UPDATE: Its seems stuff found it funny too.
UPDATE: Its seems stuff found it funny too.
Those of you who have followed my discussions with Peter Cresswell on the history of Christianity and the relationship between faith and reason in the middle ages may find this abridged article by Dr James Hannam interesting. Dr Hannam has recently completed his PhD on the History of Science at the University of Cambridge.
UPDATE:
Dr Hannam emailed me to advise that this article is no longer available online (it had to be removed at his publishers insistence) but is available in full in the book, God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern Science, which is apparently now available in New Zealand. Bethyada will be interested to hear, “as one of the comments on your blog asked, I have included a discussion of the trebuchet and other weapons developed in the Middle Ages.”
Some reviews:
“A spirited jaunt through centuries of scientific development… captures the wonder of the medieval world: its inspirational curiosity and its engaging strangeness.” Sunday Times
“This book contains much valuable material summarised with commendable no-nonsense clarity… James Hannam has done a fine job of knocking down an old caricature.” Sunday Telegraph
Guess what I’m adding to my Christmas list? …Madeleine…
God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern Science
Rethinking Science in the Middle Ages
The most famous remark Sir Isaac Newton (1642 – 1727) made is, “If I have seen a little further then it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.” What most of us assume he meant is that his scientific achievements were built on the discoveries of his predecessors. In the same passage, he alludes to René Descartes (1596 – 1650), the French philosopher and mathematician, so presumably this is one of those whom he meant. Few people realise, however, that Newton’s aphorism was first coined in the twelfth century by the theologian Bernard of Chartres (d. c. 1130). Even fewer are aware that Newton’s science also has its roots embedded firmly in the Middle Ages.
This book will show just how much of the science and technology that we take for granted today has medieval origins.
….
During the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church actively supported a great deal of science, which it also kept control of when speculation could impinge on theology. Ironically, by keeping philosophers focused on nature instead of metaphysics, even the limitations that the Church set may have benefited science in the long term. Furthermore and contrary to popular belief, the Church never supported the idea that the earth was flat, never banned human dissection, never banned zero and certainly never burnt anyone at the stake for scientific ideas. The most famous clash between science and religion was the trial of Galileo (1564 – 1642) in 1633. Academic historians are now convinced that this had as much to do with politics and the Pope’s ego as it did with science. I will examine the trial fully in the last chapter of this book when I will also explain how much Galileo himself owed to his medieval predecessors.
….
Popular opinion, journalistic cliché and misinformed historians notwithstanding, recent research has shown that the Middle Ages were a period of enormous advances in science, technology and culture. The compass, paper, printing, stirrups and gunpowder all appeared in Western Europe between AD500 and AD1500.
True, these inventions originated in the Far East, but Europeans developed them to a far higher degree than had happened elsewhere.
….
The development of printing and paper meant that an incredible 20 million books were produced in the first fifty years after Johann Gutenberg had published his printed Bible in 1455. This dwarfed the literary output of the ancient world. Printing probably had an even greater effect than gunpowder, which, like the stirrup before it, revolutionised warfare and allowed Europeans to dominate the rest of the world.
Meanwhile, the people of medieval Europe invented spectacles, the mechanical clock, the windmill and the blast furnace by themselves. Lenses and cameras, almost all kinds of machinery, and the industrial revolution itself all owe their origins to the forgotten inventors of the Middle Ages. Just because we don’t know their names, does not mean that we should not recognise their achievements.
They lived much tougher lives than we do and we are the ones reaping the rewards for their hard work.
Most significantly, the Middle Ages laid the foundation for the greatest achievement of western civilisation, modern science. It is simply untrue to say that there was no science before the ‘Renaissance’. Once medieval scholars got their hands on the work of classical Greeks, they developed systems of thought that allowed science to travel far further than it had in the ancient world. Universities, where academic freedom was guarded against all comers, were first founded in the twelfth century. These institutions have always provided scientific research with a safe home. Even Christian theology turned out to be uniquely suited to encouraging the study of the natural world because it was believed to be God’s creation. Thus, my own research over the last decade has led me to believe that it is a gross injustice to label the Middle Ages as ‘stagnant’, ‘barbaric’, or ‘uncivilised’.
….
Watermills had existed in the ancient world but the Greeks and Romans never adopted them in large numbers. In the Early Middle Ages, they became increasingly common and the Domesday Book lists over 5,000. Tidal mills were adopted on suitable estuaries where a dam harnessed the high tide and released it through a channel containing a watermill. Finally, the first recorded European windmill sprouted in Yorkshire during the twelfth century and the idea quickly spread all over those parts of northern Europe where suitable rivers or estuaries were not available.
