Author: Madeleine

  • No Defences Permitted for the Accused

    In, The referendum campaign is underway, No Right Turn’s Idiot/Savant gives an excellent example of an argument we see coming up a lot in the debate around the upcoming referendum on smacking. In addition to trotting out the standard ad hominem, that everyone who supports the reinstatement of the old section 59 of the Crimes Act is a “child-beater,” I’d like to examine the emphasised part:

    Over the next month I expect to see a succession of unhinged press releases from the child-beaters claiming that the law somehow impinges on their religious freedom or has caused the widespread persecution of parents. It does nothing of the sort. What it has done is prevent parents who punch their children in the face or beat them with a soup ladle from claiming a defence of “reasonable force”. And that is unequivocally a Good Thing. The only people who oppose that are people who wish to abuse children in that way – and we should treat them with the contempt they deserve.

    Essentially Idiot/Savant here claims the parent in his example are guilty, apriori, and as such, when they go to trial, they should not be able to attempt to raise a defence. The problem is that the whole point of having a trial is to determine guilt or innocence. Even when it seems pretty obvious, trials are still necessary and the right to due process still applies. This right to due process includes, alongside the presumption of innocence, a right to raise a defence, no matter how stupid or implausible, and have the court assess it. The importance of this concept can be summed up by Blackstone’s Ratio, “Better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”[1]

    Supporters of the anti-smacking law do not seem to get this. This ‘claiming a defence’ issue has been raised a lot ever since Sue Bradford first began promoting her bill to remove the old s59 defence, of reasonable force for the purposes of correction, from the Crimes Act. If you read the Vote Yes site, if you read the media releases and the articles and listen to the interviews you will hear it a lot.

    Of course what Idiot/Savant, Bradford, the Vote Yes people, et al miss is that there is a world of difference between claiming a defence and succeeding in doing so. The court is not stupid and the people making the determinations of guilt or innocence in our courts are normal, everyday people. If it is so obvious to all of us that hitting a child across the face with a soup ladle is child abuse, and it is obvious to all of us, a court, made up of people like us, is not going to rule that such an action is an example of reasonable force.

    The 34 reported cases on the old s59 are readily available in any law library and if you read them, instead of the media reports and politicians and websites and blogs, you will see time and time and time again child abusers failing in their attempts to raise the defence of reasonable force. The majority resulted in convictions and the few that did not were more often than not due to things like it not being proven who abused the child – which is terribly sad for the child, but you can’t just convict anyone so that you can chalk up a conviction! Wrongly decided cases are a fact of life. Just like doctors making mistakes on the operating table, just like us making driving errors. We should try very hard to ensure that these do not happen but to remove a defence entirely and risk the prosecution of the innocent is not the answer. Besides, some of the cases cited in the media as being wrongly decided were not even cases where s59 was raised, other defences like self-defences were in play… shall we remove self-defence as defence?

    The contempt for due process does not stop here; statements like Idiot/Savants that, “The only people who oppose that are people who wish to abuse children in that way,” show that he is willing to accuse anyone of being a supporter of child abuse because they support the right of an accused to a fair trial.

    Chilling. Basically once accused of something heinous, one should not be allowed to defend oneself and anyone who disagrees is morally on par with a child abuser.

    There is another patently obvious flaw in Idiot/Savant’s argument; removing the defence doesn’t just prevent people who seriously abuse children from raising the defence it also prevents the wrongly accused from being able to raise it. However, without defences there is no way of separating the two. I am not speaking here of those who can stand up in court and honestly state ‘I did not touch my child,’ such accused could plead ‘not guilty,’ I am speaking of those who end up in court for smacking their children, not hitting them with soup ladles across the face; I am speaking of those who with an open hand, lightly, smack a child on the bottom once, not out of anger or in the midst of rage but in response to disobedience on the part of child. Such people cannot plead not guilty if accused of assault, they have no legal defence if they end up before a court. To remove legal defences from people innocent of child abuse to ensure that the net catches everyone is wrong.

