Author: Matt

  • John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part I

    Several Christian thinkers, most notably, C S Lewis, John Hare, Robert Adams and William Lane Craig have argued that Theism provides a superior foundation for moral obligation than Naturalism does. Most of these thinkers defend this notion by developing and defending a divine command theory.[1] John W Loftus is aware of this and in The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority, he offers a refutation of divine command theory. I will argue that Loftus is mistaken; his arguments are based on a confusion between ontological and epistemological foundations.

    Avoiding Strawmen
    Before turning to Loftus’ arguments, it is necessary to spell out exactly what a divine command theory of ethics is. It is the thesis that “an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God.”[2] two things are noteworthy about this definition.

    What is a Divine Command Theory?
    First, the thesis is limited to deontological properties. Philip Quinn defines deontological properties as follows, “I mean to refer to whether it has such properties as being morally permitted, being morally forbidden or prohibited, and being morally obligatory or required.”[3] Deontological properties are contrasted with axiological properties such as goodness and badness. Evans notes, “it does not appear that the concept of obligation is identical to the concept of what it is ‘good to do’ … It might be good, even saintly, for me to give a kidney to benefit a stranger, but it not an act I am obliged to do.”[4]

    Despite frequently being portrayed this way in common critiques, divine command theories do not offer accounts of broader axiological properties. This is evident from the writings of those who defend such theories. Quinn, after defining deontological properties in the aforementioned way, affirms he is not offering a divine command theory of axiological properties. In this he is followed by Adams, Alston, Craig, Wierenga, Hare and Plantinga and, even to some extent, Thomas Carson. This is not something unique to modern divine command theories; older divine command theorists such as Paley, Locke, Berkley and Suarez typically limited divine command theories to accounts of deontological properties and not to broader axiological properties such as goodness in general.

    The second point is to note is that the word “because” in English is ambiguous. When a divine command theorist claims that “an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God.”[5] The theorist could mean either, that one cannot know what is right and wrong unless one believes in divine commands; or that right and wrong cannot exist independently of Gods commands. The first claim states that beliefs about right and wrong are epistemologically dependent on beliefs about divine commands. The second is that the existence of moral properties, such as right and wrong, are ontologically dependent on God’s commands.

    It is important to note that epistemological dependence and ontological dependence are not the same thing. Take a straightforward example of identity; the property of being water is identical with (or constituted by) the property of being H20. As such, H20 and water are not ontologically independent. Yet people for thousands of years could perceive water, drink it, detect it and use it without knowing anything about atomic theory. Hence, our knowledge of the existence water is not dependent on our knowledge of H20.

    When divine command theorists state that an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God they are using “because” in an ontological sense. The locus classicus for contemporary defences of divine command theory is the work of Robert Adams who affirms that “ethical wrongness is [identical with] the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving God.”[6] Adams here states that the relationship between the property of being contrary to God’s commands and wrongness is the ontological relationship of identity.

    Elsewhere in the article he is explicit about this; he suggests that wrongness is identical with or constituted by being contrary to divine commands in the same way that water is constituted by (or identical with) H20. Other divine command theorists explicitly follow Adam’s lead on this. Stephen Evans and William Alston both affirm that divine commands are constitutive of deontological properties and note Adams’ identity claim as a paradigm of the type of relationship he is defending.[7] Craig cites Alston[8] as the inspiration for his position and contends that “commands constitute our moral duties”[9] he explains that by this he means to make divine commands an ontological foundation, and in particular, the concept of “informative identity”[10] analogous to the way “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H20 or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion.”[11] Craig is explicit that he is not offering divine commands as an epistemological foundation, “It would, indeed, be arrogant and ignorant to claim that people cannot be good without belief in God. But that was not the question.”[12]Also, “My concern here is with moral ontology not moral epistemology … to repeat, my concern is with an ontological foundation for morality, not with epistemological foundations.”[13]

    The other leading defenders of divine command theory are equally clear that they are proposing a theory of the ontological and not the epistemological foundations of moral obligation. Quinn,[14] Weirenga,[15] Hare[16] and Plantinga[17] all offer accounts of the ontological foundations of deontological properties. Janine Marie Idziak notes that, historically, divine command theories were usually understood as ontological theories and not epistemological theories about how one knows what is right and wrong.[18]

    John Loftus’ Mischaracterisation of Divine Command Theories
    These observations lead into my main criticism of Loftus’ discussion. Loftus mistakenly understands divine command theories as signifying epistemological dependence. At the beginning of his article Loftus refers to the view that “[moral] standards are grounded in the commands of a good creator God, and these commands come from God’s very nature” and infers from this that “the Christian claims to have absolute and objective ethical standards for knowing right from wrong, which is something they claim atheists don’t have” [Emphasis added] here Loftus suggests that the claim that right and wrong depend on God’s commands is the claim that knowledge of right and wrong depends on belief in divine commands.

