Author: Matt

  • Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part I

    Recently Peter Cresswell published a guest post by James Valliant, which originally appeared on SOLO. The following series is a critique of this piece.

    Valliant’s basic thesis is that,

    Both science and freedom came about among European Christians despite the best efforts of pious Christians to prevent their development, and only on a foundation of pagan, pre-Christian ideas, and with conservative Christians fighting each and every step of the way.

    Like other Randian’s he erroneously thinks of Aristotle’s philosophy as a paradigm of the pagan ideas in question. Valliant’s post contains numerous errors. His uncritical acceptance of literal reading of Genocide passages, his claim that the Bible teaches sex is bad, his assertion that it teaches people will be tortured forever for not believing in Christ and numerous other things means there are far to many errors for me to address in a short post and this one is long enough as it is! Here I will focus on those errors most relevant to his main thesis. [I have inserted hyperlinks on the less relevant errors where I have previously blogged on the issue – also see the related posts at the end.]

    1. Valliant appears to accept the now discredited conflict thesis. He states that the Church “imprisoned scientists” for challenging its authority and that that “Western science only got going again following the rediscovery of pre-Christian Greek ideas, starting with Aristotle’s.” Valliant cites Copernicus as an example, claiming that he “got his ideas about the earth and the sun from an ancient, pagan source, one that he suppressed upon publication.” This is all questionable at best, as James Hannam’s recent study shows, “During the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church actively supported a great deal of science.” Hannam goes on to document that, contrary to popular belief, the Church, “never supported the idea that the earth was flat, never banned human dissection, never banned zero and certainly never burnt anyone at the stake for scientific ideas.” The one exception to this, he notes, is the case of Galileo in the 17th century, who was placed under house arrest for teaching Copernican cosmology as true (as opposed to a hypothesis).[1] The Catholic Church’s opposition to Copernicus, of course, is the sole case Valliant alludes to but a single case does not substantiate a trend.

    Valliant’s allusion to the views of Copernicus is similarly questionable. Copernicus’ heliocentric cosmology constituted a rejection of the standard Aristotelian cosmology accepted by the ancient Greeks. Stillman Drake notes that Galileo’s strongest opponents were supporters of Aristotle and it was more his calling into question Aristotle and the pressure by Aristotelians to silence him, that lead to his condemnation from the church than merely interpreting a psalm figuratively.[2] Nor is it correct to suggest that Copernicus got his “ideas about the earth” from suppressed Greek scientists. In fact, the thesis that the earth moves had already been suggested by 14th century theologians   Jean Buridan and Nicole d’Oresme and had been openly discussed in medieval universities for centuries prior to Copernicus. Edward Grant notes the positions of Buridan and d’Oresme were based in part on Theological condemnations of Aristotelian Philosophy that had occurred in the 13 century.[3] The Copernican position then was already being debated openly in theological circles before Copernicus and was a repudiation of Greek cosmology motivated, in part, by theological concerns about God’s sovereignty.

    2. Valliant makes the historical claim that “The burning of thousands and thousands at the stake for no reason other than their heretical faith, the torturing of thousands and thousands more in order to get them to confess to any deviation from the Bible … is all a matter of historical record.” He asks,

    If Christians, in the name of their faith, did horrible things in the more remote past, had they simply misunderstood the Bible that they were poring over in such detail and with such devotion? Did they finally get clear on the meaning of their true doctrine only after the better part of two millennia?. No, it was the horrible institution of Christian persecution, century after century, which inspired sensitive minds to first consider the idea of freedom of conscience, and, again, only with a good deal of philosophical help from those ancient, pagan sources, from Aristotle to Cicero.” [Emphasis added]

    Valliant appears to think that religious persecution as existed in the Inquisition was due to Christian theology and that the notion of freedom of conscience was the result of pagan ideas.  The facts, however, are not so simple. Valliant’s argument contains several false assumptions.

    First, Valliant is mistaken that Christians for the better part of two millennia both engaged in and supported the activities he refers too. In fact, for the first four hundred years of Christian history, the Church fathers supported and defended a right to freedom of conscience; it was only in the 5th century, due to the influence of Augustine, that suppression of heresy was supported. Even in this instance there was not unanimity. Many theologians such as Ambrose and Pope Siricius protested heresy executions in the late Roman Empire.  Forced baptisms did occur under Charlemagne in the 8th century but were criticised by leading theologians of the time such as Alcurin.  From Charlemagne till the 12th century, some 400 years, there were no inquisitions.[4] The Inquisition arose in Western Europe in the 12th century in response to a particular political crisis.

    Interestingly both Canon Law and Medieval Theology developed a notion of freedom of conscience in the Middle Ages, drawing from earlier patristic sources and exegesis of Paul’s comments on freedom of conscience in Romans 14.[5] In fact, the defences of religious tolerance, proposed by enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke, Pierre Bayle and James Madison are often simply repetitions of the arguments of early Christian theologians such as Lactantius and Tertullian, which had been known to Christian theologians for over a thousand years.  These facts also show that is mistaken to suggest defences of freedom of conscience were only developed after hundreds of years of Christian persecution.

    Second, Valliant’s attempt to equate religious tolerance with pagan antiquity is equally dubious. The pre-Christian Athenian democracy Valliant champions executed Socrates for heresy, around 400 years before Christ. Plato and Aristotle also experienced periods of exile from Athens – Aristotle fled precisely to avoid sharing Socrates fate. Greek Philosophers, including Plato, defended censorship of religious books and execution of those who denied the existence of the gods. For 300 years prior to the Christianisation of Europe the roman state persecuted and executed Christian believers. Eusebius records that thousands of men, women and children – sometimes whole towns – were martyred by Rome for their beliefs.[6] David Lindberg sums the evidence up,

    Intolerance is and was (and is) a widely cultivated trait, shared about equally by pagans and Christians. Moreover, each party was capable of employing coercive measures when it gained the political power to do so; Christians, in fact appear to have done so less often than Pagans.[7]

    Valliant’s contention that “freedom” was based on “pre-Christian” Aristotelian ideas “with conservative Christians fighting each and every step of the way” also ignores the obvious fact that the Inquisition came into Europe around the same time as the rise of Aristotelianism and was in fact defended and carried out by the Dominican order – the very same order that promoted and defended Aristotle in European universities. The facts, therefore, do not fit the generalised picture Valliant paints.

