Author: Matt

  • Contra Mundum: Slavery and the Old Testament

    “Why didn’t the Christian God ever explicitly and clearly condemn slavery?” This was John Loftus’ question in his book, Why I Became an Atheist: A Former Preacher Rejects Christianity. He posed it after sharing the following chilling account of slavery as practiced in the antebellum American south,

    He took her into the kitchen, and stripped her from neck to waist. He made her get upon the stool, and he tied her hands to a hook in the joist. After rolling up his sleeves, he commenced to lay on the heavy cow skin, and soon the warm, red blood came dripping to the floor … No words, no tears, no prayers, from his gory victim, seemed to move his iron heart from its bloody purpose. The louder she screamed, the harder he whipped; and where the blood ran fastest, there he whipped longest. He would whip her to make her scream, and whip her to make her hush; and not until overcome by fatigue, would he cease to swing the blood clotted cowskin.

    Loftus is not alone, it is often affirmed as an incontestable and obvious truth that the Bible supports slavery. Atheist philosopher Walter Armstrong substantiated this accusation with a citation from the book of Leviticus, “as for your male and female slaves whom you may have: you may buy male and female slaves from among the nations around you” (Lev 25:44 ESV).

    The ESV here uses the English word ‘slave’ to translate the Hebrew word ebed. The problem is that it is not at all clear that these two terms are analogous. In 1690 philosopher John Locke argued that an examination of the Old Testament’s references to an ebed shows that it is not the equivalent what we think of when we hear the term ‘slave.’ Locke is only one of many scholars who have come to the same conclusion.

    The Oxford Dictionary defines a slave as a “person who is the legal property of another or others and is bound to absolute obedience, human chattel.” Rodney Stark utilises a similar definition, “A slave is a human being who, in the eyes of the law and custom, is the possession, or chattel, of another human being or of a small group of human beings. Ownership of slaves entails absolute control, including the right to punish (often including the right to kill), to direct behavior, and to transfer ownership.” Timothy Keller astutely observes that the English term ‘slave’ carries connotations of new-world slavery as it was practiced in the British Empire and made infamous in the antebellum southern states of the US.

    In the British Empire and in many US states, slavery was governed under the Code of Barbados. This code was explicitly racist and described Africans as “heathenish, brutish, and an uncertaine, dangerous kinde of people.” It allowed owners to use, “unlimited force to compel labor without penalty even if this resulted in maiming or death.” It denied slaves due process rights and permitted owners to, in effect, kill their slave for any cause. It forbade slaves from marrying. It effectively prevented owners from setting their slaves free. Keller writes that, “The African slave trade was begun and resourced through kidnapping.” Stark notes that “20 to 40 percent of slaves died while being transported to the coast, another 3-10 percent died while waiting on the coast, and about 12 to 16 percent boarded on ships died during the voyage.”

    However, what the Old Testament refers to differs from slavery, so understood, in several important respects.

    First, an ebed was not acquired by kidnapping. Kidnapping a human being and selling that person as a slave was a capital offence in the Old Testament (Ex 21:16). Moreover, slave trading is implicitly condemned in the book of Revelation (Rev 18:13) and explicitly condemned by Paul as contrary to the law and sound doctrine (1 Tim 1:9-10).

    In the Old Testament an ebed was usually person who offered to work for another, free of charge, in exchange for a debt being cancelled. It resembled a form of indentured servitude.

    Second, the institution was not based on notions that ebed were of an inferior race. In fact, the opposite is affirmed. In the book of Job we read,

    If I have rejected the cause of my male or female slaves [Hebrew: ebed amah] when they brought a complaint against me; what then shall I do when God rises up? When he makes inquiry, what shall I answer him? Did not he who made me in the womb make them? And did not one fashion us in the womb? (Job 31:13-15)

    Here Job refers to an ebed as having a right to go to court and sue his or her “owner” in pursuit of his or her rights. Job bases this on the idea that both he and his ebed are equal, both are created by God.

    Third, as Locke noted, an ebed was not the property of another and could not be disposed of. To deliberately kill an ebed was a capital offence (Ex 21:20-21). Similarly, it was illegal to strike an ebed (Ex 21:26-27).