Taken together, these improvements in agriculture led to a population explosion. Estimates for the population of France and the Low Countries rise from three million in 650AD to 19 million just before the arrival of the Black Death in 1350AD. For the British Isles, the equivalent figures are 500,000 people and five million. In Europe as a whole, the population increased from less than 20 million to almost 75 million. These figures must be estimates, if not guesstimates, but the upward trend is clear. For comparison, at the height of the Roman Empire about 33 million people lived in Europe. Well before 1000AD, the population far exceeded what is was when the continent was ruled by Rome and remained above that level even after the Black Death had killed a third of the inhabitants of Europe in the fourteenth century.
….
In some ways, the medieval worldview was closer to ours than we sometimes imagine. For example, Gerbert and all his fellow men and women of any education in 1000AD were perfectly well aware that the Earth was a sphere. They also knew that the universe was very large compared to the Earth. As Boethius wrote in his Consolation of Philosophy:
It is well known and you have seen it demonstrated by the astronomers, that in comparison to the extent of the heavens, the circumference of the earth has the size of a point. That means that, compared to the heavenly sphere, the earth may be thought of as having no size at all.
Comments we hear today about people in the Middle Ages inhabiting a ‘poky little universe’ or believing that the Earth is flat are born of modern rather than medieval ignorance.
….
Another modern misconception about the medieval worldview is that people thought the central position of the Earth meant that it was somehow exulted. In fact, to the medieval mind, the reverse was the case. The universe was a hierarchy and the further from the Earth you got, the closer to Heaven you came. At the centre, underneath our feet, the Christian tradition placed Hell. Then, second worse only to the infernal pit was our Earth of change and decay. Above us, acting as a boundary between the earthly and the heavenly, was the sphere of the Moon. This marked the dividing line between the perfect unchanging heavens and the transient sub-lunar region containing ourselves, doomed to die. Next, there were the crystalline spheres of the seven planets – the Moon, the Sun, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn – eternally orbiting with uniform circular motion. The spheres were thought to be made of a transparent and imperishable fifth element called ether or quintessence. Above them were the fixed stars whose positions relative to each other never appeared to change. Above even them was the firmament and beyond that, Christians like Gerbert imagined, was the realm of God. This hierarchical system gave people absolute directions of up and down, one towards the heavens and one down to Earth at the bottom of the celestial ladder. To move the Earth away from the centre of the universe was not to downgrade its importance but to raise it up towards the stars.
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Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
Guest Post: Dan Brown’s History of Science
On Saturday Madeleine and I attended the launch of Laidlaw College (formerly Bible College of New Zealand or BCNZ). It was an impressive event which was well attended; the Minister of Education Chris Carter, local MP Lynne Pillay, United Future’s Judy Turner, various Waitakere City Councillors and former BCNZ Principals were in attendance. The MC was John Hawkesby, the key note speaker was Principle Youth Court Judge Andrew Beecroft.
The pomp was a little overdone with the Mayor of Waitakere City, Bob Harvey, implying via video, that the lower crime rate in the Waitakere area was attributable in part to the presence of BCNZ in the community. Likewise, it was a bit hard to swallow that Chris Carter really truly was there to support Laidlaw College’s plans to develop a more educated and politically active generation of evangelical Christians – more than one person present in the audience had been previously written off as a right wing fundamentalist by the Minister.
The best speech of the evening was by Dr Mark Strom, Laidlaw‘s Principal. Strom opened by noting that the view of history popularly peddled today that Christianity brought about the oppressive period of time known as the Dark Ages was historically false. He pointed out that the Middle Ages had seen a rise in innovation and education and laid the groundwork for the scientific revolution. Quoting from Julian the Apostate, an early Roman critic of Christianity, he pointed out that Christianity had established charities and schools for the poor, had preached a form of egalitarianism whereby the rank and stature of different levels of Roman society were viewed as unimportant. He went on to challenge the excessive pietism in evangelical circles which draws a dichotomy between secular vocation and ministry, no doubt appropriating the puritan ethos of the university at which Strom studied. He spoke of the need for Christians to be culturally informed and engaged, to demand high standards in education and to adopt an intellectually robust yet orthodox, faith that engages the questions of the day. Strom went on to lay out the plan for Laidlaw to become a Christian Liberal Arts College where ultimately the Humanities would be taught from a Christian perspective to a very high standard. The message woven throughout was that of a vision for Laidlaw to pick up its game and find its place as an institution of higher learning.
