Author: Matt

  • Sentience Part 2

    Following on from Sentience Part 1, I will now address the conclusion of Bonnie Steinbock’s argument.

    Steinbock’s Conclusion
    Similar ambiguities affect Steinbock’s conclusion. Steinbock asserts that for killing an individual to be unlawful homicide, the individual must be sentient. However, this is ambiguous; as Don Marquis points out, this could mean that the individual will be sentient at some point in its life or it could mean that it is sentient now or it could mean that it was sentient at some time in the past.[i]

    Steinbock must embrace the last of these options. If she adopts the first option, then the fetus does not lack sentience, as it will become sentient at some point in its life, hence feticide is homicide. The second option is also problematic, if the requirement is that the being is sentient now then it entails that a surgeon who actively kills a patient while he is under general anaesthetic has not committed homicide. Consequently, it is the last sense that Steinbock needs to embrace, it was sentient at some point in the past. However, this raises immediate questions. Why is sentience in the past necessary for possessing interests? On the face of it this appears simply an ad hoc manoeuvre.

    At one point, Steinbock attempts to answer this question.

    [N]ote an important difference between a temporarily unconscious person and a fetus. The difference is that the person who is now unconscious has had experiences, plans, beliefs, desires, etc. in the past. These past experiences are relevant because they form the basis for saying that the comatose person wants not to be killed while unconscious. “He valued his life” we might say or “of course he would want to not be killed” … We have all sorts of desires of which we are not at any particular time consciously aware, and it would be absurd to limit our desires to what we are actually thinking about. Nor do our desires, plans, goals, or the interests composing them, vanish when we fall into a dreamless sleep.[ii]

    Steinbock asserts that past sentience is important because without it an individual cannot be said to have a present desire to go on living. However, this argument returns us to the problems stated above. As Tooley and Singer have pointed out, an infant cannot have a present desire to go on living either, because infants lack the mental capacity necessary to conceive of continued existence. Consequently, the very property that Steinbock claims makes killing fetuses not a form of homicide is a property possessed by infants. The distinction she draws between feticide and infanticide then is ad hoc.

    Towards the end of her paper, Steinbock appears to see some of these problems and offers a third reason in addition to the Golden-Rule and interests arguments already mentioned as to why sentience marks a critical difference. Steinbock appeals to, what she suggests, is a plausible account of personal identity, the psychological continuity account.

    According to the psychological continuity account of personal identity, having a certain set of past experiences is what makes me the person I am, and the experiences I have, my experiences. What makes experiences at two different times experiences of the same person is that they are appropriately related by a chain of memories, desires, intentions and the like. So people’s past experiences are precisely what makes their futures theirs.

    Steinbock is arguing that a fetus and the infant it becomes are not the same individual; they are, rather, different individuals. In order for an individual in the past to be the same individual as me there must be a psychological link between this earlier individual and myself. I must have desires, intentions etc that it once had or, most importantly, I must remember conscious episodes that it had. In order for an earlier individual to have these psychological links with me, it must have been sentient. Consequently, there is an important difference between a fetus and an infant because an infant is sentient. It is possible for me to have been that infant. It was the same individual that I am but at an immature stage. However, this is not true of a pre-sentient fetus. On the psychological continuity account of individual identity, it is impossible for a pre-sentient fetus to have been me. I never was a fetus, some other individual was.

    Again, this argument seems to entail that infanticide is not homicide. By applying the standard psychological continuity account, it is very difficult to find the requisite psychological link between the infant that developed into me and me today. Defenders of infanticide, such as Tooley and Singer, appeal precisely to this account to argue that we are not the same individual as the infant that developed into us. Tooley, in his monograph Abortion and Infanticide, cites numerous empirical data to show that according to the Psychological identity account, a person is not identical to the infant that developed into him or her.

    Steinbock’s response to this problem is surprisingly weak; she simply states that “it may be that a more sophisticated account [of identity]” can be worked out. Merely claiming there “may be” a solution is not an adequate response. If the opponent of feticide were to respond to Steinbock’s objections by saying, “maybe my position can be modified to avoid those objections”, I doubt she would consider herself answered. Until such possibilities become defensible actualities, sentience does not give us any reason for discriminating between infanticide and feticide.

    This discussion has repeatedly led to the conclusion that accounts based on sentience do not provide a basis for concluding that feticide and infanticide are any different. Not only are the arguments mustered in favour of feticide problematic, the very features of feticide that are alleged to render killing fetuses permissible are features also present in infanticide.

    [i] Don Marquis, “Why Most Abortions are Immoral,” in Advances in Bioethics: Bioethics for Medical Education, Vol. 5, ed. Rem B. Edwards & E. Edwards Bittar (Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 1999), 239-240.
    [ii] Bonnie Steinbock, “Why Most Abortions are Not Wrong,” in Advances in Bioethics: Bioethics for Medical Education, Vol. 5, ed. Rem B. Edwards & E. Edwards Bittar (Stanford, CT: JAI Press, 1999), 252.
    Ibid., 252-54.
    Ibid., 253.
    Ibid., 254.

  • Sentience Part 1

    Following on from my series on the illiberality of Abortion, discussion in the comments section turned to the issue of sentience. Commenters asked whether perhaps sentience is the property that a newborn possesses and a fetus does not that warrants such unequal application of the non-initiation of force principle by liberals. Is sentience the property that enables the liberal to be consistent in otherwise violating the non-initiation of force principle when it comes to abortion, by permitting feticide, and yet not when it comes to liberal opposition of infanticide?