    The same interpretation is seen elsewhere in his chapter when he defines a divine command theory Loftus states Morality is based upon what God commands. “No other reasons are needed but that God so commanded it. If God commanded it, then it is right. If God forbids it, then it is wrong.” and citing the Divine Command theory of William Lane Craig he states “Many Christians will maintain they have a superior foundation for knowing and for choosing to do what is good. They claim to have objective ethical standards for being good, based in a morally good creator God, and that the atheist has no ultimate justification for being moral.” [Emphasis added] Despite the fact that Craig and other divine command theorists have repeatedly stated they claim no such thing.

    Another problem with Loftus’ characterisation is that in several places he suggests that divine command theories claim that axiological properties such as goodness depend on God’s commands. He states, for example, that divine command theory entails that “God could’ve commanded something else, or even something contrary, or something horribly evil and simply declared it good” or that “If we think that the commands of God are good merely because he commands them, then his commands are….well….just his commands.” Examples could be multiplied; the problem is, as I have noted, divine command theorists typically do not offer their theories as foundations for axiological properties, they limit their theories to deontological properties.

    These misconstruals undermine many of the criticisms Loftus makes. As I will show, many of his objections are based on a conflation between epistemology and ontology.

    In my next post, John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part II, I will address Loftus’ arguments against a divine command theory, the emptiness of God is good and his arbitrariness objection.

    [1] C S Lewis rejected a divine command theory; I believe, however, that Lewis’ dismissal is based on unsound arguments and the divine command theory coheres better with his argument in Mere Christianity as I argued in my paper “God and the Moral Law in C. S. Lewis” Theological Perspectives on C S Lewis Conference Carey Baptist College, Auckland, 1 July 2008.
    [2] W K Frankena Ethics 2nd edn (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973) 28.
    [3] Philip Quinn “An Argument for Divine Command Theory” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 291.
    [4] C Stephen Evans Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 16.
    [5] Frankena Ethics 28.
    [6] Robert Adams “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979) 76.
    [7] William Alston “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 303-304.
    [8] William Lane Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan King Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith Secularism and Ethics (Lanhan: Rowan and Littlefield, 2009) 186.
    [9] William Lane Craig “The Craig/Kurtz Debate: Is Goodness Without God Good Enough” Eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan King Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith Secularism and Ethics (Lanhan: Rowan and Littlefield, 2009) 30.
    [10] Mark C Murphy “Theism, Atheism and the Explanation of Moral Value” eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan King Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith Secularism and Ethics (Lanhan: Rowan and Littlefield, 2009) 127.
    [11] Ibid.
    [12] William Lane Craig “The Indefensibility of Theistic Meta-Ethical Foundations for Morality” Foundations 5 (1997) 9.
    [13] Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” 168.
    [14] Ibid, 293.
    [15] Edward Weirenga The Nature of God: An Inquiry into the Divine Attributes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989) 215-27. See also “Utilitarianism and the Divine Command Theory” American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984) 311-318; and “A Defensible Divine Command Theory” Nous 17 (1983) 387-408.
    [16] John Hare God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands and Human Autonomy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001) 49.
    [17] Alvin Plantinga “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience”
    www.ammonius.org/assets/pdfs/plantinga.pdf.
    [18] Janine Maree Idziak “In Search of Good Positive Reasons for an Ethics of Divine Commands: A Catalogue of Arguments,” Faith and Philosophy 6:1 (1989) 60.

    RELATED POSTS:
    John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part II

  • Divine Commands and Intuitions: A Response to Ken Perrott

    Ken Perrott from Open Parachute has asked me some questions about my views on morality and divine commands. Views I have repeatedly expressed on this blog. Given that others have from time to time asked me similar questions, and given the length of my response, I have decided to turn my answers into a post. [Ken’s questions are copied and pasted from the comments section of With God Anything can be Permitted: Another Bad Argument against Theistic Morality, numbered and italicised below]

    1. I think a key issue, one which should really be spelt out in detail, is the concept of “grounding moral duties in divine commands”. What does this mean?

    Basically, I think the relationship between the moral properties of being wrong and the property of being contrary to God commands is analogous to the relationship between water and H2O. Just as we explain the existence and nature of water by identifying it with H2O. I would explain the existence and nature of wrongness by identifying it with the property of being contrary to Gods commands.

    2. So what do you mean by “divine commands”? How do you get them? Do you hear voices?

    No I don’t hear voices. God is an immaterial being and hence has no vocal chords. I think it is possible for God to create an audible voice issuing a command but I think that this would be fairly atypical. In any event, I do not think that an auditory voice is necessary for issuing a command. I can communicate a command orally but I can also do it via e-mail, text, sign language, waving a flag, etc.