It was refreshing to hear somebody say this. In 2000 I came to BCNZ to study theology. I found it a frustrating and depressing experience having come from the University of Waikato‘s Philosophy department. I was expecting to find a similar academic standard to which I had left and was looking forward to being able to have this within a Christian community and with the support of like minded individuals. My hope was naive.
It wasn’t that BCNZ was a horrible experience, the people were very nice and friendly but they were culturally so out of touch and I despaired as I saw time and again the staff and students falling for the most ludicrous arguments against Christianity, frequently post-modern garbage, and then struggle to re-contextualise their faith so as to be sympathetic to these ‘genuine, sincere’ concerns. The fact that the argument might have been invalid and the complaint unjustified seemed to never enter their minds, in fact they did not seem to even want to raise the question. Then there were the students whose faith was essentially emotional and their approach to theological education was effectively of the calibre of Sunday School. Two years later I gladly left for Dunedin to pursue my PhD at Otago University and breathed a deep sigh of relief to be back in academia.
Last year, 5 years after leaving for Dunedin, I came back to BCNZ initially because we needed somewhere to stay as my mother had just been diagnosed with terminal cancer and we were not sure whether we would move back up or not. BCNZ was incredibly supportive and not only gave us accommodation and fellowship but also gave me some part-time work teaching theology online.
To my pleasure, things had changed at BCNZ somewhat. It is now acceptable and common for students to have theological conversations outside of class. There seems to be genuine interest in thinking and taking ownership of personal intellectual development and trying to come to an informed and reasoned evangelical faith. Strom‘s leadership has undoubtedly had a lot to do with this change. That said, many of my old frustrations do remain in some form.
Strom’s vision for Laidlaw is encouraging. I absolutely support the direction he is trying to take it in. My only concern is whether he can pull it off. My experience with evangelical organisations is that they generally do not take things far enough. They stop at a quasi-popular level that seems sophisticated to a layman but still is appallingly superficial when viewed against the kind of things that would be found within the average University. I am frustrated with the sorts of things that Madeleine was alluding to when she called herself a little p philosopher, people appointed because of their connections and the fact they have worked within some popular para-church organisation and can deliver a 1000 word overview of the thought of some trendy enlightenment thinker (generally holding a bachelors degree in an unrelated subject) whilst qualified individuals who lack the connections are passed over.
I guess time will tell whether Laidlaw College succeeds or not. I will be hoping and praying that it does because New Zealand Evangelicalism desperately needs it to.
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Laidlaw College: Mark Strom Responds to Critics
Suppose a person upon reading scripture and hearing the scriptures expounded through preaching from the pulpit believes that God has prohibited a certain class of actions. Suppose further that the believer is aware of no conclusive argument either for God’s existence or for the affirmation of the command in question. Nor is he or she aware of any cogent arguments for the reliability of scripture. The believer on discerning that God affirms this in scripture simply takes it at its word and finds himself or herself deeply convinced or persuaded that the action is wrong. Does this person believe in an intellectual acceptable manner?
Many people think the obvious answer is no, here I want to reflect on one particular argument for this negative assesment.
In an lecture expounding Calvin’s view of faith, Greg Dawes has argued that a person who believes in this fashion does act irrationally. A claim he repeats in his text book Philosophy of Religion which was , at least couple of years ago, the proscribed text for Philosophy of Religion at Otago University. ( I should add that Dawes was one of my thesis examiners) Dawes states
One can concede that it would be perfectly reasonable to believe something on the authority of God, even if one had no other evidence for its truth (what could be more reasonable than to believe something told me by an omniscient and morally perfect being). But on the face of it one would still need evidence in
support of one’s belief that (a) that these propositions are revealed by God; and, (b) that God is a reliable source of knowledge. We’ll see in a moment how believers have responded to this demand.[1]
Here Dawes claims that although it is true that one is warranted in accepting things on a reliable authority such as God, before one does so one needs evidence that the authority in question is, in fact, reliable, that the testimony is from God and that that God is a reliable testifier.
Dawes goes on however to argue that in the case of faith in scriptural testimony, no non-circular evidence is forthcoming. In questioning what makes believers think God speaks authoritatively through Scripture he states,
The more common response … is to ‘bootstrap’ the believer’s sense of certainty: to base the certainty of his belief on the very revelation in which he believes. … Religious faith believes certain propositions on the authority of God on the authority of God. (This is not a typographical error.) The authority of God is simultaneously that which (id quod) and that by virtue of which (id quo) one believes.