    Some commentators claim that feticide is not homicide until the fetus is sentient. Bonnie Steinbock made perhaps the most sophisticated defence of this position. In an article summarising her position Steinbock states, “my thesis is that killing fetuses is morally different from killing babies because fetuses are not, and babies are, sentient”.[i] She states that she finds the notion that feticide is on a par with infanticide and hence homicide, “completely implausible” because:

    A newborn can feel, react, and perceive. It cries when it is hungry or stuck with needles. Very soon after birth it cries from boredom or loneliness as well and can be soothed by being rocked and held. By contrast, the first-semester fetus cannot, think, feel, or perceive anything.[ii]

    I propose two responses. Firstly, I will analyse Steinbock’s argument in favour of this thesis, then I will criticise her conclusion in Sentience Part 2. In both cases, I will argue that Steinbock does not provide a reason for thinking that feticide is different from infanticide. On the contrary, her arguments in favour of feticide are also arguments in favour of infanticide.

    Steinbock’s Argument
    Steinbock argues that being sentient is essential for possession of interests.

    [S]entience is important because nonsentient beings, whether mere things (e.g., cars and rocks and works of art) or living things without nervous systems (e.g., plants), lack interests of their own. Therefore, nonsentient beings are not among those beings whose interests we are required to consider.

    Why is sentience necessary for possession of interests? Steinbock says “[I]t is only sentient beings to whom anything matters… since non-sentient beings cannot be hurt or made to suffer it does not matter to them what is done to them”.[Emphasis original] Elsewhere Steinbock states that what is necessary for a being to have interests in something is that it desires or wants the thing in question.

    Steinbock’s argument then rests on these claims. Firstly, that killing an individual is homicide only if continued life is in the interests of that individual. Secondly, an individual cannot have an interest in living unless it cares about living. Thirdly, that sentience is necessary to be able to care about anything.

    This argument equivocates on two separate senses of the word ‘interests’. Interests can refer to things a person is interested in, what a person likes or cares about; in this sense, tramping is one of my interests. On the other hand, to talk of someone’s interests can mean to talk about what is best for him or her, what enhances and promotes his or her welfare.

    When we examine the second premise of this argument it is clear that it is true only if interests are defined in the first of these senses. In order for something to be in someone’s interests in the first sense, then it must matter to him or her. He or she must care about the thing in question. It is not necessary for a person to have interests in the second sense. A thing can be in someone’s best interests even if he or she is not interested in it. Matters in the best interests of children such as nutritious food, clothing, shelter and education are often things they have never taken an interest in. People who suffer from mental illness can fail to take care of their interests correctly. Consequently, the second premise of the argument is true only if the word ‘interest’ is used in the first sense.

    However, if the first premise is to have any plausibility at all then interests must be understood in the second sense. If one has a duty to refrain from taking something from an individual only if the individual cares about the thing in question, then depriving the insane or children of what is in their best interests will not be wrong as long as they are not interested in it. Infants lack the mental ability to conceive, and hence, care about their future existence so infanticide would not be homicide by this line of reasoning. The argument is unsound.

    This problem with Steinbock’s position leads naturally to a second one. From the quotes above Steinbock seems to think that sentience is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition. She concedes that it would be wrong to kill unwanted infants but adds that this is different from killing a fetus “because fetuses are not, and babies are, sentient”.

    The problem is that her above argument does not justify this conclusion at all. What the argument says is that sentience is necessary for possessing interests. Moreover, it explicitly states that in order to have an interest in continued existence, an individual’s existence must matter to it; it must care about it in some way. While sentience is clearly necessary for caring about one’s continued existence various other factors are also necessary.

    Michael Tooley has argued one must also be able to conceptualise one’s continued existence and this requires awareness of one’s self as a subject of future experiences. An infant does not acquire the neurological capacity for this until some time after birth. In fact, an infant’s awareness of itself and future-orientated preferences to live are less developed than those of a mature cow. Consequently, if the premise of the argument offered is correct then infants do not have an interest in continued existence and consequently infanticide is not homicide.

    Steinbock offers a second argument in favour of sentience as a significant threshold.

    “[G]olden rule”- type reasons do not apply to nonsentient beings. That is, no one would explain opposition to burning the flag of the United States of America by saying, “How would you like it if you were a flag and someone burned you?

    Here, Steinbock appeals to a version of the Golden Rule. This rule prescribes consistency in one’s ethical judgments so that if one holds that it is permissible for you to do a particular action X to another person in certain circumstances then one must also hold that it is permissible for someone to do X to you in the same circumstances. Steinbock’s point is that such consistency is impossible with non-sentient beings. It does not make sense for one to object to destroying a flag because if one were a flag I one would not object to being burned. Flags after all cannot object to anything.

    Again, Steinbock’s argument relies on concealed ambiguities. Harry Gensler has distinguished two different interpretations of the Golden Rule. In one, the rule asks for our reaction to a hypothetical case involving ourselves. On the other it asks how we would react if faced with the actual case itself.

    Two examples demonstrate the difference between these two interpretations; a temporarily-unconscious individual and a case of infanticide. Taking the unconscious individual first, the first interpretation of the Golden Rule asks, would I object to the idea of someone killing me if I ever fell into a temporary coma? The second interpretation asks, would I object to being killed if I were, in fact, already in a coma? The answer to the first question is yes, I do object to the idea of someone killing me in the event I fell temporarily unconscious. I do not think it permissible for a surgeon to kill me while I was under general anaesthetic, for example. However, the answer to the second question must be no. If I were already unconscious, I could not object to being killed. While unconscious, I would not be capable of objecting to anything at all.

    The infanticide example demonstrates these differences further. Applying the first interpretation I would ask, would I object to the idea of being killed when I was an infant? The second interpretation asks, would I object to being killed if I was an infant? Again, I would answer yes to the first question but no to the second. I do object to the idea of being killed when I was an infant. However, I clearly could not object if I were an infant because infants lack the cognitive development to be able to object or even understand what it means to object to being killed.

