Year: 2009

  • The NZ Herald on Cactus Kate and Priorities in Journalism Ethics

    There is an interesting story unfolding in the blogosphere. Cactus Kate published extracts of APN News and Media’s guidelines for publication on her blog in, APN Chicken Out, and inserted her own commentary and spin on them based on email correspondence from staff members working for APN’s publications. Where it gets really interesting is that the New Zealand Herald ran this piece Herald tells blogger: You’re Wrong. Anyone familiar with Cactus Kate (and probably bloggers generally) will not be surprised to hear that Cactus has published a cutting response, with the rather brilliant title, Herald Clucks On Spin Cycle.

    The whole thing is worth a read for two reasons. One it demonstrates the rise of the blog, the increasing position of the blog as a source of information and as a force to not be ignored (which is a phenomena, as a blogger, that I find very interesting). The second reason is that some aspects of the guidelines for publication that Cactus cites are alarming.

    While the Herald takes issues with some of the points in Cactus’ initial blog post, it calls them a “heavily truncated mish-mash” (I think that’s journo speak for cut and pasted extracts) and says they have been in play for a long time “Nothing secret about them and nothing new”, it does not deny that these guidelines are, in fact, in play.

    “[The guidelines] are not new (same general thoughts have been included in the training document for years) … the basic points are entirely matter-of-fact for anyone seeking to get things right and avoid legal pitfalls the media have encountered before.

    There is no new ‘conservative’ approach, no recent guidelines discussed, received or implemented, no change.”

    So the Herald says they are not new, Cactus’ sources say they are but that is not why I called your attention to them. It is that the content of the guidelines are what is revealing. Now I don’t share every aspect of Cactus’ take on what precisely is wrong with the guidelines but I do agree she is right when she says some of them are pretty awful. For example, consider this guideline:

    d. There are categories of people who are more inclined to sue if they are the subject of adverse publications, so particular care should be taken in reporting allegations of misconduct against lawyers, doctors, judges, other professionals, politicians, critics and wealthy businessmen/women.

    Cactus takes issue with this and describes it as “the worst affront to investigative journalism” contained in the document.  I too think that it is the most concerning of all of them but not as an affront to investigative journalism. My issue with clause d is the suggestion that publications only bother to take care in reporting damning allegations against people who are likely to sue them – so don’t bother being as careful writing damning allegations about people who are not likely to sue?

    I’m sorry, but I thought that the reason one should take care to not publish false, private and damning allegations about people (you tend to not be able to succeed in legal action if what is written is true and in the public interest) was something vaguely to do with respect for truth, morality, ethics, integrity, respect for other people, a desire to not misinform the public and so on. When I think of the reasons why I try to not publish anything false, damning and private on our blog, the odds of my success in the courtroom do not figure very high. I’m more concerned that I get it right simply for the sake of getting it right because that is important to me.

    Nice to have what we all thought about journalism ethics set out in black and white I guess.

  • Richard Dawkins on Thinking Matters

    According to Richard Dawkins, New Zealand apologetics blog, Thinking Matters Talk, “makes for some interesting browsing.”

    The recommendation of Rob Ward’s blog post, Sarfati reviews Dawkins’ ‘The Greatest Show on Earth’, has seen a deluge traffic arrive.

    (This pleases us because we are part of Thinking Matters and are listed as contributors to Thinking Matters Talk even though we don’t contribute there much…)

  • Guest Post: The Common Good – An Emergent Phenomenon

    This guest post comes from Nyokodo of And All These Things…. Catholic social teaching stresses that civil government should seek the common good. This post contains some critical commentary as to how to understand and apply the common good.

