Author: Matt

  • Abortion and Child Abuse

    Bloggers WhaleOil and David Farrar are in disagreement over some comments made by Garth George in the New Zealand Herald regarding abortion and child abuse.

    Garth George says:

    I have said it before and I say it again: The number one cause of abuse against women and children is abortion.

    David Farrar says:

    I disagree. I think there would be less child abuse if there were more abortions. The world would be a better place if those who are not suited to be parents did not become parents.

    Whale Oil says:

    I think they both are missing the point.

    We have become a society that tolerates and indeed allows violence against children it is just a matter of where you draw the line that is the argument.

    Garth George draws the line at conceptiona and David Farrar draws the line at birth. (I think, perhaps he would like to clarify when it is ok to kill babies and when it is
    not.)

    My view is that we are indeed a sick society at whatever point we kill and excuse it away with weasel words like foetus, procedure, first trimester etc.

    Likewise my view about most of the recent cases of horrific child abuse is that they are no more and no less anything but late term abortions. The simple fact is that the parents of the children had no more respect for the life of the child than someon having a “procedure”.

    You see if we accept that you can kill children at up to 21 weeks from conception then why not at birth or why not at 5 years old, or even 18 just before they can vote. For me there is no difference. The Nia Glassie’s and Kahui twins are simply late term abortions by parents who no longer respected the life of their child. As long as we fail to respect human life then we will continue to get these case and no one should be at all shocked by it all.

    Whaleoil has a point, something Adolf agrees with me on, though David Farrar’s argument is not new; in, “Abortion a Feminist Perspective”, Susan Sherwin mentions that feticide may be justified in order to prevent child abuse.

    [F]eminists recognize that women have abortions for a wide variety of compelling reasons. … knowing the fathers to be brutal and violent, may be unwilling to subject a child to the beatings or incestuous attacks they anticipate; some may have no other realistic way to remove the child (or themselves) from the relationship.[i]

    In addition to outright abuse, she also suggests child neglect.

    Women who suffer from chronic disease, who believe themselves too young or too old to have children, or who are unable to maintain lasting relationships may recognize that they will not be able to care properly for a child when they face the decision.[ii]

    The argument is a two-premise syllogism. The first premise asserts that permitting feticide prevents child abuse or future child neglect. This is because it destroys organisms that will probably be abused in the future. The second premise claims that it is permissible to kill an organism if we know that it will probably be abused or neglected in the future.

    The second premise is false. Consider a new-born child born into a context whereby one knows that it is likely that it will be abused either physically or sexually in the future. If the major premise were true, then killing that infant to protect it from abuse would be permissible. In fact, according to this principle, it is acceptable to kill any person, child, teenager or adult whom we know is likely to be abused in the future.

    In order to be plausible, Sherwin and Farrar must limit the kinds of entities that the principle is referring to. It must be restricted to exclude entities that are infants or other human beings such as toddlers, adolescents and adults. However, the proponent of this argument must assume that fetuses are not human beings in the same sense that infants are. The argument is sound only if feticide is not homicide.

    Engaging in feticide to prevent child abuse is only justifiable if feticide is somehow the morally-better option. If the two are both homicide then one will be engaging in the very action one is trying to prevent. Sherwin and Farrar’s argument relies on the assumption that feticide is not homicide. Farrar has, of course, argued for this assumption, he maintains that a fetus is not a human being until it acquires an ECG which Farrar places at 20 weeks. As I argue in, Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar, this argument is unsuccessful as are the other attempts to place it at viability, sentience or personhood.

    [i] Susan Sherwin “Abortion a Feminist Perspective.” In Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 5th ed., ed. Bonnie Steinbock & John D. Arras, (Mountain View CA: Mayfield Publishing Co) 1999, 361.
    [ii] Ibid.

  • Why am I a Bigot?

    I am a Theologian with a strong background in Philosophy; apart from Philosophical Theology, my particular area of interest is Ethics. Given this, I often post my thoughts and reflections on moral issues of various persuasions on this blog. I have discussed the morality of warfare, whether it is sometimes permissible to lie, the morality of torture, capital punishment, the nature of our obligations to the poor.

