Author: Matt

  • Sunday Study: Did Christ Abolish the Old Testament Law? Part I

    At the start of the Sermon on the Mount, Christ states,

    “Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfil them. I tell you the truth, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished. Anyone who breaks one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices and teaches these commands will be called great in the kingdom of heaven. For I tell you that unless your righteousness surpasses that of the Pharisees and the teachers of the law, you will certainly not enter the kingdom of heaven.[1]

    Some commentators suggest that this passage merely teaches that Christ’s life and ministry is the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy. This position is based on the first four chapters of Matthew which strongly emphasis this theme. For example, the first chapter of Matthew states that Christ’s birth “took place to fulfil what the Lord had said through the prophet:”[2] the text quotes from the LXX version of Isaiah to make the point, “‘The virgin will be with child and will give birth to a son, and they will call him Immanuel’—which means, ‘God with us.’”[3] Moreover, the idea that Christ is the fulfilment of Israel’s history, the person who is the seventh king in Israel’s history, is stressed in the genealogies[4] (seven being a number frequently used in the Hebrew bible for completion or perfection).

    The problem with this interpretation, however, is that the immediate context suggests otherwise. Matthew’s theological agenda in the first four chapters of this biography is to portray Christ as a second Moses. Matthew deliberately stresses parallels between Christ’s life to drive this point home. Jesus escaped a plot by a king to kill the first born sons in his area. Jesus went into exile in Egypt; he wandered in the wilderness for 40 days and then he delivered a sermon on ethical injunctions on a mountain to 12 Apostles (Israel had 12 tribes). It is hard to resist the conclusion that Matthew is portraying Christ as the new Moses delivering the law to a reconstituted Israel.

    This is further confirmed by the immediately preceding passages. Here Christ alludes to two Old Testament metaphors, that of a city on the hill and a light to the world. In the prophetic literature Israel is portrayed as a city on the hill and a light to the gentiles. The image is further elucidated in terms of the law; that is, the commandments of God being taught to the nations. Moreover, the continual emphasis in this passage is on obedience to and the teaching of God’s commandments. Fulfilling the law and prophets is seen not in terms of prophecy but in terms of faithful obedience and teaching of these commandments. Hence, it seems fair to conclude that Christ is here referring, not to Old Testament prophecy but to the commandments, the law, the moral teaching of the Old Testament.

    Christ says three things about the law in this passage. First, he states he has not come to abolish it; the phrase “but to fulfil it” uses the Greek word alla, which is the ‘but’ of strong antithesis. Hence, ‘fulfilling’ is understood as the opposite of abolishing. What abolishing would constitute is clearly spelt out in the passage; abolishing would involve either breaking the commandments or teaching others to do so. Christ places most of the emphasis in the passage on this; one is not to break the “least” of these commandments or teach others to do the same.

    Second, Christ elaborates what he has in mind by fulfilling; it involves “practising and teaching these commands.” Christ goes on to say that obedience and teaching of the law are something that applies, “in the kingdom of heaven.” Hence, Christians, New Testament believers, are supposed to both follow and teach the Old Testament commandments of God.

    Third, Christ affirms that the Old Testament commandments are not abrogated; using a Semitic hyperbole, Christ states the smallest details remain binding until “everything is accomplished.” Verse 18 tells us things are accomplished when “heaven and earth pass away.” Christ then, in this passage, is commanding his apostles to fulfil Israel’s mandate to be salt and light to the gentiles by obeying and teaching the law better than the Pharisees do.

    This raises an immediate problem because it is fairly standard amongst Christians to hold and believe that the New Testament sets aside Old Testament law. In several places in the New Testament, for example in the book of Galatians, it is taught that Christians do not need to be circumcised or to follow Kosher food laws. In other places it appears to teach that the Mosaic law is not binding on New Testament believers; most contemporary evangelicals follow Paul here and do not conform to the 613 laws of Moses.

    However, doesn’t this contradict Christ’s teaching? Moreover, don’t these same Christians faithfully follow and defend some of the precepts laid down in the torah, such as commandments against killing or homosexual conduct or bestiality or idolatry? Richard Mohr states,

    What does seem clear is that those who regularly cite the Bible to condemn an activity like homosexuality do so by reading it selectively. Do ministers who cite what they take to be condemnations of homosexuality in Leviticus maintain in their lives all the hygienic and dietary laws of Leviticus?[5]

    I think Mohr is mistaken and his comments betray a misunderstanding of the teaching of the Old and New Testaments. To elucidate this, however, one needs to examine both the Old and New Testaments more carefully.

    The pivotal New Testament passage comes from Acts 10-11:18. In this passage, Luke refers to a gentile, Cornelius, who is “devout and God-fearing” and “gave generously to those in need and prayed to God regularly.” This then affirms the existence of righteous gentiles; gentiles who worship God and have evident piety. Cornelius is sent to Peter who, prior to his arrival, has a revelation from God. Peter interprets the revelation to affirm how true it is that, “God does not show favouritism but accepts men from every nation who fear him and do what is right;” and, “so then, God has granted even the Gentiles repentance unto life.” God fearing gentiles, then, can be acceptable to God despite not following the Mosaic Law.

    This incident is cited again in Acts 15 where the Apostles respond to the claim that, “Unless you are circumcised, according to the custom taught by Moses, [gentiles] cannot be saved.” Following Peters position, they decide that Gentiles do not have to follow the Mosaic Law, instead it is affirmed

    It is my judgment, therefore, that we should not make it difficult for the Gentiles who are turning to God. Instead we should write to them, telling them to abstain from food polluted by idols, from sexual immorality, from the meat of strangled animals and from blood. For Moses has been preached in every city from the earliest times and is read in the synagogues on every Sabbath.

    Here the Apostles state that gentiles can be saved and do not have to follow the Mosaic law; however, they are required to abstain from certain practices such as sexual immorality, from idolatry, blood laws and meat of strangled animals.

    What is interesting is the rationale for this; it is claimed that Gentiles can be required to abstain from these practises because, “Moses has been preached in every city from the earliest times and is read in the synagogues on every Sabbath.” In other words, because the gentiles have heard Moses preached they know they have a duty to abstain from these practices. If a gentile is familiar with Moses then he or she will know that there are some commandments that are binding on him or her, even if he or she does not himself or herself have to follow the law in its entirety. I think this point is the key to understanding much of the Apostles stance on the law of Moses and when it is grasped, it enables us to both see that Paul’s statements are not inconsistent with Jesus’ and that Mohr’s claim of selectivity is unfounded.

    In my next Sunday post I will attempt to articulate and expound some of these concepts in more detail.

    [1] Matthew 5:17-20.
    [2] Matt 1:22.
    [3] Matt 1:23.
    [4] Matt 2:17,18.
    [5] Richard Mohr “Gay Basics: Some Questions, Facts, and Values” in Morality in Practice ed James Sterba (Wadsworth).

  • Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II

    In my last post, Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I, I sketched Tooley’s distinction between a deontological and an axiological argument from evil and argued that Tooley rejects the axiological version because it rests on controversial ethical claims that are likely to be rejected by many theists. I outlined Tooley’s deontological version and explored the moral assumptions it is based on and Plantinga’s criticism of these.