    In the normal and typical cases, I think divine commands are usually discerned via a person’s conscience. One intuitively sees that certain actions are right and others wrong and hence intuitively perceives certain imperatives such as “do not torture children for fun,” etc. Moreover, I think anyone whose faculties are functioning properly perceives God’s commands this way whether they believe in his existence or not.

    The H2O analogy may illuminate this. We know that the property of being water is the property of being H2O. However, people can know something is water immediately via perception even if they do not have any beliefs about molecules, atoms or contemporary science. Pre-European Maori, for example, knew about the existence of water and competently used water for centuries before they knew about the existence of hydrogen and oxygen.

    I think something analogous holds with divine commands. The property of being wrong is the property of being contrary to divine commands; however, people can immediately perceive via intuition what is wrong even if they do not believe in divine commands.

    Hence, on my view, atheists can know what is right and wrong. The real question is whether atheism can adequately explain the existence of right and wrong or whether, given atheism, it is likely that moral properties such as right and wrong exist. These are separate questions.

    A person can believe in the existence of something and yet be committed to beliefs, which if true, entail that what they believe is a fantasy. I suspect this is precisely the way Atheists view Christians.

    3. And if such a command tells you commit an act which conflicts with your moral intuitions and logic – which one do you follow?

    If I understand Ken correctly here, he is asking me what I would do if I believed that God had commanded an action that I intuitively considered to be wrong. This is actually a big topic, worthy of a post in and of itself, I do plan to post something more substantial on this in the future, here I can only summarise my current position.

    As I noted above, I agree with Ken that people can intuitively recognise certain principles of right and wrong. I would, however, point out that these intuitions are fallible. So, in contrast to what Ken appears to think, I would not assume that every time there was a clash between what I believed God’s commands are and my intuitions that the latter are correct. At the same time I also think our interpretations about what God commands are also fallible and so I would not assume that my interpretations of what God commanded were always correct either. In fact, given that I have already argued that one knows God’s commands intuitively through one’s conscience, intuitively perceiving an action is wrong is some evidence that God forbids it and that claims to the contrary are mistaken.

    My answer then to Ken’s question, what do you do if one’s interpretation of God’s commands conflicts with one’s moral intuitions? is that it depends on one’s epistemic situation. If the belief that God has commanded a particular action is something that, after critical reflection, seemed to me well established by the evidence and by contrast, the contrary intuition that the action was wrong was fairly weak, peripheral and less plausible then I would go against the intuition. If, on the other hand, the intuition was very clear and seemed extremely plausible while the rival interpretation of God’s commands was, by comparison, fairly weak and tentative then I would follow the intuition.

    To turn to one example Ken mentions, the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11, 2000, I think the intuition that it is wrong to kill innocent human beings is a very strong one. Whereas I do not believe that the case from, say, scripture or theological tradition for killing innocent people in this way is very strong at all (in fact both scripture and tradition are fairly unanimously opposed to terrorism of this sort).

    On other issues my thinking is different. For example some people appear to find it self-evident that there is nothing wrong with homosexual conduct. I myself do not have this intuition, nor do most people I know, in fact, many defenders of homosexual conduct I have spoken to admit that they personally find the idea of two men having sex disgusting but defend the “liberal” view in spite of this. Moreover, for I do not think it is implausible to conclude that much of the contemporary acceptance of homosexual conduct is due to cultural conditioning rather than a sudden direct insight gained in the mid 20th century. The arguments typically given for the permissibility of homosexual sex are fairly weak and frequently consist of no more than castigating others as bigots. On the other hand, I think the theological case against homosexual conduct from scripture and tradition is fairly strong.

    I have posted a bit more about my thoughts on this in my post Brink on Dialetical Equilibrium.

    4. After all, I keep hearing of people who have committed murder as a result of “divine commands” and society usually locks them up.

    I am not sure what Ken intends to prove with this point. Ken is correct that some people who suffer from a mental disorder believe that God has commanded them to kill. I don’t think this proves much. I know of people who suffer from dementia who have had hallucinations that there is a river running through their lounge. Does it follow then that referring to the existence of rivers is somehow dubious? In fact, mental patients can also have faulty “moral intuitions” and moral logic quite independently of any theological beliefs they have.

    Despite this, Ken maintains, correctly, that people whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly can intuitively discern the presence of right and wrong. I agree with him, the difference is that I believe that what they discern is in fact the property of being in accord with or contrary to divine commands. Ken clearly does not. The question that some theistic critics of secular morality poses is not whether atheists can discern right and wrong, they can; the question is whether, if atheism is true, right and wrong actually exist.