    However, some dispute this latter point on the basis of Exodus 21:20-21,

    If a man beats his male or female slave with a rod and the slave dies as a direct result, he must be punished, but he is not to be punished if the slave gets up after a day or two, since the slave is his property.

    Some interpret this passage to mean that because a “slave” is the property of another they can severely beat the slave and providing the beating is not fatal, there is no legal punishment. However, this fails to deal adequately with the context and the Hebrew text, the word translated as ‘property’ here is actually ‘silver’ (a reference to money) and the word translated ‘punishment’ here is not the usual word for punishment.

    Old Testament scholar Christopher Wright notes that the word implies “the shedding of the blood of the master of the slave” and so refers to capital punishment. It is used in direct contrast with the same word in the previous verse where it is stated that deliberately killing an ebed is to be avenged. Therefore, it does not say the person will not be punished for beating a slave, it says he will not be executed for it unless he kills the slave. For further evidence that the passage is not a license to beat, a couple of verses later even causing a minor injury on an ebed, such as a bruise, is explicitly condemned. The same contrast occurs in the passage immediately preceding where a free man who struck and killed another was to be “held responsible” but not if the person survived. It is clear, however, that the person was in fact to be legally punished as v 19 states he had to compensate his victim for the injury. Hence, in context the ‘held responsible’ is referring only to being held responsible for murder and is not speaking to the lesser charges of assault. What Ex 21:20-21 says then, is that if a person deliberately kills his or her ebed then that person is to be held responsible for murder and executed. If the slave “gets up after a day or two,” then the person is not to be held responsible for murder because the ebed is his or her “silver.”

    This makes sense as a few verses later, in Ex 21:26-27, striking a slave is explicitly prohibited and the legal punishment is for the ebed to go free. In The Old Testament, the penalty for assault was for the assailant to provide monetary compensation to the victim. This would create a quandary in this case as an ebed is in a position of servitude because he or she is in debt to the person he or she works for. In such a case the assailant would owe money to a person who owes him or her money. The Old Testament resolves the issue by declaring that even a trivial strike, such as causing a bruise (v21:25) should result in an immediate cancelation of the ebed’s entire debt, which would often result in a financial loss to the assailant. The New Testament similarly concurs, prohibiting “masters’ from even threatening their “slaves” (Eph 6:9) and to treat their “slaves” the way the “slave” is required to treat them.

    Further, unlike new-world slavery which was life long and where, under the Barbados Code, emancipation was effectively prohibited, an ebed could not be held in service for more than six years (Ex 21:2). Upon release, their employer was morally required to give them sufficient resources for them to be set up on their own feet (Deut 15:12-18) and the community left resources for them to live on for a year (Ex 23:10-11, Lev 25:2-7).

    These passages are often thought to refer only to Hebrew and hence Jewish slaves. Wright, however, argues that that in its original context the key word ibri designated a social class, not an ethnic group. This was the class of people who did not own land and in an agrarian economy survived by hiring themselves out to land owners.

    In fact, in the passage immediately before the verse Armstrong cites the Old Testament forbids any Israelite taking another Israelite as a ebed on the grounds that they are a “ebed of God” whom God has redeemed. Paul applies the same teaching to Christians prohibiting Christians from being sold as ‘slaves’ (1 Cor 7:23). Similarly, the Old Testament commanded people to prevent family members from becoming an ebed by paying their debts for them (Lev 25:48). Further, Paul, after writing to the Corinthians and encouraging them to “retain the place in life that the Lord assigned,” encourages slaves to purchase their freedom and to not remain in this position if it was possible to do so (1 Cor 7:21-22).

    Finally, if an ebed fled from an oppressive employer it was illegal to return him or her to “his master.” Instead, he or she was to live “wherever he likes and in whatever town he chooses” (Deut 23:15-16). It was forbidden to send an ebed back to his or her owner; contrast this with the practice in the antebellum south, the Fugitive Slave Act 1850 required the return of run-away slaves at penalty of law.