    The documents of the Church and the writings of most socially minded scholars are replete with exhortations for public figures to work towards the common good in all secular affairs. In response grand public works are begun, optimistic programmes launched, and a great many resources are shifted from one sector to another to achieve this lofty goal. However, it soon becomes clear that these programmes introduce further imbalances, insecurities and evils. Entire strata of society become addicted to welfare, economic protectionism make prices soar, unjust monopolies are established, and regulations are always too little too late. Some of these problems can be explained by ordinary political corruption and the general imperfection of man, however there is an even larger problem with all these methods: it’s literally impossible for them to work.

    The problem is information:

    • how to collect it;
    • how to interpret it once you have it;
    • and the time frame in which all this is done.

    Governments simply cannot aggregate enough information in a timely enough fashion, and even if they could social and economic data are largely subjective and impossible to interpret correctly when distanced from the specific situation and the particular people involved.

    Readers will be familiar with government economic data only coming out after the fact, often sometime after. This is because it takes time for sectors of the economy to report how they’re doing, there is always a delay requisite with the time it takes for individuals and businesses to aggregate their own data and to government requirements. Even then the data is often manipulated to make government policies look better so the reliability of the data is questionable.

    The data are also very much subjective as the needs, wants, aspirations and acceptable outcomes of economic and social activities differs per person, business, city and region. The sheer immensity of this subjective information is too vast for any government to sufficiently aggregate and essentially impossible to even attempt to collect.

    Governments who attempt this central planning of our social and economic lives are simply driving blind because they cannot have the information they would need to direct us effectively. This is why government programmes always encourage the wrong behaviour, leave certain groups and issues behind, grow stale and unresponsive, and generally spring leaks from every orifice.

    The only way for the Common Good to be achieved is to unleash the power of individuals, families and groups to work towards their own benefit. The Common Good emerges out of this chaos with the most efficient use of resources, the most timely actions taken and no interpretation being necessary. The only people who have the necessary information to achieve their good, and in chorus the common good, are the individuals directly involved. Governments need to get out of the way and enable this process to occur instead of their futile attempts to conjure the common good from the top down.

  • Philosophy Carnival XCIX

    The Philosophy Carnival XCIX is now online.

    Matt’s and my post Audi and the Infallibility of Religious Reasons is featured.

    There are a number of other interesting reads also linked to so head on over and check them out.

  • Happy Birthday Matt

    It is Matt’s birthday today. As he is in Tauranga (so we cannot celebrate his birthday with him until he gets home late tonight) our youngest two children, Brittany and Noah, made this present for him to enjoy in the meantime.

  • “My Ways are Not Your Ways” Notre Dame Conference

    In September this year, the centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame hosted a conference entitled “My Ways Are Not Your Ways”; the proceedings of the conference can be seen at the previous link and is a good resource.

    The theme of the conference, as outlined on Notre Dame’s webpage,  is as follows;

    Adherents of the Abrahamic religious traditions contend that human beings are made in the image of God and that modeling the character of God in one’s life represents the pinnacle of human flourishing and moral perfection. Defenders of this tradition commonly point to passages in the canonical texts of the Jewish and Christian faiths that portray God as loving, merciful, patient, etc. in support of such a position. Since the seventeenth century, however, numerous critics of these Abrahamic traditions have argued that God, especially in the Hebrew Bible, is often portrayed as anything but a moral role model.

    On the one hand, historical narratives in these texts describe God apparently committing, ordering, or commending genocide, slavery, and rape among other moral atrocities. On the other hand, a number of commands purportedly issued by God seem to commend bigotry, misogyny, and homophobia. In recent days, similar criticisms of the Abrahamic traditions have been raised by philosophers (Daniel Dennett), scientists (Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris), social commentators (Christopher Hitchens), and others.

    Are these apparent commendations and commands of the Hebrew Bible consistent with the claim that the Abrahamic God is perfectly good and loving? Those defending this tradition have two avenues of response open to them. The first response would be to argue that the aforementioned troubling narratives or commands should simply be rejected. Those taking this approach would have to explain how they think such passages could be rejected without placing in peril the Abrahamic religions, which have traditionally claimed that the Hebrew Bible is, represents, or contains the inspired word of God. The second response would offer explanations aiming to show that the apparently untoward consequences can be avoided without rejecting the narratives or commands. Those taking this approach must explain either why the untoward consequences do not follow, or why they are not, in the end untoward.