    RELATED POSTS:
    With God Anything can be Permitted: Another Bad Argument against Theistic Morality
    See labels:
    Divine Command Theory
    Euthyphro

  • Sunday Study: Gender in Genesis a take on Adam’s Rib

    In the comments on The Problem of Evil: Why does God Allow Suffering? Marc suggested that the scriptures denigrate women. In the comments on The Inconsistent, Condescending, Paternalism of Left-Wing Feminism, Anna has also raised some thoughtful questions about the scriptures and how they portray women, many of which are worth addressing. The issue, however, is a large one; numerous different texts could be discussed and there is too much to deal with in a single blog post. Here I thought I would elaborate on some reflections I made a few years ago in response to a comment by Hugh Young, a thoughtful, Wellington based, historian. (A reflection, I later used as the basis for a homily I preached at Lost Soul’s wedding last year.)

    The discussion began when Young stated that the creation story in Genesis 2 “denigrates women.” When questioned, he clarified his position somewhat; he stated that the text in Genesis “defines the woman in terms of the man, rather than as a human being in her own right. It says women were MADE to be “helps meet” for men (and nothing else).” And went on to state

    I guess the inferior position of women came first, and the story was concocted to justify it. They’d hardly write a creation myth in which man was created out of woman’s rib and then say “Hey, we ought to be treating women better! “When I said “the INTENTION is to denigrate women” I meant the intention is to keep them in their place.

    Young is of course not unique in reading Genesis in this way. I have heard feminist critics of Christianity express essentially the same interpretation of the passage on several occasions so I hope my response is helpful to the current discussions on the matter.
    First, the Hebrew word is not necessarily a reference to a rib; the meaning is broader and is probably more accurately translated as something like ‘side’. Also, the text needs to be read in the context in which it appears. The immediate context is Gen 2:19-24,

    Then the LORD God said, “It is not good for the man to be alone; I will make him a helper suitable for him.”19 And out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field and every bird of the sky, and brought them to the man to see what he would call them; and whatever the man called a living creature, that was its name.20 And the man gave names to all the cattle, and to the birds of the sky, and to every beast of the field, but for Adam there was not found a helper suitable for him.21 So the LORD God caused a deep sleep to fall upon the man, and he slept; then He took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh at that place.22 And the LORD God fashioned into a woman the rib which He had taken from the man, and brought her to the man.23 And the man said, “This is now bone of my bones, And flesh of my flesh; She shall be called Woman, Because she was taken out of Man.”24 For this cause a man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they shall become one flesh.

    Note three things here. The emphasis is on the fact that it is not good for man to be alone and he needs a helper suitable to him. This phrase in Hebrew is ezer neged this is the idea of someone who helps or aids and who is similar; a counterpart to or an equal to oneself. David Freedman argues it has the sense of a help equal to him,[1] a view defended by Walter Kaiser.[2] The phrase appears to teach that the helper is like the male, on par with, a counter-part to him, an equal.

    Second, this fact is emphasised further by the context. Note that none of the animals is a help equal to man; while no Hebrew in an agrarian society would deny that animals can be aids or helps to mankind they are not helpers that are equal to or of the same nature as humans and that is the whole point.

    Finally, note Adam’s response, when he learns that Eve has been created from his side, This is now bone of my bones, And flesh of my flesh; She shall be called Woman, Because she was taken out of Man.

    Two things are noteworthy here. First the reference to bone of my bones, etc is a Hebrew idiom for kinship. Second, the last sentence emphasises a Semitic literary technique known as paronomasia or word-play. This technique is common in this section of Genesis; for example, Noah sounds similar to the Hebrew word for comfort and Noah designates the man in the narrative who brings comfort (Gen 5:29). Abraham means ‘father of many’ and the whole story of Abraham is a story about how he is promised that he will have many children. Jacob means ‘pulls his leg’ and the story is of a trickster. In each case the name is deliberately used to emphasis a characteristic or feature of the person named. In Gen 4 it is noted that Adam and Eve acquired a child by the LORD, the child is named Cain which sounds like the Hebrew word acquired.

    Similarly, use of word-plays occurs here in Genesis. Adam is similar to the Hebrew word for dust ‘Adamah.’ The emphasis of Genesis 2-3 is that man has kinship with the dust; he is made from it 2.7; will return to it 3.19; will toil it 3:17; his sin curses it once again. The clearest use is in 3:19 where it says “dust you are,” the name Adam is used to point to a feature or character of man.

    Similar things can be said about Eve. The word eve sounds like the Hebrew word for mother; the text notes that she was called Eve because she was the mother of the living. Again, the name is deliberately chosen to reinforce a point or teaching.

    In this passage the play is on the Hebrew word for women ishshah and man iysh. The idea is that she is called ishshah because she comes from man iysh, the point is that the two are fundamentally of the same nature. Understood in its genre, then, the passage asserts that women and men are very close kinsman, they are fundamentally of the same nature, they are one.