    “God can do wrong only if he commands himself to do something and then disobeys his own command.”In this post, I will argue that Plantinga’s criticisms can be reformulated by appealing to a divine command theory of ethics and when they are, it can be shown that Tooley’s argument relies on controversial moral assumptions that many theists do, in fact, reject. Finally I will look at two objections to this line of argument; the claim that, even on a divine command theory, God has obligations and Tooley’s critique of the divine command theory. I will argue both objections fail.

    To save you having to click back repeatedly to the previous post, I will first re-cite step one of Tooley’s argument,

    (12) The property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the death of more than 50,000 ordinary people is a wrongmaking property of actions, and very serious one.
    (13) The Lisbon earthquake killed approximately 60,000 ordinary people.

    Therefore, from (12) and (13):

    (14) Any action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake has a very serious wrongmaking property.

    Tooley then adds as an additional premise,

    (15) No rightmaking properties that we know of are such that we are justified in believing both that an action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake would have had those rightmaking properties, and that those properties are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking property.[1]

    Modifying Plantinga’s Response : The Divine Command Theory
    In a more recent paper, Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience, Plantinga makes a comment that suggests he could formulate his objection so that “permitted by God” was taken in the second sense mentioned above. Plantinga writes,

    Theists typically think ethical properties are intimately related to what God approves or values or commands. Thus they will often think of moral obligation as a matter of what God commands. What is obligatory are those actions God commands or wills; what is wrong are those actions God prohibits; what is permissible are those actions God does not prohibit.[2]

    Plantinga here refers to what has been called the divine command theory of ethics[3]; the position that, “an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God.”[4] According to a divine command theory of ethics, being permitted by God is a right-making property; actions are right, if and only if, and because, they are permitted by God. I am inclined to think that any theist who accepts a divine command theory of ethics will deny (15) whether or not they “offer a theodicy.” They will also have reasons for denying (12).

    This is because, if the divine command theory of ethics is true then (12) is false. Tooley affirms that, “the property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the death of more than 50,000 ordinary people is a wrongmaking property of actions, and very serious one.” According to a divine command theory of ethics this is false; there is only one ultimate wrong-making property, that of being contrary to God’s commands. Given that the property of “choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the death of more than 50,000” is not the same property as “being permitted by God,” it follows that the former property is not a right-making property of actions and, as such, (12) is false.

    Even if one puts this point to one side, if a divine command theory of ethics is true, there is a further problem with (12); it is ambiguous compare:

    [12 a] The property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the deaths of more than 50,000 ordinary people is a serious wrongmaking property of actions performed by human beings (or rational creatures relevantly like human beings).

    and

    [12b] The property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the deaths of more than 50,000 ordinary people is a serious wrongmaking property of actions performed by (including God).

    For Tooley’s argument to be successful he must mean for (12) to be taken as [12b]. Tooley is arguing for the conclusion that if God exists then he has performed actions that it would be wrong for God to perform; which, given that God is good, is an impossible state of affairs.

    However, what is an “uncontroversial moral claim” that “does not seem very problematic” is [12a]. If a divine command theory of ethics is true then [12b] is false. This is because one implication of a divine command theory of ethics is that God does not have obligations and hence, strictly speaking, nothing he does can be right or wrong.[5] Craig notes “nor, plausibly, is God bound by moral duties since he does not issue commands to himself.”[6] Similarly Alston, in an article defending the claim that God has no obligations, states “we can hardly suppose that God is obliged to love his creatures because he commands himself to do so.”[7]

    Craig and Alston’s arguments seem sound. If the divine command theory of ethics is true then a person p is required to do an action a, if and only if, God commands p to do a. It follows then, that God is required to do a, if and only if, God issues commands to himself. Moreover, if divine command theory of ethics is true then a person engages in wrongdoing, if and only if, they disobey a command that God issues to them. Hence, if divine command theory of ethics is true then God can do wrong only if he commands himself to do something and then disobeys his own command.

    Neither of these conditions seems very likely. It seems unlikely that God issues commands to himself. Why would he need to? If he wanted to do something wouldn’t he just do it? Moreover, it seems absurd to suggest that even if God issues commands to himself that he would then disobey them. That would suggest that God displays some form of weakness of the will and it is not clear that weakness of the will is compatible with a supremely excellent being such as God.[8]

    The divine command theorist will take a similar stance towards (15). If a divine command theory of ethics is true then the property of “being permitted by God” is a right-making property. If God permits an action, in the sense of refraining from prohibiting it, then that makes the action morally permissible. Consider then, “[God’s] action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake.” For the reasons spelt out above, God did not forbid himself from doing this; hence, this action has a right-making property that a theist, who embraces divine command theory of ethics, knows about.

    Similarly, this right-making property outweighs any wrong-making property that the action has. As I mentioned previously, according to a divine command theory of ethics, there is only one ultimate wrong-making property, the property of being contrary to God’s commands. Given that God did not command himself to stop the Lisbon earth quake, the action of allowing the Lisbon earthquake to occur does not have any wrong-making properties and so there can be none that outweigh it.

    Consequently, if a divine command theory of ethics is true then both (12) and (15) are false. It is not just theists who offer a theodicy then who would reject (15).

    The Significance of this Conclusion
    I think this conclusion is significant for two reasons. First, a significant number of contemporary theists embrace and defend the divine command theory of ethics. Those who have defended it include, Robert Adams,[9] John Hare,[10] William Alston,[11] William Lane Craig,[12] Stephen C Evans,[13] Philip Quinn,[14] Edward Wierenga,[15] Janine Marie Idziak,[16] William Wanwright,[17] William Mann,[18] Thomas Carson[19] and more recently Alvin Plantinga.[20] These people are not obscure, marginal representatives of theism; these names include some of the leading defenders of theism in the literature today. Tooley’s argument then contains a premise that would be, and in fact is, rejected by many leading theists.

    Second, this fact introduces a significant incoherence into Tooley’s discussion of the argument from evil. In “Does God Exist?” Tooley rejects an axiological argument from evil on the grounds that it rests on a moral claim that was “within ethical theory deeply controversial, and likely to be rejected by many theists and others.” Tooley’s own argument, however, presupposes the denial of a divine command theory of ethics. This is a controversial moral claim and one that is rejected by many theists. His own deontological argument then seems to be no better than the axiological version he rejects.

    Finally, it seems in light of these conclusions that Tooley’s deontological argument from evil is incomplete. It is not enough for Tooley to simply ask “what rightmaking properties can one point to that one has good reason to believe would be present in the case of an action allowing the Lisbon earthquake and that would be sufficiently serious to counterbalance the property of allowing more than 50,000 to be killed?”[21] The theist can point to such a property. Tooley needs to supplement his argument with a refutation of the divine command theory; specifically, he needs to argue that even if theism is true then this theory is implausible and problematic. Until the divine command theory can be shown to be a rationally untenable option for theists, theists can avoid Tooley’s deontological argument from evil.

    Objections
    In this last section I want to anticipate and criticise two lines of argument that Tooley or a defender of Tooley, might make against the above line of critique.