    However, while defenders of this tradition have both routes available to them, few of these defenders seem to have taken the challenge to heart. Despite these recent, forthright criticisms, only a handful of theologians or philosophers in these traditions have sought to respond to the criticisms.

    The present conference aims to remedy this deficiency, taking as its focus the charge that the Abrahamic tradition should be rejected because of its foundation in the Hebrew Bible, which portrays God as immoral and vicious.  The presenters and commentators include philosophers—both theistic and nontheistic—as well as Biblical scholars.

    For those who are interested, Michael Rea from Notre Dame has put the entire conference online (including the Q & A).

    Enjoy 🙂

  • Audi and the Infallibility of Religious Reasons

    In “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics”,[1] Robert Audi defends the liberal thesis that religious reasons should not be utilised in debate on issues of public policy. Instead he contends that “one should not advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts human conduct unless one has, and is willing to offer, adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support.”[2] Audi explains that “an adequate reason for a law or policy is a proposition whose truth is sufficient to justify it.”[3] Audi’s position is that it is immoral for a person to defend any legislation or public policy on theological grounds alone; one can only licitly defend a policy if one has secular reasons for it.

    A secular reason is, roughly, one whose normative force, that is, its status as a prima facie justificatory element, does not (evidentially) depend on the existence of God (for example, through appeals to divine command) or on theological considerations (such as interpretations of a sacred text), or on the pronouncements of a person or institution qua religious authority.[4]

    Audi supplants this principle of secular reason with two others, a principle of “secular motivation” and something he calls “theo-ethical equilibrium.”[5] His principle of secular motivation goes further; “one should not advocate or promote any legal or public policy restrictions on human conduct unless one not only has and is willing to offer, but is also motivated by, adequate secular reason, where this reason (or set of reasons) is motivationally sufficient for the conduct in question.”[6] Theo-ethical equilibrium is “a rational integration between religious deliverances and insights and, on the other hand, secular ethical considerations … a mature, conscientious theist who cannot reach it [theo-ethical equilibrium] should be reluctant or unwilling to support coercive laws or public policies on a religious basis that cannot be placed in that equilibrium.”[7]

    So construed there is an obvious asymmetry in Audi’s position. In a review of a book which defends Audi’s position, Philip Quinn observes;

    These principles impose burdens on religious people that Audi nowhere suggests imposing on nonreligious people. … Audi does not propose that nonreligious people must be sufficiently motivated by adequate religious reason for their advocacy or support of restrictive laws or politicise. The lack of symmetry is striking. [8]

    The fact that Audi’s position singles religious reasons out for exclusion from public discourse in a manner which he does not apply to secular reasons, raises the obvious question of why? What’s so special or objectionable about theological reasons being used in public?

    Elsewhere in his article Audi offers some reasons for this; he notes, “[religious reasons] are special in relation to liberal democracy even by contrast with [secular reasons] … that are not accessible to any normal adult.”[9] He gives five “salient points” to support his case, all based on the idea that religious reasons are dangerous to society.[10]

    In this post we want to focus on the first of these. Audi thinks any appeal to God’s commands in public debate is dangerously divisive because “religious reasons … are directly or indirectly taken to represent an infallible authority.”[11] This line of thought strikes a chord with many, concern about the infallible nature of divine will is often the basis for criticism of appeals to theology in public discourse.

    However, as Audi defines the term ‘infallible’ any reason a person offers for their position would be infallible; according to Audi, propositions are infallible if it is “impossible that they be both endorsed or accepted by God and false”.[12] God, as Audi understands him, is omniscient. God only believes true propositions. It follows then that any proposition one can imagine, regardless of its content, will be such that it is impossible for both God to believe it and that the proposition be false. Given this it is hard to see how “religious reasons” are especially objectionable on Audi’s contention.