    Third, Valliant’s comments appear to assume that the torture and execution of heretics was justified solely by an appeal to the Bible. However, nowhere does the Bible mention executing or torturing heretics nor was it typically taken to teach this. Christopher Eberle and Terence Cuneo note that suppression of heresy was frequently punished, not on religious grounds per se, but on broader secular grounds,

    Religious believers have employed coercive power to violate the right to religious freedom, they themselves rarely have done so in a way that violates the [Doctrine of Religious Restraint] … when such rights have been violated, the justifications offered, even by religious believers, appeal to alleged requirements for social order, such as the need for uniformity of belief on basic normative issues. One theological apologist for religious repression, for example, writes this: ‘The king punishes heretics as enemies, as extremely wicked rebels, who endanger the peace of the kingdom, which cannot be maintained without the unity of the faith. That is why they are burnt in Spain’. [8]

    Régine Pernoud points out that reason heretics were burnt or tortured is because the 12th century saw the revival of Roman law which allowed torture to gain a confession and punish treason with burning.[9] Hence contrary to Valliant, the torture and burning of heretics had as much to do with ancient pagan roman legal customs as it did with biblical exegesis.  In fact, the evidence suggests that unlike secular courts, the Inquisition used torture sparingly, more moderately and rarely executed those who came before it, suggesting that it in fact moderated and softened the harshness of roman practice.[10]

    In my next post in this series, Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part II, I address Valliant’s claims that the writers of the Declaration of Independence were not influenced by Christianity and his claims around freedom and slavery.

    In the meantime see this update: The Theological Foundations of the Enlightenment Philosophers


    [1] James Hannam God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern Science (London: Icon books, 2009) 2-3.
    [2] Stillman Drake Galileo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
    [3] Edward Grant “Science and Theology in the Middle Ages” in David C Linberg and Ronald L Numbers eds God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter between Religion and Science (Berkley: University of California Press, 1986) 49-75.
    [4]
    Regine Pernoud Those Terrible Middle Ages: Debunking the Myths (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,  2000) 120.
    [5]
    See Joseph Lecler Toleration and the Reformation trans. by TL Weslow (New York: Association Press, 1960).
    [6] Eusebius Ecclesiastical History.
    [7] David Lindberg “Science and the Early Church” in David C Linberg and Ronald L Numbers eds God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter between Religion and Science (Berkley: University of California Press, 1986) 22.
    [8]
    Christopher Eberle and Terence Cuneo “Religion and Political Theory” (2008) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    [9]
    Pernoud, above n 4, 128-129.
    [10] See, for example, Edward Peters Inquisition (London: Collier Macmillan, 1981); also Henry Kamen The Spanish Inquisition: A Revisionist History (New Haven Conn: Yale University Press, 1998).

    RELATED POSTS:
    Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part II
    The Theological Foundations of the Enlightenment Philosophers
    The “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda
    Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part I
    Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part II
    William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell. Part Two
    Guest Post: James Hannam on Dan Brown’s History of Science

  • Sunday Study: Two Forms of Inerrancy

    The discussion arising in response to my recent post Inerrancy and Biblical Authority, both on this blog and on some of the blogs that linked to it, got me thinking a bit more about this topic. I was reminded of an interesting comment made by Alan Rhoda regarding the doctrinal statement of the Evangelical Philosophical Society “EPS,”

    The Bible alone, and the Bible in its entirety, is the Word of God written and therefore inerrant in the originals. God is a Trinity: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, each an uncreated person, one in essence, equal in power and glory.

    In a discussion with Bill Vallicella of Maverick Philosopher on the meaning, Alan Rhoda distinguishes two accounts of inerrancy,

    It seems to me that the EPS statement is sufficiently vague to permit a few different readings.

    The strongest is what’s known, I think, as verbal plenary inspiration (VPI). This is the view that each and every word used in the Biblical originals is exactly the word that God wanted used. Hence, since God is infallible, the Bible is inerrant. (VPI is the position of the Chicago Statement.)

    A weaker, and I think more defensible view, may be called didactic plenary inspiration (DPI). This is the view that whatever the Biblical originals were intended to teach is inerrant. It is not necessary that the particular words of the Bible be chosen by God so long as the particular message that God wants to convey gets across. (VPI entails DPI, but not vice-versa.) If one accepts this view, then the question to be asked with respect to a Biblical text is “what was it intended to teach?” Is Genesis 1, for example, intended to teach that the world was created in six 24-hour days? Or is it, perhaps, a kind of literary framework intended to teach the absolute superiority of Yahweh over all other gods? Or perhaps its purpose isn’t primarily didactic at all, but something primarily evocative like poetry?

    My point is that since the EPS inerrancy statement does not specify the primary locus of inerrancy (whether the words, the teachings, or something else) it permits a flexible range of approaches to Biblical interpretation.

    Rhoda suggests two different ways of understanding the doctrine of biblical inerrancy; one that follows from affirming verbal inspiration and another that follows from didactic inspiration.

    To see how DPI works consider a legal analogy, suppose that I want to write up a last will and testament. I approach a lawyer and tell set out precisely what I want put in my will. The lawyer then drafts a document that contains the provisions I stipulated but expresses them in standard legal terms and in accord with standard legal conventions and phrases e.g. “I, Matthew Flannagan, being of sound mind, hereby decree that…”

    The document expresses, in first person, my will regarding my assets and property so I can be said to be its author, a court will call it my will as will my surviving family. However, I did not write it. The form, exact wording, turns of phrase, sequencing, choice of font and paper, etc are the lawyers’. Given that the will was drafted in New Zealand, in 2010 it will be in New Zealand English and drafted in accord with the styles and conventions of the statutes and precedents applicable to New Zealand wills and testaments. Nevertheless, as the content of the document express my wishes, despite my lack of authorship, it is a faithful expression of my will. Something like this picture of inspiration is suggested in Exodus 4:10-16.

    Now it is important to note that a DPI model of inerrancy does not mean that people reject the entire biblical text as mythical and figurative stories, which illustrate theological and moral truths and assert nothing about space-time history. If the message is articulated through the literary and rhetorical conventions of human beings then a plausible interpretation, as opposed to a strained one, will take these conventions into account. When this is done, it is implausible to conclude everything in scripture is myth.

    Take, for example, the genre of ancient biography, as mentioned in my previous post. This genre does not intend to affirm as true every detail it records but rather seeks to give an accurate picture of the person the biography is about. This still requires that much of what it records is true; no one would interpret biographies about Alexander the Great to read that they did not teach that he was king of Macedon, son of Philip, who conquered Persia, fought in the battle of Gaugamela, etc. Similarly, if Jesus did none of the things recorded in the gospels and said nothing at all remotely resembling what they attribute to him then these accounts do not give an accurate picture of him.  However, the genre of ancient biography does not require that Jesus’ teaching on divorce be presented verbatim, in precisely the same order or using exactly the same words in the various synoptic gospels. Neither does it require that every temporal or geographical detail mentioned within them is taught as correct.

    Many historical books intend to teach historical claims. The Old Testament teaches, among other things, that Israel went into exile as a result of disobedience; it also teaches God lead the Israelites out of slavery in Egypt. These texts are, as far as I can tell, historiographies. Admittedly they are ancient near eastern “ANE” historiographies and the fact that the genre of ANE historiography uses hyperbole, lack of precision, a degree of historical reconstruction, etc needs to be taken into account. Nevertheless, as are historiographies they intend to teach us the significance of events that occurred in the past.