    Contrary to what some contend, the Old Testament does not permit slavery. It is more accurate to say it tolerates indentured servitude under certain situations; the paradigm being where the servitude is voluntary, temporary, is done in exchange for payment of a debt where the alternative is starvation and destitution and only in situations where the servant is given the same basic legal rights as everyone else and is protected from abusive treatment. To suggest this picture fits with the opening quote above is a stretch to say the least.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the April 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

    RELATED POSTS:
    Contra Mundum: Secular Smoke Screens and Plato’s Euthyphro

    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic
    Contra Mundum: The Judgmental Jesus

  • Happy Birthday Madeleine

    Today is Madeleine’s 37th birthday.  I write this to say to Madeleine, from myself and the kids, that we love you, we are proud of you and we hope you have a great day.

    Matt

  • Contra Mundum: Secular Smoke Screens and Plato’s Euthyphro

    In “Religion: A Barrier to Clear Thinking,” the final article in the award winning series of lay philosophy articles published in the Christchurch Press, Canterbury based Philosopher Simon Clarke addressed the question, “what is the biggest obstacle to thinking clearly about social and political issues?” Predictably he answered “Several answers suggested themselves but time and again I came back to the same thing: religion.” Clarke explained that “the fallacy of grounding morality upon religion was pointed out by Plato over two thousand years ago.” [1]

    Clarke was appealing to a famous argument that purports to show that ethics (what is right and wrong) is independent of religion. This argument is known by professional ethicists as “The Euthyphro Dilemma” or “Plato’s Euthyphro” and is named after a dialogue Plato wrote. The current version used against mono-theistic religions, such as Christianity, Islam and Judaism, is an adaptation (the original applied to poly-theistic religions, those religions that believe in many gods).

    The argument is usually framed in terms of a rhetorical question ‘are actions wrong because God prohibits them or does God prohibit them because they are wrong?’ As the question is framed, there are only two possible answers a person can offer.

    The first is to contend that actions are wrong because God prohibits them. This answer is said to suffer a debilitating problem, it makes morality arbitrary – anything at all could be deemed ‘right’ as long as God commanded it. Philosopher Michael Tooley has suggested this, “if God had commanded mankind to torture one another as much as possible, then it would follow that that action was obligatory. … many people, including many religious thinkers, are very unhappy with that consequence.” Therefore, the critics conclude, actions are not wrong just because God issues commands against them.

    The failure of the first answer means that the only possible way out is to claim that God prohibits actions because they are wrong; they are not wrong just because he prohibits them. This answer does not have the problems of the former. However, as Clarke points out, it entails that “there are independent standards for what we should do, independent that is of the dictates of religion.” Actions are wrong before God prohibits them. His commands simply tell us what is already wrong, quite independently of what he prohibits.

    This argument is something of a cliché in contemporary secular ethics and is found in almost every secular text book I have read (and will undoubtedly make its way into the Ethics section of the new NCEA Philosophy course). Typically “religious ethics” is mentioned and then dismissed with a short rendition of Plato’s Euthyphro. When I studied Philosophy Plato’s Euthyphro was one of the first things I was taught in first year Ethics. The lecturer spelled out the argument, contended that it showed “religious ethics” was mistaken/confused/ muddle-headed/whatever and from there would went on with the serious business of offering secular perspectives on topics such as abortion, affirmative action, euthanasia, homosexual rights and so on.

    Philosopher Peter Geach noted “In modern ethical treatises we find hardly any mention of God; and the idea that if there really is a God, his commandments might be morally relevant is wont to be dismissed by a short and simple argument that is generally regarded as irrefutable.” The short, simple argument he mentioned was, of course, Plato’s Euthyphro.

    Given this backdrop it is perhaps not so surprising that Clarke, after mentioning Plato’s argument, stated “… Plato’s pretty convincing demonstration has been ignored by the vast majority of people in the intervening millennia. Why are appeals to religion so common?”

    Despite the popularity of making claims like this, I still find them somewhat puzzling. Perhaps secular ethicists assume that theological ethicists have never read Plato or that, if they have, they have ignored him. In fact, the opposite is true. The last 40 years, in fact, has seen sustained defences of theological ethics including thorough refutations of Plato’s Euthyphro. These have been published in the philosophical literature at the highest levels – off the top of my head I can rattle off over 22 different articles and monographs which have offered rebuttals to Plato’s Euthyphro – yet secular ethicists and many textbooks blithely continue as though these answers had never been offered.