    The passage then states that it was not good for man to be without a helper equal to or like him. The animals, though helpful, are not like him, they are different and hence, won’t do. That is the point of the passage. Far from teaching the inferiority of men to women or teaching women are subhuman, the passage teaches the precise opposite.

    [1] R. David Freedman “Woman, A Power Equal to Man” Biblical Archaeology Review January-February 1983 56-58.
    [2] Walter Kaiser Towards an Old Testament Ethics.

  • With God Anything can be Permitted: Another Bad Argument against Theistic Morality

    Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov’s famously contended that if God does not exist then anything is permissible. Ken over at Open Parachute disagrees and goes one step further and argues that the shoe is on the other foot. Ken maintains that theistic accounts of obligation lead to an “extreme form of moral relativism” and in fact, Dostoevsky’s contention should be rephrased as “with God anything can be permitted.” Ken claims,

    But when secular morality is abandoned, and religious appeals to what God wants, or what God ordains, this opens the gates wide to the worst sort of moral relativism. It enables any despot to sanction any form of inhumanity by claiming that their god supports it.

    “if Ken’s argument is sound then he has offered, not just an argument against theism, but an argument against the existence of morality itself.”Now regular readers of this blog will know that I have written several defences of theistic accounts of moral obligation. I have also argued that moral relativism is a mistaken theory of ethics. Hence, if what Ken says is true then my own position is incoherent. I defend a thesis and at the same time I critique and reject a position that is a logical implication of that thesis or at least follows from the thesis when it is conjoined with some uncontroversial facts.

    For this reason, it is worth asking whether Ken’s claim is true, or at best, whether the arguments he gives for this claim are sound. I contend that they are not. Ken’s main argument for his thesis is found in the following quote,

    This seems crazy to most people but is not at all unusual. Consider the civil rights struggles in the USA. Christian beliefs were used to justify both segregation and the opposition to it. The same in South Africa. Most members of the Dutch reform Church thought apartheid was sanctified by God, whereas many anti-apartheid activists opposed apartheid on religious grounds. Consider slavery. Consider just about any struggle over human rights in human history and we can see examples of a god being used to justify both opposition to, and support of, human rights.

    This suggests to me that religion does allow for an extreme form of moral relativism. Truly anything can be justified by claiming support from your god.

    I think Ken’s argument is flawed. Let me offer two lines of response to demonstrate why.

    First, if Ken’s argument is sound then he has offered, not just an argument against theism, but an argument against the existence of morality itself. Consider the structure of his argument; he notes that one group of theists oppose P and claim, as the basis for their opposition, that P has the property of being contrary to God’s commands. Ken then notes that another group of theists oppose not-P and claim, as the basis for their opposition, that not-P has the property of being contrary to God’s commands. Ken infers from these examples that belief in God entails “an extreme form of moral relativism” and that it follows from this that “with God anything can be permitted.”

    The problem is that an exactly analogous line of argument applies to the existence of right and wrong per se whether it has a theistic grounding or not. Consider any paradigmatic moral debate on an issue. Whether it is capital punishment, affirmative action, war or whatever, one group of believers in the existence of right and wrong will oppose P and claim, as the basis for their opposition, that P has the property of being wrong. Another group who also believe in right and wrong will oppose not-P and claim, as the basis for their opposition, that not-P has the property of being wrong. Hence, if Ken’s argument is valid then it must be the case that the existence of right and wrong entails “extreme moral relativism,” and, that if right and wrong exist then anything can be permitted.

    So we have, then, two arguments, Ken’s own argument that God’s existence entails extreme moral relativism and an analogous argument that the existence of right and wrong entails extreme moral relativism. Both have true premises. Ken’s premise is that some believers in God disagree over whether to support a given action. The analogous argument has as its premise the contention that people who believe in the existence of right and wrong sometimes disagree over whether to support a given action.

    Given this, it follows that either both arguments are sound or neither one of them is. Ken must either embrace extreme moral relativism and the kind of nihilistic tendencies he criticises “religion” for having or he must retract his argument.

    The second line response I will make to Ken’s argument is to note that it clearly is not a valid argument at all. In fact, it conceals a subtle fallacy. Ken notes that,

    [1] Different religious believers appeal to God to justify mutually incompatible practises.

    From this he infers that,

    [2] Anything can be justified by appealing to God.

    The problem here is that [1] is ambiguous. When we say that a person appeals to a belief to justify a conclusion, we can mean

    [1a] He or she actually does show that the position is actually justified by appealing to this belief;

    or we can mean,

    [1b] That he or she attempts to show that the position is justified by appealing to this belief.

    Which, then, does Ken mean?

    Ken could mean [1a]. If he does mean this his argument is unsound. This is because the examples he shows do not substantiate this premise, they do not support the claim that theists have actually justified mutually incompatible positions with appeals to God.