    Now a person would not take an Egyptian history as entirely figurative. One should take it to teach that a particular event happened. It is true that one should recognise the hyperbole present, the theological/political message the text affirms but this would not be taken to be all that the author teaches. Ramses’ campaigns into Syria are intended to tell us that the campaigns actually happened, that the battles actually occurred even if they use hyperbole, rhetoric and historical reconstruction to articulate a political/theological message over and above the mere reporting of history. Hence, DPI does not necessitate a licence to de-historicise the text or embrace biblical minimalism.

    Of course, there are other books and literary forms in scripture, such as the parables or the apocalyptic, which are not intended to be read as history. Then there are the early chapters of Genesis or the books of Job and Jonah, where it is not clear that the text intends to teach that the events actually occurred in history and where it seems more likely that these were stories were meant to convey theological and ethical truths. What is needed when reading these texts is attention to the genre. Conclusions about what a text teaches must be based on defensible claims about the literary style and the context of the text in question.

    DPI, therefore, is not the same as the view that scripture is infallible in faith and morals but not in history. It may simply be that at certain junctures scripture intends to teach us something about the past. On the other hand, DPI does allow for certain types of errors that a more verbal account may not allow for. Here are two examples. The first is one I alluded to in my previous post, cases where the form or way the message is articulated presupposes error. Consider Jesus’ comments in Matt 15:18-19, “But the things that come out of the mouth come from the heart, and these things make a man unclean. For out of the heart comes evil thoughts, murder, adultery, sexual immorality, theft, false testimony, slander.” Some scholars take, as metaphoric, references to the heart as the seat of the will, emotions, intellect. However, others suggest that ancient cultures literally believed the heart was the seat of psychological states like this and conclude that these texts reflect and presuppose a false and erroneous view of anatomy. I am inclined to think that even if these scholars are correct, little of interest follows.

    An analogue here would be a person who reads a 12th century account of a battle that is recorded to have occurred at “sun rise”. We know that 12th century people literally believed that the sun rose, in accord with the accepted pre-Copernican cosmology of the day. Hence, it is plausible to think that the human authors of these texts took the phrase “sun rise” to literally mean that the sun rose. Despite this, I think it would be a mistake to suggest that the phrase “the battle took place at sunrise” is false because of Copernicus’ discoveries. While the text presupposes an erroneous view of cosmology, it clearly does not intend to teach us pre-Copernican cosmology; all it teaches is that a battle occurred at dawn and it uses pre-Copernican cosmology to express this point. What the text teaches is true if the battle occurred and it occurred at dawn. It would be false if the battle occurred at another time of the day or never occurred at all.

    I am inclined think that the references to heart, kidneys, etc in the scriptures function in an analogous way to the word “sunrise” in medieval texts. I would say the same thing about references to the “four corners of the earth” or “the waters above and below” even if the original human writers understood these to be literally true. The cosmology in question is presupposed by the text abut is not what the text is trying to teach us. The author uses these phrases them to teach something else and it is what the author taught not the author’s mode of presentation that matters.

    A second example of an error that would be allowed under DPI would be where scripture affirms or states something which is unrelated to what is being taught. An example would be Paul’s instruction to Timothy in 2 Tim 4:15, “When you come, bring the cloak that I left with Carpus at Troas, and my scrolls, especially the parchments.” Suppose, for the sake of argument, Paul did not leave his cloak at Troas, perhaps he thought he had but in reality he had left it somewhere else. I am inclined to think this kind of error would make absolutely no difference to whether what Paul teaches in 2 Timothy is true or not. As the point of this letter is not to give an apostolic teaching on whether there is a cloak in Troas.

    Paul’s teaching is authoritative because he is an apostle, what he teaches as an apostle is true. It does not follow from this, that every personal conversation, remark, Paul ever made in his life or every memory he had was without error. It’s rather that what he taught in the function of an apostle has divine authority. It seems to me that while the letter to Timothy expounds apostolic teaching and instruction and the whole book letter is therefore authoritative, the specific passage in v 4:13 records a personal aside Paul gives to Timothy regarding some property he left at Troas. To interpret Tim 4:13 as a divine command to collect Paul’s cloak, or a prophetic or apostolic utterance that a cloak existed in Troas seems to me to be excessively pedantic and implausible, hence I myself see nothing about the divine authority of scripture threatened by a discovery that there was no cloak in Troas. All it would show us was that Paul’s memory was not perfect, which we already knew.

    So DPI is compatible with certain sorts of errors in the text provided they are not what the text teaches. Of course none of this means that scripture contains these errors. There may well have been a cloak at Troas. References to “the waters above,” “heart,” etc may be phenomenological language, the point is that even if these references do presuppose or  contain errors of a certain sort this does not really make any difference to the claim that whatever scripture intends to teach is true. Other examples could be given but I think you get the point.

    I suspect something like what Alan Rhoda calls didactic plenary inspiration is the view I was elaborating in my previous post. It also appears to be the view defended (at least in some places) by William Lane Craig and something like it is the view expounded by Alvin Plantinga. I also suspect that Glenn Peoples holds this view; although Glenn considers himself to not be an inerrantist he would probably, on Rhoda’s classification, be a particular kind of inerrantist, one that rejected VPI and instead asserted DPI.

    On the other hand, the sceptics I referred to in my previous post (people like Tooley, Fales, Brink, Loftus, etc) in their critiques, work with a fairly strong VPI view of inerrancy. John Loftus’ speaks of Jesus’ reference to “the heart” and how this reflects a primitive view of anatomy, Fales states that certain books may contain the genre of myth and Tooley suggests that Genesis contains a story in which God wipes out the human race. This suggests that they think that every word, illustration or literary convention used to teach us about God must itself be without error. If I am correct, then what sceptics attack is one particular version of inerrancy. They may or may not be successful in this attack but attacking one version of a doctrine does not show that all versions are false, and in this case many leading defenders of Christianity do not hold the version under attack any way.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Inerrancy and Biblical Authority

    RELEVANT CONVERSATIONS:
    Basic Inerrancy
    @ First Things (also at Parableman)
    Inerrancy again – a blog about a blog about a blog about a blog
    @ Beretta
    The Pitfalls of Literalism
    & Plantinga on Inerrancy @ The Church of Jesus Christ

  • Sovereignty and The Treaty of Waitangi

    In the Theory of Morality, Alan Donagan has a concise discussion of the morality of contracts. At one point he makes the following plausible argument,

    Obviously, the normal conditions of the existence of a contract are not fulfilled if the promisee misunderstands what the promiser intends. … a promiser is morally bound to perform whatever he believed his promisee to have understood him to promise. He cannot reasonably do less; for he should have corrected any misunderstanding he was aware of. And not even his promisee can fairly claim that he has knowingly bound himself to do more.[1]

    Donagan here notes that when two parties enter into a contract they are bound by the terms of the contract because they agreed to them. Given this, they are only bound to do what they agreed to do, or what it is reasonable to assume that they agreed to do, given the circumstances. They cannot be required to do more than this as they did not agree to do more and could not reasonably have been expected to forsee needing to do more.