The circularity in this position might seem to be the Achilles’ heel, not just of the Protestant system, as David Friedrich Strauss suggested, but of this traditional, ‘bootstrapping’ view of faith in whatever form it is expressed.[2]
Dawes’s argument rests on two assumptions. Firstly, that the believer has no non-circular reasons for thinking that the scripture is a medium of divine discourse. Secondly, that the believer must have such reasons if he or she is to be warranted in accepting anything on these grounds. I think both assumptions are false.
1. Does the Believer Need Reasons for Thinking his Source Reliable?
I suspect Dawes conflates two separate questions in the second of his assumptions; whether a given ground is, in fact, reliable and whether one has grounds or reasons for thinking it is reliable. These are not the same question. It is possible for a ground to be reliable without knowing or having any reason for thinking it is. Likewise, the fact that a person has no reason for thinking something is reliable does not entail that it is not reliable.
In defending Calvin’s view of faith Alvin Plantinga and those who follow a similar tack such as William Alston and Nicholas Wolterstorff utilise a highly-influential theory of knowledge known as Reliabilism. Reliabilism holds that a belief is warranted if, and only if, the source, grounds or mechanism that produces the belief, or that it is based on, is reliable, i.e. likely to produce true beliefs on the topic in question. Robert Nozick, Alvin Goldman, John Armstrong, Alvin Plantinga and William Alston have advanced versions of this theory.
The exact version of Reliabilism does not matter too much but for clarity I will use Alston’s version. Alston suggests that a belief is warranted if it is based on a reliable ground or grounds.[3] A person’s belief is warranted if the grounds on which the belief is held are reliable grounds for holding a belief of that sort. He also adds that the person who holds the belief must not have a reason for thinking that the belief is false nor a reason for thinking that the belief is not reliable.
On a reliabilist account, it is the former and not the latter condition that must be met for a belief to be warranted. Alston’s Reliabilism entails that a belief is warranted if it is based on a reliable ground; it does not hold that it must be based on what one has reason for thinking is a reliable ground. The same can be said for most Externalism and Reliabilism theories in general. Noting that a person has no reason for thinking that something is reliable does not show that this condition is not met and hence, does not show that the belief in question lacks warrant.
An obvious response to this line of argument would be to claim that there is some kind of epistemological principle or requirement to avoid believing something based on a given ground or source until one has reasons for thinking that such sources are reliable and that the believer violates this requirement. However, this position has at least two problems.
Firstly, it leads to absurd conclusions. If I cannot believe any thing on a given ground until I have good reasons for thinking the ground reliable, then I cannot believe anything because I remember it happening. To do so I would need good reasons for thinking my memory is reliable. Clearly, such reasons are not forthcoming as any argument I use to try to demonstrate my memory would be circular. I could attempt to show that most of the times I used my memory in the past it was correct but then I would need to remember how I had used my memory in the past and remember whether or not it was accurate. However, I am not permitted to utilise memory in this way until I have reason for trusting it and hence, any such argument could not get off the ground. Similarly, I would be unable to rationally rely on the deliverance of reason. After all, how can I show that a reason is reliable? This can only be done by offering reasons.
The problems do not stop here because memory is essential to any given line of reasoning one engages in. Reasoning is a temporal process; one begins with the first premise and follows an inference through to a conclusion. One does not hold every step of an argument in one’s mind at the same time. Rather one relies on one’s memory to remember the first steps while the second is assessed and then remembers this step while the third is examined and so on. Hence, without memory one cannot reason at all. This creates an unsolvable sceptical situation. One cannot trust memory if one does not have a reason for thinking it is reliable but one cannot get any such reason unless one trusts one’s own memory. Moreover, one cannot engage in reasoning at all if one does not trust it. This position leads to the destruction of all reason.
The second problem created by this kind of stance is that it leads to an infinite regression. To show that the source were reliable, I would have to appeal to certain premises that are based on some other source but then I would have to show that this source was reliable and so on. The claim that one needs reasons for thinking a ground is reliable before one can be warranted in believing anything on the basis of that ground appears problematic.
A further rejoinder suggests that it is in general true that I do not need to have reasons for thinking a ground reliable before I am warranted in accepting a given proposition on this ground. However, I do need such reasons if the ground of my belief is testimony, that is, the say-so of some other person. Dawes suggests something like this in his paper.[4] He distinguishes beliefs based on testimony from basic beliefs. He states that basic beliefs are such that one is warranted in believing them independently of any argument for them, whereas beliefs based on authority are warranted by “indirect evidence”. By indirect evidence, he means evidence that the testimony in question is reliable. A person who believes something based on testimony will, if they are rational, have “reasons to believe the trustworthiness of the source” from which he or she “gained the information”.[5]
However, this view of testimony is mistaken. Coady summarises the problem. If one is going to have grounds for the reliability of a given authority or testimony then these grounds will be either some other testimony or authority, in which case there is a problem of circularity, or it will be based upon sources apart from testimony. [6] The problem with this second horn of the dilemma is that if we exclude what we know by way of testimony we will have so little to go on that such grounds will be almost impossible to come by.