    On occasions, I discuss issues related to abortion and homosexual conduct something which, I think, is unavoidable if one is a theologian writing from a relatively conservative evangelical perspective. I believe that homosexual conduct is contrary to divine law and I believe that feticide is homicide. The latter claim is not just a casual opinion; I spent some years writing a PhD thesis on the topic and over the last couple of years I have had articles published in this area.

    Now a pervasive response to my position on these issues is that appeals to divine law to condemn practises like feticide or homosexual conduct are really an expression of bigotry. One would think that it would be fairly obvious to people that you don’t refute a position by calling the person who holds it a bigot and it is tempting to dismiss this response as simply a confused ad hominem; the problem is that people do not appear to find this obvious. In my experience, many people even educated people, recoil from considering any argument against feticide or homosexual conduct or listening to theological concerns on these matters because they perceive such positions to be bigoted.

    It’s worth fisking this objection a bit. A good place to start is to ask what does this charge amount to? When someone claims that another is a bigot, what is meant by this? The Pocket Oxford English Dictionary defines a bigot as someone who is obstinate in his or her beliefs and is intolerant of others. Presumably, the objector claims that one who appeals to the law of God to condemn feticide or homosexual conduct (or some other practise celebrated by contemporary liberal secularists) displays or expresses these features – they are both obstinate and intolerant. The accusation clarified, an obvious question arises, why hold this claim?

    Obstinance
    Turning to the issue of obstinance, why must a person who holds these beliefs do so in an obstinate manner? Could they not have come to these beliefs as a result of careful reflection? Alternatively, could they hold to them because they are not convinced the counter arguments are sound? What is needed here is some argument to preclude such options and none is forthcoming.

    I suspect that what lingers behind this accusation is the belief that theologically-based opposition to abortion is obviously mistaken and the case against it so compelling that no rational, informed person could think otherwise. If so, then this is not so much an argument against such appeals but an assumption that those who make them are mistaken on other grounds. The objector should come clean about what these other grounds are and put forward the compelling, unassailable arguments that everyone else should apparently already know about.

    Let me add further that as a person who studies ethics and aspires to be a professional theological-ethicist, nothing is more frustrating than being told by a journalist or a tax lawyer that it’s an obvious fact that a certain theological ethical stance is mistaken. Further, if I think otherwise I must be misinformed and ignorant of the subject, a subject they often have done little or no study on. Perhaps this is one area where a little humility is needed.

    Intolerance
    Turning to the issue of intolerance, let me here just say that, the concern about intolerance implicit in this objection is mistaken. Even if the proponents of more conservative positions were intolerant, this would only constitute an objection to their behaviour if it were first assumed that people have a duty to refrain from intolerance and this assumption is problematic.

    In many contexts intolerance is appropriate and contrary to popular slogans, a virtue. Imagine a society that tolerated rape, child molestation or infant sacrifice? Moreover if unqualified, the assertion that people have a duty to be tolerant entails that one should tolerate intolerance, is deeply paradoxical.

    For this charge to have any substance, the objector needs to specify what sorts of action he or she thinks one should tolerate and which ones are such that intolerance is inappropriate. He or she needs to justify this distinction and then provide reasons for thinking that appeals to divine law in a subject like feticide fall into the latter category yet no argument of this sort has been forthcoming.

    Here us the rub; if feticide is an action on a par with infanticide then intolerance towards it is justified. In asserting that it is not, the objector implicitly assumes that feticide is not homicide without offering argument. Similarly if homosexual conduct is a serious form of sexual immorality, such as incest, bestiality, polygamy or adultery, then intolerance against it is not necessarily wrong. Our society, for example, has laws against incest and bestiality and few contend for their repeal (though the chipping away has begun). Once again, the objector here, in making their charge, assumes that homosexual conduct is not seriously immoral.