    Tooley’s Critique of Divine Command Theory
    I suggested that Tooley’s argument was incomplete until he provides the theist with some reason why a divine command theory of ethics cannot be accepted then the theist can reject two crucial premises of his argument. (A defender of Tooley could object here that he has argued for this conclusion. In a debate with William Lane Craig at the University of Colorado Tooley addressed the divine command theory and offered a Euthyphro style argument against it. I agree that a complete defence of my position requires a response to this argument, regular readers, however, will note that I have addressed this argument previously in Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands.)

    Divine Commands and Divine Obligations
    My argument depended on the claim, made by Craig and Alston, that if a divine command theory is true then God does not have duties. Linda Zagzebski has called this claim into question. In “More Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists,” Zagzebski proposes an account of divine obligations which is compatible with a divine command theory. Zagzebski starts by offering an account of the meaning of obligation, “What we mean by ‘obligation,’ is essentially this: there is no other option compatible with moral goodness.”[22] From this definition she argues that “the metaphysical source of divine obligation” and “the metaphysical source of human obligation are distinct.”[23]

    The metaphysical source of the property of an act of a human being which makes it the case that there is no alternative act compatible with goodness is that it is commanded by God. The metaphysical source of the property of an act of God that makes it the case that there is no alternative act compatible with goodness is that that any alternative is incompatible with Gods nature.[24]

    Hence, she concludes that it is “metaphysically necessary that an act X is an obligation for a human if and only if X is commanded by God” and “it is metaphysically necessary that an act X is an obligation for God if and only if X is compatible with Gods nature.”[25]

    While I am not convinced by Zagzebski’s account of divine obligations, even if one grants them for the sake of argument it is clear that it cannot be used to defend Tooley’s deontological argument from evil. Consider,

    (15) No rightmaking properties that we know of are such that we are justified in believing both that an action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake would have had those rightmaking properties, and that those properties are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking property.[26]

    If Zagzebski’s account of divine obligation is correct then (15) is false. Plantinga’s original unreformulated response is rehabilitated. As Plantinga pointed out “God exists and is a perfectly good being. If this is true, then any action that God has in fact performed has the property of being performed by a perfectly good being.”[27] Moreover, “theists believe that God performed the action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake. They therefore believe that the action of performing the Lisbon earthquake has the property of being performed by God, who is a perfectly good person.”[28] But if the Lisbon earthquake was performed by a perfectly good person, performing it must be compatible with the divine nature and hence it has the very right-making property that Zagzebski identifies in her account of divine obligation.

    The same is true for (12). Tooley contends,

    (12) The property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the death of more than 50,000 ordinary people is a wrongmaking property of actions, and very serious one.

    On Zagzebski’s account (12) is false. There are only two right-making properties that exist. The property of being compatible with God’s nature, which is what makes God’s actions right, and the property of being permitted by God, which is what makes human actions right. Now the property of “choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the deaths of more than 50,000 people” is neither of these properties and hence, is not a right-making property.

    [1] Michael Tooley “Does God Exist?” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, M A: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 119; I am following Tooley’s enumeration.
    [2] Alvin Plantinga “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience” accessed 4 April 2009.
    [3] The position is perhaps more correctly known as ethical voluntarism as some proponents of it emphasise the divine will as opposed to divine commands. However, because of the widespread use of the term ‘divine command theory’ in the literature I will stick with the term.
    [4] W K Frankena Ethics 2nd ed (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973) 28.
    [5] It should also be noted that the claim that God does not have obligations has been defended on grounds other than a divine command theory. See, for example, William Alston, “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). Hence, even if one dismisses a divine command theory of ethics it still follows that [12a] is not the obviously uncontroversial statement Tooley thinks it is.
    [6] William Lane Craig Philosphical Foundations of a Christian World View (Downers Grover Il: Intervarsity Press, 2003) 529.
    [7] William Alston “Response to Zagzebski” Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston eds Heather D Battaly, Michael P Lynch, William P Alston, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005) 204.
    [8] It is worth noting the definition of God that Tooley works with in formulating his argument. For the purposes of his argument, Tooley is defining God as “an appropriate object of worship” as well as an appropriate object of other human concerns such as the desire that good will triumph over evil, and that justice will be done” etc.
    [9] Robert Adams “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979); Finite and Infinite Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
    [10] John Hare God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands and Human Autonomy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001); God and Morality: A Philosophical History (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).
    [11] William Alston “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990).
    [12] William Lane Craig “This most Gruesome of Guests” in Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanthan: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2009) 172; also Philosphical Foundations of a Christian World View (Downers Grover Il: Intervarsity Press, 2003) 529-532.
    [13] C Stephen Evans Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
    [14] Philip L Quinn Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); “An Argument for Divine Command Theory” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 289-302; “The Recent Revival of Divine Command Ethics” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Fall 1990) 345-365; “The Primacy of God’s Will in Christian Ethics” Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992) 493-513; “Divine Command Theory” in Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory ed Hugh Lafollette (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 53-73; “Theological Voluntarism” The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 63-90.
    [15] Edward Weirenga The Nature of God: An Inquiry into the Divine Attributes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989) 215-27. See also, “Utilitarianism and the Divine Command Theory” American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984) 311-318; and “A Defensible Divine Command Theory” Nous 17 (1983) 387-408.
    [16] Janine Marie Idziak “Divine Commands Are the Foundation of Morality” Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Malden, MA:Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004) 290-298.
    [17] William Wrainwright Religion and Morality (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2005).
    [18] William Mann “Theism and the Foundations of Ethics” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion ed William Mann (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).
    [19] Thomas Carson Value and the Good Life (Notre Dame IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2000).
    [20] Alvin Plantinga “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience”available at http://www.ammonius.org/grant_topics.php#0708 accessed 4 April 2009.
    [21] Michael Tooley “Does God Exist?” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, M A: Blackwell Publishers, 2008), 122
    [22] Linda Zagzebski “More Suggestions for Divine Command Theories” in Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston eds Heather D Battaly, Michael P Lynch, William P Alston, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005) 189.
    [23] Ibid.
    [24] Ibid.
    [25] Ibid.
    [26] Tooley “Does God Exist?” 119.
    [27] Alvin Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, M A: Blackwell Publishers, 2008), 170
    [28] Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I

  • Sunday Study: Sodom and Gomorrah Part II

    In my previous Sunday Study post, Sodom and Gomorrah Part I, I argued that it is a mistake to conflate what scriptural narratives describe with what they prescribe. I suggested that often the characters in these narratives do things that The Torah later explicitly condemns and in this context it is plausible to read the narratives as records of people’s failings and errors. Such passages often dramatically highlight the consequences of these failings. I think the example of Lot offering his virgin daughters to a group of men is an example of this. Let me elaborate a bit more on why I am inclined to think this.

    After the proto-history of flood, fall, Babel, etc the tale of Israel’s history proper began in chapter 12 with Abram being called by God to leave Ur of the Chaldees and to go to an unknown land (this land is later identified as Canaan which today is Israel or Palestine). Abram was given several promises that ultimately promised the renewal of all nations on earth. The text states that Lot accompanied Abram in this quest.