To demonstrate this, consider an example Dawes himself provides, the belief that E=MC2. Dawes writes,
Very many of our beliefs are held on the basis of testimony. (In this context I shall sometimes refer to these as beliefs held on the basis of authority.) Does e=mc2 represent the rate at which matter can be transformed into energy? I believe so, although I would not have the faintest idea how to demonstrate its truth I have it on good authority that it is true…Of course, there is a sense in which I do believe this on the basis of evidence. I have reasons to believe in the trustworthiness of the sources from which I gained the information.[7]
Dawes suggests that a non-physicist can rationally believe e=mc2 because he or she has reasons to believe that his or her sources are trustworthy. I believe this last comment is incorrect. Consider, for example, what reasons he could offer for believing that the source of his information was reliable. Presumably, it would be because the author of the book in which he read it or the person who told him it was a physicist. Nevertheless, how does he know this? He could have read the person’s qualifications off a faculty list, off the dust-jacket of the book or been told them by the person himself but in each case he is relying on testimony and so, in the absence of further reasons he cannot believe these sources. Suppose, however, Dawes was to investigate thoroughly and locate the address of the university where the degree in physics was awarded in order to check its original records. Yet again, he will be relying on testimony in the form of an address list and records. He would also have to have trusted the testimony of maps and road signs in getting to the university in question.
Consider then what Dawes would have left to go on if he did not use testimony. He could not rely on any information which he himself did not observe first-hand. This would exclude any information about events prior to his own lifetime, any events in his own lifetime that he did not remember witnessing first hand and any event that happened in a place other than where he was at the time. Nothing read in journals, books, heard in lectures, taught to him by his parents or teachers could be used. Nothing heard on the news, read on the computer, told over the phone or reported on would be included. Almost everything he had learnt through his entire education would be excluded because nearly all of it is based on testimony. It seems, then, that if Dawes were really to comply with the epistemic standards he laid down, he could not rationally believe in e=mc2. It appears he is mistaken in thinking that one needs to have reasons for thinking a given authority is reliable to be warranted in believing in testimony.
I think this example shows that this is not isolated. What we know by way of being told by others accounts for a huge and pervasive amount of what we believe. Everything I know about other places, other times, everything learnt at school, university, from parents, friends, books, newspapers, television, etc. is based on testimony. If I were to try to verify any of these beliefs without first relying on some other piece of testimony, I would be unable to.
2. Does the Believer have Non-Circular Reasons for Believing in Scripture
These observations also give us grounds for calling into question the first contention Dawes makes in his criticism of believing in scriptural testimony. Dawes assumes that the believer has no non-circular grounds for thinking that scripture is a medium of divine discourse.[8]
Here his argument appears to be as follows. Dawes grants that if scripture is a medium of divine discourse then one is warranted in accepting theological beliefs on scriptural testimony. He then notes that the only way one could get to the conclusion that such beliefs are warranted is by affirming the antecedent of this conditional and affirming that scripture is in fact a medium of divine discourse.
However, he goes on to argue that this latter belief is typically believed based on scriptural testimony and hence the argument is circular.
What is mistaken here is Dawes’s assumption that this practice involves some form of argument in which the proposition that scripture is a medium of divine discourse serves as a premise. On the above model a person believes propositions affirmed in scripture not by inferring them via argument but by simply taking scripture’s word for it. Consequently, these propositions are not based on any argument at all and cannot be based upon a circular argument as Dawes suggests.
Here his argument appears to be as follows. First he conceeds that if scripture is a medium of divine discourse then one is warranted in accepting theological beliefs on the basis that scripture affirms them. He then suggests that this entails that one can believe on the basis of scripture only if one has good reasons for thinking scripture is the word of God. However, he goes on to argue that this latter belief is typically believed based on scriptural testimony and hence the argument is circular.
What is mistaken here is Dawes’s assumption that this practice involves some form of argument in which the proposition that scripture is a medium of divine discourse serves as a premise. On the above model a person believes propositions affirmed in scripture not by inferring them via argument but by simply taking scripture’s word for it and hence believes such propositions as basic. Consequently, these propositions are not based on any argument at all and cannot be based upon a circular argument as Dawes suggests.