    Hat Tip: HalfDone

    [1] William Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1760).

  • We’re Confused about the Anti-Smacking Referendum Question

    … we’re confused that anyone could find it confusing. The referendum question is:

    Should a smack as part of good parental correction be a criminal offence in New Zealand?

    Should it or shouldn’t it? It seems pretty simple to me.
    According to TVNZ,

    Labour leader Phil Goff says the question implies that if you vote ‘yes’ that you’re in favour of criminal sanctions being taken against reasonable parents, when actually nobody believes that. [Emphasis added]

    Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, the defence to the criminal charge of assault (“Every parent or person in place of a parent of a child is justified in using force by way of correction towards a child if that force is reasonable in the circumstances”) was part of our c r i m i n a l code. To reinstate s59 of the Crimes Act (or not) is the question.

    If Mr Goff wants anyone to believe that removing a defence from the Crimes Act will not have any bearing on criminal sanctions against those charged with assault he needs to stop being a legislator.

    Does making something a criminal offence mean that criminal sanctions should not be brought against those who commit the offence? If yes then it does not follow that giving a yes vote in the referendum means that you support criminal sanctions against those who smack their children. If the answer is no then it is already the case that criminal sanctions can be brought against offenders who smack their children because it is currently a criminal offence to do so – Goff’s claim that nobody advocates this is false because the Crimes Act does.

    The only people confused here are Goff, Key, Bradford who seem to not understand that if your action crosses the Crimes Act then your action is criminal. Twits.

    The only ambiguous, confusing thing about the law is the convoluted crap they inserted in place of s59. It reads like the sort of thing those who think they know a few things about the law write to impress their friends; read subsection (4) and see if you can work out what it means, it’s the bit that starts “to avoid doubt…” but then doesn’t (one wonders if Bradford wrote it herself, if someone with a law degree wrote it they should be up before the Bar).

    Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act 2007 No 18, Public Act

    New section 59 substituted
    Section 59 is repealed and the following section substituted:

    “59 Parental control
    “(1) Every parent of a child and every person in the place of a parent of the child is justified in using force if the force used is reasonable in the circumstances and is for the purpose of—

    “(a) preventing or minimising harm to the child or another person; or
    “(b) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in conduct that amounts to a criminal offence; or
    “(c) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in offensive or disruptive behaviour; or
    “(d) performing the normal daily tasks that are incidental to good care and parenting.

    “(2) Nothing in subsection (1) or in any rule of common law justifies the use of force for the purpose of correction.
    “(3) Subsection (2) prevails over subsection (1).
    “(4) To avoid doubt, it is affirmed that the Police have the discretion not to prosecute complaints against a parent of a child or person in the place of a parent of a child in relation to an offence involving the use of force against a child, where the offence is considered to be so inconsequential that there is no public interest in proceeding with a prosecution.”

  • Theology and Natural Sciences Conferences

    TANSA (Theology and Natural Sciences in Aotearoa) run conferences in Auckland. As Matt will be speaking, on “Does Evolution Make Belief in God Untenable? – An Examination of the Common Arguments,” at the TANSA August Churches Conference, Faithful Science? – Just How Well Do Science and Faith Get Along? I thought I would refer you to their events page so you can check out what other events they have coming up.
  • Blog Ranking Buttons

    Andy made some buttons for those blogs who make the various New Zealand blog rankings and he kindly sent me the code for each to share with you. Just copy the code for the button you want to display on your blog and past it wherever you want it.

