Category: Jurisprudence

  • Watch Matt on the GCSB Bill on Shine TV

    On 30 July 2013 Matt was interviewed on Shine TV about the Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment (“GCSB”) Bill. The discussion on the issues of civil liberties, spying in times of threats against citizens is very good. The video is here:

  • Why Defamatory Speech is not Free Speech

    The following is a representation of the standard argument as to why a remedy requiring the removal of defamatory speech from a publication is not a violation of the right to free speech:

    1. The right to Freedom of Expression is protected by s14 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“BORA”).
    2. The operational provisions of the BORA provide in section 5 that a reasonable limit to Freedom of Expression can be justified in a free and democratic society where that limit is prescribed by law.
    3. Section 5 is subject to section 4, which states in mandatory terms that no court can decline to apply any provision of an enactment on the sole grounds that the provision is inconsistent with the BORA.
    4. Notwithstanding this, section 6 requires the court rule in a manner as consistent as possible with Bill of Rights.
    5. If a Respondent’s actions constitute a breach of s4 of the Defamation Act 1992 therefore the remedy sought, removal of the defamatory material from the publication, does not violate the Respondent’s right to Freedom of Expression.

    Freedom of SpeechWhile this is the standard argument it has always felt wrong to me. There is something unsatisfactory about appealing to a mechanism in the law that, as argued, feels like it is shearing off a part of an important right and freedom, even if the law says that it is ok.

    I find this argument unsettling and lacking something; at the same time defamatory speech is insidious, causes harm, hurts; intuitively it just feels wrong to say that one is morally justified in spreading harmful falsehoods about a person and is not required to account for the wrongs done, because of their right to free speech.

    After discussions with Matt about this I have decided that I prefer the following argument:

    1. Freedom of Expression exists to allow people to freely express their opinions and impart information without fear of legal penalty.
    2. Defamation is expression imparted to another that lowers the standing of a person in the eyes of their peers and is not true and is not honest opinion which is genuinely held.(I am ignoring the third defence, privilege).
    3. A person who expresses defamation is not engaging in Freedom of Expression as where there is no truth or honest opinion then a person is neither attempting to inform another or attempting to express their opinion.
    4. The basis for this is that to attempt to inform someone is to attempt to increase that person’s repertoire of true beliefs’ and to impart an opinion is to express what one honestly believes to be the case.
    5. Therefore, the freedom that the right to Freedom of Expression protects is all speech that is true or honestly held to be true by the speaker.

    That is much better.

    Defamatory speech is not free speech therefore legal sanctions against it are entirely appropriate in both legal and moral senses.

    Context:
    Two blogs have recently been found to have published defamation of me, the nature of which was described as “extremely serious” by a Court of Law. The above demonstrates why I feel I was perfectly justified in seeking the removal of the defamatory material, one by Court Order, one by private request. John Stuart Mill, the UN Charter, Milton, Common Law, to point to a few, have agreed for centuries that defining Freedom of Speech to be all speech that is not Defamation is just in all mediums. Defamatory speech being restricted or punished by law, offline or online, poses no threat to anyone.

  • Flannagan v ACC: 5 Years on, an Update

    On Tuesday 26 March 2013 it will be 5 years since I was in a car accident that destroyed a cervical disc and saw me need surgery to have an artificial disc inserted and which left me with an ongoing pain condition and a habit of dropping things and having tingly episodes in my hands – still!

    At the time of the accident I was on track to become an in house counsel for one of NZ’s leading brands; the company were paying for me to complete my law degree.

    Initially ACC covered my income and treatment costs (well, part of them). They did not cover the part of my remuneration which related to my university fees and text books.

    They sent me to see a specialist who is considered by many within his own field and has been found by the court to have, in the face of contrary evidence, “stuck to his tried and true assertion that degeneration is the cause” (read the judgment in Lu v ACC). He made no exception for me stating that was his diagnosis as I entered his rooms, before he asked me a single medical question, before he saw my scans. Matt was with me and saw this.