Perhaps what Dawes is driving at is not that this claim that scripture mediates divine discourse is based on a circular argument but rather, it is circular in some other fashion. The distinction between logical and epistemic circularity is helpful here. Logical circularity occurs when a person affirms in the premise of the argument what he or she is attempting to establish in the conclusion. Such circularity can then only apply to arguments and not to basic beliefs. However, William Alston has pointed out that there is also such a thing as epistemic circularity. This occurs when one in practice relies upon a particular source or type of ground in order to establish the reliability of the type of ground in question. A person who relied on perceptual judgements to argue for the reliability of sense perception would be an example. This approach is not logically circular; the person need not argue from premises affirming the reliability of perception. However, it is circular nevertheless.[9]
It is clear, I think, that the model is epistemically circular. The real question is whether there is anything wrong with such circularity. This is borne out by another point Alston stresses, that every, major, doxastic practice, even ones that are paradigmatically rational, are epistemically circular. [10] I noted this with memory above; one can only establish that memory is reliable by relying on the deliverance of memory as premises in a deductive argument. Similarly, with beliefs based upon a sound, deductive argument. Such arguments can be shown to be reliable only with other arguments and so on. Even an omniscient being could not demonstrate that his cognitive faculties are reliable without appealing to those faculties. Hence, if the practice of believing in divine commands because they are affirmed in scripture is problematic because one cannot believe the reliability of scripture without engaging in epistemic circularity, then various paradigms of rational belief are also problematic. In fact, rationality is impossible. This is, of course, absurd.
[1] Greg Dawes, “Faith and Reason”, a paper presented to the University of Otago Theology and Religious Studies Faculty. This is contained in Dawes, Philosophy of Religion, (so far unpublished) 46.
[2] Ibid.
[3] William Alston, “The Concept of Epistemic Justification,” in Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, ed. William Alston (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 77.
[4] Ibid., 38.
[5] Ibid.
[6] C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
[7] Dawes, “Faith and Reason,” 34.
[8] Ibid., 9.
[9] William Alston, “Epistemic Circularity,” in Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, ed. William Alston (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 319-349.
[10] By doxastic practice, I refer to the practice of forming beliefs in response to certain grounds, whether the ground is argument, some form of experience or the assertion of some authority.
In my last post I took a swipe at certain popular dismissals of theism on the grounds that “God’s existence can’t be proved.” Mark V offered a measured and thoughtful response in the comments section. We enjoy feedback from our readers and I have always enjoyed his, particularly those on the Euthyphro dilemma and I think Mark raises some interesting points in his latest response. So, in order to advance these issues a bit further I will use this post to respond to Mark V. I do so, in part, because I think the issues he raises reflect broader views of God and religion in our culture.
Mark writes:
My position is not that I deny God exists, but that I am not convinced by the arguments that he does exist.
Simply someone claims that God exists; I look about me and cannot see this God so I ask the person to prove this God exists. My response would be the same if the person claimed to believe in ghosts or telepathy.
I will take Mark’s position here as agnosticism, the position that neither affirms nor denies the existence of God. Strictly speaking Mark does not say this, he claims merely that he, “is not convinced by the arguments that God does exist,” however, I assume he means to affirm more than this. After all, there are many theists who find the arguments for God’s existence unconvincing. Some theist’s influenced by Pascal or William James, for example, believe that there are no arguments either for or against theism but nevertheless hold that practical considerations mean one should accept God’s existence. Some, such as Plantinga in God and Other Minds, hold that while the arguments for and against God’s existence both fail, belief in God is justifiably believed in the absence of evidence as a properly basic belief. In contrast to these positions I think Mark V is intending to adopt a position incompatible with theism.
Assuming this, if I read Mark correctly, his comments in this citation presuppose a certain method which goes something like this:
[1] If something cannot be detected by the five senses then it needs to be proven to be true.
[2] If something cannot be proven to be true then we should not deny its existence but we should not believe it exists either i.e. adopt some form of agnosticism towards the object.
He applies this method to God and concluding that God’s existence can’t be proved, embraces agnosticism.
I think this objection to theism is problematic; [1] and [2] appear to me to have at least two problems (a) they entail skepticism about rational beliefs; and, (b) [1] is self-contradictory.
Turning to the first of these points, (a), consider the belief that the universe has existed for more than six seconds or the belief that minds other than mine exist. One cannot “see” with the five senses that these claims are true. What we can see is limited to the present and while we can see physical beings engaging in certain behavior, we cannot feel or detect their thoughts or feelings. Hence by [1] the existence of these objects would need to be proven. However, I think it’s pretty evident from the history of philosophical discussion on these matters that one cannot prove these things to be true.