    I think these points are fairly obvious; however, they have implications that are often less obvious. Today is Waitangi Day in New Zealand. One common argument proposed in the debate around the Treaty of Waitangi is that in the Maori translation, under Article 2, the Crown promised,

    … to protect the chiefs, the subtribes and all the people of New Zealand in the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures.[2]

    Now there is some debate about whether the phrase translated “chieftainship” (tino rangatiratanga) entails the idea of sovereignty or self-determination in this context or whether it simply conveys an idea of property rights.

    Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the former is correct. The fact that the Maori translation promises Maori sovereignty does not mean that the Crown promised this. In order for the Crown to be bound in this manner, the Crown would have to have believed (or been in a position where it was reasonable for them to have believed) that they were promising various Iwi (tribes) “sovereignty” in this sense. This clearly was not the case. The crown thought that they were merely promising what the English translation affirms they were:

    Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession;[3]

    It is clear that, under the English version, the Crown intended to guarantee Maori property rights in their land and it promised to protect these rights. Any promise of sovereignty was due to a translation error or not speaking Maori fluently. The representatives of the Crown could not have reasonably believed they were doing anything else. They relied in good faith on a translator to put their terms accurately into Maori and had no reason for thinking he had done anything other than this; hence, the Crown did not agree to provide Maori sovereignty and so did not promise it under the Treaty. It may be that some leaders mistakenly thought they did, but they were mistaken. Whatever the Maori version says, the Crown is not bound by it.

    I can think of two objections to this line of argument. The first, as Madeleine tells me, is the contention that the majority of Iwi signed the Maori version and under international treaty jurisprudence, where there is a conflict in translation the version that the majority of the parties signed is the valid one.

    This argument, however, misses the point. It is not that I am claiming that the English version is valid and the Maori one is not. I am quite willing to grant that the Maori version is valid, the point is that the Crown is morally bound only to do what they reasonably believed they were agreeing to do when they accepted the terms of the Treaty and the terms they believed they were agreeing to were those contained in the English version of the Treaty.

    Moreover, this argument appeals to international law. International law recognises that the Crown is the legal sovereign of New Zealand as it has been a stable de-facto government, recognised as such, by the majority of its citizens.

    A second objection is to note reciprocity; just as the Crown was not bound by what it reasonably believed it was agreeing to, so too the various Iwi are only bound by what they reasonably believed they were agreeing to. If one grants for the sake of argument that “tino rangatiratanga” means sovereignty, then Iwi were not bound to relinquish this sovereignty over to the Crown. They believed, quite reasonably given the translation they had, that they were not promising to relinquish sovereignty to the Crown but rather to maintain it.

    If this were the case the problem still arises that today in New Zealand, in 2010, the Crown is Sovereign. We do not have independent tribal nations that hold sovereign political power over their lands. All land in New Zealand is under the sovereignty of parliament and is subject to English common law and NZ statutes. Hence, the question is not whether Iwi are required to relinquish sovereignty to the Crown under the Treaty as, for better or worse, justly or unjustly, they have done so. The question today becomes, whether, after 170 years of the Crown being sovereign, Iwi should attempt to gain this sovereignty back? On this issue the Treaty is silent. It says nothing about what various parties are entitled to if another party misunderstood the agreement.

    The question then of Maori sovereignty is not a question of the Treaty at all. It is simply a question of morality in general. The real question is this, if one lives under a de-facto government that has been sovereign in practise for 170 years and if this government is relatively just then should one continue to defer to its sovereignty?

    I think the answer to this question is yes. I believe that when a stable de-facto government exists and has existed for over a century and when there is an absence of gross abuses of human rights then its sovereignty should be recognised as legitimate by the citizens of that nation. I will not further advance this argument here but I will simply note that whatever the answer to this question it seems reasonable to say that the Crown never promised sovereignty to Maori and claims that it did are based on the mistaken idea that a person can be bound by the terms of a contract which he or she both did not agree to and could not reasonably have been expected to have agreed to – to expect anything else is nonsense.


    [1] Alan Donagan The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977) 91.
    [2] “Treaty of Waitangi” Kawharu Translation Article 2.
    [3]
    “Treaty of Waitangi” English Version Article 2.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Maori and Pakeha are Not Partners to the Treaty of Waitangi

  • Contra Mundum: The Judgmental Jesus

    Few things are thought to be more morally pernicious than the practice of judging others. Sometimes this is given a theological spin with people citing the Sermon on the Mount “Do not judge, or you too will be judged. For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged, and with the measure you use, it will be measured to you.” (Matthew 7:1-2).

    It is common for this imperative statement to be used as a kind of rhetorical club to silence moral critique of various cultural practices. When a particular practice is subjected to such critique those who engage in the practice will complain they are being “judged.” If the alleged judgers are Christian, the claim that “judging is contrary to what Christ taught” is typically added to the charge.

    I think this is a misrepresentation of the passage and an affront to common sense. I will address the latter point first. The claim that it is wrong to judge other people is problematic; it is so problematic that it is amazing that anyone gives it credence. For example, if it is wrong to judge other people then since Hitler was another person, it is wrong to say that what he did was wrong. To claim that his actions were wrong is to make a judgment about them and if judging is wrong then it is wrong to judge Hitler. Similarly, Martin Luther King Junior was wrong to criticise racism and doing so judged the actions of racists and William Wilberforce was wrong to make moral judgments about the slave trade as in doing so he was judging slave owners. Taken consistently, the claim that “it is wrong to judge” entails that we should have no legal system, no laws and no courts as all these things involve judging others by deeming certain conduct as wrong.

    The problems with this interpretation of Matthew 7:1-2 do not stop there. A little reflection will demonstrate that the claim that it is wrong to judge other people is incoherent. To claim that it is wrong to judge others is to make a moral judgment; in making the statement one is judging that a particular action is wrong. Moreover, when a person announces this to other people he or she is implicitly making a judgment about other people’s actions. To utter that it is wrong to judge others is to engage in judging others. This kind of thinking can easily induce a kind of intellectual vertigo, it is analogous to the person who states, in English, “I can’t speak a word of English” or a person who tries to convince you of the truth of the claim “there is no truth.”