    ACC cut my cover after he wrote his report. This spun us into significant hardship. So I hired the best ACC lawyers I could find. I took ACC to a review hearing conducted by ACC’s own reviewer. I lost. My lawyer told the court I would appeal. Two other specialists have now examined me and my files, both agree my condition is the result of an accident, both have written evidence for the court stating this. My lawyer has written her submissions. Yesterday Matt and I swore our affidavits, which we wrote ourselves and had my lawyer vet. This coming week my appeal will finally be filed. I hope to have a court date this year.

  • Yet Another Lawyer Agrees: Marriage Amendment Act Bill is an Affront to Freedom of Religion and Belief

    Barrister Ian Bassett has given another opinion describing the risks to freedom of religion and belief of Louisa Wall’s Marriage Amendment Act Bill if it is enacted in its presently proposed form, which would include this amendment:

    “Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), no celebrant who is a minister of religion recognised by a religious body enumerated in Schedule 1, and no celebrant who is a person nominated to solemnize marriages by an approved organisation, is obliged to solemnize a marriage if solemnizing that marriage would contravene the religious beliefs of the religious body or the religious beliefs or philosophical or humanitarian convictions of the approved organisation.”

    It is clear that any marriage celebrant exercising their public function who is not covered by the amendment risks being in breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 if they refuse to perform their public function as marriage celebrants because it is a same sex couple seeking to be married.

    Injustice

    Church ministers, marriage celebrants, court registrars, church elders, leaders, photographers and caterers and any other person or entity supplying services to the public risks being in breach of the Human Rights Act 1993 if they refuse to supply services to a couple seeking to be married because the couple are same sex. For some this could also mean risking their employment.

    Service providers to the public risk being in breach of the Human Rights Act 1993 if they refuse to supply services to a married couple because the couple are same sex.

    The New Zealand Law Society’s Law Reform Committee headed by Professor Paul Rishworth LLB (Hons) M Jur highlighted the risk to freedom of religion and belief in the Bill in its submission to Parliament:

    “The proposer of the Bill said that the Bill was not intended to compel marriage celebrants to perform marriages contrary to their religious beliefs. However, in the Law Society’s view, Professor Rishworth says it is arguable that marriage celebrants who refuse to perform same-sex marriages will be acting unlawfully under the Human Rights Act 1993, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, or both.

    “We want to highlight arguable conclusions which seem to be at odds with the settled intentions of the Bill’s drafters. Whatever the position, the Law Society believes it makes sense to put the matter beyond doubt,” Professor Rishworth says.

    The only thing that the amended Bill puts beyond doubt is that the critics of those raising fears about the Bill’s threat to freedom of religion and belief were wrong. By recommending an amendment the Select Committee are agreeing that a risk existed, as the likes of Ian Bassett, Grant Illingworth have argued, contra to The Human Rights Commission’s claim that all “…religious officials and leaders are free to refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs.”

    Bassett, Illingworth and Rishworth are not alone with their concerns among the legal fraternity.

    Graeme Edgeler, a Wellington Barrister has been quoted in the Herald saying:

    … if an independent celebrant declined to marry a same-sex couple, the couple could then complain to the Human Rights Commission.

    “It’s not about [celebrants] being forced, it’s about people getting in trouble afterwards if they didn’t,” he told APNZ.

    “They’re not breaking any rule in the Marriage Act, but rules in other acts. The main one would be the Human Rights Act, which says you can’t discriminate on the basis on sexual orientation or gender.”

    Auckland Barrister Rachel Wong has raised issues against the Bill.