Everything we see is in fact logically compatible with the claim that the entire universe (including all traces of age) popped into existence six seconds ago or that other people merely behave in certain ways and have no thoughts or feelings at all. Similar things can be said about the existence of physical objects. We assume that certain objects such as trees, logs, rocks, etc exist independently of whether we are looking at them or not. We cannot test that they are there when we go inside or turn our backs as by hypothesis we can only see them when we are looking at them. Their existence would need to be proven and proven from premises that do not assume that there exists anything independent of our senses from the outset. However, given that these things can’t be proven in this manner acceptance of [2] means we should be agnostic about the existence of trees, logs, rocks and any physical object, other people, the existence of a world that is more than six seconds old, etc.
Turning now to (b), that [1] is self refuting, take the claim explicitly articulated in [1] that if something cannot be detected by the five senses then it needs to be proven to be true. Now the truth of this claim itself cannot be detected by sight, hearing, touch, etc. So, if [1] is true, Mark needs to prove that [1] is true using the method he proscribed. He has not done so. Moreover if [2] is true, the failure of Mark to provide such a proof would mean that neither he nor I nor you should believe [1], but rather be agnostic towards it.
Note also that any proof Mark attempts to offer can only appeal to premises which can be ascertained by the five senses. If they do not, we will be required to disbelieve the premises and hence the proof.
This, then, is what I think is the problem with this kind of critical rejection of theism. The skeptic rejects God’s existence out of allegiance to certain assumptions about what constitutes a rational belief. The problem is that these assumptions are in the same boat as theism is alleged to be; a person who rejects theism because he believes these assumptions is acting inconsistently. Moreover, if these assumptions were consistently applied, almost all knowledge would be destroyed.
Similar things can be said about Mark’s other argument, which I take to be an expression of a very similar line of thought.
People belive in the existence of many things e.g. ghosts UFOs telepathy. To prove these phenomena exist various experiments are conducted using a range of instruments. If these experiments do not detect the phenomena the conclusion is that the phenomena do not exist.
The exception is God. God cannot be detected by our senses or by any instrument. God’s existence can only be established by the use of logical arguments. But then almost anything can be proven or disproven by carefully wording a logical argument.
No one outside the individual believeing in God can conduct a test to confirm that the God the individual believes exists in fact does exist. The existence of God is personal to each individual believing in God.
Here I think Mark’s reasoning is similar to what I criticised above. If I understand him correctly he reasons something like as follows,
[1] Existence claims can only be known by experiments “conducted using a range of instruments” or by logical arguments.
[2] God cannot be detected by experiments conducted using a range of instruments” as “No one outside the individual believing in God can conduct a test to confirm that the God the individual believes exists in fact does exist.”
[1] and [2] entail:
[3] God can only be determined by logical arguments.
However, Mark also contends:
[4] “[A]lmost anything can be proven or disproven by carefully wording a logical argument.”
These premises jointly entail that God’s existence cannot be known. If one accepts [1] and [2], it follows that, “God’s existence can only be established by the use of logical arguments,” but then [4], prima facie rules out the idea that anything can be known by logical argument.
I find the argument fascinating because it is a good expression both of contemporary exaltation of science as sole paradigm of knowledge, seen in Mark’s claims about experiments “conducted using a range of instruments” and his concerns that God cannot be subjected to scientific testing, alongside a kind of relativistic dismissal of all non-scientific sources of knowledge, seen in Mark’s claim that “almost anything can be proven or disproven by carefully wording a logical argument.” I also, predictably, think this mindset is mistaken.
Turning first to [1], I think Mark’s first premises again leads to skepticism on a wide scale. Take my previous examples of belief in other people or the existence of physical objects that continue to exist when people do not perceive them or the belief in the past. None of these things can be determined by the type of empirical testing Mark refers to, they can only be determined by logical arguments. However, given [4], no such arguments are ever conclusive as almost anything can be proved or disproved by them. So presumably we should not believe in other people, the past or enduring physical objects.
In addition, in this context one could reflect on what these assumptions do to moral knowledge. Take the claim ‘rape is wrong.’ This suggests that there exists some kind of binding prescription ‘do not rape’ that we are required to follow, presumably one that holds even if I or my society or my peers think rape is a good idea. However, such a prescription cannot be detected by experiments “conducted using a range of instruments,” hence, we need logical arguments.
I happen to think, however, that the claim ‘rape is wrong’ is not self-evident and something that cannot be proved by argument and does not need to be. However, if it can be proved by argument then Mark’s advancement of [4] suggests that it probably can be disproven by argument and hence we have no real rational grounds for believing that rape is wrong. Surely this is absurd. We do know rape is wrong independent of scientific experiments and independently of logical arguments.