    Now it is possible that these assumptions are correct but it is also possible they are not.
    Anyone who appeals to divine law to condemn practises like feticide or homosexual conduct is denying these assumptions. You don’t provide a cogent objection to a position by assuming it is false at the outset and then using this assumption to prove that it is. What is needed is an actual argument for the assumption in the first place. Until some actual argument is forthcoming that demonstrates the falsity of what has been defended, objections based on the notion of tolerance merely beg the question and have no impact on the thesis being advanced.

    I think there is a kind of irony here; often when someone accuses Theologians of bigotry they themselves are simply obstinately assuming that their position is true and their assumption leads them to castigate and refuse to tolerate the opinions or person who expresses dissent to the secular liberal orthodoxy. Here, as elsewhere, the accusation of bigotry is a form of Orwellian double-speak.

  • What About the Poor? More on Sustenance Rights

    In my last post, What About the Poor? Sustenance Rights Examined, I noted the position of Nicholas Wolterstorff that, “If a rich man knows of someone who is starving and has the power to help that person, and chooses not to, then he violates that person’s rights as surely and reprehensively as if he had physically assaulted the sufferer.” I argued that as stated, this position is subject to three problems; first, that it leads to absurd consequences, entailing that I have a duty to give to every poor person I know about. Second, that it has totalitarian implications and third, that acceptance and practise of this principle would destroy any incentive people have to work.

    In a more recent article “Christianity and Social Justice,” Wolterstorff attempts to defend his thesis against the three criticisms I mention above.

    Turning to the first problem, Wolterstorff’s response is to note that “acknowledging a person’s right to some good does not imply laying on everyone else a duty to extend to that person that good.” This seems odd, if a right to sustenance on the part of the poor does not mean we are obligated to give them the means to sustenance, what bite does it have?

    Wolterstorff puts forward an interesting suggestion. Turning to the paradigm of a right to not be assaulted, Wolterstorff suggests that while we have a duty to not assault people we do not have a duty to protect every person against assault. However, he goes on to note that in addition to having a right to not be assaulted, people have a right against their society “to have practises” and “social structures” that protect them from assault. In particular, such things as a police force, courts and an army. Clearly, if the right does not just mean that members of society refrain from attacking people, it also means that these members have a duty support the police force. Further, if the police force is ineffective, people have a duty to try and improve it (through such things as voting and lobbying).

    Moreover, Wolterstorff suggests if “I see you about to get mugged when no policeman is in view – then I may be obliged to offer you my protection in a direct way.” Wolterstorff’s argument is that sustenance rights are analogous to the right to not be assaulted in this way. People have a duty to support whatever institutions or charities exist that alleviate poverty. If they are ineffective, they have a duty to reform them. Further, if one encounters a person in extreme necessity one is required to assist them in a direct way.

    Turning to the second criticism, Wolterstorff makes three points to get around the totalitarian implications sketched previously. First, he states that,

    the general idea behind having such a right to some good is that individual actions and social practices ought to be such that one enjoys that good. But the role of the government in practices which secure that right may be nil or negligible. Not all rights are enshrined by law. Sometimes in the early church the care for the poor of society was principally in the hands of the bishop.

    He goes on to note, correctly I think, that,

    Far from acknowledging that there is such a right, nothing directly follows as to what, if anything, governments should do by way of securing that right. In particular, it does not follow that the poor should be put on a dole supported by public taxation. In principle there is a wide variety of other practices which would undo the violation of this right, some of which the government would have little or no role.

    Accepting sustenance rights then, does not entail accepting massive public ownership or redistribution.

    Second, he tries to mitigate the objection by appealing again to the analogy with assault; “in our fallen world… we do not suppose that, in the face of all the aggressive impulses of human beings purely voluntary arrangements would suffice to secure our freedom from assault.” He goes on to note, “why should we suppose that, in the face of acquisitive impulses of human beings, purely voluntary arrangements would suffice to secure our right to sustenance?” Finally he notes, “it is true, indeed that there are dangers lurking when governments try to ensure that the rights of the poor are respected. But who would be so foolish as to argue that the armies and police forces that we assemble propose no threat?”