    By chapter 13 Abram and Lot had reached Canaan and Abram had gained considerable wealth. Disagreement over land and resources had lead to in v 7 “quarrelling … between Abram’s herdsmen and the herdsmen of Lot.” Abram diplomatically solved the dispute by allowing Lot to take his pick of the land, promising that his men would go elsewhere. Lot’s response was to, rather ungraciously, in v 10 “choose for himself the whole plain of the Jordan and set out toward the east,” land that the text stated was, “well watered like the garden of the LORD, like the land of Egypt, toward Zoar.”

    The reference to the garden of the Lord here is an allusion to the garden of Eden. The narrator added a side comment starting in v 12, “Lot lived among the cities of the plain and pitched his tents near Sodom.13 Now the men of Sodom were wicked and were sinning greatly against the LORD.” Apparently Lot’s response to Abram’s diplomacy was to take the very best of the land for himself, thus forcing Abram to go elsewhere. Moreover, the text implies that Lot, in order to gain the economic resources that his men had been in dispute with Abram over, decided to “pitch his tent” amongst people known to be of corrupt character – he was willing to compromise himself for material gain.

    In the next chapter, chapter 14, everything went to custard. Lot’s decision rebounded on him. The inhabitants of Sodom violated a vassal treaty and engaged in a violent uprising. The war that ensued was disastrous; Lot lost all his possessions and was taken hostage. In 14:13-17 Abram rescued Lot and his possessions.

    I think a careful reader can detect a clear irony in this account. From the dispute in chapter 13 it seems clear that Lot wanted Abram’s resources. Abram essentially yielded them; Lot then chose to live amongst people known to be corrupt and violent to ensure he got to keep them. However, Lot lost all his resources and his freedom and had to rely on Abram’s men, the very men he had disputed with, to get them resources back. The irony here is perhaps made quite clear at the end of chapter 14,

    The king of Sodom said to Abram, “Give me the people and keep the goods for yourself.” 22 But Abram said to the king of Sodom, “I have raised my hand to the LORD, God Most High, Creator of heaven and earth, and have taken an oath 23 that I will accept nothing belonging to you, not even a thread or the thong of a sandal, so that you will never be able to say, ‘I made Abram rich.’ 24 I will accept nothing but what my men have eaten and the share that belongs to the men who went with me—to Aner, Eshcol and Mamre. Let them have their share.

    Here Abram’s actions contrast starkly with those of Lot’s. Whereas Lot chose to associate with evil people to gain wealth, Abram refused to seek economic gain from the people of Sodom out of fidelity to a covenant he had with God. Despite all of this, Lot decided to remain with the people of Sodom. We do not hear of Lot again until Gen 19 when he was forced to flee from Sodom, losing all his possessions and his wife. Once again it was Abram’s intervention that saved him.
    A careful reading of the Sodom and Gomorrah story in its context shows Lot, not as a paradigm of wisdom but something of a tragic ironic figure. Lot was called by God with Abram and was faithful to that call, he packed up and went to Canaan. However, Lot compromised his integrity to gain the wealth of his kinsman and as a result lost everything. The little he was left with at the end was due to the intervention of the man he tried to deprive.

    This kind of irony is not uncommon in Genesis. Perhaps the clearest example is that of Jacob. Jacob conned both his father and brother (the eldest son and his father’s favorite) in an attempt to secure an inheritance. He was forced to leave his home and seek shelter with Laban, who ironically tricked him into marrying Leah instead of Rachel which caused a massive amount of marital and domestic stress which reverberated into the next generations. Jacob retaliated by tricking Laban out of his flocks. He was again forced to flee. Jacob had a strange encounter with God whereby he underwent some kind of conversion symbolised by a name change. However, in his later life as a father, his sons tricked him into believing Joseph, his favorite son, is dead. The grief from this trick almost destroyed Jacob. Once again there is evident irony. A careful reading of the Pentateuch narrative shows this feature repeatedly.

    When the story of Lot is picked up again I think one can see similar ironies emerge. Many people read the story of Sodom and Gomorrah and note Lot’s comments to the men of Sodom in 19:7-8

    “No, my friends. Don’t do this wicked thing. Look, I have two daughters who have never slept with a man. Let me bring them out to you, and you can do what you like with them. But don’t do anything to these men, for they have come under the protection of my roof”

    However, what is less noticed is what immediately follows this passage. When fleeing Sodom, Lot is promised sanctuary in the nearby town of Zoar. In v 30, however, the text informs us that “Lot and his two daughters left Zoar and settled in the mountains, for he was afraid to stay in Zoar. He and his two daughters lived in a cave.” The man who chose to live in Sodom for the economic gain associated with the cities of the plain became too frightened to live in them. But the irony has not finished yet. The text goes on in v 32,

    “One day the older daughter said to the younger, “Our father is old, and there is no man around here to lie with us, as is the custom all over the earth. Let’s get our father to drink wine and then lie with him and preserve our family line through our father.” That night they got their father to drink wine, and the older daughter went in and lay with him. He was not aware of it when she lay down or when she got up. The next day the older daughter said to the younger, “Last night I lay with my father. Let’s get him to drink wine again tonight, and you go in and lie with him so we can preserve our family line through our father. So they got their father to drink wine that night also, and the younger daughter went and lay with him. Again he was not aware of it when she lay down or when she got up. So both of Lot’s daughters became pregnant by their father.”

    The man who only a few verses earlier offered his daughters to a mob to be raped to save his own skin was drugged and raped by his daughters. The story has come full circle.

    Lot was faithful to God’s call to leave Ur and offered kindness, shelter and protection to homeless strangers in a brutal and violent town so for that reason his life was spared. But Lot had to face his own sins and failings which ricocheted back upon him imposing a severe cost. The man who was willing to associate with evil and violent people in order to wrest the economic wealth of the plains from his kinsman, found his decision left him with nothing. He ended up living in a cave in the mountains, not the plains he coveted, afraid of the people in the plains and survived only because of the intercession of his kinsman. He treated his daughters with contempt and tried to have them raped to save his own skin and then found that his daughters were willing to rape him to get children. This is how I read the tragic and insightful tale of Lot.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Sodom and Gomorrah Part I

  • Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I

    This two-part series criticises the deontological argument from evil proposed by Micheal Tooley in The Knowledge of God, the print debate between him and Alvin Plantinga.1 My critique proceeds in four parts. Initially I will sketch Tooley’s distinction between a deontological and an axiological argument from evil and will argue that Tooley rejects the axiological version because it rests on “controversial ethical claims;”2 claims that are “likely to be rejected by many theists.”3 Then I will outline Tooley’s deontological version and focus on the moral assumptions upon which it is based and Plantinga’s criticism of these. This will conclude Part I of the series.

    In my next post, Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II, I will argue that Plantinga’s criticisms can be reformulated by appealing to a divine command theory of ethics and when they are it can be shown that Tooley’s argument relies on controversial moral assumptions that many theists do, in fact, reject. Finally I will look at two objections to this line of argument; the claim that, even on a divine command theory, God has obligations and Tooley’s critique of the divine command theory. I will argue both objections fail.