    <a href="http://www.mandm.org.nz/2009/06/christian-blog-ranking-report-for-april.html"><img

    border="0" src="http://equipbiz.co.nz/hosted/nzc10.jpg"

    style="padding: 2px;" /></a>


    <a href="http://nzblogosphere.blogspot.com/2009/05/nz-blogosphere-rankings-april-2009.html"><img

    border="0" src="http://equipbiz.co.nz/hosted/nz10.jpg" style="padding:

    2px;" /></a>


    <a href="http://nzblogosphere.blogspot.com/2009/05/nz-blogosphere-rankings-april-2009.html"><img

    border="0" src="http://equipbiz.co.nz/hosted/nz100.jpg"

    style="padding: 2px;" /></a>


    There is also our button,

    <a href="http://www.mandm.org.nz/2009/06/christian-blog-ranking-report-for-april.html"><img style="PADDING-RIGHT: 2px; PADDING-LEFT: 2px; PADDING-BOTTOM: 2px; PADDING-TOP: 2px" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_0E68LtPk7D0/STS2MM1X9lI/AAAAAAAAAH8/yvzk8JNDwzc/S180/10sqmm.jpg" border="0" /></a>

  • Coming Soon

    The Sunday study for this week should be online tomorrow. I have written the draft and am just waiting on my editor and proof reader the beautiful and talented Madeleine Flannagan to go over it. Madeleine has an exam tomorrow and so has been extremely busy.

    I also plan to start blogging more regularly again once Madeleine’s exams are out of the way. I have multiple assignments to complete for my teaching diploma and have been employed by Laidlaw College for three weeks to teach a block course on the history of philosophy which has kept me very busy.

    Hope to return to normal soon, I have several posts already planned.

  • Defamation of the Acquitted – Some Advice

    Due to the presumption of innocence we are all supposed to accord an accused following a not guilty verdict, please do take care in suggesting and stating any disagreement you might have in regard to a court’s decision. Defamation is a real possibility in such instances and the defamed can sue the blog/site owner, in some instances the ISP, as well as the comment poster.

    Be aware that you can defame someone when you suggest or allude to your meaning as the court can imply both identity and meaning; if you have written it cryptically so people will get it without you saying it directly what makes you think that the court won’t?

    Stating it is your opinion is not a defence unless you can show your opinion is reasonably held and even then, unless you have the money to prove your defence in court it is wiser to not go there and to respect the presumption of innocence – you were not in that court room afterall. Don’t rely on a plaintiff’s broke status, that they won’t be able to afford to drag you into court; lawyers are far more willing to do pro-bono work when their client is legally famous.

    MandM do not moderate comments and allow anonymous contributors; however, as with spam, any comments posted on this blog that are defamatory will be deleted; legal defences for permitting publication of a defamatory viewpoint are much harder to succeed with. I suggest other bloggers watch their comments for this issue and be aware that even if you promptly delete it, you can still be sued even though you didn’t write it.

    From all of the above the so called “chilling effect” of defamation can be seen. Effectively what I am saying is that if you criticise the court’s finding or you claim the court got it wrong then effectively you are saying that the accused that the court ruled ‘not guilty’ is in fact guilty and you step into the realm of defamation law. Whilst I support the concept of reputation as property that one can defend at law, as reputation can directly affect the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness, I also support freedom of expression and the principle of openness and further, I strongly oppose a system that effectively renders the courts as infallible or unquestionable.

    Even though defences to defamation do exist that can, in some instances, support questioning of court and jury decisions, such as:

    • honest opinion – must be reasonably held,
    • truth – because defamation is a civil action in New Zealand, this will be held to the balance of probabilities, not reasonable doubt;
    These defences are expensive to mount, you could easily run up a legal bill of $20,000 plus and there is no guarantee you will succeed, most of us don’t have a spare 20k to throw at the things we say online so when confronted with the risk of having to we err on the side of caution and cede too much of our freedom of expression and our right to open trials; hence the chilling effect of defamation law.

    However, rather than do away with defamation law or deem reputation to not be a form of property – I think requiring people to think about not harming others before they open their mouths is not that unreasonable a limitation on freedom of expression – the problem could be solved by a revamp of how the law works. Either publicly fund access to justice so you can defend yourself when accused and protect your property when it is attacked – judges could keep a check on frivolous actions or make defamation a criminal offence, which would achieve the same thing.

  • David Bain 111 Call "I Shot the Prick" – Court Decisions Available Online UPDATED AGAIN

    Did David Bain tell the 111 operator “I shot the prick” on discovering the dead bodies of his family?