    Returning now to Steinbock, it is evident from her discussion that she is interpreting the Golden-Rule in the second way. Her question, “how would you like it if you were a flag and someone burned you?” asks us how we would react if we were a flag. Such a question is absurd because as a flag we could not have any cognitive reactions at all. However, interpreted this way it is equally absurd to apply the Golden Rule to infants or the temporarily unconscious. Consequently, if feticide is not homicide because the Golden Rule questions interpreted in this manner do not apply to fetuses, then killing infants and killing the temporarily unconscious are also not homicide.

    On the other hand, if the golden rule is interpreted the first way a different result emerges. It remains absurd to ask whether I would object to the idea of being killed in the event that I became a flag. It is dubious that I could ever be a flag, that a human adult and a flag could ever be the same individual. However, it does make sense to ask whether I object to the idea of being killed when I was an infant or when I was a fetus. This is because rational agents like myself once were fetuses and infants. The fact that a being is a potential rational agent makes it possible for rational agents to ask Golden Rule questions about them.

    Steinbock’s arguments for the sentience threshold are unsound. Further, when conjoined with certain facts of neurology they entail that infanticide is not homicide. The claim that feticide is not homicide while infanticide is appears ad hoc and arbitrary.

    I will address Steinbock’s conclusion in my next post, Sentience Part 2.

    [i] Bonnie Steinbock, “Why Most Abortions are Not Wrong,” in Advances in Bioethics: Bioethics for Medical Education, Vol. 5, ed. Rem B. Edwards & E. Edwards Bittar (Stanford, CT: JAI Press, 1999), 248.
    [ii] Ibid.
    Ibid.
    Ibid.
    Ibid.
    Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) 47.
    Steinbock “Why Most Abortions are Not Wrong,” 248-49.
    Harry Gensler, “Abortion and the Golden Rule,” in The Abortion Controversy 25 Years after Roe v Wade: A Reader, ed. Francis Beckwith & Louis Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1998), 323.

  • Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2

    In my previous post, Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1, I argued that liberals who support the non-initiation of force principle can support abortion only on two grounds;

    (a) the fetus is a person but its existence inside the mother without her consent constitutes a form aggression, and hence, the mother’s action of killing it is defensive; or,
    (b) a fetus is not a person.

    I will now address each of these in turn.

    Is the Fetus an Aggressor?
    Consider first (a), the contention that a fetus can be considered an aggressor because it is intruding upon a woman’s body without her consent; an intrusion grave enough to justify the use of lethal force. In this respect then, being subject to an unplanned pregnancy would be on par with being the recipient of a serious assault such as being raped or severely beaten.

    Frank Beckwith and Steve Thomas in Consent, Sex and the Pre-Natal Rapist, have demonstrated several problems with this claim. It leads to the conclusion that, in certain circumstances abortion is justified without the consent of the woman.

    Consider the following scenario. A young woman is involved in a car accident and is rendered unconscious by her injuries. She is brought to a hospital where, still comatose, she is examined by a doctor. While performing some tests, the doctor determines that the woman has been pregnant for several weeks. Furthermore, suppose that evidence comes to light to suggest that the woman is unaware of her pregnancy, perhaps her close friends know nothing of the pregnancy, her diary shows no knowledge of being pregnant, and so on.

    Adopting McDonagh’s understanding of pregnancy as morally equivalent to rape or assault, what is the doctor’s obligation to this unconscious patient? It would seem that, under these conditions, the doctor is morally required to perform an abortion to rid his patient of the ‘massive intrusion’ being imposed upon her by her unborn offspring. After regaining consciousness, the woman would have to be told that she’s undergone an abortion for a pregnancy of which she was not aware, for there was good evidence that no consent had been given and that she was under assault.[i]

    Beckwith’s point is that if the fetus is morally or legally on par with an aggressor who intrudes upon a woman’s body without her consent, such as a assailant or rapist then it would follow that in the case sketched above the doctor would be justified (and arguably would have an obligation) to abort despite the fact that no consent from the women had been obtained.

    Consider, that if one saw a person having sex with an unconscious woman and one knew the woman had not consented, it would be absurd to wait for the woman to wake up to see if she wanted to consent to sex. One would be obligated to intervene. “[T]he doctor in the midst of the situation, aware of the pregnancy in the absence of consent, must see it as the rape-in-progress of his unconscious patient. How could he do anything else but end the assault?”[ii]

    Now I assume that liberals would oppose the idea that any woman who both does not know she is pregnant and is unconscious should be subjected to an abortion without her consent. If this is the case then it is clear that they do not think that an unconsented to pregnancy constitutes an act of serious aggression.

    If the fetus is an unjust aggressor then liberals are committed to coercive abortions. If coercive abortions are not liberal then the fetus is not an unjust aggressor.

    Is the Fetus a Person?
    If the fetus is not an unjust aggressor then a liberal defense of abortion must be based upon (b), the idea that a fetus is not a person, a being that possesses the rights to life, liberty and property that liberals believe the state exists to protect.

    Now a fetus is clearly a human organism. After 14 days at least, it is an individual living being that is a member of the species homo sapiens. To justify abortion via (b), the liberal needs to tell us what property a human being possesses that grounds the right to not be subjected to the initiation of force, to not be killed. Further a liberal must also be able to plausibly maintain that a human organism does not acquire this property until after the fetal stage.

    Peter Cresswell takes the view,

    [T]he foetus is not yet a human being, but a part of a human being – the mother – who has rights over it. To be an actual, rather than merely potential, human being is, among other things, to be physically separate, which a foetus is not.

    This claim is erroneous. First the “parts of” relationship is transitive; if a brick is part of a wall and the wall part of a house then the brick is part of the house. If a fetus is part of a woman’s body it follows then that any organ that is part of the fetus will be part of the mother. A woman pregnant at eight weeks then possesses four arms, four legs and two brains. If the fetus is male, she will have both a vagina and a penis and be both male and female. Conclusions that are even more bizarre follow if the woman is pregnant with twins. She could have three faces, three brains, six arms, two penises and a vagina, three hearts, six kidneys and so on.[iv]

    Moreover, PC’s contention that “to be an actual human” one must be “physically separate” entails that conjoined twins are not human. Consider conjoined twins Bob and Scott. If Bob is a human being then since Scott cannot live independently of Bob, Scott must not be a human person (the converse is equally true).