    Deontological and Axiological Arguments from Evil
    Tooley distinguishes axiological versions of the argument from evil from deontological versions. The former, “are formulated in terms of axiological concepts—specifically, in terms of the goodness or badness, the desirability or undesirability of states of affairs.”4 [Emphasis original] The latter, “uses concepts that focus upon the rightness and wrongness of actions, and upon the–rightmaking or wrongmaking–properties that determine whether an action is one that ought to be performed.”5

    Tooley suggests that axiological versions are problematic. He takes as a paradigm the version proposed by William Rowe. Central to Rowe’s argument is the following conceptual claim about a perfectly good being.

    (2) Any omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect person would prevent the existence of any state of affairs that is both (a) intrinsically bad, or undesirable, and (b) such that he could prevent its existence without either allowing an equal or greater evil, or preventing an equal or greater good.6

    Rowe applies (2) to concrete evils in the world. He identifies various concrete evil states of affairs and contends that these concrete cases meet the criteria (a) and (b) specified in (2).

    There are well rehearsed problems with Rowe’s attempt to do this.7 While Rowe can maintain that there are cases where we do not know of any greater good lost or greater evil prevented by the allowance of these evils, this is insufficient to show that the cases meet the specified criteria. His argument requires that we know that there are no greater goods lost or evils prevented known to an omniscient being. Tooley notes that the step from “we don’t know” to the claim that an “omniscient being does not know” is difficult to bridge and Rowe’s attempts to do so have been unsucessful.8

    Tooley’s most important objection is to contest (2) itself. Tooley notes that (2) appears to rely on a,

    common consquentialist claim … namely, the claim that an action is morally wrong if it fails to maximise the balance of good states of affairs over bad states of affairs. But the difficulty then is that “such a claim is, within ethical theory, deeply controversial, and likely to be rejected by many theists, and others.9

    In response, Tooley develops and defends an argument from evil which does not rely on “controversial ethical claims,”10 one that focuses “upon the rightness and wrongness of actions.”

    Tooley’s Deontological Argument
    Tooley summarises his argument succinctly,

    The basic idea involved in a deontological formulation of the argument from evil is then as follows. First, it is claimed that the world contains certain states of affairs such that any action of allowing any of those states of affairs to obtain would involve one or more known wrongmaking characteristics that would outweigh the sum total of known rightmaking characteristics that the action would have. If this is right, then any such action is prima facie wrong, relative to the total information that one presently has concerning the action’s rightmaking and wrongmaking characteristics. Secondly, the crucial question is then whether there is any sound inductive argument that will take one from the conclusion that such an action is prima facie wrong to the further conclusion that the action is probably wrong all things considered. If there is, one will then have an ‘inductively sound’ version of the evidential argument from evil.11 [Emphasis original

    As Tooley notes the argument has two crucial steps. The first is the claim that an argument that allows a certain states of affairs to occur is prima facie wrong. The second is an inductive argument from the conclusion that such an action is prima facie wrong to the claim that it is ultra facie wrong; that is, wrong all things considered.

    It is clear that Tooley considers the second step to be the ‘crucial question’ and he spends most of his article defending the inductive inference he draws. Tooley appears to think that the first step is fairly straight-forward and uncontroversial. His defence of it consists of a few paragraphs.

    Tooley’s Argument for Step One
    Tooley’s argument for the first step consists of three premises,

    (12) The property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the death of more than 50,000 .ordinary people is a wrongmaking property of actions, and very serious one.

    (13) The Lisbon earthquake killed approximately 60,000 ordinary people.

    Therefore, from (12) and (13):

    (14) Any action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake has a very serious wrongmaking property.

    Tooley then adds as an additional premise,

    (15) No rightmaking properties that we know of are such that we are justified in believing both that an action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake would have had those rightmaking properties, and that those properties are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking property.12

    Tooley believes that (12)-(15) are uncontroversial “(12) makes a moral claim, but one that does not seem at all problematic while statement (13) makes a historical claim for which there is, I believe, very good evidence.”13 Tooley appears to think that the only potentially controversial premise is (15) but that this would be denied only by philosophers who offer a theodicy.14 Tooley maintains that (15) is,

    [V]ery reasonable, given the relevant facts about the world, together with the moral knowledge that we possess. For what rightmaking properties can one point to that one has good reason to believe would be present in the case of an action of allowing the Lisbon earthquake, and that would be sufficiently serious to counterbalance the wrongmaking property of allowing more than 50,000 to be killed.15

    Tooley concludes that, in the absence of a defensible theodicy, there are compelling arguments for concluding that allowing the Lisbon earthquake to occur is prima facie wrong. This is not an insignificant conclusion. Many contemporary theists discuss the argument from evil by conceding that there are no defensible theodicies and then arguing that even in the absence of such a theodicy, belief in God is not rendered improbable by the existence of evil. If Tooley is correct, this line of argument is mistaken. The burden of proof is clearly on the theist to provide a theodicy; if he or she cannot then God’s action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake to occur is prima facie wrong. Moreover, if Tooley’s inductive arguments hold, the God’s actions will be ultra facie wrong.

    Plantinga’s Response
    Plantinga responds to Tooley’s argument by calling into question (15).

    Christians and other theists believe that God exists and is a perfectly good being. If this is true, then any action that God has in fact performed has the property of having been performed by a perfectly good being. Furthermore, Christians and other theists believe that God performed the action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake. They therefore believe that the action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake has the property of having been performed by God, who is a perfectly good person. This is a rightmaking property that clearly outweighs and counterbalances any wrongmaking properties that action has.16

    In this citation, Plantinga denies that only theists who offer a theodicy would contest [15]. Plantinga suggests that theists will typically believe that there is a right making property of which they know of; the property of being permitted by God. This property overrides all others and the action of allowing the Lisbon earthquake has this property. Hence, the Theist has good reasons for rejecting [15] even if he or she cannot offer an adequate theodicy.

    Tooley’s response is to deny that being permitted by God is a right making property,

    Suppose that God exists, and, thus permitted the Lisbon earthquake. One can ask “What property did the action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake have that made it morally permissible for God to permit it?” The response that it had the property of having been permitted by God, who is perfectly good, is not a satisfactory answer to that question: there must be some other property that made it permissible for God to permit the Lisbon earthquake. The property of having been permitted by God, while it entails that there must have been a rightmaking property, is not itself a rightmaking property.17 [Emphasis original]

    The phrase “having been permitted by God” is ambiguous. In one sense it could refer to God allowing an event to occur; if he does not stop it occurring then God permits the Lisbon earthquake. In another sense, however, it can refer to God refraining from forbidding an action. God permits drinking alcohol, for example. If God refrains from issuing a command to abstain from drinking alcohol then it is clear, I think, that Plantinga means the former and Tooley seems18 correct in suggesting that in this sense it is clear that being permitted by God is not a right making property but this leaves an important question hanging; couldn’t Plantinga’s critique be reformulated in terms of the “second sense” of the phrase “having been permitted by God.”

    In my next post, Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II, I will propose a Plantingan reformulation and address some objections.