    Fortunately, one does not need to attribute to Jesus such absurd, incoherent, platitudes because it is doubtful that Jesus meant anything quite so stupid. Several factors bear this conclusion out. First, one should note that the claim, “do not judge, or you too will be judged,” occurs as part of the Sermon on the Mount. In this Sermon, Jesus regularly used hyperbole to vividly illustrate a point. One should note that interpreting these hyperboles too literalistically leads to obvious absurdities. For example, Jesus states, when referring to the act of looking at another person’s spouse with lust, “If your right eye causes you to sin, gouge it out and throw it away” (Matthew 5:9). It is evident that Jesus is not advocating self-mutilation but simply making his point about not lusting in a vivid, hyperbolic fashion. Similarly, he commands people to, “do good deeds before men,” (Matthew 5:16) but a few verses later he tells us, “not to do good deeds before men.” (Matthew 6:1). Taken in a strictly literalistic sense this is a contradiction. However, a reading of the context shows these apparently opposing statements are simply vivid illustrations of the same point; one’s good deeds should be motivated by a desire to honour God, to do the right thing and not by a desire to advance one’s own reputation. In light of such contexts the phrase, “do not judge,” should be seen for what it is, a hyperbolic statement illustrating the point elaborated in the surrounding verses.

    Second, when one seeks out this context one can see quite clearly the point being made. The phrase translated in the NIV as, “do not judge, or you too will be judged,” was originally written by Matthew in Koine (a Greek dialect). The Interlinear Bible gives the literal translation here as, “do not judge that you be judged.” In other words, do not judge others in a way that leads one to put oneself under judgement. The surrounding words support this conclusion,

    For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged, and with the measure you use, it will be measured to you. ″Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother’s eye and pay no attention to the plank in your own eye? How can you say to your brother, ‘Let me take the speck out of your eye,’ when all the time there is a plank in your own eye? You hypocrite, first take the plank out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother’s eye.″ Do not give dogs what is sacred; do not throw your pearls to pigs. If you do, they may trample them under their feet, and then turn and tear you to pieces. (Matthew 7:2-6)

    Here the qualifications are evident. One is not to judge in a way that brings judgment on oneself. The reason for this (“for”) is that the standard one uses to judge others is the standard that one’s own behaviour will be measured by. Jesus goes on to illustrate, with a sarcastic example, precisely what he is talking about; a person who nit-picks or censures the minor faults of others (taking the speck out of their brothers eye) who ignores the serious, grave, moral faults in their own life (the log in one’s own eye). His point is that such faults actually blind the person’s ability to be able to make competent moral judgments. This suggests that Jesus is focusing on a certain type of judging and not the making of judgments per se.

    In fact, the conclusion that Jesus does not mean to condemn all judging of others is evident from the proceeding sentences in the above quote. Rather than engaging in the kind of judgment Jesus has condemned one should “first take the plank out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother’s eye.” In other words one should try to rectify the serious moral flaws in one’s own life precisely so one can assist others with theirs. One needs to avoid hypocrisy in order to make constructive and effective moral judgments about others. This would make no sense if Jesus meant to condemn all judging by this passage.

    The reference to “pigs and dogs” in verse 6 further bears this out. Dogs and pigs, to Jews, were unclean animals and the term was frequently used to designate people considered to be of low moral character who were “unclean” before God. In this verse Jesus is simply repeating the Old Testament teaching to “not rebuke a mocker or he will hate you: rebuke a wise man and he will love you” (Proverbs 9:8). The implication, again, is that one should try to make constructive judgments rather than simply provoking anger. Constructive judgments involve making judgments.

    Just in case I have not belaboured the point enough, my interpretation is further reinforced by what follows after these passages. While reading a passage in its context is not the strength of many popular critics of Christianity, immediately after the cited passage Jesus goes on to warn about the dangers of religious charlatans, which he, rather judgmentally, refers to as “ferocious wolves” in “sheep’s clothing” (Matthew 7:15). In the age of Osama Bin Laden, David Koresh and Jim Jones the danger of such charlatans needs little further elaboration.

    In exhorting the requisite discernment, Jesus actually instructs his disciples to make moral judgments about others. He tells his disciples to judge whether a person is a false prophet or not by their “fruit.” Anyone familiar with Old Testament prophetic literature, as Jesus’ hearers were, would know that “fruit” is a metaphor for character. Isaiah’s use of the metaphor is paradigmatic; Isaiah famously described Israel as a vineyard that did not bear fruit. In the metaphor, fruit quite clearly referred to such things as right conduct, justice, morality, etc. Paul uses the same metaphor when he states that “the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control” (Galatians 5:22-23a). Jesus makes it clear that he is utilising this metaphor. He goes on to stress that in this context the fruit of a prophet is whether he or she “does the will of my Father” and is not an “evil doer.” It is clear then that Jesus here is exhorting his disciples to make moral judgment about other people, to critically evaluate other people’s lives, choices and actions and to make judgments about their spiritual authenticity based on this evaluation. All of this would be very odd if Jesus thought it was wrong to judge.

    Moral judgment of religious leaders, of oneself, of the organisations one is contemplating joining, of people one considers associating with, of the political leaders one supports at the ballot box and broader issues in wider culture is a task essential to both authentic spirituality and the competent navigation of everyday life.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the February 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

    RELATED POSTS:
    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic

  • Chai Feldblum: “We Should not Tolerate Private Beliefs”

    In “Diatribe: To All Da Haters” (originally entitled “Queers and Destiny: Who Hates Who”) an article published a few years ago in Critic (the student magazine of Otago University) I wrote the following:

    … If teaching that homosexual conduct is wrong is akin to racism or propagation of apartheid, then the aforementioned religious organisations are the moral equivalent of the Ku Klux Klan. Those who propagate such arguments need to reflect on the implications of what they affirm. Imagine a society where the local synagogue or Mosque is treated as though it were the local Klan headquarters. Or where Muslim students are perceived and treated the way we currently relate to white supremacists. It is not difficult to see that the widespread dissemination and acceptance of this argument would lead to an atmosphere of pervasive religious intolerance – such intolerance is the very antithesis to what many of those protesters ostensibly claim to stand for.

    The solution to intolerance is tolerance. Tolerance of those ideas you may fervently disagree with and recognition of another’s right to freely hold and express them. Tolerance requires one to respond to disagreement with rational persuasion, not vilification. This cuts both ways.

    I was widely vilified and ridiculed for my comments and denounced as hate filled and bigoted. It is interesting to compare what I said with the comments of Chai Feldblum, the Georgetown University law professor nominated by Obama to serve on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

    Just as wYes we can!e do not tolerate private racial beliefs that adversely affect African-Americans in the commercial arena, even if such beliefs are based on religious views, we should similarly not tolerate private beliefs about sexual orientation and gender identity that adversely affect LGBT [lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender] people,” the Georgetown law professor argued…

    For those who believe that a homosexual or bisexual orientation is not morally neutral, and that an individual who acts on his or her homosexual orientation is acting in a sinful or harmful manner (to himself or herself and to others), it is problematic when the government passes a law that gives such individuals equal access to all societal institutions.