    Yet it is difficult to see what property Bob has that Scott lacks which would justify considering one of them human and the other not simply because neither is dependant of the other. It appears then, that one would be forced to conclude that they both are and are not, human. Perhaps PC is simply giving a poorly worded defence of the viability criteria, which I have previously critiqued here.

    However, the usual liberal response is to ground the right to not be subjected to the initiation of force, to not be killed, in certain psychological capacities that human beings typically display; such things as sentience, rationality, self-awareness, autonomy, etc.

    Despite the pervasive appeal of this approach, it faces serious problems. Boonin notes that those who attempt to ground humanity in the amount of brain development an organism has face a dilemma. “Any appeal to what a brain can do at various stages of development would seem to have to appeal to what the brain can already do. Or to what the brain has the potential to do in the future.”[v]

    Either option leads to problems for a defender of the permissibility of abortion who does not also want to endorse infanticide. This is because “by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows and pigs, chickens and ducks or more intellectually developed than a new born infant.”[vi] Suppose, then, one takes the first horn and appeals to what the brain can already do. However, unless one wishes to affirm that cats, dogs and chickens are human beings, “appeals to what the brain can already do” will “be unable to account for the presumed wrongness of killing toddlers or infants.”[vii] Suppose, then, one takes up the second horn of the dilemma and appeals to “what the brain has the potential to do in the future;”[viii] Boonin notes that this will entail that feticide is homicide. “If [such an account] allows appeals to what the brain has the potential to do in the future, then it will have to include fetuses as soon as their brains begin to emerge, during the first few weeks of gestation.”[ix]

    A couple of examples will illustrate this. Suppose the liberal appeals to sentience, the capacity for consciousness and the ability to perceive pleasure and pain. This criterion will mean abortion is permissible up to 24 weeks.[x] The problem is that this criterion also catches cats, dogs, cows, and chickens as well all. All of which are as sentient if not more sentient than new born infants and post-24 week fetuses.

    If the liberal draws the line at sentience, he/she will have to hold that farming, butchers shops, McDonald’s restaurants, Kentucky fried Chicken restaurants all engage in unjustified aggression against people because they kill sentient beings without their consent. Further, to remain consistent, the liberal will have to maintain a policy of outlawing all these industries and prosecuting those who engage in them for murder and cannibalism.

    Suppose the liberal appeals to more advanced psychological states such as self-awareness, rationality or autonomy. Such accounts of the grounding of rights will exclude the animals mentioned above and will exclude human fetuses. The problem is, according to this account, newborn infants are not persons either.

    In a definitive study of infanticide, Michael Tooley compiles an impressive array of neurological and physiological data that demonstrates that infants are not persons in this sense until some time after birth.[xi] The price of this line of inference is the reduction of newborn infants to the ethical level of cows. A newborn cow, and certainly a mature cow, is more person-like than an infant is. It is difficult to understand by this view why killing and eating infants is any more problematic than consuming a Big Mac.

    Of course the liberal can avoid this by claiming that it is the potential to acquire properties such as rationality, self-awareness, autonomy, not their actuality that matters. This will enable one to claim infants are protected by the non-initiation of force principle and will exclude animals. But the problem of course is that foetuses will also be protected by the non-initiation of force principle because fetuses also have the potential to possess these properties.

    In summation, liberal proponents of the non-initiation of force principle can only support abortion if they are willing to be inconsistent and arbitrary in their application of the principle or if they are willing to endorse not just infanticide but the eating of newborn infants or state mandated vegetarianism or coercive abortions. These policies are an anathema to most liberals; as such, abortion is not liberal.

    UPDATE: In response to comments below see Sentience Part 1 and Sentience Part 2.

    [i] Francis J. Beckwith & Stephen Thomas, “Consent, Sex, and the Prenatal Rapist; A Brief Reply to McDonagh’s Suggested Revision of Roe v Wade,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 17: 3 (2003): 4.
    [ii] Ibid, 6.
    [iii] Peter Creswell, “Not PC: Cue Card Libertarianism – Abortion”.
    [iv] Here I am influenced by Peter Kreeft, The Unaborted Socrates (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1983), 45-47 and Francis J Beckwith, Politically Correct Death, 124.
    [v] David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 125.
    [vi] Ibid, 121.
    [vii] Ibid.
    [viii] Ibid.
    [ix] Ibid.
    [x] It is generally accepted that sentience occurs around 24 week’s gestation. There is some dispute over this and some scientists date sentience in the first 10 weeks of gestation.
    [xi] Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) Ch. 11.5.

  • Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1

    Laws permitting abortion on demand are often deemed to be liberal. Further, political liberals are frequently ardent defenders of such laws. I think these conclusions are mistaken. In a series of two posts I will provide some reasons why.

    Most contemporary liberals advocate a form of the harm principle, famously articulated by Mill in On Liberty,

    The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.[i] [Emphasis added]

    Mill here draws a distinction between other-regarding actions, actions that harm other people, and self-regarding actions, those that harm oneself. He argues that society, either by law or by social pressure, cannot justly regulate any action a person performs unless it is other-regarding; that is, it harms people other than the agent him/herself. As Mill’s position is typically interpreted harm is understood to be governed by the principle volenti non fit injuria (where there is consent, there is no injury) and hence refers to things done to other people without their consent. On this interpretation, self-regarding actions are those that people consent to and that harm no non-consenting, third party. As Mill himself notes, a self-regarding action is that “which affects only himself, or affects others with their free and voluntary, and undeceived consent”.[ii]

    The most common version of the harm principle is known as the non-initiation of force principle; Rothbard sums it up well,

    The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the “nonaggression axiom.” “Aggression” is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. Aggression is therefore synonymous with invasion.[iii]

    I do not subscribe to the harm principle or the non-initiation of force interpretation of it (I give some reasons why here). However, in this series of posts I will adopt it for the sake of argument so as to examine what follows for abortion. Abortion involves killing a fetus, usually by dismembering it. Moreover, the fetus does not consent to it. Hence if a Liberal is to support abortion he/she must do so for only one of two reasons. Either,

    (a) the fetus is a person but its existence inside the mother without her consent constitutes a form aggression, and hence, the mother’s action of killing it is defensive; or,
    (b) a fetus is not a person.