    Wolterstorff makes some pertinent points here. However, it is worth noting that if one takes the assault analogy seriously, several things are evident. First, the police and armed forces actually do not play as big a role in protecting us from assault as it may appear.

    The Police do not patrol everyone’s houses at night, nor does it have 24/7 video surveillance cameras set up on every home, nor do we have publicly funded burglar alarms. If people want any of these things, they hire private security guards, install privately owned cameras and buy their own alarms. The police are called when these systems fail and there is immediate danger.

    It is also worth noting that the ability of the Police to catch and prosecute assailants is limited by such things as the presumption of innocence, the need for warrants, probable cause, etc. In societies with lower crime rates, police typically have more sweeping powers, powers our society rightly rejects precisely to avoid the danger of excess state intrusion and its subsequent abuses. As such, if the state is to secure our rights to sustenance similar limits should apply.

    Turning to the third criticism, Wolterstorff states that while people do not earn their basic human rights by merit, such as the right to be free from assault or the right to liberty, the same is true of the right to sustenance. Wolterstorff notes correctly that a person can forfeit these rights by misdeeds; if a person attacks another his right to be free from assault is forfeited and I can strike him if necessary to defend myself. Similarly, if a person commits a crime they forfeit their right to liberty and can be imprisoned.

    In the same way, Wolterstorff suggests that the right to sustenance can be forfeited if a person is capable of providing for themselves but refuses to do so; just as a needy person has a right against society to sustenance, society has a right against those it supports that they will take responsibility for themselves when they can and not pass of their responsibilities onto someone else.

    As far as I can tell, Wolterstorff’s responses enable him to accept sustenance rights without falling into the problems mentioned in my previous post. It is worth noting, however, his response makes the claim that the poor have sustenance rights significantly qualified.

    What it means is that individuals in a society have a duty to support various institutions that aid and assist those who are unable to provide for their own needs. These institutions may or may not be run by the state but if they are, the state plays a last resort role and is subject to careful checks on its power. This picture may differ from that some proposed by certain types of Libertarian, particularly those who believe we have no obligations to support the poor at all, but it is hardly the charter for statism or massive public ownership

  • What About the Poor? Sustenance Rights Examined

    When I began university I had strong socialist leanings. The reason was that I believed, as a Christian, we had a duty to help the poor. Studying at Waikato University, however, brought me face to face with socialist academics and left-wing activists and I discovered a hostile and dangerous social agenda that I could not in good conscience embrace.

    That, however, left me with a burning question. What about the poor? If the classical liberal or conservative view is correct. What about the poor?

    In the next two posts I want to discuss my thoughts on this a bit. I will do so by examining Nicholas Wolterstorff’s defence of welfare or sustenance rights. I will argue that, as initially stated, Wolterstorff’s position is subject to three problems. In my second post, What About the Poor? More on Sustenance Rights, I will suggest that while Wolterstorff’s position can escape these problems, it does so only by qualifying itself in such a way that there is no necessary link between accepting the poor’s right to sustenance and the kind of statist re-distributionary policies favoured by the left

    In, When Justice and Peace Embrace, Nicholas Wolterstorff suggests that “If a rich man knows of someone who is starving and has the power to help that person, and chooses not to, then he violates that person’s rights as surely and reprehensively as if he had physically assaulted the sufferer.” Wolterstorff suggests further that this conclusion is orthodox Christian teaching. He provides citations from Basil, Ambrose, John Chrysostom and Aquinas to substantiate this claim.

    One immediate problem with this line of analysis is it ignores something of the context in which these theologians wrote. They were addressing the situation of alms-giving. A wealthy person living in a small town or village in the Roman Empire would come across destitute people in his community whom would ask for assistance in most cases a wealthy lord would be able to do so. In the age of the mass media, however, things are quite different. It is not just about the poor person down the road; I am regularly bombarded with stories of poverty and suffering of thousands of people all across the globe when I turn on the new or surf the web.

    In this context, to suggest that failure to alleviate any poverty I know about violates the person I fail to help and is analogous to assaulting them is problematic for a couple of reasons.