I think Mark’s premise [4] is self refuting. Mark is offering an argument for his position. But if [4] is true and almost anything can be proved or disproved by logical argument, it would seem everyone, including Mark, has good reasons for not trusting conclusions based on argument, therefore we should reject his argument.
As a final comment I would like to broaden my comments a bit. I noted above that Mark’s comments appear to reflect an epistemological paradigm which exalts science as the sole method of knowledge and dismisses what science cannot accommodate as a kind of private personal preference. Many Christian thinkers have responded to this charge by trying to show this paradigm can accommodate God. They offer scientific type arguments for God’s existence by appealing to things like the big bang, the fine-tuning of the universe, laws of nature, etc as evidence for God’s existence. While I have some sympathy for this response I am inclined to think that in one sense these arguments are irrelevant as the more important point is to note the paradigm itself is mistaken. In Mark’s case applying the paradigm consistently would rule out not just God but all kinds of knowledge which even an ardent atheist would hold as rationally held. Moreover, the paradigm appears to invalidate itself. Hence, even if it is the case that such methods cannot establish the existence of God the problem lies with the methods and not with theism.
Matt
One common reason I hear for atheism is the claim that there is no proof that God exists. Several questions can be asked about this objection. What exactly does the objector mean by proof? If all things need to be proved to be sensibly believed then what is the proof that all things require proof? Further, what is the proof for the claim that there is no proof? Finally, if some things can be believed without proof, why is God in the “must be proved” category?
There is however another question. If the absence of proof for a thesis provides rational grounds for claiming the thesis is false then wouldn’t absence of proof for atheism provide grounds for claiming that atheism is false? The person who is an atheist on the basis of this objection seems, on the face of it, to work with a double standard here. He claims that theism requires proof and that the absence of such proof requires us to reject theism as false. However, he thinks that atheism can be believed in the absence of proof for it.
What is the basis for this distinction on the atheist’s part? To avoid this prima facie inconsistency the atheist needs to provide some reason why theism requires proof but atheism does not. In the absence of any good reason his position seems simply arbitrary.
This brings me to the issue I want to address. One common reason, one I often hear expounded is that theism asserts a positive claim, it affirms the existence of something. Atheism, however, makes a negative claim, it denies the existence of something. According to the line of argument I want to address negative statements cannot by their nature be proven. The objector argues that it is impossible to prove a universal negative; however, positive claims can be proven. Hence, for this reason, positive claims need to be proved and negative ones do not. We can assume the denial of somethings existence in the absence of proof but we cannot affirm the existence of something without proof.
I have heard this claim repeated in cyber space over and over. I think it’s a very bad argument for three reasons.
First, the claim that “you cannot prove a negative” is false. Here are some examples of negatives which can be proved:
a) there is no 1,000,000 mile high pile of African elephants in New Zealand
b) there are no promiscuous virgins
c) there are no married bachelors
d) there is no planet between earth and the mars
e) there is no such thing as a square triangle
One can prove a negative statement in several ways. One can show that an existential statement would, if true, entail a contradiction or metaphysical absurdity or the denial of things which we know are the case.
Second, if one claims that positive existential statements always need to be proved, one is lead into a fairly radical skepticism about everything. Take the claim that there exists a physical world independent of my senses. Or that other people (with thoughts and feelings) exist. Or that there exists a world that is more than six seconds old. There are well known problems with being able to prove these things and yet each one is a positive existential statement. On the view sketched above we are committed to denying these things exist.
In fact I think a little reflection shows that it would, on the assumption that positive existential always need to be proved, be almost impossible to prove everything. If I prove the existence of something I do so by appealing to other premises which assert facts. But facts are things that exist in the world. Consequently, I would need to prove these facts exist before I can appeal to them but I can’t prove these facst unless I appeal to them as proof.
It follows that if I cannot prove anything, and one should deny the existence of whatever cannot be proven, then the only option is to deny the existence of everything.
Let me turn to my third reason for thinking this line of argument is flawed. Suppose one grants [a] that it is impossible to prove negatives; and also that for this reason, [b] one should deny a positive existential statement unless proof is provided. Both [a] and [b] create problems for an atheist. Consider the following claim, there exist some material objects that were not created by God. This claim is a positive existential statement. Hence, until the atheist can provide proof that it is true, until he can prove that some material objects were not created by God, he must deny that such objects exist. However to deny this statement is to affirm that every material object was created by God and hence that God exists.
In conclusion, the claim that theists bear the burden of proof because they are making a positive claim and that the denial of positive claims is the default position until proven is a problematic claim.
Matt