    Perhaps, however, this is a technical point based on a mistaken definition of infallibility. Audi’s main concern is that a person, who believes that an action is commanded by God, believes that an omniscient, infallible being has endorsed that action. Appeals to purported divine commands are therefore problematic because the authority appealed to cannot err.

    The obvious rejoinder is that many secular ethical theories face precisely the same problem. One of the most influential secular theories is the ideal observer theory, which is endorsed by ethicists as diverse as David Hume, Adam Smith, Henry Sidgwick, Richard Hare, Roderick Firth, John Stuart Mill, Tom Regan, Richard Brandt, Immanuel Kant and others. On this theory, an action is wrong, if and only if, it would be proscribed by an ideal observer, by a person who is perfectly impartial and perfectly informed on all the relevant facts. A hypothetical ideal observer is no less infallible than religious believers take God to be. It is hard to see how invoking religious reasons is not acceptable but invoking the secular reasons is.

    This is probably enough to address Audi’s concerns but there are several other points worth noting.

    Firstly, the fact that the law of God is infallible does not entail that there is or cannot be debate over what the law of God in fact is. Claiming that God’s law is infallible is not to claim that any human never errs in his or her discernment of what this law is, his or her interpretation of it or his or her application of it to particular cases. Claiming that there is debate over the interpretation of divine law and debate over how to apply various precepts of divine law to specific cases, is compatible with affirming that divine law is infallible.

    In this, the law of God is analogous to deductive reasoning. By definition, a sound argument can never have a false conclusion. It is impossible for the conclusion to be false if the argument is sound, hence sound arguments are infallible. It does not follow from this that people never err in constructing arguments that they mistakenly believe are sound or that there is no debate over which arguments are sound. Reason is authoritative; however, human reasoners are not. It is hard to see why the infallibility of the law of God means that appeals to this law are any more problematic than appeals to logic.

    A similar response is available on the immutability of divine law. The fact that God’s law is immutable does not mean that any person’s understanding of this law cannot change. He or she may find his or her particular beliefs about God’s law were mistaken or that he or she had applied it incorrectly.

    In this respect, the law of God is analogous to numerous things that it is unobjectionable to appeal to. Consider an appeal to facts and reason; these too are immutable. If it is a fact that the world was round at the time of Columbus then this is something we cannot change. It cannot be true 100 years from now that the world was not round when Columbus sailed. Moreover, whether an argument is sound is also immutable; we cannot repeal the laws of logic. Therefore, both facts and reason are as immutable as God’s law is.

    Moreover, consider a precept such as it is wrong to torture children for entertainment. Is this mutable so that society could repeal it tomorrow? Is the claim that rape and genocide of Jews is wrong something that is mutable, that human beings can change and repeal these things? Obviously not. Immutability is a feature of any serious, ethical viewpoint. If you cannot base civil law on immutable things, then you cannot base it on facts, reason or secular values.


    [1] Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66.
    [2]
    Robert Audi “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship” (1989) 18 Philosophy and Public Affairs 259, 279.
    [3]
    Ibid 284.
    [4]
    Ibid 278.
    [5]
    Audi, above n 1, 25-37.
    [6]
    Ibid 284.
    [7]
    Audi, above n 1, 21.
    [8]
    Philip Quinn “Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate” (2000) 60:2 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 486, 487 (book review).
    [9]
    Audi, above n 1, 31.
    [10]
    Ibid 31-32.
    [11]
    Audi, above n 1, 31.
    [12]
    Audi, above n 1, 62.

    This post was jointly authored. It is largely a mash of extracts from Madeleine’s  paper “Religious Restraint and Public Policy” and from Matt’s “Is Historic Christian Opposition to Feticide Defensible in the 21st Century.”