    Of course those religions that believe homosexual conduct is sinful include Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, evangelical Protestantism, many neo-orthodox Protestants, Islam, Orthodox Jews, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witness’s, Seventh Day Adventists and so on. So presumably, if we are to take Feldblum at her word, none of these groups should be tolerated in Obama’s society and all should be denied equal access to societal institutions.

  • Sunday Study: Inerrancy and Biblical Authority

    Recently Glenn Peoples and Dominic Bnonn Tennant had an interesting exchange over the issue of biblical inerrancy, the doctrine, that the bible contains no errors. In his post, Errantly Assuming Inerrancy in History, Peoples makes this interesting comment,

    While there has always been a clear expression of the view that what Scripture teaches is correct, this has certainly not always been seen in terms of the notion of “inerrancy.” After all, the very disagreement that exists between evangelicals who affirm inerrancy and those who do not is whether or not the idea that the Bible is authoritative and truthful in what it teaches us should (or need not) give rise to the further claim that the Bible is also inerrant.

    Peoples here distinguishes between two theses; the first is that bible contains no errors, the second is that whatever the bible teaches is true. In his article Peoples argues that the first of these theses is false, he argues that there are numerous factual errors in scripture. On the other hand Peoples maintains that the second thesis is true, none of the errors he mentions call into question the authority of scripture because they do not affect the truth or falsity of what scripture teaches. Hence, one can affirm the authority of the bible, even the claim that it is infallible in what it teaches, without affirming that it is inerrant, in the sense of containing no errors.

    In A response to Glenn Peoples’s ‘No, I am not an inerrantist’ Bnonn argues that Peoples is attacking a straw-man. The doctrine that the bible is inerrant does not mean to deny that the kind of discrepancies Peoples points to do not exist; rather, supporters of the position Peoples attacked have in mind a different account of what constitutes an error to what Peoples’ critique suggests. Here, I do not want to discuss whether Bnonn is correct or incorrect here because whether he is or not, I think Peoples is onto an important distinction here and he offers an important critique of one way of understanding biblical authority which is often assumed by sceptics.

    A couple of examples may illustrate this point. In Does God Exist Michael Tooley, for example, suggests that those who hold that Genesis is the revealed word of God run into trouble because in Genesis God decided to “drown all men, women, and children in a great flood” and suggests that this means they must believe that God has engaged in genocide of the human race.[1] David Brink similarly argues that the Genesis story of Adam and Eve is contradicted by contemporary geological evidence and evolutionary biology so, hence, is unreliable.[2] Fales notes “then, there is the generally mythical character of Genesis, and the fact that many of the themes in the first eleven chapters are borrowed from, or influenced by, the myths of other ancient Near Eastern cultures”[3] and considers this to undercut the authority and reliability of the book of Genesis. Some sceptics contend that primitive scientific understandings of the world are presupposed in various biblical passages. In Matt 15:18-19 Jesus states “But the things that come out of the mouth come from the heart, and these things make a man unclean. For out of the heart comes evil thoughts, murder, adultery, sexual immorality, theft, false testimony, slander” Some sceptics argue that this passage reflects a primitive ancient understanding of human anatomy that held that the heart was literally the seat of the emotions, will and intellect.

    Now some evangelical scholars would contest each of these claims by questioning the existence of such underlying cultural beliefs, the geological evidence and so on, however, here, for the sake of argument, I will assume these basic contentions are correct. I think an important question to ask is, so what? Because even if the sceptic’s claims are true it is far from clear that this actually calls into question biblical authority, the distinction Peoples raised gives us some insight into why. The examples might show that the text contains errors in some sense of that term but it is not clear that they actually show that what the bible teaches is false.

    Interestingly something like this distinction occurs in the characterisation of inerrancy offered by two leading, contemporary, Christian philosophers. Alvin Plantinga states, “Scripture is inerrant: the Lord makes no mistakes; what he proposes for our belief is what we ought to believe”. Here Plantinga defines inerrancy not in terms of the bible containing no errors at all, but rather that what God proposes to teach with scripture is not mistaken. William Lane Craig articulates a similar account:

    Nobody thinks that when Jesus says that the mustard seed is the smallest of all seeds (Mark 4.31) this is an error, even though there are smaller seeds than mustard seeds.  Why?  Because Jesus is not teaching botany; he is trying to teach a lesson about the Kingdom of God, and the illustration is incidental to this lesson. Defenders of inerrancy claim that the Bible is authoritative and inerrant in all that it teaches or all that it means to affirm.  This raises the huge question as to what the authors of Scripture intend to affirm or teach.[4]

    Craig’s point here is that Jesus’s comment taken literally contains a falsehood, that the mustard seed is the smallest of all seeds. I myself am inclined to see hyperbole here and so do not think that Jesus did literally say the mustard seed is the smallest of seeds, suppose however he did, then his statement would be false. Nether the less Craig notes, and I think correctly, that this is irrelevant because even if Christ said this about mustard seeds, this passage is not supposed to teach us about Botany. It’s a teaching about the growth of the kingdom of God. The saying about the mustard seed is simply a way of illustrating the point Jesus is trying to teach. And it’s the truth or falsity of this teaching, not the details of the illustration that is what is at stake in the question of biblical authority.  I think Craig is correct here, God uses texts written by human beings to teach people certain truths about himself and the world. What is authoritative is what is taught not the details of how it is expressed. This distinction between what the text teaches and what it contains then is I think illuminating, it also I think casts some light on cases of error that Peoples refers to the difference between the gospel of John and the synoptic gospels in terms of the cleansing of the temple:

    Scholars have come to see that the genre to which the Gospels most closely conform is ancient biography.  This is important for our question because ancient biography does not have the intention of providing a chronological account of the hero’s life from the cradle to the grave.  Rather ancient biography relates anecdotes that serve to illustrate the hero’s character qualities.  What one might consider an error in a modern biography need not at all count as an error in an ancient biography.  To illustrate, at one time in my Christian life I believed that Jesus actually cleansed the Temple in Jerusalem twice, once near the beginning of his ministry as John relates, and once near the end of his life, as we read in the Synoptic Gospels.  But an understanding of the Gospels as ancient biographies relieves us of such a supposition, for an ancient biographer can relate incidents in a non-chronological way.