    I maintain that there is an answer to the Euthyphro dilemma, one that many have pointed out; it is to adopt the first of the answers I mentioned above, to contend that an action is wrong because God prohibits it. Contrary to popular claims, this option can succeed. The objections raised against it are not as debilitating as they are made out to be.

    The primary objection is that morality is made arbitrary; anything at all could be deemed ‘right’ as long as God commanded it – even atrocious commands. What is important to note here is that the objector assumes that it is possible that God could command atrocious things like ‘torturing people as much as possible.’ This assumption, however, seems very dubious. We need to remember that we are not taking about right or wrong as being based on the commands of just anyone, we are talking about these things being based on the commands of God. In the mono-theistic tradition that this line of argument seeks to criticise, God is typically defined as a being who is all knowing, all powerful, and is morally perfect.

    So, as the terms are defined, the claim that it is possible for God to command people to “torture one another as much as possible” is true only if it is possible for a morally perfect person to command such an atrocious thing. But this is unlikely. The very reason critics cite examples such as “torturing others as much as possible,” is because these actions are paradigms of conduct that no morally good person could ever entertain or endorse. The situation the critic envisages then is a situation which is impossible.

    Of course the critic could contend that he or she does not accept the existence of a being who is all knowing, all powerful, and is morally perfect. However, because those the critic is criticising do believe in such a being and also if the dismissal of theological ethics is to be based on an accurate understanding of what the various theological traditions actually believe and teach, and is not based on a caricature, then the sceptic must address what these traditions actually affirm.

    This answer typically generates a rejoinder. If some action is right or wrong because God permits or prohibits it then God cannot be said to be good in any meaningful sense. This answer renders the claim ‘God is good’ into no more than the claim that God obeys his own commands, if this is so, can God be said to have any duties at all?

    Philosopher William Lane Craig argues that “[duties] are not independent of God nor, plausibly, is God bound by moral duties, since He does not issue commands to Himself.” William Alston drew the same conclusion, “we can hardly suppose that God is obliged to love his creatures because he commands himself to do so!” William Wainwright suggests “the notion of commanding oneself to do something … is incoherent.”

    The rejoinder that, if God has no duties then he cannot be said to be good in any meaningful sense, has a grain of truth to it. If we are going to understand God’s goodness in terms of God having duties or obligations that he consistently fulfils then theological ethics, of the sort envisaged, has problems. However, it is not clear to me why the phrase ‘God is good’ should be explicated in terms of God having duties that He follows.

    Many theologians have suggested that one should not understand God’s goodness in this way. When God’s goodness is explicated in sacred texts like the Psalms or in official creedal statements such as the Westminster Confession of Faith it is often explicated in terms of God having certain character traits. To claim God is good is to claim that He is truthful, benevolent, loving, gracious, merciful, that He is opposed to certain actions such as adultery, murder and rape and so on. Now, even if God does not have duties, it does not follow that he cannot have character traits such as these. It is true that God may not be under any obligation to love others or to tell the truth or what have you, but that does not mean that He cannot love others or tell the truth. God does not have to have a duty to do something in order to do it.

    So there seems, on the face of it, nothing incoherent about contending that God is good, that he has certain attributes like being truthful, benevolent, loving and so on. It is not that theological ethicists have never read Plato or that they have ignored him – they have read him, found his arguments wanting and published responses explaining why – it is that some sceptics have never read the responses or they have chosen to ignore them.

    Perhaps these rebuttals do not work (though I think that they do) but even if I am wrong the onus is surely on the sceptic to demonstrate why. Simply ignoring them, misrepresenting the situation and then dismissing religion “as a barrier to clear thinking” is simply not good enough.


    [1] Clarke’s series “Clear Thinking” was awarded the Australasian Association of Philosophy Media prize in 2006.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the March 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

    RELATED POSTS:
    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic
    Contra Mundum: The Judgmental Jesus

  • Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part II

    Recently Peter Cresswell published a guest post by James Valliant, which originally appeared on SOLO. In Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part I, I addressed Valliant’s claims that science and freedom of religion were unanimously opposed by Christians and the success of science and freedom of religion in Europe was solely due to the influence of pagan ideas which the church sought to suppress. Then in The Theological Foundations of the Enlightenment Philosophers, I further documented how Enlightenment defences of freedom of religion were grounded in earlier theological writings. Here I will continue my critique of Valliant’s article.