    First, take my duty (and corresponding right on the part of others) to not assault people. This duty applies 24-7, it is not like I can refrain from assault on Fridays but smash peoples heads in on Sunday. There are 6 billion people in the world, as I have a duty to not assault anyone I owe that duty to all these 6 billion people. Moreover, each one of them holds a right to not be assaulted against me. This is not problematic, because discharging my duty to all 6 billion is not hard, I can do so by refraining from assault.

    Discharging such a duty and its corresponding right, is unproblematic because the duty to not assault is a duty to not do something

    A claim right; a right requiring me to do or give assistance, however, is different. Clearly I cannot give assistance to all 6 billion people in the world at all times. I simply do not have the resources or the ability to do that. Hence, each individual poor person cannot hold a right to assistance against me. At best, I have a duty to help some people, some of the time, with some of my resources.

    A related problem is that unless I live just above the sustenance level and force my family to do the same, and donate every cent I earn above that level to the poor then I will be failing to discharge my duty. Hence, accepting Wolterstorff’s claim would quite literally imply that everyone has a duty to live just above the poverty line. Wealth of any sort is a sin, a conclusion at odds with scripture which commends many wealthy people (like Job and Abraham) as Godly people and not as mass murderers.

    A second problem is the quite oppressive political implications of Wolterstorff’s claim. Given what I have outlined above, if failure to give to a poor person when we can is analogous to assaulting them then every person who does not live just above sustenance level and does not donate everything they own and earn to charity is in fact a serious criminal. A just government would then be required to lock all these people up, their children would end up in foster care and all their property confiscated and given to the poor as restitution. The implications of accepting a right of the sort Wolterstorff affirms is totalitarianism; a system where everyone is poor and anyone else is arrested and detained. The state would be obligated to take almost everything.

    A third problem, which follows on from the first and second, is that if everyone must be self-frozen in their income to just above sustenance level and any falling below it grants one a right to receive what’s needed to get above the sustenance line wouldn’t this destroy all incentives to work or be productive in any shape or form?

    The problems with the idea of ‘sustenance right’ were not lost on Aquinas, whom Wolterstorff interestingly cites. In the Summa Theologica Aquinas addresses the question of whether a destitute person who steals food to avoid starvation has committed theft. Aquinas’s answer is no and he cites with approval the claim of Ambrose of Milan that the poor have a right to sustenance and any property given to those unable to maintain themselves is money they are owed.

    However, Aquinas goes on to offer some important qualifications. First, in the articles prior to this section of the Summa, Aquinas defends the concept of private property and argues that those who claim the private property of others are in sin, further, those who claim we are required to renounce property to be Christians are expounding a heretical doctrine. Second, Aquinas states that;

    Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all
    to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the
    stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of
    those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that
    it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at
    hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no
    other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by
    means of another’s property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this
    properly speaking theft or robbery.

    Aquinas observations are worth noting. Because there are so many in need and I cannot give to all I am not required to give to every needy person I know of. Instead I have a duty to give some of my money to some needy people and it is my choice to decide who. It follows from this observation that giving to the poor is an imperfect duty. Unlike the duty to refrain from assault it is not a duty to be discharged to all people at all times, but rather it is a duty to give some money to some poor people. But it is at the discretion of the property owner to decide who.

    While there is a duty to give to the poor there is not a duty to give to any specific poor individual and hence no individual poor person has a right to my property (although I will be in serious dereliction of duty if I give to no-one).

    Aquinas does provide an exception; what has been called the case of extreme necessity. As Donagan puts it, if a person “encounter[s] another who then and there needs help, which only he can give without disproportionate inconvenience” then such a person has a duty to give it and the other has a right to such help.

    The medieval position Aquinas expounded is well summed up by Donagan in The Theory of Morality. Donagan suggests that all people have a duty of beneficence, “it is impermissible not to promote the well-being of others by actions in and of themselves permissible, in as much as one can do so without proportionate inconvenience.” By promoting the well-being of others, Donagan means things such as [paraphrasing Donagan] promoting the well being and up-bringing of those who are not adults, especially orphans; helping those who have duties, which owing to bereavement, injury, illness or desertion, they can’t perform without help; restoring to a condition of independence those who have been incapacitated with illness, accident, or injury and caring for those who are crippled, deaf, blind, are chronically ill, or senile.