    1 Michael Tooley “Does God Exist?” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, M A: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 70-147.
    2 Tooley “Does God Exist?”105.
    3 Ibid.
    4 Ibid.
    5 Ibid, 106.
    6 William Rowe “Evil and Theodicy” Philosophical Topics 16: 119-32. I am following Rowe’s enumeration.
    7 Stephen John Wykstra “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil;” Peter van Inwagen “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence” and “Reflections on the Chapters by Draper, Russell, and Gale;” William P Alston “The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition” and “Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil;” Daniel Howard-Snyder “The Argument from Inscrutable Evil” in The Evidential Argument from Evil ed Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, Indiana University Press: 1996). See also, Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
    8 Tooley “Does God Exist” 104.
    9 Ibid, 105.
    10 Ibid.
    11 Ibid, 116.
    12 Ibid, 119; I am following Tooley’s enumeration.
    13 Ibid, 122.
    14 Ibid.
    15 Ibid.
    16 Alvin Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 170-71.
    17 Michael Tooley “Closing Statement and Reply to Plantinga’s Comments” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 238.
    18 I say seems because Linda Zagzebski’s account of divine obligations would challenge this contention as I will argue in part IV.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II

  • Sunday Study: Sodom and Gomorrah Part I

    Something I’ve been deeply disturbed about since childhood is the Sodom & Gomorrah tale – specifically, the offering of the virgin daughters to satisfy the hordes of men outside the house. On the face of it, this looks like a negation of the daughters’ autonomy (mind you, I’ve never seen this passage interpreted – Matt may have some insights). There are lots of Biblical instances where we’re exhorted to curb our autonomy for others or the greater good – eg turning the other cheek – but the Sodom & Gomorrah incident doesn’t seem like one of them.

    In response to these comments let me begin by examining a little of what is going on in the passage Anna cites. The passage occurs in the 19th chapter of the book of Genesis,

    1The two messengers arrived at Sodom in the evening, and Lot was sitting in the gateway of the city. When he saw them, he got up to meet them and bowed down with his face to the ground.2 “My lords,” he said, “please turn aside to your servant’s house. You can wash your feet and spend the night and then go on your way early in the morning.” “No,” they answered, “we will spend the night in the square.”3 But he insisted so strongly that they did go with him and entered his house. He prepared a meal for them, baking bread without yeast, and they ate.4 Before they had gone to bed, all the men from every part of the city of Sodom–both young and old–surrounded the house.5 They called to Lot, “Where are the men who came to you tonight? Bring them out to us so that we can have sex with them.” 6 Lot went outside to meet them and shut the door behind him 7 and said, “No, my friends. Don’t do this wicked thing. 8 Look, I have two daughters who have never slept with a man. Let me bring them out to you, and you can do what you like with them. But don’t do anything to these men, for they have come under the protection of my roof.”9 “Get out of our way,” they replied. And they said, “This fellow came here as an alien, and now he wants to play the judge! We’ll treat you worse than them.” They kept bringing pressure on Lot and moved forward to break down the door. 10 But the men inside reached out and pulled Lot back into the house and shut the door.

    Lot offered his daughters to the mob in exchange for the mob not having sex with his guests. Analysing various legal and mythical writings from the ancient near east, Robert Gagnon argues that in the ancient near eastern context “it was apparently regarded as degrading and shameful for a man to be penetrated as if he were a woman regardless of whether the passive partner was a voluntary participant. To be routinely penetrated by other men was to be treated as a “man-woman” and hence made inferior in honour and status to those doing the penetrating.”[1] This is reflected in the middle Assyrian laws which stipulated that the punishment for slandering a man of the same social class by claiming he had sex with men was castration.

    Similarly having sex with a man of the same social class carried the punishment of “they shall turn him into a eunuch.”[2] I noted in an earlier post that penal sanctions of this kind serve a kind of ironical hyperbolic function; however, the point of the law is clear, “the principle of lex talionis explains the punishment: just as the perpetrator deprives the penetrated man of his manhood, so to the penetrator will be denied his manhood by being castrated.”[3] The Egyptian myth of Horus and Seth has similar motifs; when Seth sodomises Horus in his sleep it is stated that the gods “screamed aloud, and belched and spat on Horus’s face.”[4] Ancient near eastern mores apparently did not condemn sex with a man of lower social standing than oneself as this person’s standing was already lowered relative to oneself.

    The men (messengers) in the passage entered Sodom as strangers. Lot showed them the required hospitality and hence brought them “under the protection of his roof” the men of Sodom’s actions, therefore, are an attempt to symbolically castrate his guests, to humiliate and degrade them and lower the social status of the outsiders relative to the community. Lot who is responsible for showing hospitality to his guests’ attempts to avert this outrage, offered his own virgin daughters to the mob. This makes some sense given the mores of the time; clearly a woman cannot be emasculated, nevertheless Anna is correct to find this deeply disturbing. After all is not handing your daughters over to be raped by men also outrageous? Who would deny that women are humiliated and degraded and treated as inferiors when they are raped by men? Lot’s priorities here are clearly selective.

    On numerous occasions I have had interlocutors point to this passage and argue that the scriptures teach that rape is permissible. This text is cited to show that the canonical scriptures teach a misogynistic morality whereby women are seen as inferior to men. This response is too quick; for starters, those who reason this way make a straightforward error in interpretation. That of conflating what scriptures records with what it prescribes.

    Some examples can demonstrate this; in the book of Acts the martyrdom of Stephen is recorded. The passage tells us that at Stephens’s trial, “They produced false witnesses, who testified, ‘This fellow never stops speaking against this holy place and against the law.’” And the text goes on to record what happens after this event,

    they covered their ears and, yelling at the top of their voices, they all rushed at him, dragged him out of the city and began to stone him. Meanwhile, the witnesses laid their clothes at the feet of a young man named Saul…. And Saul was there, giving approval to his death. On that day a great persecution broke out against the church at Jerusalem.

    The text records perjury and judicial murder yet no one would sensibly infer from this that Acts teaches that perjury and judicial murder of Christians is justified. Similarly, the gospel of Matthew records Herod ordering the murder of John the Baptist, this does not entail that Matthew’s gospel teaches that we should kill John the Baptist. The same is correct here; the text records Lot offering his virgin daughters to a mob. It does not follow from this that the text teaches that this kind of conduct is permissible or good.

    In fact, I want to suggest that a careful reading of these narratives gives a different picture. I think one important feature of the patriarchal narratives is that they record the mistakes and failures of Israel’s patriarchs. A good example is the case of Abraham. In Gen 15 Sarah is childless. God promises Abraham that “a son coming from your own body will be your heir.” Abraham tries to get a woman other than Sarah (Hagar) pregnant and succeeds in doing so. The result is a whole lot of domestic strife and rivalry much of which continues in the Jewish/Islamic struggles in the middle east today. What we note later in the text, however, is that God gives Abraham a child through Sarah. It is interesting that when Moses delivers laws in the Torah, of which Genesis is a kind of extended preface, he proposes laws that condemn the kind of treatment Abraham gave Hagar and Ishmael.

    Noah is another. Noah experimented with alcohol and got drunk. The result is he was shamed, possibly raped. Later passages in the proverbs warn about intoxication and again drunkenness is implicitly condemned in the Torah.