    3. Valliant contends that it is absurd to suggest that “the US declaration of independence is based on Judeo-Christian ideas.” His reasons, however, are once again based on ignorance of Christian intellectual history.

    First he ridicules the idea of Christian influence, “We are asked to believe that it took a mere 1,776 years of reading that darned Bible before any of those great and learned Christian scholars figured out its true political implications!” Valliant seems blissfully unaware that many ideas expressed in the declaration were expressed by Christian writers sometimes hundreds of years prior to 1776.

    The claim that there is a creator and that this is self-evident, are ideas that go back centuries in Christian theology. Moreover, the contention that people are created equal is found in the book of Job and would not have been contested by many medieval or patristic theologians.  Mark Murphy has noted that the idea of ‘consent of the governed’ was also accepted in political thought of the Middle Ages.[1] In fact, a form of ‘consent of the governed’ was actually a key feature of feudalism; under this system the monarch was elected or chosen by the land owners and could be deposed by the land owners.[2] Nicholas Wolterstorff has documented that the notion of natural rights had its origins in medieval canon law and theological reflections of the middle ages.[3] Many of the ideas expressed in the declaration were defended centuries earlier by Calvinist tracts such as Lex Rex and Vindicae Contra Tyrannos. In fact, medieval theologians criticised absolute monarchy, debated the question of just revolutions and so on resulting in the birth of the Magna Carta.

    The declaration simply repeats the argument for liberty, put forward by John Locke in his Two Treatise of Civil Government. Locke’s argument occurred in the context of an exegetical debate with Robert Filmer about whether or not the bible supported absolute monarchy. Locke’s main argument was that because human beings are created by God, they have an inalienable right to life and liberty and so could not licitly sell themselves or give another person arbitrary or total power over them. In making this argument, Locke actually appropriated an ancient rabbinical argument against slavery which was alluded to by the Apostle Paul (1 Cor 7:23) and is implicit in the Torah (Lev 25: 42). Paul’s appropriation of this argument was the basis for the Christian abolition of slavery in the early Middle Ages. Valliant’s ignorance about what Christians did not support or write about prior to 1776 does not mean that these texts do not exist.

    Valliant continues with the claim that Paul told Christians “to just ‘obey’ the governmental ‘authorities’ placed over us, because God has appointed them, by St. Paul himself, who likely wrote during the reign of the monster Nero.” This again is a caricature, as I have pointed out elsewhere, the context (which Valliant ignores) qualifies Paul’s command. Moreover, the passage Valliant cites was written during the early part of Nero’s reign when Nero was strongly influenced by Seneca the Younger and Barrus and his rule was widely considered to be competent and relatively enlightened. When Nero later degenerated into a monster the scripture, rather scathingly, describes Nero as a satanic beast whom Christians are required to resist – not obey!

    Valliant also seems blithely unaware of the fact that Paul wrote as a prisoner of Rome and was himself executed by Nero for refusing to pay homage to Nero (as were many other Christians). His picture then of Paul as a proponent of advocating unqualified obedience to Nero is simply inaccurate.

    4. Valliant similarly quotes Paul’s admonition to slaves to obey their masters in contrast to the US Framers who “thought slavery was evil, too, and it was this belief that provided the basis (e.g., see the Gettysburg Address) for later abolishing it” as evidence that abolitionist ideas originate from ancient Greek/Aristotelian thought and not Christian theology. Apart from the fact that Jefferson was himself a slave owner, Valliant’s understanding is extremely selective.

    First, opposition to slavery in various forms has a long history in Christian thought and practice. It predates the American Founding by hundreds, maybe, thousands of years. Early Christians advocated emancipating slaves, a practice exhorted by several leading theologians and early church councils.  W.E.H. Lecky contends that early Christian saints such as Melania, Ovidius, Chromatius, and Hermes, between them liberated almost 20,000 slaves.[4] Later, in 315, Constantine made it a capital offence to steal a child and bring it up as a slave. Justinian, in the 6th century, abolished earlier roman laws prohibiting the freeing of slaves. Similarly St Bathilde, a runaway slave who became the wife of King Clovis II in the 9th century, campaigned against the slave trade as did other notables, St Patrick in the 5th century, St Anskar in the 9th century and St Wulfstan, St Anselm in the 11th century. Rodney Stark notes that Christian opposition to slavery in the lead to its effective abolition within in Europe during the Middle Ages. Stark goes on to document that Pope Eugene IV (1431-1447), Pope Pius II (1458-1464), Pope Sixtus IV (1471-1484), Pope Paul III (1534-1549), Pope Urban VIII (1623-1644) issued papal bulls against slavery. In addition, the Roman Inquisition condemned slavery on 20 March 1686.