    Craig’s point can be seen this way. John records the cleansing of the temple near the beginning of his ministry, whereas the synoptic gospels record it occurring near the end of his ministry. Hence, these accounts contain contradictory records of the same event. This, however, does not call into question the accuracy of what is being taught because once one understands the genre being employed, the genre of ancient biography, it is evident the authors did not intend to teach that every event they recorded actually happened in the precise way they narrate. The authors are not teaching that Christ actually cleansed the temple at a particular time and place in history, they are trying, rather, to provide a faithful account of who Christ was, what he was like, what he taught, the major things he did and said. These records are accurate if they faithfully reflect a correct answer to these questions. They, like other biographers of the time, drew on accounts or traditions that highlighted the point they were trying to make without necessarily accepting that every account they refer to actually happened precisely how it is stated. The authors, in relaying the story of the cleansing of the temple, are teaching not that the event actually happened as they narrated it but that Christ was opposed to the kind of actions that were taking place in the temple; he was so opposed to it that given the opportunity, whether late in his ministry or early, he would respond in the way the Gospels portray and take the kind of stance he is portrayed as taking. The text teaches truth if it is true that Christ was like this and false if he was not. If Christ had no problem with money changers in the temple, and considered this activity to be a perfectly appropriate way to make money, then what this text asserts would be false.

    I think many of the cases cited by sceptics of the Hebrew and Greek scriptures are unpersuasive because they fail to distinguish between what is contained in the text and what the text teaches. Given this they fail to really challenge biblical authority as this has, according to Peoples, been traditionally understood.

    Suppose, as Fales suggests, the evidence supports the contention that Genesis is not an historical account of origins but a rewritten legend or myth, it does not follow that what this myth teaches is false. Myths are used to teach theological and ethical points and the question of whether these points are true or false or not is whether the genre that expresses them is mythic.

    Similar points can be made about the other examples. The fact that Genesis contains a story about God drowning the human race in a flood does not entail that the text teaches that God committed genocide. For this latter conclusion to follow one would need to establish that the genre of Genesis is on par with the genre of modern histography and hence intends to teach the events recorded actually happened. This may or may not be the case but it requires argument. Merely citing a passage does not do this.

    Similarly, Brinks’ argument assumes that the text not only contains stories about Adam and Eve but also teaches the story occurred as historical fact. This involves important questions of genre that Brink ignores. It is possible that these stories are included by the author to teach certain theological and moral truths about human beings, sin and God; of course they might not be either, but merely pointing out that a story contains error if taken as literal historical fact does not substantiate this.

    Finally, even if Christ’s statement presupposes or reflects a mistaken ancient view of human anatomy it is clear that in the passage in question he is not teaching that this anatomy is true. He is teaching about human sin and its relationship to the Torah. He might use a primitive understanding of anatomy to illustrate or make the point but that is not the point he is imparting.

    Here, as elsewhere, sceptics show themselves up as fundamentalists working with an excessively pedantic understanding of inerrancy; a conception that Peoples correctly rejects and also argues, again correctly, is largely irrelevant to the question of biblical authority. Moreover, if Bnonn is correct, most inerrantists do not assume this understanding of biblical authority either, which means that such arguments are simply attacks on straw men, often by people who should know better.


    [1] Michael Tooley “Does God Exist?” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, M A: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 75.
    [2]
    David O Brink “The Autonomy of Ethics” The Cambridge Companion to Atheism ed Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 159.
    [3] Evan Fales “Plantinga’s Case against Naturalistic Epistemology” 63 Philosophy of Science 1996, 447-448.
    [4]
    William Lane Craig “What Price Biblical Errancy?” Reasonable Faith Q&A.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Two Forms of Inerrancy

  • John Loftus on Calvin, Matthew Flannagan and Psalm 14

    John Loftus from Debunking Christianity is at it again. In his recent post, When Psalm 14:1 Says Atheists Are “Fools” This Can Be Easily Refuted, he suggests he can easily refute the idea of biblical inerrancy and cites me to assist him in doing so! Unfortunately he makes several straight-forward mistakes. Given that he has decided to devote a blog post to elaborating these claims, I will devote one in response.

    Loftus states his thesis clearly, “I claim Psalm 14:1 is about morality, that it claims an atheist is an immoral person, not an insane one. And I reject that was well. I also claim this correct interpretation is easily proven false.”

    To demonstrate this thesis he cites my discussion with him on the meaning of the word “fool” and my Sunday Study Sunday Study: Christ on The Prohibition on Homicide Part II. In that post I cited Psalm 14 and stated “A fool here is not someone who is imprudent but someone who is positively wicked. The text speaks of those who commit “abominable deeds;” the idea is that such a person is morally corrupt, someone who rejects doing good, someone who is committed to evil.”

    Loftus’ response is as follows:

    Thanks so much Matt.

    You wrote:

    “A fool here is not someone who is imprudent but someone who is positively wicked. The text speaks of those who commit “abominable deeds;” the idea is that such a person is morally corrupt, someone who rejects doing good, someone who is committed to evil.”

    It’s about deeds is it not? It’s about immoral behavior.

    …Then we’re agreed, Matt. Jim West is ignorant, and so was Calvin!

    As to the immoral charge, do you think that’s true of atheists? You see, this is not about having a basis for morality. It’s a charge against the behavior of people who do not believe in God. It claims that we are in fact immoral people; that we do not live according to moral “wisdom.” This is about our behavior not beliefs.

    I would think this discussion alone should end any pretensions about an inerrant Bible. One lone ethical atheist destroys such a notion, even if he does not believe, or even if he is inconsistent in his behavior, as you might want to claim….

    …All it takes is one lone ethical atheist to upset the cart, correct?  I’ll put my behavior up to most Christian theists, okay?

    Agreed?

    Unfortunately John has made straight-forward errors here. I’ll make a few brief points in response.

    1. Loftus thinks my discussion of the meaning of the word fool somehow provides a refutation of biblical inerrancy: he writes,

    As to the immoral charge, do you think that’s true of atheists? You see, this is not about having a basis for morality. It’s a charge against the behavior of people who do not believe in God. It claims that we are in fact immoral people; that we do not live according to moral “wisdom.” This is about our behavior not beliefs.

    I would think this discussion alone should end any pretensions about an inerrant Bible. One lone ethical atheist destroys such a notion, even if he does not believe, or even if he is inconsistent in his behavior, as you might want to claim.”

    Three things here. First, as I said in to Loftus, I am not sure that the passage talks about atheists in the modern sense of the term. The NIV translates Psalm 14:1 as follows, “The fool says in his heart, “There is no God.” They are corrupt, their deeds are vile; there is no one who does good.” In English this appears to be talking about people who profess atheism, the philosophical position that God does not exist. However, as I noted in correspondence with Loftus, the words “there is” are not in the original Hebrew. They are rather an interpretation of the Hebrew added by many modern English bibles. The original Hebrew simply states “the fool says in his heart no God”. Many commentators interpret the phrase “no God” to mean “there is no God”, however, as I pointed out to Loftus, there is an alternative way of interpreting the phrase as someone who says no to God; someone who is aware of God’s existence and his commands and yet chooses to reject them.

    It is worth noting that even commentators who interpret the phrase as “there is no God” do not think it refers to atheism as we understand the term today. There are several reasons for this. The first is that the phrase “no God” is used in Psalm 10:4. Here it refers to a person who “curses and renounces God”, acts as though God will not hold him or her accountable for his or her actions. The point is not that the person does not believe in God but that the person rejects God’s requirements to do what is right and does not consider him or herself to be accountable or responsible for what they do.