    Noting that theists have disagreed over what policy is in accord with the will of God does not show that all parties to the dispute have actually justified their claim that these policies are in fact in accord with God’s will. Merely noting the existence of an argument does not demonstrate that the argument is sound.

    Perhaps then Ken means [1b], he is simply noting that different theists have attempted to justify their beliefs by appealing to God. This claim certainly is supported by the evidence he cites; however, the problem is that the conclusion Ken draws does not follow.

    The fact that people have attempted to offer justifications for mutually inconsistent positions does not entail that all these positions can in fact be justified. It only tells us that people have attempted to justify mutually incompatible positions by appealing to God.

    I grant that people can use theological premises in an attempt to justify different and inconsistent positions but this is a fairly innocuous claim. Take any premise you like, secular or theological, it is true that a person could to appeal to this premise in an attempt to justify something. Such a person’s argument may be stupid, unsound or unsuccessful but that does not mean that it is impossible for that person to try to mount it. I am sure Ken would agree that people offer stupid arguments for things all the time.

    Consider Darwinian Evolution. People can and have appealed to this theory to justify Marxism, Nazism, racism, colonialism, atheism, scepticism, ethical nihilism, infanticide and a whole host of other positions, many of which are mutually incompatible. Of course, the fact people have tried to use Darwinism for this purpose does not, in and of itself, entail that Darwinism actually justifies any of these theories. It only tells us that some people appealed to it to try to show this.

    Ken, I am sure, would object to being told that his beliefs commit him to social Darwinist views of race relations purely because someone once appealed to Darwinism in the past to justify such claims. Similarly, he would object if I suggested that the mere existence of these arguments by others in the past commits him to extreme relativism and the view that any action, including rape and torturing of little children, could be justified.

    Ken would rightly point out that the issue is not whether Darwinian arguments have been offered for all sorts of crazy positions; rather, it is whether these arguments are correct. Here I would simply note that what is good for the goose is equally good for the gander.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Divine Commands and Intuitions: A Response to Ken Perrott
    See labels:
    Divine Command Theory
    Euthyphro

  • Sunday Study: The Parable of the Workers in the Vineyard

    “If something nice happens to somebody else be happy for them and not angry for yourself.” This is one of those concepts we try to drum into our kids when we talk about good sportsmanship, not being jealous when watching a sibling open their birthday presents or when one gets an invite somewhere exciting that the other really wants to go to as well. We tell them that this is life and that as they grow to be adults they need to understand this concept. Sadly many adults often miss fail to remember this concept when faced with comparitive adult versions of these life realities as the Parable of the Workers in the Vineyard demonstrates.

    The Parable of the Workers is found in Matthew 20:1-16

    1″For the kingdom of heaven is like a landowner who went out early in the morning to hire men to work in his vineyard. 2He agreed to pay them a denarius for the day and sent them into his vineyard.
    3″About the third hour he went out and saw others standing in the marketplace doing nothing. 4He told them, ‘You also go and work in my vineyard, and I will pay you whatever is right.’ 5So they went.
    “He went out again about the sixth hour and the ninth hour and did the same thing. 6About the eleventh hour he went out and found still others standing around. He asked them, ‘Why have you been standing here all day long doing nothing?’
    7″ ‘Because no one has hired us,’ they answered. “He said to them, ‘You also go and work in my vineyard.’
    8″When evening came, the owner of the vineyard said to his foreman, ‘Call the workers and pay them their wages, beginning with the last ones hired and going on to the first.’
    9″The workers who were hired about the eleventh hour came and each received a denarius. 10So when those came who were hired first, they expected to receive more. But each one of them also received a denarius. 11When they received it, they began to grumble against the landowner. 12’These men who were hired last worked only one hour,’ they said, ‘and you have made them equal to us who have borne the burden of the work and the heat of the day.’
    13″But he answered one of them, ‘Friend, I am not being unfair to you. Didn’t you agree to work for a denarius? 14Take your pay and go. I want to give the man who was hired last the same as I gave you. 15Don’t I have the right to do what I want with my own money? Or are you envious because I am generous?’
    16″So the last will be first, and the first will be last.”

    The first thing to note is that this passage, in its English translation, begins with the word “for”; hence, it is a continuation on the previous passages. Chapters and verses were added to the Bible in the early 13th Century. The original scriptures did not have these. Some of these divisions were not always placed well. This set of passages is arguably an example.

    If one looks back to 19:27-30 one sees the context this parable falls in. Jesus had just spoken to the rich young ruler and elaborated that it was difficult for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven. Popular theology of the day would have been shocked by this as a wealthy person who kept the commandments, such as this ruler, would have been seen as a person God had blessed for his piety.