    All of the above occurred hundreds of years prior to the US Founding Fathers.[5] In fact, evangelical Christians, such as William Wilberforce, had brought about the abolition of slavery peacefully in the British several decades before the US fought a civil war over it. Moreover, Stark’s analysis shows that the earliest abolitionist tracts within the US were whttp://www.mandm.org.nz/wp-admin/post-new.phpritten by Puritans – actually by one of the judges at the Salem witch trials. The abolitionist movements in the US were overwhelmingly religious in orientation.[6] The suggestion then that opposition to slavery was without Christian precedent and was a novel idea proposed by the revival of pre-Christian ideas in the Enlightenment is implausible. The issue of slavery is a particularly bad example to substantiate Valliant’s thesis given that in the pre-Christian pagan world slavery was widely practiced and accepted. In fact Aristotle, Valliant’s pre-Christian Greek hero, famously defended slavery (in three chapters no less) contending the enslavement of other races was natural.[7]

    Valliant’s reading of scripture is also questionable. While it is true that Paul exhorted slaves to obey their masters, this by itself does not entail support for slavery anymore than my paying my taxes constitutes my agreement with taxation laws. Moreover, Valliant ignores the numerous other things both the scriptures and Paul stated about slavery, which contradict and condemn the practice of slavery that existed in America. In fact, the enlightenment philosopher who most influenced the US, John Locke, appealed to these very texts both explicitly and implicitly, to condemn slavery. Once again, Valliant ignores crucial facts of Christian intellectual history to come to his stereotypical conclusions.


    [1] Mark Murphy “Natural Law, Consent, and Political Obligation” Social Philosophy & Policy 18 (2001) 70-92.
    [2]
    Regine Pernoud,  Those Terrible Middle Ages : Debunking the Myths (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,  2000) 128-129.
    [3] Nicolas Wolterstorff  Justice Rights and Wrongs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
    [4] W.E.H. Lecky History of European Morals: From Augustus to Charlemagne (New York: D. Appleton, 1921) 2:69.
    [5]
    Rodney Stark For the Glory of God: How Monotheism led to Reformations, Science, Witch-hunts and the end of Slavery (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
    [6] Ibid.
    [7] Aristotle The Politics Bk I iii, iv, v.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part I
    The Theological Foundations of the Enlightenment Philosophers
    The Theology of the Declaration of Independence
    The “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda
    Guest Post: James Hannam on Dan Brown’s History of Science
    Slavery, John Locke and the Bible
    666 The Number of the Beast
    R 13: Romans, Revelations and the Role of the State

  • The Theological Foundations of the Enlightenment Philosophers

    In my previous post, Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part I, I criticised a recent post by James Valliant. I plan to put Part II of this critique online later this week (after Madeleine is clear of her exam on Tuesday to edit it). Here, I simply want to pick up on and further substantiate a point I made in Part I.

    On the SOLO discussion board, where Valliant’s article was originally posted and where I have posted some of my Part I response, Lindsay Perigo has dismissed my claims (notably without citing a single source) as “revisionist history.” I doubt very much anything I say will dissuade Perigo but for those like him, who react to this questioning of popular mythology with disbelief and scepticism, I ask them to compare the following enlightenment arguments for freedom of religion with some earlier patristic ones.

    Originally, Valliant argued,

    No, it was the horrible institution of Christian persecution, century after century, which inspired sensitive minds to first consider the idea of freedom of conscience, and, again, only with a good deal of philosophical help from those ancient, pagan sources, from Aristotle to Cicero — and from natural law to the experience of the Spartacus slave rebellion…. These are not to be found in the Bible, either. And, if they had been there, in any way, then why was this never noticed by the Councils, saints and theologians who piously taught what they thought was good Biblical policy, century after century after century?