    Only if one of these two options is adopted, can a liberal support the non-initiation of force principle and permissive abortion legislation and remain consistent.

    Failed Avoidance Tactics
    At this juncture it is worth noting that two very common tactics of avoiding this conclusion fail. The first is to defend abortion, as Rodney Hide tried to at the recent Family First Forum, on the basis of the perceived positive social consequences of ‘liberal’ abortion laws. In popular political discourse, and in some feminist writings, abortion is defended on consequentialist grounds; it is argued that abortion prevents unwanted children, children who are likely to be poor, abused, neglected or engage in crime. It is hailed as a solution to over-population and the existence of handicapped people. It prevents adult and teenage women from falling into economic hardship and stress and enables them to complete their education, pursue their careers and so on.

    The problem with this line of argument is that this is only cogent for liberals if they assume that abortion does not violate the non-initiation of force principle. If abortion does violate this principle then allowing abortion on these grounds would be tantamount to saying that people can engage in aggression (as Rothbard defines it) they can initiate lethal force against others provided doing so brings about positive consequences, like lower crime rates, less child abuse, lower population rates, access to education and employment, etc. This conclusion contradicts the non-initiation of force principle which states that one cannot justly pursue social utility by violating an individual’s right to life, liberty or property; the very basis of their opposition to socialism.

    The second avoidance tactic is to appeal to slogans such as “you can’t force your morality onto others, you can’t legislate morality”. The problem with these claims is that the non-initiation of force principle is itself a moral principle and liberals believe the state should enforce this principle and should defend people against others who would violate it. This forces a dilemma upon liberals who cite this slogan; either the claim “you can’t force your morality onto others” applies to the non-initiation of force principle or it does not. If it does, then abortion involves an unjust imposition of morality onto another only if you assume it is not the initiation of force. If it does not, then liberalism as a doctrine collapses as the state has no duty to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens from aggression. In fact, it entails the conclusion that acts of aggression such as rape and murder should be decriminalised alongside abortion.

    It follows then that the liberal cannot rationally avoid the question. If one is to both support ‘liberal’ abortion laws and hold to the non-initiation of force principle, one must do so either on (a) or (b) above. I think neither is terribly defensible. I will address (a) the fetus is a person but its existence inside the mother without her consent constitutes a form aggression, and hence, the mother’s action of killing it is defensive; and, (b) a fetus is not a person, in my next post, Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2.

    [i] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin Classics, 1985), 69.
    [ii] Ibid. 71.
    [iii] Murray N Rothbard, For A New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto (New York: Collier Books, 2002) 23.

  • Some Autobiographical Remarks: How I Discovered Christian Philosophy

    Increasingly so of late, I find myself in conversations, in the receipt of email requests or blog comments asking where to begin and how to expand one’s Christian philosophical understanding. I have been asked to recommend books and places to study and to share my own journey in this area.

    I started my studies at Waikato University in 1993. I was advised by the leadership at the church I attended, a church with some 300 student members I might add, to not study philosophy. I was told that this subject was one Christians should avoid or risk being led astray. However, for the reasons of timetabling, I was left with no option but to study Introduction to Philosophy.

    At that time the only apologists I was familiar with were Josh McDowell and Steve Kumar, who had spoken to our youth group. In Kumar’s book, Christian Apologetics: Think Why You Believe, there was a bibliography and for some reason I decided to go to the University library and follow these books up. I did not end up following the bibliography exactly as the first book that stood out on the shelf when I went into philosophy of religion section of the library was a book called God, Freedom and Evil by Alvin Plantinga and something prompted me to pick it up. I had never heard of Alvin Plantinga and had no idea that I had just picked up the definitive discussion of the logical problem of evil. As a first year student, with no background in philosophy, I actually managed to read it from cover to cover.

    This is not where I recommend people to start, as Plantinga is hard going, but it did give me one advantage. I had not been captivated by a superficial treatment of the issue but by arguably the best treatment of that issue in the literature. Plantinga opened my eyes to the possibilities of Christian theorising.

    I began devouring other authors. I stumbled on Richard Swinburne’s The Existence of God, one of the most rigorous arguments for the existence of God written in the last century. I read Paul Helm’s discussion Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time and Reichenbach’s defence of the cosmological argument in Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment. Following up a footnote in Helm’s book, I came across another author I had never heard of, William Lane Craig and read his book The Kalam Cosmological Argument. I discovered Thomas Morris’s The Logic of the God Incarnate (I don’t know why more theologians don’t read Morris) and began reading various anthologies on Philosophy of Religion.

    At the same time I was studying religious studies under Doug Pratt, someone very sympathetic to Lloyd Geering, and we covered the rationality of theism in our Introduction to Philosophy course. I can honestly say the sceptical focus of these courses had absolutely no effect except to teach me how superficial the scepticism I was being subjected to was. To be told by Geering that no intelligent person can believe in God with only brief justification and then be informed that Christianity must be completely re-worked alongside contrasted by the detailed point by point rebuttal of arguments for atheism in my extra-curricula reading by Plantinga and Swinburne meant there was no contest.