    It is in this context that Peter makes his comments in verses 19:27-30

    27Peter answered him, “We have left everything to follow you! What then will there be for us?”
    28Jesus said to them, “I tell you the truth, at the renewal of all things, when the Son of Man sits on his glorious throne, you who have followed me will also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel. 29And everyone who has left houses or brothers or sisters or father or mother[a] or children or fields for my sake will receive a hundred times as much and will inherit eternal life. 30But many who are first will be last, and many who are last will be first.

    The rich young ruler had been asked to give everything up and follow Christ. He was unable to do this. Peter stepped in and drew a contrast between the rich young ruler and himself. He and the other apostles, had left everything to follow Christ. Surely, then, they, in contrast to the young ruler, will inherit some reward?

    Jesus’ response is to affirm that the apostles sacrifices will be compensated for and they will be rewarded, as will everyone who makes sacrifices out of service to Christ. Jesus finishes, however, by adding a twist, “many who are first will be last, and many who are last will be first.”

    The parable of the workers is Jesus’ exposition or explanation as to what this, otherwise cryptic, phrase means. This is clear from the fact that the very last phrase in the parable is “So the last will be first, and the first will be last.” This is the conclusion of the parable and it is precisely the very same point that Jesus has just made in response to Peter.

    What, then, does the parable mean?

    The first verses state “for the kingdom of heaven is like a landowner who went out early in the morning to hire men to work in his vineyard. He agreed to pay them a denarius for the day and sent them into his vineyard.”

    The phrase “for the kingdom of heaven is like” is ambiguous in this English translation. Directly translating from the Greek is more helpful; in the Greek, this phrase asserts ‘the kingdom of heaven is like the situation of…’. Jesus is drawing from an everyday or familiar employment situation and saying that the “the kingdom of heaven” is analogous to this situation.

    NT Wright notes that the phrase “kingdom of heaven” was “a Jewish way of talking about Israel’s god becoming king.”[1] Wright adds,

    I intend to demonstrate two things: first that when Jesus spoke of the ‘reign’ or ‘kingdom’ of Israel’s god, he was deliberately evoking and entire story-line that he and his hearers knew quite well; second, that he was retelling this familiar story in such a way as to subvert and redirect its normal plot.[2]

    The situation in verse 2 is fairly normal. Casual workers were available in the marketplace selling their labour. The landowner went to the market, early in the morning and hired some workers. He contracted them to work for a day for the price of 1 denarius, the going rate for a days work at the time. There was nothing untoward about the bargain. The employer contracted the work at a fair rate and the text tells us he payed the workers the same day. This satisfied the legal requirements contained in Leviticus 19:13 “Do not defraud your neighbor or rob him. Do not hold back the wages of a hired man overnight.”

    This relates quite clearly to Peter’s question in the previous chapter and Jesus’s answer. The disciples will be fairly rewarded for the work they have done for the kingdom of heaven.

    The situation in verses 3-7 is slightly different. The Hebrew day was divided, as ours is, into hours. The text refers to the third hour, the sixth hour, the ninth hour and the eleventh hour which correspond to our 9am, 12pm, 3pm and 5pm. The landowner went back to the market at each of these times and discovered people who were unemployed (“Why have you been standing here all day long doing nothing?” “Because no one has hired us”) and offered them work. These people, however, were not contracted to work a full day for a full day’s wage; the landowner said “I will pay you whatever is right,” unlike with the first workers, there was no agreed on amount, the landowner instead asks them to trust him, to have faith in his integrity.

    Each of these workers worked for part of the day. When evening came, around 6pm, the landowner paid the workers in the reverse order that he hired each in. The workers hired at 5pm were given a full day’s wage for what was probably an hour’s work. For this reason, the other workers, hired earlier in the day, expected to receive more. Again, this relates back to Peter’s question. Peter is contrasting himself with others in terms of the sacrifices and work he has done for the kingdom.

    It is at this point that the twist Jesus introduced in verse 30 above. The workers that were hired first were paid 1 denarius. This caused them to grumble, see verse 12, ” ‘These men who were hired last worked only one hour,’ they said, ‘and you have made them equal to us who have borne the burden of the work and the heat of the day.’ ” The answer given is three-fold. First the landowner asked rhetorically whether he had been unjust. The answer is clearly no. They were contracted to work for one day for a day’s wage. This obligation has been kept; hence, the landowner did not deprive them of what they were entitled to. Second, the landowner pointed out that it was his money, the workers had received what was rightfully theirs and everything left over rightfully belonged to the landowner. Did he not then have a right to use his own money at his own discretion? This leads to the third point, the landowner was generously giving his money to people who did not have work. The problem is not that the workers hired first were treated unjustly or not given what they were entitled to, the issue was that others had been treated generously. Was the desire of the first workers that the other workers be stripped of these generous gifts? The issue seems to be one of envy, a desire to bring others down rather than to get what one is entitled to.

