and concluded “It makes you think.”

    You might have gathered from obvious clues like the title and from the way I have set this article up that I dispute the veracity of much of these historical claims. If I state this publicly there are very few settings where this admission does not at least earn me an incredulous stare (as if I were, in fact, asserting that the earth was flat). Invariably some comment follows, “come on Matt, everyone knows this story is true, didn’t you learn this at school? Haven’t you read any history textbooks?”

    It is true that I did learn this story at school and that I have read it in more than one history textbook but because I took the time to research the history of theology when I was at university I know that this story is fiction. It is a slanderous fabrication invented by opponents of Christianity in the 19th century and has been thoroughly debunked by contemporary historians of science.

    The definitive study is undoubtedly that of Jeffrey Burton Russell in Inventing the Flat Earth: Columbus and Modern Historians. Russell summarised his findings, in a paper presented to the 1997 American Scientific Affiliation Conference, as follows,

    [W]ith extraordinary few exceptions no educated person in the history of Western Civilization from the third century B.C. onward believed that the earth was flat. A round earth appears at least as early as the sixth century BC with Pythagoras, who was followed by Aristotle, Euclid, and Aristarchus, among others in observing that the earth was a sphere. Although there were a few dissenters—Leukippos and Demokritos for example–by the time of Eratosthenes (3 c. BC), followed by Crates(2 c. BC), Strabo (3 c. BC), and Ptolemy (first c. AD), the sphericity of the earth was accepted by all educated Greeks and Romans.

    Nor did this situation change with the advent of Christianity. A few—at least two and at most five—early Christian fathers denied the spherically of earth by mistakenly taking passages such as Ps. 104:2-3 as geographical rather than metaphorical statements. On the other side tens of thousands of Christian theologians, poets, artists, and scientists took the spherical view throughout the early, medieval, and modern church. The point is that no educated person believed otherwise.

    Russell traced the story about Columbus and medieval flat-earthers back to the 19th century; it originated in a fictional novel by Washington Irving The Life and Voyages of Christopher Columbus I (1829). Later it was picked up by two influential books, John Draper’s History of the Conflict between Religion and Science (1874) and Andrew Dickson White’s book A History of The Warfare Between Science and Theology in Christendom. These books famously used the Columbus story plus many others to defend the thesis that the Church, for centuries, suppressed science and worked to prevent its flourishing; this is known as the conflict thesis.

    These books and the conflict thesis they spawned, are highly influential in popular science and media coverage of theological and scientific issues today despite most historians rejecting them as propaganda. In The Encyclopedia of the History of Science and Religion, Collin Russell notes,

    Draper takes such liberty with history, perpetuating legends as fact that he is rightly avoided today in serious historical study. The same is nearly as true of White, though his prominent apparatus of prolific footnotes may create a misleading impression of meticulous scholarship.

    Steven Shapin wrote in the same vein in The Scientific Revolution,

    In the late Victorian period it was common to write about the “warfare between science and religion” and to presume that the two bodies of culture must always have been in conflict. However, it is a very long time since these attitudes have been held by historians of science.

    Numerous other specialists in the field of the history of science and religion concur that the existence of medieval flat-earthers is a myth. Numbers and Lindberg noted in a journal article, “there was scarcely a Christian scholar of the Middle Ages who did not acknowledge [Earth’s] sphericity and even know its approximate circumference.” In his study of medieval cosmology, God and Reason in the Middle Ages, distinguished historian Edward Grant noted that,

    All medieval students who attended a university knew this. In fact any educated person in the Middle Ages knew the earth was spherical, or of a round shape. Medieval commentators on Aristotle’s “On the Heavens” or in the commentaries on a popular thirteenth century work titled “Treatise on the Sphere” by John of Sacrobosco, usually included a question in which they enquired “whether the whole earth is spherical”. Scholastics answered this question unanimously: The earth is spherical or round. No university trained author ever thought it was flat.

    Draper’s and White’s books remain widely cited despite being debunked as historically inaccurate. In fact, the kinds of textbooks Katie mentioned have been subject to scathing criticism precisely for making the aforementioned claims. Lawrence S. Lerner, a professor in the Department of Physics and Astronomy at California State University who is a member of the panel that wrote the 1990 framework for science education in California’s public schools criticised Pretence Halls history text denouncing it as “ignorant fakery.” In an article entitled “Fake ‘History’ That Is Flatly Wrong,” Lerner described the flat-earth claims as a “popular piece of pseudo historical folklore” he added that it “remains popular today among people who have had little education. These evidently include the people who produce ‘science’ books for Prentice Hall.”

    The historical facts are difficult to dispute. During the, so called, “dark ages” Boethius (480-525) cited a well known and accepted ancient Greek cosmological model that affirmed the sphericity of the earth in the Consolidation of Philosophy. Isidore of Serville (560-636) affirmed a round earth in the Etymologies. Bede (672-735) in The Reckoning of Time taught the earth was round; as did Rabanus Marcus in the ninth century.

    The late middle-ages are no different. Hemannus Contractus (1013-155) measured the circumference of the world. Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179) taught the world was round as did John of Sacrbosco (1200-1256) and Peire d’Ailly (1350-1420). Dante’s Divine Comedy portrays the earth as a sphere. In the Summa Theologicae Thomas Aquinas wrote,

    The physicist proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth.

    Even medieval textbooks taught the world was round. Both the Elucidarium of Honorius Augustodunensis, a twelfth century manual for educating clergy, and On the Sphere of the World, the standard cosmological textbook of medieval universities in the 13th century, taught that the world was round.

    As I have delved into religious history further I have found that this had not been the first or only instance where I was fed false propaganda about Christianity. I could document several other false versions of history; the flat-earth story will suffice for now. As New Zealand blogger Contra Celsum wrote, “the flat earthers are those who think they existed.”

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the December 09 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

    RELATED POSTS:
    The “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda
    More on the “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda
    Things They Don’t Teach you in Public Schools…
    The Flat Earth Myth
    Guest Post: Dan Brown’s History of Science

  • This one’s for Anna Woolf

    Peter Cresswell has an update on blogger Anna Woolf‘s battle with cancer which is very near the end. We met Anna on my and her birthday in April this year at bloggers drinks and have enjoyed her company and shared laughs and swapped pain meds at each bloggers drinks since.

    We have not known her that long but we have come to know an incredibly warm, funny, brave and courageous person with a heart of gold and it with deep sadness that we share this news. Our love and prayers go out to Anna, her sister Maria and her family and friends.

    You can leave a comment at the link to NotPC which will be read to Anna. This week’s bloggers drinks have now been moved to The Cavalier, which is over the road from the hospice Anna is in, with the hope that those who wish to can pop over the road and say goodbye.