    This evidence was originally suppressed “until completion of the re-trial” as, per Wilson J,

    The probative value of the disputed sounds is very modest, but the risk of prejudice resulting from their introduction into the trial is very great. There is more than a minor imbalance; the scales come down firmly on the side of exclusion of the evidence. Even if the disputed sounds were admissible under s 7, they should plainly be excluded under s 8. [of the Evidence Act 2006]

    However, as the trial is now over, David Bain had sought to have the suppression continued “until further order of the Court.” Fairfax New Zealand Limited and Television New Zealand applied to set aside the suppression orders. In a judgement issued this afternoon David Bain lost his appeal to continue the suppression (see David Cullen Bain v The Queen [2009] NZSC 59 to read the three page judgement of the Supreme Court which explains why the suppression order remains lifted; effectively there was no clear and compelling reason to continue to offend the principle of openess and the right to free expression).

    Due to this decision the original suppression case has now been made public and was also released this afternoon. Now you can read David Cullen Bain v The Queen [2009] NZSC 16 and find out why the court decided on 6 March 2009 that the disputed evidence (the alleged “I shot the prick” part of the 111 call) would be excluded and that part of the call would be excised. (Full transcripts of the various interpretations of David Bain’s 111 call are included in the reported decision.)

    Extract from the decision of Supreme Court of New Zealand on the appeal to suppress the evidence, per Elias CJ and Blanchard J at paragraphs 3, 4 and 5:

    … The presence of the disputed admission was first found by Detective Ward, when he reviewed the recording, in preparation for the retrial, in July 2007. At that time he listened to the recording at a commercial sound studio in Dunedin. Mr Dempsey, the ambulance officer who took the call, had not heard the disputed words and did not suggest their inclusion in the transcript originally prepared in 1994. In October 2007 he was asked to recheck the recording after being told of the words which had been discovered. In listening to the recording with that knowledge, he heard the words “I shot the prick I shot” and was “stunned that I hadn’t heard the words previously”.

    Because of the discovery, the recording was sent for analysis to the United Kingdom to forensic consultants, expert in analysing recordings of speech. It was also analysed by experts for the defence. There is very little difference between the experts as to their findings. The opinions constitute evidence extrinsic to the recording itself upon which the decision to admit the recording was based.

    Although it is necessary to refer to the forensic opinions at some length later in these reasons, they may be briefly summarised for present purposes. None of the experts is able to say that the sounds relied upon in the recording are words, rather than meaningless exhalation of breath. If they are words, none of the experts is able to say that they amount to the words the Crown wishes to rely upon as evidence. Some consider such words can be heard in the recording, with effort. But all experts caution as to the dangers of hearing something that may not in fact be there, because of accident in arrangements of sounds. …

    After examining further evidence in detail their honours start to hone their thinking, at para 54,

    Three reasons weighed principally with the Court of Appeal in concluding that the evidence of the disputed words on the recording should be admitted. They were the fact that the “hypothesis” was “open” on the expert evidence; the fact that the appellant spoke on an exhaled breath without vibration of the vocal folds when giving his telephone number; and the “contextual sense” of the sentence, which left it open to the jury to decline to accept that the sounds had been made by random movements of the tongue and lips in an exhaled breath. …

    Then they conclude at para 67,

    … The prejudicial effect on the proceeding could be profound. The jury would, as Mr Raftery acknowledged, be entitled to find the accused guilty simply on the basis of an inculpatory statement unable to be proved to the satisfaction of experts or, in their estimation, of lay people. …

    Finally at para 68,

    … For these reasons, we consider that the disputed sounds are not admissible. The risks of jury speculation as to the content of the sounds, and the risk of the contentions put forward being available to them, make it necessary to excise the portion of the recording.

    JJ McGrath, Wilson and Gault’s judgments are shorter and add slightly different angles, all of them agreeing with Elias CJ and Blanchard J, that jurors may not be able to make the necessary complex and extremely important distinctions and that they should not be given the chance to get it wrong.