    In response, I argued that, in fact, the defences of religious tolerance, proposed by enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke, Pierre Bayle and James Madison were often repetitions of the arguments offered by early Christian theologians such as Lactantius and Tertullian. Further, these pro-freedom of conscience arguments had been known to and given by Christian theologians for over a thousand years.

    These facts suggest it is mistaken to say that the idea of freedom of conscience was “first considered” after hundreds of years of Christian persecution and was developed from Pagan, as opposed to earlier Christian, sources.

    Turning to the enlightenment philosophers, let’s begin with James Madison,

    That religion or the duty we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, being under the direction of reason and conviction only, not violence or compulsion, all men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of it accord[in]g to the dictates of conscience; and therefore that no man or class of men ought, on account of religion to be invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges, nor subjected to any penalties or disabilities.[1]

    Madison argues that true worship is based on conviction and therefore has to be voluntary; it is incompatible with coercion. His argument is not new, several Enlightenment defenders of freedom of religion made the same point. Below are two prominent examples. The first is John Locke,

    The care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force: but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force. Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any such efficacy as to make men change the inward judgment that they have framed of things.[2]

    The second is Pierre Bayle,

    It is evident then that the only legitimate way of inspiring religion is by producing in the soul certain judgments and certain movements of the will in relation to God. Now since threats, prisons, fines, exile, beatings, torture, and generally whatever is comprehended under the literal signification of compelling, are incapable of forming in the soul those judgments of the will in respect to God which constitute the essence of religion, it is evident that this is a mistaken way of establishing a religion and, consequently, that Jesus Christ has not commanded it.[3]

    Now compare these arguments with the following three examples from prominent, pre-Enlightenment, Christian Theologians.

    First, Aquinas, a 13th century theologian, discussed whether one should tolerate non-believers. In his discussion he summarised the following argument for an affirmative answer, which he attributed Augustine of Hippo, another theologian, who lived in the 5th century,

    Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that “it is possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot believe unless he is willing.” Therefore it seems that unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.[4]

    Second, Lactantius, a 4th century theologian,

    I should wish to know, when they compel men to sacrifice against their will, what reasoning they have with themselves, or to whom they make that offering. If it is made to the gods, that is not worship, nor an acceptable sacrifice, which is made by those who are displeasing to them, which is extorted by injury, which is enforced by pain….These things may indeed be said with justice. But who will hear, when men of furious and unbridled spirit think that their authority is diminished if there is any freedom in the affairs of men? But it is religion alone in which freedom has placed its dwelling. For it is a matter which is voluntary above all others, nor can necessity be imposed upon any, so as to worship that which he does not wish to worship. Some one may perhaps pretend, he cannot wish it. In short, some, through fear of torments, or overcome by tortures, have assented to detestable sacrifices: they never do that voluntarily which they did from necessity;[5]

    And finally Tertullian a 2nd century theologian

    It is a fundamental human right, a privilege of nature, that every man should worship according to his own convictions: one man’s religion neither harms nor helps another man. It is assuredly no part of religion to compel religion— to which free-will and not force should lead us— the sacrificial victims even being required of a willing mind. You will render no real service to your gods by compelling us to sacrifice. For they can have no desire of offerings from the unwilling.[6]

    Comparing these texts, it is, I think, fairly evident that Madison, Locke and Bayle repeated the same line of argument one finds in Aquinas (Augustine), Lactantius and Tertullian. Their arguments had been formulated and known and accepted for over a thousand years before the Enlightenment.

    So Randians remain free to make claims that no Christian thinkers supported freedom of religion until after the Enlightenment and that the Enlightenment thinkers did not get their ideas from Christian thinkers if they wish but supported examples, like the above, show that this is mistaken. This is not revisionist history (at least, not on my part). I would simply call it checking sources and comparing them.


    [1] James Madison Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments.
    [2] John Locke A Letter Concerning Toleration.
    [3] Pierre Bayle Pierre Bayle’s Philosophical Commentary trans AG Tannenbaum (New York: Peter Lang, 1686) 31.
    [4] Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologicae II II q. 8, obj 3.
    [5] Lactantius Epitome of the Divine Institutes 53, 54.
    [6] Tertullian To Scapula Ch 2.

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