    However, the principle of beneficence is an imperfect duty. No individual poor person has a right to my assistance except in cases of extreme necessity. Donagan draws the appropriate conclusion; apart from cases of extreme necessity,

    Duties of beneficence, seeing they are not owed to specific individuals generate
    no enforceable rights; and apart from duties of beneficence, no innocent
    person has any obligation to contribute to the wellbeing of others, except as he
    may freely undertake.

    Donagan suggests that the duty to benefit the poor is an imperfect duty to pursue a particular end and not based on a right that another may have. While one has a duty to pursue this end, it is at a person’s discretion as to how exactly they would pursue it.

    It would seem then that social polices based on alleged welfare rights of the poor and the authority of the state to coercively uphold such rights are unjust. While we have a duty to aid the well-being of the poor as an end, no poor individual, outside of cases of extreme necessity, has a right to such assistance and hence one cannot justly be forced or required to give any individual such assistance.

    In my next post I will look at how Wolterstorff responds to criticisms of this sort and how he qualifies his position to do so.

  • Barack Obama and Martin Luther King’s Dream

    A generation ago Martin Luther King stated he had a dream: that people should be judged on the content of their character, not the colour of their skin. Fast-forward to the current day and thousands are celebrating the fulfilment of this dream in the election of Barack Obama as US President.

    There is an irony here; people are saying Obama’s election is great because he is black; it is good that a “black man” has taken office. The result is being evaluated on the basis of the “colour” of the president-elect’s skin. Everyone, who praises Obama’s ascendancy for these reasons, is in fact rejecting King’s dream.

    Ironically King’s dream is being upheld by those conservatives, like Robert George, who opposed Obama’s pursuit of the Presidency on the basis of his character. Such conservatives considered the kinds of values Obama holds to and the policies he supported on the basis of these values to be lacking.

    To celebrate Obama’s election because a black man has finally been elected to office without heeding the concerns about his character is exemplify the very racism that Martin Luther King was speaking against.

  • The Myth of Left Wing Moral Superiority

    Irish Bill at The Standard writes:

    One of the things I like about being left wing is how often the best moral decision is also the best economic decision.

    Take economic stimulus for example. In a recession it’s the most vulnerable such as beneficiaries, low paid workers and youth that are hit worst because they are the ones least likely to have any financial backstop. The good thing is the best way to ameliorate the effects of a recession on society as a whole is to help these people out.

    Irish Bill here insinuates that only left-wingers support giving to the poor and right wingers do not. The problem is that this claim is false. As I pointed out here, evidence suggests that religious conservatives actually give significantly more money to assist poor people than secular liberals do.

    The difference between the left and right is not about whether or not financial assistance should be provided to the poor. Contrary to the false moral superiority (and slander) propagated by left wing activists, the difference is that the left primarily believe in taking other peoples money by threats of violence and giving it to the poor and in practice they give very little of their own money voluntarily. Conservatives, on the other hand, give generously of their own money and take others by force only when as a last resort.

    The Standard can con themselves into thinking that the former is the more moral stance, but I think that is fairly questionable.

  • Fisking Grant Robertson

    Supporters of Labour Candidate for Wellington Central, Grant Robertson, have published this video to provide evidence that Stephen Franks, the National Candidate for the same electorate, is “homophobic.” I remain unconvinced; in fact, I suggest that a careful analysis of the contents show that, if anything, Robertson is the bigoted ideologue. Unlike Robertson’s supporters, I will endeavour to argue for my position.

    The video opens citing Franks’ comments that he was tired of having to deal with “grumpy Christians and whiny gays;” the caption is put above the head of John Key and attributed to the National Party as a whole. This is clearly dishonest. Franks’ comments were made in a particular context; while he was on the select committee for the Civil Unions Act, he commented that he was sick of grumpy Christians and whiny gays appearing before the committee. To suggest from this that he is sick of gays and Christians in general is simply engage in inaccurate spin.