    Jesus summarises this as ‘the first will be last.’ The point, then, is this, God is a king who will reward people for their deeds and their sacrifices. People will be given what their deeds entitle them to but God also gives generously to those who trust in him. There is a rebuke here to his disciples about envy and resentment that other people have people have been blessed by God.

    [1] NT Wright Jesus and the Victory of God (London: SPK, 1996) 203.
    [2] Ibid, 199.

    In Any Requests we were asked to post more on exegetical topics, to occasionally expound and explain biblical passages. So this post marks the launch of Sunday Studies; we will attempt to regularly post some sort of exegetical study each Sunday, unpacking and examining passages of scripture.
  • Antony Flew v William Lane Craig debate “Does God Exist?”

    In 1948 Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston debated the existance of God on the BBC radio. That debate was considered the definitive debate of that generation.

    Fifty years later, to commemorate this debate, a debate re-examining the arguments for and against the existence of God was arranged between William Lane Craig and Antony Flew before 4,000 students at the University of Wisconsin in 1998.

    Flew has since, famously, become a theist but at the time he was one of the world’s leading atheists so this is a great engagement of minds. This debate is now online. Watch and enjoy.

    Hat Tip: Many thanks to Josh Darville who sent us this link via Twitter.

  • ANZAC Day: Lest we Forget or Have we Already?

    ANZAC DayIn ‘MCMXIV’ Philip Larkin describes the queues to enlist at the start of the first World War:

    The crowns of hats, the sun
    On moustached archaic faces
    Grinning as if it were all
    An August Bank Holiday lark

    His late-century comment was “Never such innocence again.”

    When I read these words in Jonathan Glover’s Humanity they struck me with some force. I had witnessed this “innocence” a few years earlier at a family reunion.

    My mother had a large photo of a moustached man standing in military uniform between two flags. As a child I thought this picture was fascinating and I loved the uniform as my brothers and I used to play “war” in the gully out the back of our house. Mum told us that the photo was of her uncle Dick who had been killed in World War I.

    Years later as an adult I attended a family reunion on my mother’s side. The event was held in Otorohanga and someone had gone to a lot of trouble meticulously researching the family tree. In the hall the reunion was held in there were documents on display going back centuries from my ancestors, birth certificates, death certificates, letters, photos, etc.

    One letter gripped me when I found it. It was written by my great-uncle Dick and was sent from Egypt. I can’t remember the exact wording but the gist of it is still clear to me. The letter spoke of how he and the boys had arrived in Egypt and that they would be home in a few weeks; ‘they were simply waiting for Jerry [the Germans] to be man enough to let their boys face them.’ The impression conveyed was that they would have a quick bout, “Jerry” would be dispatched and they would all go home. There was a jolliness to the letter, it sounded like he was an about to have a friendly game of rugby. The real chilling part came next, he had written the letter to inform ‘the girls’ back home’ that he was moving from Egypt soon, they were going to the Dardanelles and from there ‘the war would be over in a few days.’

    Of course we know the history. The New Zealand contingent did land in the Dardanelles at a place called Gallipoli and there my uncle Dick was killed in one of the worst military massacres in New Zealand’s history.

    Interestingly I read a book recently on Gallipoli that contained an account from a survivor of a brief conversation he had with a Dick Sircombe, my great-uncle. As far as I know that is the last record we have of Dick; the book lists him as one of the many killed in action in its appendix.

    This reality, seeing the innocent naivety that my great-uncle had had struck me quite strongly. It reinforced to me the need to never forget the mistakes our forefathers made.

    This was driven home to me even more the other day in my year 12 Ethics class. We had shown the students the movie Saving Private Ryan and I saw the naivety once again. One student asked me, puzzled, “why is the US invading Germany?” It was said with a tone and demeanour that suggested he was wondering whether this was just another case of the US, yet again, sticking its nose in another country’s affairs.

    When we came to the scene where one solider freezes and cannot kill a German solider nearby, the class denounced him as a “faggot” and a “wimp.” One wonders if they really understood what was going on.

    Every time we commemorate the events of World War I we say “lest we forget,” it seems to me that we have already become a generation that has forgotten. To some this is not a personal event that effected their family in the way it effected mine but some boring facts of history one needs to learn to get NCEA and perhaps an exciting playstation game or cool movie.

    MacDoctor sums up the same theme but in regard to how we treat our freedom,

    A war such as the Second World War can bring us the coin of freedom, but we often spend it without regard to how precious it truly is. Typically, we trade that freedom a little bit at a time for a little comfort, a little peace and quiet, a little feeling of false security.

    It is a sad day when we honour the people who gave their lives to protect us from tyranny by succumbing slowly to tyranny in our own land.

    For our international readers, today is ANZAC day, a day on which Australia and New Zealand pause and remember those who died in service to our countries at Gallipoli, Turkey on 25 April 1915.