    By my second year, I had read Plantinga’s God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God. This book was absolutely brilliant. Plantinga demolished several common arguments for atheism; however, he also made some astutely critical points against the standard Christian arguments for God’s existence. Two thirds through the book he concluded that the arguments for and the arguments against were inconclusive, he the made what seemed to be a bizarre move and turned to the problem of other minds, he pointed out that the arguments for and against the existence of other people were equally inconclusive and in some cases the arguments failed for reasons very similar to the arguments for the existence of God. Yet, belief in other minds was clearly rational, so why wasn’t belief in God?

    This struck me as odd. Surely belief in God was totally different to belief in other minds. Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God edited by Plantinga and Wolterstorff changed my stance. Until then I had been devouring books by Craig and Swinburne arguing for the existence of God. Plantinga, however, suggested that there was a flawed method behind the demand for evidence. Many discussions on the existence of God tacitly assumed that there was a neutral body of propositions assented to by believer and non-believer alike. All other propositions were rational only if they followed from this original body by evidence. Plantinga’s radical suggestion was that Christians and non-Christians started with a different body of evidence to each other. The idea of a neutral agreed upon starting point was a fiction and usually incoherent. Frequently assumptions that made sense only from a naturalistic viewpoint were smuggled in to the ‘neutral’ starting point, subtly rigging the debate.

    This opened my eyes, particularly in the area of ethics. I started seeing why people came to the conclusions they did and Christians seemed unable to combat them despite perceiving that there was something wrong with their argument. The idea that religion had no place in public life or scholarship and people had to bracket their faith commitments when answering normative questions meant that the fundamental premises Christians relied on for their conclusions were discounted from the outset. Christians were being forced to justify their conclusions from a perspective that was really hostilely secular but was taken for granted as the neutral starting point that nobody could question.

    I went on to write my Masters thesis in Philosophy on Plantinga’s ideas on faith and reason. I took the lessons I learned into my PhD in Theology and extended them into ethics. At no point, at any institution I studied in, was I ever taught these things in class. The textbooks used contained superficial treatments of Christian ethics that had been shredded by Christian Philosophers. The lecturers hadn’t read Christian Philosophy or if they had, they had only dabbled in it and had a superficial understanding or were unaware of the extent it went focussing on minor players. I had no choice but to teach myself by reading widely.

    So in summation, in New Zealand, there is nowhere (yet) where I could recommend people to study Christian Philosophy. If you want to become proficient in this field you are probably best to enrol in a secular philosophy degree program, and hunt down and read all the counter arguments from the high-level Christian philosophers as you progress.

    As a starting point, accessible to anyone without a background in Philosophy, I would recommend the book Reason for the Hope Within: Alvin Plantinga edited by Michael Murray. This book is hands down, the best introduction to Christian Philosophy and Apologetics as it combines rigour with accessibility to the lay person. I cannot recommend this book highly enough.

    Further, in conjunction with Thinking Matters Tauranga, we are developing a critical thinking course for lay people to teach the basics of logical analysis of arguments, some intro to Christian Philosophy and how to approach common objections to the faith. This will initially be launched in Tauranga early next year but we intend to bring it to Auckland and hopefully make it available more widely from there.

  • Answering the New Atheism: Invitation to a Thinking Matters Event

    Taken from Thinking Matters – Events & Announcements:

    Answering the New Atheism

    Dr Steve Kumar Dip Theo, BA, M Div, PhD

    When: Tuesday 28 October
    Time: 7.30 – 9.30pm
    Where: Bethlehem Community Church Center – 183 Moffat Rd, Bethlehem
    Cost: Free
    Event Format: Live Presentation followed by Q&A and discussions

    In this presentation, Dr Kumar will examine the objections to religion put forward by the New Atheists, showing how they fail the tests of reason, history and common sense. He will then weigh Christianity against the atheist view of the world and show how Christianity better accounts for the source of morality, meaning and truth.

    Dr Kumar has been speaking and writing about questions of religion and philosophy for over twenty five years. He is a frequent debater and guest speaker at universities and conferences throughout Europe, Asia and the Pacific and is the author of many books, including Christianity for Skeptics.

    Thinking Matters
    Thinking Matters is an inter-denominational group where you can come to analyse and discuss some of the deeper issues of the Christian faith in the areas of Philosophy, Science and Apologetics (see definitions here

    ).

    The purpose is to make Christian truth claims more relevant to an increasingly sceptical and secular culture, showing the reasons why we believe what we believe and providing answers that simply make sense.

    Who is Welcome?
    It’s open to Christian and Non-Christian alike – anyone who is seeking the truth in philosophy, science and scripture. You don’t need a philosophy or a theology degree to be able to understand the speakers.

    More on Thinking Matters Tauranga

    More on Thinking Matters

    RELATED POST: The Point of Intellectual Engagement: Why Thinking Matters

  • Guest Post: Laidlaw College’s Mark Strom Responds to Critics

    Some weeks ago I wrote a review on the launch of Laidlaw College. I commented on the new vision for the future and my own reflections and frustrations of studying at its previous incarnation, Bible College of New Zealand.

    The comments section of this post saw the eruption of strong sentiment and criticism of Laidlaw College. The level of tension evident in what was said and the volume of readers concerned about the issue was quite surprising; our site stats record that this entry is one of our most read and most commonly Googled-for blog posts. Under fire was the seriousness of Laidlaw’s commitment to its new stated vision, its ability to commit to it and the employment process around the appointment of one of the new heads of department.

    As we are not party to the hiring practices of Laidlaw and as I was an unsuccessful candidate for the position that came under fire, we did not feel it appropriate to participate in the discussion. However, given the nature of some of the claims made, we have granted Dr Mark Strom, Principal of Laidlaw College, a right of reply.

    Matt

    Mark Strom’s Response:

     

    I’m delighted that the changes at Laidlaw have drawn so much interest. I’m also amazed that so many people (claim to) know (alleged) relationships between institutions, the intentions of board members, the processes of faculty appointments, my motives, the extent of faculty members’ knowledge, and so much more.


    Perhaps I can clarify one or two things.