    Moreover, to suggest that because Franks’ on one occasion, several years ago, was sick of them in a particular context means that it follows that the entire National party is sick of them in every context is a whopping non-sequitur. It is hard to take this kind of inference seriously except for the fact that many people actually appear to!

    Turning to the video; Grant Robertson starts by responding to the arguments Stephen Franks gave against the Civil Unions Bill in parliament. After admitting that he has read the speech, Robertson does not provide any arguments against Franks’ reasons or offer any critique, he instead suggests that Franks’ arguments are “convenient” given the comments he made which “did not put the gay community in a positive light.”

    Note what’s going on here, Robertson is suggesting that if a person utters comments that do not put the Gay community in a positive light, if such comments do not advance the PR agenda of homosexuals, then their argument can be written off. It apparently does not matter whether their arguments are well reasoned, sound or that the facts they cite may be true. The crucial consideration is whether everything they have stated is in the interests of the gay community.

    If it is not then everything they say should be ignored and dismissed by members of parliament considering legislation. Apparently, the state should only listen to and consider the reasoning offered by those who advance the PR of the gay community.

    This is not open minded tolerance, its close mindedness of the worst kind.

    The other point about this opening comment on Robertson’s part is that it is clearly irrational. Robertson is responding to Franks’ arguments, not by showing there is anything mistaken about them but by insinuating he is really motivated by homophobia.

    In other words, his response to a critique of government policy is to impugn the motives of the critic and attack his character. Grant suggests that Franks’ is homophobic but then immediately declines to mention or provide evidence of the charge despite the fact that he has put it out there. Moreover even if what Robertson claims of Franks were true, it actually does not address any of Franks’ arguments.

    Even if people are motivated by hatred or fear in adopting a position, it does not follow that the position itself is mistaken or that the reasons they offered for its adoption were bad. If I, for example, were motivated by an irrational fear and hatred towards fundamentalists to publish books defending evolutionary theory that would not mean that evolutionary theory is based on an irrational fear of fundamentalism and that I had offered no reasons for this theory. The theory stands or falls on the evidence not the motives of its proponents. Hitler thought the world was round. Was he wrong because he was a monster?

    Turning to the allegedly homophobic comments; Robertson cites Franks’ statement “I love my dog that does not mean I can marry him.” Some of Robertson’s supporters have claimed on the basis of this that Franks “compares civil unions to marrying your dog.” This way of interpreting Franks’ comments is of course easily turned into something homophobic, if Franks had actually suggested that a same-sex civil union is on par with marrying a dog, one could then suggest that he thinks that gays are like animals, and hence less than human with no civil rights.

    The problem is that this is not what Franks’ said. He did not say that “civil unions are like marrying your dog” he said the fact that you love your dog does not mean you can marry it. In other words, he is stating that the mere presence of love is not enough to justify the state issuing a marriage licence.

    As Franks himself clarified, he was not attacking civil unions per se, but the premise of one particular argument for civil unions; the premise that the state should recognise all loving relationships.

    Now contrary to what Robertson and his supporters contend, there is in fact a world of difference between noting that one premise of one argument in favour of civil unions entails that one can marry one’s dog and the claim that all gays are dogs.

    The reasoning of Robertson’s supporters seems to be this:

    P. If one premise of one argument for P entails Q then P is analogous to Q.

    But this is clearly false: the North American Man Boy Love Association has offered arguments for Gay rights which utilise premises that entail that paedophilia is a loving relationship between adult and child. Many gay people are aware of these arguments and reject them precisely because they have this implication. Does it follow that these gay people believe that all homosexuals are paedophiles? Of course not! They simply reject these particular arguments and ensure that those who defend ‘gay rights’ use other arguments that do not entail support for paedophilia. To suggest that anyone who rejected NAMBLA’s argument because of its absurd implications then believes that all gays are paedophiles is ridiculous.