    This blog’s Madeleine Flannagan LLB, Associate Barrister and Solicitor at Coast Legal, adds her voice:

    “The Bill, in its present form, fails to protect individual freedom of religion and belief (belief being a comprehensive viewpoint not based on religion). The proposed amendment only protects group religious rights, which is little protection at all for most religious celebrants as few denominations hold formal views on marriage, many practitioners of religion do not belong to a group and for those that do they might hold a different personal view on this topic to the group view. The amendment then fails to protect the religious freedom of most religious celebrants just as it utterly fails to protect the freedom of belief of non-religious celebrants who have no group to appeal to to protect their freedom.”

    Ian Bassett’s latest opinion thoroughly analyses the legal effects of the amended Bill, a summary as to whose freedom of religion and belief it protects and whose it does not follows: (more…)

  • Matt on Radio: Women tells Court of Appeal being pregnant with a defective baby is an injury

    A New Zealand woman has gotten her case against the Accident Compensation Corporation (“ACC”) into the Court of Appeal. The Herald carried the story. Matt was interviewed for his view on Radio Rhema last week.

    The woman was told at her 20-week scan that "no anatomical abnormality" was detected. Photo / Getty Image

    ACC claim mother: I would have aborted

    Woman says she would have terminated pregnancy had she been told baby was disabled.

    A woman who says she would have terminated her pregnancy had doctors properly diagnosed her unborn child with spina bifida is seeking ACC cover for her disabled daughter.

    In what her lawyer says could be a landmark case if she is successful, the woman has won the right to a hearing in the Court of Appeal against the decision by the Accident Compensation Corporation not to grant her cover for her young daughter.

    The Auckland mother says her 5-year-old daughter, who walks mostly with a support frame, may miss out on crucial and costly physiotherapy as she grows older.

    “We want her to have the best possible life that we can give her and with ACC cover it makes it a lot easier for us to be able to provide everything we need to provide,” said the mother, who did not want to be named.

    She said her evidence to the court that she would have chosen to abort the pregnancy if she and her partner had been told of their daughter’s condition at 20 weeks’ pregnancy was difficult testimony to give.

    “Obviously once she’s with us we want and love her,” the mother said yesterday.

    Continues…

  • “Same-Sex Marriage is not Valid Marriage” – A Potentially Convict-able Statement

    In MandM on Same-Sex Marriage and on being “sneaky” we referred to section 56 of the Marriage Act 1955 which provides:

    56 Offence to deny or impugn validity of lawful marriage

    (1) Every person commits an offence against this Act, and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 100 pounds, who—

    (a) alleges, expressly or by implication, that any persons lawfully married are not truly and sufficiently married; or

    (b) alleges, expressly or by implication, that the issue of any lawful marriage is illegitimate or born out of true wedlock.

    (2) For the purposes of this section the term alleges means making any verbal statement, or publishing or issuing any printed or written statement, or in any manner authorizing the making of any verbal statement, or in any manner authorizing or being party to the publication or issue of any printed or written statement.

    (3) A person shall not be deemed to make an allegation contrary to the provisions of this section by reason only of using in the solemnization of a marriage a form of marriage service which at the commencement of this Act was in use by the religious body to which that person belongs, or by reason only of the printing or issue of any book containing a copy of a form of marriage service in use at the commencement of this Act by any religious body.

    Criminal OffenceLousia Wall’s Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill, which seeks to amend the Marriage Act to allow for same-sex marriage does not seek an amendment to this section. This suggests that if her Bill passes, then anyone who claims that a same-sex marriage is not a valid marriage or a true marriage commits an offence.

    The fairly comprehensive legal opinion by Ian Bassett, argues that the law will have this effect.

    This is, of course, concerning because this is precisely what many religious groups teach. The Westminster Confession, for example,which is the doctrinal standard for  Presbyterian and Reformed Churches, states:

    I. Marriage is to be between one man and one woman: neither is it lawful for any man to have more than one wife, nor for any woman to have more than one husband at the same time.

    II. Marriage was ordained for the mutual help of husband and wife; for the increase of mankind with a legitimate issue, and of the Church with an holy seed; and for preventing of uncleanness.