    Notably none of the justices appear to give any consideration to section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 as they are required to,

    Freedom of Expression – Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form.

    All suppression orders offend the right to expression; the disputed tape was information, the evidence of expert witnesses were opinions, the Act does not limit what kind or form this expression comes in and the suppression order meant that we, the public, were unable to receive this order. Suppression orders offend both expression and the principle of openness which is grounded to the right to a fair trial also in the Bill of Rights.

    As such, the interests of justice must be weighed against the right to expression “and only where the Court’s capacity to ensure justice is significantly imperilled will the right of citizens and the media to seek, receive and impart information be curtailed.” (Thomas J in Police v O’Connor [1992] 1 NZLR 87, 99) In deciding to grant a suppression order the court must take into consideration the effect of doing so on freedom of expression, alongside its affronts to the principle of openness, and engage in the weighing Thomas J referred to – especially when the court is the highest court in the land, cannot be appealed from and is overturning a lower court’s decision. I cannot find where they considered it, let’s hope they thought about it even though they appear to not have recorded doing so.

    The fact that the previous courts had not allowed the appeal and the Supreme Court did, will undoubtedly open up the arguments around the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council. If you want to see the judgements and compare the reasoning of the lower courts that originally allowed the appeal – you’ll want to start with The Queen v David Cullen Bain [2009] NZCA 1 and work your way back from the Court of Appeal to the High Court [the direct link to the pdf of this case won’t work so go here and click on the ’30 January 2009′ decision entitled “CA 571/2008 (PDF)”].

    Personally I tend to lean towards the Court of Appeal’s thinking on this one, that while the nuances are complex and very important to grasp, managing this evidence would not have been impossible; starting at paragraph 256,

    … As to prejudice, the primary risk is that the jury may wrongly construe the disputed sounds as an inculpatory sentence – in other words, may simply get the facts wrong. But risks of this sort – that the trier of fact may get the facts wrong – are an inescapable part of the trial process and do not in themselves usually represent the sort of prejudicial effect which warrants evidence exclusion. It is, of course, the responsibility of the judge to guard against obvious risk (and particularly one that will be more apparent to a professional judge than lay jurors) of misunderstanding. In this case, there is an obvious risk, namely suggestibility, which must be addressed. But providing this happens, we see no reason why the evidence should not be admitted.

    As the Judge noted, it is well settled that the interpretation of an item of real evidence, such as a tape-recording, is a jury question: see for example R v Wickramasinghe (1992) 8 CRNZ 478 at 481 (CA) and R v Taylor [1993] 1 NZLR 647 at 650 – 651 (CA). The Judge took the view, with which we agree, that a transcript is not required, given the short length of the conversation (about a minute).

    We think it would be best if the jury first heard the tape without being primed, except perhaps with a request that they listen to it carefully and possibly advice (as recommended by Professor French) that they will hear some speech produced on breath. If they initially do not hear the disputed sounds as an inculpatory sentence (which we think is likely given past history [no one noticed this sentence during the first case]) but, once primed, subsequently do hear the disputed sounds in this way, this should provide a graphic indication of the power of suggestion.

    The Judge concluded that after the tape has been played to the jury “unprimed”, expert evidence should be received concerning the interpretation of the disputed sounds. We agree.

    We have no doubt that in his summing up the Judge will warn the jury of the dangers of suggestibility. …

    I have no doubt that any Judge would have taken this care and I doubt that any jury wouldn’t take their duty and their role seriously given the seriousness of the task they were faced with. I find the tone of the Supreme Court somewhat patronising and agree with the Court of Apeal at paragraph 261,

    … it would be quite extraordinary for this Court (or the Judge) to deny the jury the opportunity to listen in full to what the Crown can credibly claim is a recording of the account given by the appellant, within 25 minutes or so of the completion of his paper round, of what he found when he returned to the house.

    Extraordinary is one way of putting it.

    RELATED POST:
    How to Find the Reported Judicial Decision on the David Bain Re-Trial