    Abraham’s children display similar flaws. One example is the seduction of Dinah. Gen 34 records how “Shechem son of Hamor … was drawn to Dinah daughter of Jacob, and he loved the girl and spoke tenderly to her.” This is elaborated in the next passages as involving pre-marital sex with her. After this Shechem asks his father Hamor to, “Get me this girl as my wife.” The response of Dinah’s brothers is to negotiate in bad faith, deceive the men of the city into getting circumcised and then when they are still recovering from this (imagine circumcision of adult males prior to the development of anaesthetics) they attack the city and kill the men in it. This action is again implicitly condemned by Moses when he passed a law in Deut 22:28 that states, “If a man happens to meet a virgin who is not pledged to be married and seduces her and they are discovered, 29 he shall pay the girl’s father fifty shekels of silver. He must marry the girl, for he has violated her.” This law actually enjoins the very opposite of what Dinah’s brothers did; moreover, the language of Deut 22:28 alludes to that of Gen 34, it is almost is if the law is commentary on the actions of Dinah’s brothers.

    Examples could be multiplied; the point is that if one reads Genesis in context with the Torah it is evident that not everything the patriarchs did is held out as a paradigm of just conduct. Frequently they serve as object lessons of errors to avoid and their conduct is implicitly condemned elsewhere in the text. I think it is plausible to see Lot’s actions in Gen 19 as a graphic example of this. In the next Sunday Study I will elaborate on this more fully.

    [1] Robert A Gagnon The Bible and Homosexual Practice: Texts and Hermeneutics (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2001) 46.
    [2] Ibid, 45.
    [3] Ibid, 46.
    [4] Ibid, 52.

  • John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part II

    In my previous post, John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part I, I argued that Loftus’ position was based on a confusion between ontological and epistemological foundations. I will now address his arguments against divine command theory.

    Loftus’ Arguments Against a Divine Command Theory
    After misconstruing the divine command theory as an epistemological theory, Loftus offers a series of fairly standard criticisms of divine command theories. Here I will focus on the two most important,

    1. The contention that acceptance of a divine command theory makes it impossible to coherently attribute goodness to God; and,
    2. The claim that a divine command theory makes God’s commands and hence, moral obligations, arbitrary.

    The emptiness of God is Good
    To support the first contention Loftus offers two reasons which I term the Empty Tautology Objection and the Arbitrariness Objection. I will address each in turn.

    Empty Tautology Objection
    The first is that on a divine command theory claiming God is good becomes an empty tautology as seen in this statement, “If we think that the commands of God are good merely because he commands them, then his commands are….well….just his commands.”

    Here we see Loftus mistakenly assuming that a divine command theory is an account of “goodness.” As I argued above it is not, it is an account of deontological properties such as right and wrong. Suppose, however, we recast the objection in terms of deontological properties, the objection still fails. Loftus contends that if something is right because God commands it then God’s commands become right by definition; and hence, the claim ‘God commands what is right’ becomes a tautology, it is just the assertion that “his commands are….well….just his commands.”

    This argument is mistaken. It rests on the assumption that if something (in this case an action) has a property (in this case the property of being right) because it has another property Q (in this case the property of being commanded by God). Then the claim that Q is P is a tautology with no substantive content. However, this assumption is mistaken.

    Consider the claim that water is H20. This is a statement that one property is constituted by and hence cannot exist independently of, another property. Yet one who makes the claim ‘water is H20’ is uttering a substantive, non-tautological statement. Claiming ontological dependence between two properties does not entail that a statement attributing such a relationship is a tautology.

    Independent Standard
    The second and perhaps major argument Loftus offers is that we cannot call God’s commands good unless we appeal to a standard independent of him. He expresses different versions of this objection in several places in his argument. He writes,

    We cannot call them good, for to call them good we’d have to have a standard above them to proclaim that they are indeed good commands. But on this theory they are just God’s commands. God doesn’t command us to do good things, he just commands us to do things. “All that could mean is that God wants us to do what he wants us to do.

    Responding to Moreland he makes the same argument,

    But think of what Moreland is saying here. He’s saying that morality is grounded in God’s nature, not in his commands. But this is a difference that makes no difference. It does no good to step back behind the commands of God to God’s purported nature at all. For we’d still want to know whether or not God’s nature is good. God cannot be known to be good here either, without a standard of goodness that shows he is good. For unless there is standard that shows God is good beyond the mere fact that God declares that his nature is good, we still don’t know whether God is good.

    Elsewhere he makes essentially the same point,

    [T]he modified divine command theory becomes equivalent to the autonomy thesis: the Good (or right) is not good (or right) simply because God commands it. Furthermore, if this is correct, then we can discover our ethical duties through reason, independent of God’s command. For what is good for his creatures is so objectively. We do not need God to tell us that it is bad to cause unnecessary suffering or that it is good to ameliorate suffering; reason can do that. It begins to look like the true version of ethics is what we called ‘secular ethics.’

    Loftus goes on to summarise his point as follows,

    The bottom line here is that if there is no moral standard for us to appeal to when we’re assessing the claim that God is good, and all we have to go on is the fact that God said he was good, then we cannot asses whether or not God is good. We still haven’t been given as answer to what he means by the word good.

    Much can be said about these arguments. First, Loftus again construes divine command theories as offering an account of axiological properties such as goodness. I have already noted this is mistaken.

    Second, Loftus again confuses ontology with epistemology. He affirms that “God cannot be known to be good … without a standard of goodness that shows he is good.” if there is no moral standard for us to appeal to when we’re assessing the claim that God is good, … we cannot assess whether or not God is good.” Also, “we can discover our ethical duties through reason, independent of God’s command.” These are all statements about epistemological independence of our beliefs about right and wrong. They show that one can know right and wrong independently and prior to any beliefs one has about what God commands. The problem is that divine command theorists do not deny this. They do not claim that one needs to believe in the existence of divine commands to be able to tell what is right and wrong. They claim that the property of being wrong is ontologically dependent on the property of being contrary to God’s commands.

    Turning again to the analogy regarding H20 and water, most people throughout history have known what water is without knowing water is H20. In fact, one cannot determine whether H20 really is water unless we have an independent standard of some sort in our minds as to what water is. It does not follow from this, however, that water is not H20 and given that something cannot exist apart from itself, it does not follow that water and H20 are ontologically independent. The same is true of divine commands; people can know what is right and wrong without believing in God. Further, to know whether God’s commands are right, one will have to have some standard of what things are right and wrong. It does not follow from any of this that right and wrong can exist independently of divine commands.

    Loftus’ arguments for the claim that one cannot coherently attribute goodness to God then fail. These arguments rely on the conflation of ontological and epistemological dependence I mentioned above.

    Arbitrariness Objection
    The second argument Loftus appeals to is the claim that a divine command theory makes God’s commands arbitrary. Again, he offers two versions of this.

    No Reasons for Commanding
    Loftus claims that a divine command theory means that God cannot have reasons for his commands and hence, they are arbitrary,

    If we say, on the one hand, that something is right because God commands it, then the only reason why we should do something is that God commands it. It makes God’s commands arbitrary, because there is no reason why God commanded something other than the fact that he did.

    This argument is again based on a failure to distinguish epistemic and ontological questions. Loftus argues,

    [1] According to a divine command theory the only reason an action is wrong is because God commands it.

    He infers from this that,

    [2] Therefore there can be no reason why God issued the commands he did; hence,
    [3] God’s commands are arbitrary.