    First of all, a big thanks to Matt and Madeleine for their very fair and balanced comments on Laidlaw. I personally appreciate encouragement and support from fair-minded friends able to be constructively critique and provoke us to push on.

    Second, people are right that Laidlaw still has a very long way to go. Our best over 86 years has been very significant. But did we become somewhat captive to a dualistic piety and its attendant culture(s)? Yes. Was this true of everyone and everything at college? No. Are we genuinely imagining, articulating, designing and making concrete something more holistic and engaged? Yes. Are there gaps between what we espouse and what we deliver? Yes. Is the trajectory clearly toward teaching, researching and championing real integration of thought and culture around a critically-informed evangelical theology at the highest standards of academic quality, intellectual rigour and serious faith? Yes, yes, and yes. This is our commitment. Piece by piece we are rethinking things and taking decisions that move us toward this. And we’ll take all the constructive criticism we can get from people who can imagine what a difference Laidlaw College could make to New Zealand and beyond, and who will give us room to try, to fall short, to grow and just maybe to succeed.

    Third, a few comments on details raised by respondents.

    Matt is right to note that evangelical organisations sometimes do not follow through on significant reforms. Like every other western institution, two legacies shape us: a Classical tradition that (for the greater part) censured change; and a Judeo-Christian tradition that introduced the appalling innovation (to classical minds) that one could break with conformity and be transformed by a radically changed mindset. Centuries of dialogue, intrigue, enmity and plagiarism between the traditions, overlaid by wave upon wave of Christian convention, has bequeathed an uneasy juxtaposition of conformity and innovation to evangelical institutions and leaders. I know this only too well within myself.

    I am loathe to comment on a colleague (and Rod will be appalled that I have defended him). Were there other candidates? Yes. Were some better qualified as per degrees and writings? Yes. Were these the only criteria for the appointment? No. The following competencies were crucial. First, an ability to see the disciplines of theology through the lens of the Bible’s own narrative structures and in particular the NT witness that the story and its great themes have reached their culmination in Jesus Christ. In other words, to read Christology not as one of many loci of Christian theology, but as that which makes theology Christian. [Barth surely had that right.] Second, an ability to model the teaching of theology as engaged in matters of historical, intellectual and public discourse, ie. worldviews and their impact on society. Third, an ability to inspire teaching around these themes. Fourth, an ability to model a realistic and effective mentoring of students as they seek to choose patterns of personal and public response to God and his world that reflect an integrated faith grounded in the historic gospel. Fifth, the maturity and gifts to nurture a relational culture between academics. Rod was a very strong choice on all these criteria.

    Has Laidlaw reached its full potential as an academic institution? Not by a long shot. Do we have some fine scholars with impressive PhDs and publishing records? Yes. Do we need more of both? Absolutely, and we will seek them. Respondents may be interested to know that earlier this year we completed a faculty restructure process. Three faculty chose not to apply for new roles. All others were rehired under improved conditions for the express purpose of completion of PhDs and the generation of peer-reviewed research publications. Eleven already have PhDs. Six are underway on their PhDs (some nearing completion). Two have begun advanced studies (with highest grades) to progress into PhD studies: one in philosophy at the University of Auckland, and one in ancient history at Macquarie University. We have set the bar high for ourselves, and we have embarked on an ambitious programme of making good on these aspirations. These things do not happen overnight.

    The conspiracists may be interested to know that the Laidlaw board represents a very healthy mix of theological perspectives (within a broad evangelical consensus) and political and economic perspectives, and we enjoy spirited banter and debate on these things. The board ‘relationship’ with Maxim amounts to a few friendships. And why wouldn’t there be?! Many respondents have noted there are far too few individuals and groups in NZ prepared to engage in serious thought and action on matters that shape society. So when you find some, you engage. Do we always agree? Far from it. Do you shun the dialogue because someone has caricatured your dialogue partner (even in this blog)? I choose not to. Ignorant caricatures are one thing, but when someone writes “that Laidlaw, like many other NZ Christian organisations has been captured by Maxim institute and appointments are being made not on academic ability but from the approved Maxim checklist”, this is a stupid comment. Plain stupid…and offensive. If it were naming an individual, it might be considered defamatory. There is no agenda. There is no captivity. There is no list. This comment is ignorant, untrue and offensive to the good people of Laidlaw and of Maxim. [On a personal note, had I voted in the last Australian election (I’m an Aussie), I would have voted for Rudd – I doubt that fits the assumptions of the conspiracists.]

    The question has been raised about whether “we really need a Christian liberal arts college”. I am on record as being against the idea. Like doctoral mentor, Emeritus Professor Edwin Judge of Macquarie University, I always read the early Christians’ distinctive innovations and interactions with Greco-Roman society and thought as evidence for arguing against the idea of a distinctively Christian educational institution. Our forebears showed no sense of need nor ambition to establish Christian structures as alternatives to those of their societies. That evidence and line of inference is still suggestive to me for the modern context. Personally I have long argued against the establishment of university type programmes in Christian colleges. In my opinion, a public university education has afforded both a better education (greater breadth and less cloistered) and a stronger platform for progression into places of influence.

    However, more recently I have come to a different place. Since 2006 I have found myself arguing in favour of this College offering a small number of first class qualifications equal to or better than the best New Zealand universities (yes that is an audacious goal – but closer than some might think in some areas; yes we have a long way to go). My shift of argument has 3 pillars:

    1. I am alarmed at the loss of faith among undergraduate students (some student workers estimate it is as high as 70-80% of students by the end of their programmes). This trend includes Maori and Pacific Island students. I have come to believe the College can and should address this tragedy through the provision of first class tertiary education grounded in a biblical worldview.