    This defines marriage as being between a man and a woman. It entails that if a union is not between a man and a woman then it is not a marriage. Moreover, the purposes of the institution explicitly exclude same-sex unions in that the purposes include the mutual help of a husband and wife and procreation which rules out same-sex unions – particularly if the biblical and theological context and basis for those affirmations is understood.

    When the Human Rights Commission was asked about this, prior to the Basset legal opinion being commissioned, it gave the following response: (more…)

  • MandM on Same-Sex Marriage and on being “sneaky”

    In his Letter from Birmingham Jail, Martin Luther King wrote there are two types of laws: just and unjust.” He went on to ask “How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law.”

    While King was protesting segregation, his argument drew on a theological tradition going back to Augustine, Aquinas, Locke and others, namely, that right and wrong is not defined by governments but by the law of God. Governments are under God’s authority and cannot command absolute allegiance. Of course the state can and often has good reasons for tolerating actions contrary to divine law but if the states endorses them,  is complicit in their commission or attempts to legitimate them as valid, then it usurps its authority. When it does this its citizens have the right to resist it.

    MarriageThis theological tradition is the reason many Christians oppose same-sex marriage. King was correct to claim that the law of God grants equal dignity to all people regardless of race; the law of God also instituted marriage as a union of one man and one woman. Sexual activity between people of the same-sex is morally wrong, just like people of the same family or sexual activity with multiple partners at the same time. The state may have good reasons in a fallen society for tolerating such actions but has no right to declare them valid.

    We believe that given certain defensible theological presuppositions this position is defensible and robust.

    The above summarises the basis for our opposition to same-sex marriage; this is why we believe the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill should not be passed. Over at Whale Oil our guest post, “Critiquing the Case for Same-Sex Marriage“, offers rebuttals of the arguments that have been advanced by proponents of the Bill.

    Readers of both this post and the one at Whale Oil will note that in this post we appeal to theological premises – this is because we are describing why we oppose it and we, as Christians, accept these theological views – but on Whale Oil we are offering a rebuttal of other people’s arguments; hence, there we draw on premises that those who support the Bill are likely to be committed to.

    In the comments section at Whale Oil we have been accused of being sneaky in taking this approach. We disagree. We are quite happy to speak about our own position; however, that was not what we were doing on Whale Oil. What we were doing on Whale Oil was offering a critique of our opponents’ position – the dialectical context was not the same. Offering reasons why we accept something is not the same thing as offering our opponents reasons why they should reject certain arguments they have advanced. Far from doing anything sneaky, we are simply trying to engage our opponents on their own terms.

    When there is a fundamental difference in presuppositions between one’s opponent and oneself then a critique of one’s opponents’ argument only provides them with reasons for rejecting the argument if the critique appeals to premises they accept or are logically committed to by virtue of their presuppositions.

    Appealing to theological beliefs they do not themselves hold provides them with no reason for accepting anything. Incidentally, the converse is also true: attempts to rebut theologically based positions do not provide religious people who hold such positions any rational reason for abandoning them unless those rebuttals appeal to premises the religious person accepts and is logically committed to. This is not being sneaky, it is called effective rational dialogue. The alternative is simply talking past each other in a dialectical stand-off of assertion and counter-assertion where neither side is listening to each other, no true engagement occurs and no understanding is possible.

    So that said, check out our guest post: “Critiquing the Case for Same-Sex Marriage“.

    Aside
    For all those who state that the passage of the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill will not have any impact on Christians like us consider section 56 of the Marriage Act 1955, then consider the statement we made at the outset of this post expressing our religious viewpoint in light of the Marriage Act being amended as proposed (and no, the proposed Bill does not propose amending this section):

    56 Offence to deny or impugn validity of lawful marriage

    (1) Every person commits an offence against this Act, and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $200, who—

    (a) alleges, expressly or by implication, that any persons lawfully married are not truly and sufficiently married;