    This argument equivocates on the word “reason”. William Wrainwright notes that the word reason can be used in two different senses; the “constitutive” sense, one affirms that the reason water has certain phenomenological properties is because it is H20. This use of the word “reason” denotes a special kind of ontological relationship. The second sense is a “motivational” reason, as in when I state that the reason I feed my daughter is because I love her. This sense is more psychological or epistemological.[19]

    It is important to note that these two senses are not the same. Suppose my son pours water into a glass. If we ask what the constitutive reason is for him to pour water into the glass, the answer is  that he poured water into the glass because he poured H20 into the glass. This was not the motivational reason for him pouring water into the glass; the  motivational reason will be that he wanted a drink. His wanting a drink does not constitute water and water being H20 is not the motivational reason he wants the drink.

    Turning to Loftus’ argument, when Loftus states in [2] that God has no reason for commanding as he does, he clearly means that he has no motivating reason; this is why he can draw the conclusion that God’s commands are arbitrary. If God has motivational reasons, such as concern for the welfare of others for issuing the commands he does then God’s commands are not arbitrary.

    The problem is that [2] follows from [1] only if one interprets [1] as affirming that a divine command theory contends that the only motivating reason an action is wrong is because God commands it. But this is false. As noted, when divine command theorists claim that the only reason an action is wrong is because God commands it, they have in mind constitutive reasons. The only constitutive reason an action is wrong is that God prohibits it; it does not claim anything about motivating reasons. Hence, Loftus’ argument commits the equivocation fallacy.

    Abhorrent Commands Objection
    The second version of the arbitrariness objection Loftus cites is the claim that a divine command theory entails that abhorrently evil acts could be morally required.

    God could’ve commanded something else, or even something contrary, or something horribly evil and simply declared it good. If God is the creator of morality like he’s purportedly the creator of the universe, then he could have simply declared any act good, and there would be no moral reason to distinguish such a God from the Devil. This presents us with the “seemingly absurd position that even the greatest atrocities might be not only acceptable but morally required if God were to command them.

    Turning to the second version, Loftus proposes two premises;

    [1]If a divine command theory is true then it follows that if God commanded something abhorrently evil it would be required.
    [2] It is possible for God to command something that is abhorrently evil.

    From this it follows that it is possible for abhorrently evil actions to be required.

    I agree with [1]; it is an implication of divine command theory that if God commands an abhorrently evil action then the action is required. This is not as significant as it seems for two reasons. First, any meta-ethical theory, whether secular or religious, that contends that some property P is equivalent to moral obligation will entail an analogous conditional; it will be the case that if an abhorrently evil action has P, the abhorrent action will be required. Hence, [1] by itself does not render a divine command theory implausible unless any and every account of obligation is implausible.

    Second, according to the standard account of counterfactual conditionals, a conditional, such as “if God commanded something abhorrently evil it would be required,” is true if the antecedent is impossible. If the antecedent is impossible, the conditional is on par with claims such as “if there were a round square, its area would equal the square of one of its sides”[20] or “if there were no prime numbers, all numbers would have been Prime.”[21] The real issue then is [2]; is it possible for God to command abhorrently evil actions?

    The problem is that [2] is false. Divine command theorists contend that an action is right, if and only if, God commands it. God here is used to refer to a personal being that is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good. Hence, for [2] to be possible, there needs to be a possible world in which a perfectly good being would command an action which is gratuitously abhorrently evil. This is an incoherent notion.

    I think Loftus does have a response to this; it can be seen in his reply to essentially the same line of argument proposed by Robert Adams,

    If Adams wants to claim that it is goodness plus God’s command that determines what is right,” Pojman rightly asked, “what does God add to rightness that is not there simply with goodness…If love or goodness prescribes act A, what does A gain by being commanded by God? Materially, nothing at all.” It is at this point where both a modified divine command ethic and a secular ethic share the exact same grounding.

    Loftus here asks, if the commands of a good and loving God constitute right and wrong, why can’t a secular ethicist simply appeal to goodness and love to ground ethics and bypass an appeal to divine commands? What do divine commands add to love and goodness that is not “simply there with goodness?” Loftus seems to think Adams is refuted by the mere raising of this question.

    This is rather puzzling because in an article Loftus cites, Adams himself raises this question and answers it. Adams notes,

    It may be objected that the advantages of the divine command theory can be obtained without an entailment of God’s existence. For the rightness of an action might be said to consist in the fact that the action would agree with the commands of a loving God if one existed, or does so agree if a loving God exists. This modification transforms the divine command theory into a nonnaturalistic form of the ideal observer theory of the nature of right and wrong. It has the advantage of identifying rightness and wrongness with properties that actions could have even if God does not exist. And of course it takes away the basis of my metaethical argument for theism.

    The flaw in this theory is that it is difficult to see what is supposed to be the force of the counterfactual conditional that is centrally involved in it. If there is no loving God, what makes it the case if there were one, he would command this rather than that? Without an answer to this question, the crucial counterfactual lacks a clear sense I can see only two possible answers: either that what any possible loving God would command is logically determined by the concept of a loving God, or that it is determined by a causal law. Neither answer seems likely to work without depriving the theory of some part of the advantages of divine command metaethics.

    No doubt some conclusions about what he would not command follow logically or analytically from the concept of a loving God. He would not command us to practice cruelty for its own sake, for example. But in some cases, at least, in which we believe the act is wrong, it seems only contingent that a loving God does or would frown on increasing the happiness of other people by the painless and undetected killing of a person who wants to live but will almost certainly not live happily.6 Very diverse preferences about what things are to be treated as personal rights seem compatible with love and certainly with deity.[22]

    Adams’ point is that “the essential features of a loving and omniscient creator would seem to under-determine the creator’s preference.”[23] God is not required, by the facts of the world or by his own nature, to issue the exact commands he does. Of course there are some things a loving good God will not command, such as cruelty for it own sake but once these options are eliminated, there is still no one set of commands that a loving being in a world like ours must command. There are possible worlds like ours where a loving being would issue one set of commands and there are other possible worlds like ours in all other respects in which a loving being would issues other commands. Hence, if we ask what a perfectly good and loving being would endorse, no correct answer can be ascertained. As such, one cannot ground moral obligations in the notion of lovingness or goodness alone. One needs to ground these things in the commands of an actually existing, loving and omniscient being.

    Conclusion
    My conclusion, then, is that Loftus’ critique fails. Loftus mistakenly construes defenders of divine command theories as claiming an epistemological dependence of goodness upon belief in God. It, in fact, claims that right and wrong ontologically depends upon God’s commands. Loftus’ major objections fail as a result. He fails to show that the idea of a good God is incompatible with a divine command theory and he fails to show that God’s commands are arbitrary. Finally his critique of Adams consists merely of a rhetorical question and ignores the responses actually made to this question by Thomas Carson and Robert Adams himself.

    [19] William Wrainwright Religion and Morality.
    [20] Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” 172.
    [21] Plantinga “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience” 32.
    [22] Robert Adams “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief” 3 http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/ADAMS1phil1reading.pdf.
    [23] Thomas Carson Value and The Good Life (Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 2000) 243. Carson defends the idea of under determination in more detail in his The Status of Morality (Dordrect: Reidel, 1984).

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