    The second is that Psalm 14, in context, applies its criticism not to atheists per se but to all human beings, the majority of whom historically and today do believe in a deity of some sort. Note the second half of the verse,

    The fool says in his heart, “There is no God.” They are corrupt, their deeds are vile; there is no one who does good.

    The next verse states,

    The LORD looks down from heaven on the sons of men to see if there are any who understand, any who seek God. All have turned aside, they have together become corrupt; there is no one who does good, not even one.

    This brings me to the third reason for doubting that the psalm refers to atheists as Loftus and I mean the term – someone who affirms that God does not exist – as the New Testament applies the judgment in this psalm to theists. In the opening chapters of Romans (verses 1-3) Paul identifies two groups specifically who fail under the criticism of this psalm; the first are Greeks who for the most past believe a deity exists, know what his requirements are and yet still reject them. The second are Jews who know that God exists, know what his requirements are in the Torah and yet refuse to follow them.

    In Romans 3:12 Paul cites this Psalm to summarise the point he has made that both groups, who are theists, have rejected God. Clearly these groups are not atheists in the sense that Loftus and I use the term. The person who says “no God” is not the person who does not believe in God, rather, it is the person who rejects the demands that God places on their lives.

    2. Suppose the passage does refer to the intellectual position of atheism and says “the fool says in his heart there is no God” Loftus seems to think that this means that all atheists are immoral. But this does not follow. The claim that fools are atheists does not entail that all atheists are fools, any more than the claim that all Buicks are cars entails that all cars are Buicks. This would commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent.

    3. Suppose the text did affirm that all atheists are immoral. Loftus seems to think that this means that the text affirms that all theists are more moral than atheists. His response, “I’ll put my behavior up to most Christian theists, okay?”, implies that if one atheist is more moral than most theists then the Psalmists claim is refuted.

    Now I could express my scepticism that Loftus knows enough about the character of most theists in the world to make this claim, not to mention the hubristic self-righteousness this comment displays, but these issues can be put aside because even if Loftus is a shining paragon of virtue, the claim that all atheists are immoral does not entail that all atheists are more immoral than all theists. It is possible that both atheists and theists could be immoral to a degree and that the degrees of each differ on an individual by individual basis.

    4. John seems to believe that his citation of me, writing on the meaning of the word “fool” in Psalm 14, is in disagreement with Calvin’s exposition of the psalm. Further, that this commits me to saying that Calvin was ignorant. This is mistaken.

    First, if one examines Calvin’s commentary on Psalm 14 it is not clear that he does disagree with what I have said. On the meaning of the word fool he states,

    As the Hebrew word נבל, nabal, signifies not only a fool, but also a perverse, vile, and contemptible person, it would not have been unsuitable to have translated it so in this place; yet I am content to follow the more generally received interpretation, which is, that all profane persons, who have cast off all fear of God and abandoned themselves to iniquity, are convicted of madness. David does not bring against his enemies the charge of common foolishness, but rather inveighs against the folly and insane hardihood of those whom the world accounts eminent for their wisdom. We commonly see that those who, in the estimation both of themselves and of others, highly excel in sagacity and wisdom, employ their cunning in laying snares, and exercise the ingenuity of their minds in despising and mocking God. It is therefore important for us, in the first place, to know, that however much the world applaud these crafty and scoffing characters, who allow themselves to indulge to any extent in wickedness, yet the Holy Spirit condemns them as being fools; for there is no stupidity more brutish than forgetfulness of God. We ought, however, at the same time, carefully to mark the evidence on which the Psalmist comes to the conclusion that they have cast off all sense of religion, and it is this: that they have overthrown all order, so that they no longer make any distinction between right and wrong, and have no regard for honesty, nor love of humanity.[1]

    It is clear that Calvin agrees with my point here; the word fool refers to a person of low moral character and not an intellectually sub-par person. Moreover, it also seems clear that Calvin’s reading of the use of the phrase “there is no God” in psalm 14, it is not a reference to people who profess the philosophical position of atheism. On the meaning of the phrase “there is not God” Calvin states,

    Not that they maintain, by drawn out arguments or formal syllogisms, as they term them, that there is no God, (for to render them so much the more inexcusable, God from time to time causes even the most wicked of men to feel secret pangs of conscience, that they may be compelled to acknowledge his majesty and sovereign power;) but whatever right knowledge God instils into them they partly stifle it by their malice against him, and partly corrupt it, until religion in them becomes torpid, and at last dead. They may not plainly deny the existence of a God, but they imagine him to be shut up in heaven, and divested of his righteousness and power; and this is just to fashion an idol in the room of God. As if the time would never come when they will have to appear before him in judgment, they endeavor, in all the transactions and concerns of their life, to remove him to the greatest distance, and to efface from their minds all apprehension of his majesty. And when God is dragged from his throne, and divested of his character as judge, impiety has come to its utmost height; and, therefore, we must conclude that David has most certainly spoken according to truth, in declaring that those who give themselves liberty to commit all manner of wickedness, in the flattering hope of escaping with impunity, deny in their heart that there is a God.[2] [Emphasis added]

    Here Calvin states that the issue is not so much the intellectual disbelief in God but rather the living of one’s life in a manner that rejects God’s laws and one’s own responsibility for following them.

    5. Putting aside Loftus’ apparent misunderstanding of Calvin’s position (he did, afterall, confess to not having read Calvin after he wrote the post in question) let’s assume for the sake of argument that I did come to a conclusion different from Calvin, does it follow, as Loftus suggests, that Calvin was ignorant? I think this is a non-sequitur, if Loftus has Calvin correct (which he does not) and Calvin contends that a fool is someone who is intellectually or mentally sub-par, not a person with a bad character, then I would disagree with him – but it does not follow from this that Calvin is ignorant. I think it is quite possible (and common) for educated, informed people to disagree on a particular issue. The suggestion that unless someone agrees with me on everything then they are an ignoramus seems to me to make to big a leap.

    Given points 1-5, I do not accept John Loftus’ claim that my comments on Psalm 14 force me, or anyone else, to conclude that Biblical inerrancy is false or that one of history’s greatest Biblical expositors and theologians was an ignoramus. Loftus’ claims to the contrary seem to be based on reading a comment I made, failing to grasp the issues in interpreting a Psalm, misunderstanding the position of Calvin and then making a series of unwarranted jumps in logic (all, I deduce, in an attempt to make me side with him in his attack on Jim West, whom I had not heard of until a few days and whose writings on the subject are no longer online).


    [1] John Calvin Commentary on Psalms Psalm 14:1.
    [2] Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Christ on The Prohibition on Homicide Part II
    Sunday Study: Christ on The Prohibition on Homicide Part I
    John Loftus Tag