    2. I believe the reductionism of knowledge in university programmes has diminished their intellectual and academic rigour and integrity (not of course in every case). I believe in time this diminishes public discourse to the detriment of the nation. I have come to believe Laidlaw can offer a credible alternative education capable in time of influencing public discourse through literate and articulate graduates. Are we there? No. This is an audacious goal that will not come quickly, easily or cheaply.

    3. I believe Laidlaw should prepare (particularly young) women and men more deliberately for leadership in society, as well as in the churches. I have come to believe Laidlaw can equip such leaders for society most effectively through first class qualifications in education and the humanities (we are moving towards a School of Humanities with a PPE style BA degree: philosophy, politics, economics). I believe these qualifications offer appropriate ‘generalist’ educations for placing leaders of faith within education, media, business, health, social services, arts, politics and community leadership as well as continuing to serve the churches. My experience advising heads of corporations (commercial and government) confirms the sense that many employers are frustrated by the narrowness of many bright young university graduates of law, accountancy, commerce, business and engineering. Many are looking for classics and PPE grads. [This was confirmed earlier this year by the global managing partner of one of the world’s highest profile consultancies when I spoke at their global partners conference.]

    My argument for Laidlaw becoming such a College is not a reaction to ‘liberal’ humanism, nor an apologetic for a retreat into a Christian ghetto. On the contrary, I want to argue for a turning of the tables on the assumed hegemony of public universities over higher education. Most of the famed European and American universities began as colleges teaching a breadth of knowledge unified by theology as the core discipline. In short, they started like us. Over time almost every one of these institutions abandoned this theological and epistemological core. In the USA in particular this has prompted the rise of the Christian liberal arts college. [Yes, you may well hear echoes of Wolterstorf, Plantinga and others, as well as my own teacher of many years ago, Cornelius Van Til (and no, I am not a card-carrying VanTillian). By the way, Nick Wolterstorf enthused with me about the vision of Laidlaw when I visited him last year. And yes, that is name-dropping to counter some respondents’ assertions that no one knows or has read anyone.]

    The current education situation seems unnecessarily polarised: it seems we either accept the hegemony of the public university over intellectual discourse; or we retreat into the parallel universe of the Christian college. I no longer accept these as the only options. The time may be propitious for quietly, slowly building a credible alternative to university education on behalf of a nation: an alternative grounded in the theological worldview of historic Christianity, free of the dualistic legacies of traditional piety, and genuinely world-engaging and world-serving in the quality and openness of its teaching, mentoring and research and its contribution to public discourse. As Madeleine points out, this will require and make possible new engagements between Laidlaw College and the public universities.

    To all this talk of excellence I hasten to add our gospel commitment to strength-in-weakness and wisdom-in-foolishness. God delights in nullifying the “things that are” by the “things that are not”. Personally, I am a university drop-out who went on to consult to CEOs of major commercial and government institutions; I am a labourer who earned a PhD in the history of ideas; I am a spare parts salesman who become a principal. Some of the finest young men and women whom we seek as our students dropped out of school, did poorly at school, and generally do not think themselves capable of the kind of academic and personal formation we are seeking to make a reality. So in all our plans for “lifting the bar” we are working hard to establish a dignified, high-quality, effective pathway for those who would otherwise be overlooked.

    We don’t for one moment think any of this can be done easily or quickly. If this is a worthy task, it is a commitment to a generation.

    The notes about William Lane Craig are a bit of a mystery to me. I certainly know who he is (recall my VanTillian heritage). So do others at Laidlaw. I do recall hearing about it late. That happens. It had far more to do with poor communication (perhaps by us) than with ignorance or reluctance. We will endeavour not to make another “academic faux pas of this magnitude”.

    This has ended up a lot longer than I intended when I started. I’d like to frame my final comments (for now) around a thought I muse upon:

    I wonder how many respondents have lead significant institutions and been charged with effecting large-scale structural and cultural change? Or let me put it another way: a lot of people who point out our inadequacies, nonetheless join us in longing for high calibre Christian scholarship that has broken with the captivity of dualism to play a significant role in influencing a nation, society and church, with the gospel. I wonder if these people have the foggiest idea what it takes to position a traditional institution to deliver on such a desire.

    In other words, the ease with which people offer their opinions on what we should or shouldn’t have done at Laidlaw to this point is remarkable. Having been charged with being naïve, it seems only fitting to turn the table.

    Changing an 86 year old institution takes imagination, courage, humility and patience. Fortunately I am surrounded by people with far more of each than I possess. The pace at which we have instituted change has been mind-bogglingly fast for some, and too slow for others. One must honour a heritage and its continuing rich contributions even as one frames a vision that calls for radical changes. You cannot go from financial uncertainty to fully funded PhDs, new faculty and facilities overnight. Governance must be tightened. Financial reporting must be reworked. Deficits must be turned into surpluses. Assets must be reexamined. Accrediting and funding agencies must be given time to appraise and support the new directions. Cultures must begin to shift.

    Those expecting overnight adoption of the conventions and facilities of fine public universities will be deeply disappointed. Public lectures putting theological reflection on the table for the first time for hundreds of people will be viewed as populism. Hiring people with outstanding capacity to forge new trust and integration of gospel, culture and faith will be viewed as far less important than getting impressive CVs. Those with an eye to the long term will recognise strategy; the laying of further foundations (in addition to the fine existing legacies) upon which a great institution can be reimagined and redesigned by people in whom is combined an acuity and humility that will welcome scholars and students who exceed them.

    Can Laidlaw “see past their discovery of the basics”? I think so.

    Will people who read theology and philosophy beyond the popular, and who long for change within churches and evangelicalism and academies and public discourse in New Zealand, give us room to try, to fail, to grow, and just maybe to succeed? Time will tell.

    The Tall Poppy Syndrome is a pernicious, cowardly trait. Laidlaw College seeks an end to its hold over the imaginations and wills of New Zealanders. The fact that we have named a big vision makes us a target. We welcome the support of those with the faith, heart and guts to back something that just might make a difference.

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    Laidlaw College