    Take another example, Grant Robertson supports abortion. Grant is also aware, I am sure, that one argument for abortion rights, proposed by Peter Singer, entails that infanticide is permissible. Does Grant admitting this problem exists with Singer’s argument mean that he thinks abortion is on par with infanticide and that he is ok with this? Clearly not. He simply concludes that this particular argument is flawed.

    So contrary to Robertson’s supporters, Franks did not suggest either directly or by implication that “civil unions is like marrying your dog”.

    Its interesting that when Franks’ points out that Robertson has confused a claim about a premise with a claim about a conclusion and has cited him out of context that the response is not an apology and retraction; instead Robertson’s supporters, boo, hiss, shout “shame on you” and continue to affirm the false claim Robertson makes against his opponent. No attempt is made to suggest the original allegation was inaccurate or apologise. These people apparently think that it is ok to accuse people of malicious intent without evidence or to back their claims up and that when the claims are refuted they simply maintain them anyway. Who is the bigot here? Not Franks.

    Its worth noting that even if Franks’ had claimed that having “a civil union is like marrying your dog” it does not necessarily follow that this is offensive or “does not portray the gay community in a positive light.” It depends upon what respects Franks’ said they were alike. It is true, for example, that heterosexual relationships are like marrying ones dog in some respects as both, for example, occur on earth; both involve at least one human, both can take place in the 21st century, both can happen in the middle of the day etc. Of course in other respects they are quite different. Marrying a dog, for example, (if one consummated the union) violates the law of God whereas a heterosexual marriage does not. But the point is that whether saying they are alike is offensive depends on the way in which they are said to be alike.

    Interestingly, even if one misrepresents Franks’ comments, it is clear that he only stated they were alike in that both were loving. Is this what Grant finds offensive? Apparently to say gay relationships are loving “does not portray the gay community in a positive light.” Would Robertson prefer that people said gay lovers hate each other?

    Finally let me say some comments about Franks’ argument. While Franks refers to a person loving one’s dog, elsewhere he pointed out that a common premise utilised by defenders of the Civil Unions Act entailed that incestuous unions should be recognised by the State. In this he is absolutely correct; many people who defended the Bill did so on the grounds that:

    (1) the government should not discriminate against any loving committed relationships;

    The problem is that it is a fact that:

    (2) incestuous and unions with multiple partners can be loving and committed;

    However, [1] and [2] entail that:

    [3] incestuous and multiple partner relationships should be recognised by the state.

    Hence if one affirms [1], one is rationally committed to supporting incestuous marriages. Now despite howls and boos from Robertson’s supporters, it is difficult to see what is wrong with this inference. The argument form is clearly valid, it follows the form: all A’s are B, x is an A; therefore x is a B. To deny this form is to affirm that all things of a particular sort can have a property and also some can not, which is a contradiction. Robertson’s supporters may be suggesting that it is homophobic to not contradict oneself but I doubt they are that stupid.

    Seeing the argument is valid, the objector needs to reject [1] or [2] as false. The whole point of the argument, however, is to show that [1] is false by showing the absurd conclusions it entails. Moreover, Robertson’s supporters in the You Tube clip clearly support [1] one of them asserts very loudly that something like [1] is true. So presumably their claim is that incestuous couples or polygamous couples never love each other, but that is clearly false. The only sensible thing then is to suppose they support [3], but then if that is the case, then why is it offensive to suggest that homosexual unions are like incestuous ones? They apparently see nothing wrong with incest.

    The honest thing to do then would be to simply admit that this argument is a bad one and offer another one. But of course they do not. When an argument for civil unions is refuted, they resort to quoting out of context, character assassination and dogmatic assertions of the falsehood even when its mendacity had been shown.

    It is then unwarrantedly claimed that Franks’ comment in one context applies to all times and places and are held in this absurd way by everyone in the National Party. Moreover, any other argument against their position is irrationally dismissed and ignored on the grounds that it does not further their political agenda to consider it. Apparently this is the type of activity that some Labour supporters consider open minded tolerance.

    Matt (posted by Madeleine)